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Abstract 
The thesis studies the political participation of Thai farmers and focuses on two main 
factors, namely the domestic and the external impacts, which inform the case studies of rice, 
sugarcane, and potato farmers groups. Overall, the research has established that farmers 
groups have felt the impacts of domestic factors far more strongly than external factors. 
Furthermore, through comparative studies in relation to the case studies of rice, sugarcane, and 
potato farmers groups in Thailand, differences emerged between these three Thai farmers 
groups, in terms of the degree to which domestic factors impacted on their political 
participation. 
The theories of Western interest groups are reviewed, in order to examine their 
applicability to explaining farmers groups formation in Thailand. The concepts of 'collective 
benefits' and 'selective incentives', which were used by Mancur Olson have been adopted as 
the main theoretical framework. With reference to this, the research has established that 
selective incentives have played a highly significant role in Thai farmers groups formation, 
and concludes that the problems of mobilisation, which relate to rice, sugarcane, and potato 
farmers groups, have been solved primarily through the provision of a range of selective 
incentives by the farmers groups themselves. 
In order to classify the differing levels of political participation of Thai farmers groups, 
the analytical framework provided by Grant Jordan, Darren Halpin, and William Maloney has 
been utilised. Accordingly, the rice and potato farmers groups are classified as 'potential 
pressure participants', whilst the sugarcane farmers group is classified as an 'interest group', 
which has enabled an examination of their political participation through the Western concept 
of the policy network/community framework. In order to make the Western policy 
network/community framework more applicable to the policy-making process in Thailand, the 
specific, dominant characteristics of the Thai political culture, namely the patronage system 
and the operation of both vote-buying and corruption are included in the analysis. This 
conceptual stretching does not significantly affect the original concept of the framework and 
the way in which it was intended to be applicable, because it already includes informal 
relationships such as those, which exist within the policy network/community framework. 
This understanding is an important aspect, which forms a part of the theoretical contribution to 
the discipline of international political economy and to the arena of Thai political studies. The 
policy network/community framework provides a new conceptual lens in the study of the 
political participation of Thai farmers groups. Accordingly, these arguments promote the 
opportunity to consider alternative frameworks in the analysis of the political participation of 
Thai farmers groups, and group participation across civil society more generally. 
The study of the political participation of Thai farmers has utilised empirical evidence, 
which illustrates the successes of farmers' interest groups in both Japan and the United 
Kingdom, in order to explain the relative successes and failures of Thai farmers. In contrast to 
the experiences of Western and notably Japanese farmers groups, in many respects Thai 
farmers are largely excluded from the policy-making process, with the only exception in 
Thailand being certain sugarcane farmers groups. The thesis concludes that the political 
participation of farmers groups in Thailand has generally been affected by domestic impacts 
rather than by external impacts, and that their influence in domestic policy-making has been, 
and is likely to remain for the foreseeable future at least, somewhat limited. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Background to the Study 
Thailand's economy is primarily agricultural, but despite this, the driving force 
behind its economic development has been through the transfer of resources from the 
agricultural sector to the industrial sector, in order to support the country's policy of 
industrialisation. The period between 1958 and 1973 was described as a 'golden age' of 
agriculture-driven growth. 1 However, Chatthip argues that this transfer of resources has been 
at the expense of rural farmers by the state. Moreover, he believes that the 'State and 
capitalism did not corne to develop the village, only to extract benefit from the villagers. ,2 
The state had come into existence, and had its centre outside the village. The 
important relationship then was between the village and the state, between the class of 
farmers and the class of government officials ... Under this direct relationship between 
the sakdina state and the village, the state claimed to protect the village from the attack 
by other states, to provide public services such as communications (digging canals), 
and to promote Buddhism. But in reality, the state exploited the village. The state was 
alienated from the village rather than being at one with the village.3 
A policy of intensive industrialisation, which was introduced in the late 1970s had 
produced a significant improvement in the Thai economy by the mid 1980s, and was seen as 
an 'economic miracle' in the period between 1986 and 1995.4 Between 1986 and 1990 the 
Thai economy emerged as the world's fastest growing economy.5 This impressive economic 
performance was illustrated through the high growth rates of 9.5 per cent of GDP in 1987, 
13.2 per cent of GDP in 1988 and 12 per cent of GDP in 1989.6 This high growth rate in the 
Thai economy was mostly achieved through the development of the industrial sector. 
I Ammar Siamwalla (1997b) 'The 'Thai Economy: Fifty Years of Expansion', in Thailand Development 
Research Institute [TDRI](ed) Thailand's Boom and Bust, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute 
[TDRI], p.14 
2 Chatthip Nartsupha (1999) The Thai Village Economy in the Past, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, translated by 
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker (originally published 1984), p.74 
3 Ibid., p.31 
4 Ammar Siamwalla (1997b), p.15 
5 WaIT, P.G. and Bhanuphong Nidhiprabha (1996) Thailand's Macroeconomic Miracle: Stable Adjustment and 
Sustained Growth, Kuala Lumpur: World Bank! Oxford University Press, p.2 
2 
Between 1981 and 2000, the industrial sector expanded significantly, and its contribution to 
GDP of 172.14 billion baht in 1981 had increased to 594 billion baht in 1990 and 1,637.63 
billion baht in 2000.7 Interestingly, the industrial sector has more than maintained its relative 
share of GDP, regardless of the contraction to the economy as a whole, in the wake of the 
Thai economic crisis of 1997. 
The impressive performance of the Thai industrial sector strengthened the relationship 
between government and business groups, whereas the relationship between government and 
the agricultural sector, and, correspondingly, the Thai farmers groups were weakened. This 
dislocation adversely affected the government's level of appreciation with regard to issues of 
agricultural development. Indeed, Dixon has argued that 'successive Thai governments have 
explicitly promoted industry while implicitly discouraging agriculture ... ,8 
During the period of Prime Minister Prem Tinasulanonda from March 1980-April 
19889, the government and businessmen established various patronage networks. These 
relationships developed in the 1980s because the government required policy-relevant 
information and resources supplied by businessmen, in order to develop its policy of 
industrialisation. This relationship continues to the present day; however it has evolved into a 
reciprocal relationship, which has strengthened the patronage system within Thai society. 
The channels of political access have been almost completely closed for Thai farmers groups. 
As a result, 'agriculture has been in serious trouble from the 1980s onwards. Various 
observations and pieces of data can be deployed as evidence; the increase in poverty and the 
massive out-migration from rural areas are two that come readily to mind.' 10 
6 Christensen, S.R., Ammar Siamwalla and Pakorn Vichyanond (1997) 'Institutional and Political Bases of 
Growth-Inducing Policies in Thailand', in Thailand Development Research Institute [TDRI] ( ed) Thailand's 
Boom and Bust, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute [TDRI], p.37 
7 Asian Development Bank (1999c) Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 1999 Volume 
XXX, Oxford University Press, p.333 
8 Dixon, C. (1999a) The Thai Economy: Uneven Development and Industrialisation, London: Routledge, p.140 
9 Thai Government Official Website, at www.thaigov.go.thlgeneral/prime/preprime_e.html Retrieved on 23 
October 2001 
10 Ammar Siamwalla (1996) 'Thai Agriculture: From Engine of Growth to Sunset Status', TDRI Quarterly 
Review, VoUI No.4, 4 December 1996, at www.info.tdri.or.thllibrary/quarterly/textld96_l.htm Retrieved on 12 
February 2001 
3 
However, the May Unrest of 1992 and the economic crisis of 1997 have brought 
about both economic and political change in Thailand. Shigetomi argues that the May Unrest 
of 1992 'was followed by the invigoration of a movement for democratization and reform in 
the Thai political system.' 11 Academics, businessmen, the urban middle class, and NOOs 
called for political reforms, in order to increase popular participation in the democratic 
process. In rural areas people became more aware of their rights. This was mainly the result 
of the failures of the policy of agricultural development, and of problems caused to farmers as 
a result of the government's dam building project. These problems, in addition to problems 
resulting from the economic crisis of 1997, were a catalyst for rural people becoming more 
assertive within the Thai political arena. Specifically, this occurred when rural farmers 
became aware that the government had agreed to accept the International Monetary Found 
(lMF) bailout programme of US$17.2 billion, soon after the baht was floated onto the world 
currency market in July 1997, and in addition, private debts were nationalised, in order to 
rescue the Thai financial sector. 
The governments' response to the crisis largely ignored the plight of rural farmers. 
The government was heavily criticised for only helping the rich, without regard to the poor, 
by academics, NOOs and locally based political activists in rural villages. During the crisis, 
Thai people considered this behaviour to be rath urn khonrouy tordtung khonchon, meaning 
that the government only helps the rich and disregards the poor. It was argued that if the 
government were able to borrow this amount of money in order to rescue the rich, why was 
the government not able to do the same for indebted farmers, or in any case to increase 
expenditure with regard to agricultural development. This sense of injustice helped to 
accelerate the development of the political movement in the rural areas. With reference to 
this, Pasuk and Baker argue that 'The crisis changed the context of rural politics in several 
ways. It demystified the supposed superiority of the urban economy, and emboldened groups 
which promote rural self-reliance and groups which demand greater government attention to 
agricultural development.' 12 
II Shigetomi, S. (2002) 'Thailand: A Crossing of Critical Parallel Relationships' in Shigetomi, S. (ed) The State 
and NGOs: Perspective From Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS], p.29 
4 
The increase in the potential political influence of the Thai farmers groups is not only 
related to domestic issues however, since Thai agricultural trade is heavily reliant on the 
world market. Therefore, the impact of the changing rules of international trade on the 
incomes of Thai farmers groups cannot be disregarded. With respect to international 
agricultural trade, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is the most significant institution. 
Thailand was expecting to benefit from agricultural trade liberalisation, particularly when 
Japan and Korea were forced to open their rice markets after the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round of the international trade negotiations of the GATT, in 1994. The Thai government 
has been over optimistic, with regard to the positive impact of agricultural trade liberalisation 
over the long term. The Thai government believed that it could balance the country's exports 
between industrial products and agricultural products. Furthermore, the government believed 
that as a consequence, it could bring about an improvement in the standard of living for 
farmers, and reduce the income gap between the rural and the urban areas. 13 Therefore, it is 
important to discuss the impacts of the WTO on Thai agricultural policy, in order to assess its 
effect on the political participation of Thai farmers groups. 
1.1 Contribution and Analytical Framework 
The nature of the structure of power in Thailand has been assumed to be the main 
cause for the political weakness of the rural population. The political implication of this 
situation is a weak relationship between government and Thai farmers groups. However, the 
research has been informed by case studies on rice, sugarcane and potato farmers groups, 
which indicate that the various farmers groups display different levels of political influence 
within the Thai political arena. Therefore, the overall objective of the study on the political 
participation of Thai farmers groups is to examine both the process of group formation and 
the political influence of these groups at the present time. With reference to this, the Western 
concept of interest groups will be employed, in order to help examine the process of group 
formation, and in addition, contributing factors to their sustainability. 
12 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (2000) Thailand's Crisis, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, p.233 
13 Saridet Marukatat and Somporn Thapanachai (1996) 'Farming Nations Bid For More Free Trade', Bangkok 
Post (Internet Edition), 10 December 1996, at 
www.bkkpost.samart.co.th/newslBparchiveIBP961210IBP96121 0/1 0 12_ busi09.html Retrieved on 14 June 2000 
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A further objective of the study will be to analyse the relationship between 
government and Thai farmers groups. In this respect, the inequalities of government action, 
with regard to development policies, will be taken into account. However, with regard to the 
process of group formation and farmers political actions, the study will not focus on how the 
government's development policies have affected Thai farmers. This is because the impact of 
development policies, for the most part affect economic, rather than political factors. So 
instead, the thesis will consider the relationship between government and interest groups, 
within the process of policy development. The role of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' within the 
network of the policy-making process will be illustrated, through the Western concept of 
policy network/community. 
'The basic question raised here is whether measures that are constructed for the use of 
one political setting, and that are based upon the experience of one society or culture, are 
necessarily meaningful or useful in another setting.' 14 There are problems, which occur when 
the Western concepts of interest group and policy network/community are applied to Thai 
case studies. This is a result of the differences between the Thai and Western societies, and 
can reduce the utility of the Western frameworks and make them less applicable in the Thai 
political context. Research in political science is by its very nature dynamic, and therefore the 
established framework, with regard to any particular aspect within the political arena, cannot 
necessarily perfectly explain another. Therefore, specific cultural factors will be considered, 
in order to accommodate explanations provided by the Western frameworks. This will 
enhance the utility of the Western frameworks, with regard to the study of the political 
participation of Thai farmers groups. 
The contributions made by the Western frameworks will help to provide more 
systematic explanations, with regard to the case studies on rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers 
groups in Thailand, and in addition will help facilitate an interesting comparative study 
between these three groups. This study will in tum be used to examine their potential future 
roles, in investigating whether the farmers groups can further develop their political influence 
within the Thai political arena. 
14 Peters, B.G. (1998) Comparative Politics: Theory and Method, London: Macmillan, p.87 
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The way in which the thesis contributes to the arena of international political 
economy is to link theoretical frameworks to case study examples, with new conceptual 
lenses providing a novel insight and perspective through the study of the political 
participation of Thai farmers, namely with the previously untried application of the interest 
group and the policy network/community frameworks in such a context. With reference to the 
concept of the interest group, Olson's arguments regarding collective and selective incentives 
provide a particularly useful analytical framework in relation to the study of Thai farmers 
groups formations. Accordingly, the research has concluded that it is selective incentives 
specifically, which have been of a significant benefit for Thai farmers groups in solving the 
problem of mobilisation. 
In examining the degree to which political influence affects rice, sugarcane and potato 
farmers groups, through the utilisation of the adapted policy network/community framework, 
the thesis has made significant contributions in furthering the understanding of how the 
notion of conceptual stretching can be applied in the arena of comparative politics. Through 
successfully integrating an analysis of the patronage system within the Thai political arena 
into the policy network/community framework, whilst implying the importance of the 
analysis at the micro level, the thesis both contributes to the original framework, and in 
addition, conceptualises a contemporary analytical framework applicable within the arena of 
Thai political studies. 
Whilst the original framework emphasises meso-level analysis, in order to maintain 
compatibility with the case studies of the rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers groups in 
Thailand, consideration of the micro-level is intended to contribute towards a broader, more 
comprehensive analysis. At the micro-level, particular consideration will be given to the 
interaction between the various actors within the network of the policy-making process. This 
consideration is particularly applicable to the Thai case, because the existence of the 
patronage system helps to explain why certain interest groups are excluded from the network 
of the policy-making process by the dominant actors within the network. Accordingly, a more 
comprehensive analysis will benefit the study of the network of the policy-making process 
and the political influence of the involved actors. 
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1.2 Hypothesis and Main Arguments 
In the wake of the need for political reforms in Thailand in the 1990s, the main focus 
reflected the increasing role of the Thai people and civil society. It is widely believed that if 
the Thai people and organisations within civil society have a greater say in the Thai political 
arena, this in tum will balance the political power of the government. This belief has led to 
changes in the structure of power in the rural areas, and in the political behaviour and 
expression of rural people. Thai farmers groups have become more aware of their own rights 
and are now more able to express their own demands. However, their political expression 
today is not as powerful as that of business groups. Almond, Powell, Str0m and Dalton argue 
that, 'To be effective, interest groups must be able to reach key policymakers through 
channels of political access. Groups may express the interests of their members and yet fail 
to have an impact on policymakers.' 15 Accordingly, whether channels of political access are 
available to Thai farmers groups requires investigation. In this regard, the thesis will look at 
how domestic economic and political factors have impacted on Thai farmers groups. Societal 
structure, political culture and education will also be taken into account, with regard to this 
discussion. 
The discussion will not only be limited to the domestic impact on the political 
participation of Thai farmers groups however, as in addition, the thesis will also examine the 
global impact in this regard. The impacts of the WTO will be taken into account. The WTO is 
recognised as a major organisation at the global level, intended to help to develop the free 
trade system internationally. The WTO rules are decided through the agreement of its 
members in the multilateral trade negotiations. These rules will affect member countries 
directly, once they are applied. This process will lead the discussions, with regard to the 
impact of the WTO on Thai agriculture, and specifically the political participation of Thai 
farmers groups. Therefore, it is important to establish with regard to the discussions in 
relation to the thesis, the global impact on Thai farmers groups, and as to whether they are 
being properly informed about both the existence and roles of the WTO. 
15 Almond, G.A., Powell, G.B., Stmm, K. and Dalton, RJ. (2000, Third Edition) Comparative Politics: A 
Theoretical Framework, New York: Longman, p.90 
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1.3 Research Techniques 
In obtaining accurate information about the formation of farmers groups and their 
political participation, face to face interviews are the most useful and practical 
methodological approach. However in addition, documentary data was widely consulted as a 
secondary source with which to complement the data from the interviews. All interviews with 
rice farmers, sugarcane farmers and potato farmers were conducted in Thailand during the 
periods of March and April 2000, and April and May 2001. Additional field research was 
conducted between March and April 2001, which involved collecting documentary data in 
Thailand, including interviews with academics and bureaucrats. The documentary research 
was successful at providing crucial evidence with respect to farmers and government, 
information unavailable in the United Kingdom. In addition, a whole variety of evidence was 
provided through periodicals, newspapers, and information available through the Internet. 
Difficulties experienced during the field research, mostly occurred during the second 
visit to Thailand, and involved interviews with farmers, academics, government officials, and 
NGOs. Most interviewees had inconvenient timetables and lived across widely spread regions 
of the country. In addition, varying local dialects also led to problems with respect to fully 
understanding interviews with farmers, particularly with regard to the northern and 
northeastern dialects. Helpfully, other members of the farmers groups spoke the central Thai 
dialect, which is the formal dialect of Thailand, in addition to the local dialect, which 
completely solved this problem. 
Because of both time constraints and the difficulty in travelling to reach the farmers in 
remote rural areas, the interviews were limited to 10 members of the rice farmers group, 10 
members of the sugarcane farmers group and representatives from the sugarcane mill, 8 
members of the potato farmers group, 4 academics, 5 politicians and bureaucrats, and 3 
representatives ofNGOs, totalling 40 in all. During the process of data analysis, and after the 
formal interviews had been completed, it was evident that some additional data would be 
required. In addition, there was a lack of consistency in relation to both terminology and 
statistical data, which was provided by a range of government agencies. Accordingly, 
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telephone interviews and electronic mails were used, in order to both update and corroborate 
the data. 
As a proportion of the total number of farmers in Thailand, the number of farmers in 
the study may seem to be low. However, as the farmers from the case studies are largely the 
active members within their groups, they are able to effectively represent the opinions of the 
wider groups. The data, which they provided during the interviews, was remarkably 
consistent, and this was important in establishing the reliability of the data. Significantly, 
through having similar experiences in relation to both their productivity and political 
participation, there was a high level of agreement between the farmers who were interviewed. 
Accordingly, in relation to the farmers, the data from the field research can be considered to 
be reliable. By way of contrast, the interviews with the academics produced a broader 
spectrum of opinion, which evidences their varying perspectives, and furthermore, highlights 
the areas in which academics are able to contribute, with regard to the political participation 
of Thai farmers. 
The interpretation of the data may, on occasion, require use of the Thai language, in 
order to avoid what would otherwise be lost in translation. Translation from the Thai, into 
English is not always reasonably possible, as the authentic subtlety of the meaning will be 
lost. Meaning may only have local relevance, whether written in Thai or English, with respect 
to the group or groups involved. English will be used whenever possible, however on 
occasion it may be more appropriate to retain the original Thai. The thesis will endeavour to 
provide the closest possible translations, and to maintain consistency with regard to the 
academic arena on Thai studies, and will, wherever possible, utilise the work of experts on 
Thai studies. The main texts utilised, with reference to both translations and Thai history, are 
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999) Thailand: Economy and Politics, Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, and Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan (1994) 
Corruption & Democracy in Thailand, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. 
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1.4 Research Method 
In this thesis, the 'comparative' method is to be utilised as the methodological tool of 
choice when testing the main hypothesis, in considering whether it is either domestic or 
global factors, which impact most greatly on the level of political participation of Thai 
farmers. The research has established that there are many factors, which affect the level of 
political participation of Thai farmers groups, and rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers groups 
in particular. Accordingly, 'a comparative research design can test hypotheses through 
isolating the effect of one variable on another.' 16 By comparing these three groups, it is 
intended that an understanding of the different levels of political participation of Thai farmers 
groups more generally can be revealed. Furthermore, in addition to domestic comparisons, 
the thesis will also consider international comparisons, by examining the level of political 
influence experienced by farmers groups in Western societies such as the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and in addition, in Japan. The achievements of farmers groups in Western 
societies and in Japan have resulted from a number of contributing factors, and therefore, 
international comparisons will assist in predictions relating to the future political participation 
of Thai farmers groups. 
However, the notion of comparative politics has been criticised by academics such as 
Sartori 17, specifically, with regard to the use of conceptual stretching, in order to solve the 
'travelling problem'. Sartori notes that conceptual stretching portrays a deliberate attempt to 
make conceptualisation value liberated and more applicable to the cases in comparison. 'It 
appears that we can cover more-in travelling terms-only by saying less, and by saying less 
in a far less precise manner.' 18 Sartori 19 has concluded that conceptual stretching provides 
extensional coverage of the explanation power, but the benefits from extensional coverage 
may result in losses in terms of the preciseness of the connotation. The result of this outcome 
can lead to major problems in relation to comparative methods, as this scenario tends towards 
16 Burnham, P., Gillard, K., Grant, W. and Layton-Henry, Z. (2004) Research Methods in Politics, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, p.69 
17 Sartori, G. (1970) 'Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics', The American Political Science Review, 
Vo1.64 No.4, December 1970, 1033-1053, p.l036 
18 Ibid., p.1035 
19 Sartori, G. (1970) 
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vague and undefined conceptualisations. Nevertheless, comparative methods help researchers 
to improve both the classification and the conceptualisation of political theories, because 'the 
research process is a dynamic between theoretical level (that is, the classification) and the 
empirical level (the measurement we use), the comparison will then feed back into the 
classification and it by refining it on the basis of additional information. ,20 Accordingly, 'it 
can also suggest how the hypothesis might be usefully refined or reformulated. ,21 
Sartori has introduced the term 'ladder of abstraction', in order to illustrate the 
problem of the requirement for analysis at a number of levels, which can result from the 
differences associated with the various elements in comparison. He classifies three main 
levels of abstraction: high, medium and low. 'High level categorizations obtain universal 
conceptualizations: whatever connotation is sacrificed to the requirement of global denotation 
- either in space, time, or even in both. Descending a step, medium level categorizations fall 
short of universality and thus can be said to obtain general classes: at this level not all 
differentiae are sacrificed to extensional requirements .... Finally, low level categorizations 
obtain specific, indeed configurative conceptualizations: here denotation is sacrificed to 
accuracy of connotation. ,22 Accordingly, when 'ladder climbing' becomes a requirement, 
researchers tend to diminish the properties or attributions of a concept, in order to make it 
both more abstract and more general. Moreover, comparative politics can to lead towards 
biased analysis, because individuals tend to make perceptions in congruence with their own 
perspectives. 'This problem of bias and competing values is particularly acute in comparative 
politics, where we are often seeking to understand governments and cultures with different 
values from our owns. ,23 
Indeed, 'if we do not stretch some then concepts may remain too parochial, and the 
possibility of any genuine comparison is reduced or even eliminated. ,24 However, this thesis 
will not argue that conceptual stretching can completely solve the travelling problem in 
20 Burnham, P., Gillard, K., Grant, W. and Layton-Henry, Z. (2004), p.68 
21Ibid., p.69 
22 Sartori, G. (1970), 1041 
23 Hague, R., Harrop, M. and Breslin, S. (1992, Third Edition) Comparative Government and Politics: An 
Introduction, London: Macmillan, pp.29-30 
24 Peters, B.G. (1998) Comparative Politics: Theory and Method, London: Macmillan, p.l05 
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comparative politics. Nevertheless, conceptual stretching can help to inform a more 
systematic analysis with reference to the study of the political participation of Thai farmers 
groups by using the Western analytical frameworks as a main research tool. The thesis will 
incorporate Sartori's solutions in relation to conceptual stretching, adapting the Western 
analytical frameworks, in order to make them more applicable to the Thai political studies. 
'(1) to develop the discipline along a medium level of abstraction with better intermediate 
categories, and (2) to manoeuvre, both upwards and downwards, along a ladder of abstraction 
in such a way as to bring together assimilation and differentiation, a relatively high 
explanatory power and a relatively precise descriptive content, macro-theory and empirical 
testing. ,25 With reference to this argument, the consideration of the patronage system when 
applying the policy network/community framework to the Thai case studies, does not distort 
the original concept of the policy network/community. This is because the manifestation of a 
patronage system implies informal relationships between actors, whereas the study of 
relationships between actors within the policy network/community already considers the 
notion of informal relationships and the role of dominant actors. 
1.5 Case Study Arguments 
Thailand's economy is primarily based on agriculture, and almost two-thirds of the 
country's population are farmers who live in rural areas.26 These rural farmers are very 
fragmented in terms of organisation, and as a result, well-organised farmers representative 
groups are rarely observed at the national level in Thailand. The study on the political 
participation of Thai farmers groups considers three of these groups, namely rice, sugarcane 
and potato farmers, because they represent a catholic range of farmers groups more generally. 
In terms of cultivable land, these three groups operate on very different scales of 
production. According to the report of the Office of Agricultural Economics, rice cultivation 
occupied 57.02 million rai (9.12 million hectares), while sugarcane cultivation occupied just 
25 Sartori, G. (1970), 1053 .. 
26 Rural Development and Natural Resource Sector Unit of the World Bank (2000) Beyond the Cnsls: A 
Strategy for Renewing Rural Development in Thailand, Bangkok: World Bank, p.xi 
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5.77 million rai (0.92 million hectares) in the year 2000.27 In another report of the Office of 
Agricultural Economics, potato cultivation occupied only 0.06 million rai (0.01 million 
hectares) for 2000/2001.28 Indeed, rice and sugarcane are leading agricultural products for 
Thailand, whereas potato cultivation is only locally important. Whilst these three sectors are 
not comparable economically, this is not the main concern of the thesis. This is because the 
study of the political participation of Thai farmers, by definition implies that political issues 
are more relevant. The three farmers groups have different characteristics, with regard to their 
political participation, and as a result they provide an interesting comparison. In addition they 
are rurally based groups, which have many shared elements, with respect to rural values and 
culture. 
Coincidentally, the local rice and potato farmers groups examined in the case studies 
have been developing over the same period of time, as they both formed in the mid-1990s. 
This shared element between these two groups, suggests that a comparative study can 
potentially bring about an interesting comparison in terms of their group formation and 
development. The case study of the sugarcane farmers group is of a distinct case, when 
compared to the case studies of the rice and potato farmers groups. This is because of its long 
period of development, which began with its formation in the mid 1960s. Whether this factor 
is one of the main factors with regard to the accumulation of political power of interest 
groups in general, is to be examined in the thesis. 
1.5.1 Rice Farmers 
In the world agricultural market, Thailand is best known as a major exporter of rice. 
Rice is cultivated in every region of the country, and therefore rice farmers are 
geographically dispersed. A distinctive and influential representative of rice farmers, like the 
Nokyo in Japan is not yet observed at the national level in Thailand. For this reason, the thesis 
27 Centre for Agricultural Statistic (2000) Warasan Payakorn Pholphalit kankaset (Agricultural Production 
Forecast Journal), Office of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, [in Thai] p.2 
and p.7 
28 Department of Agriculture (2001) Kanphalit Munfarang Lea Houphan Munfarang (The Prod~ction of Potato 
and Potato Seedlings), Department of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, paper for 
conference on The Production of Potato and Potato Seedlings [in Thai], p.4 
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has chosen a rice farmers group at the local level, namely the Krueakhai khon ploog khao lum 
maenam kong, or the 'Network of Rice Growers of the Mekong River' (NRGMR), in the 
district of Khemmarat, in the province of Ubon Ratchathani. This is in order to help to 
illustrate the level of political participation of Thai rice farmers groups. However, this is not 
to argue that this group can be fully representative of rice farmers at the national level, 
because there are significant variations in respect of culture, the level of development, 
societal structure and the level of political awareness across rice farmers groups in different 
regions of Thailand. 
Nevertheless, many of the problems confronting the NRGMR are typical of the 
problems, which confront rice farmers throughout Thailand. According to Ngampit's stud/9, 
most rice farmers live in poverty, and as Buddhist adherents, are unlikely to actively 
challenge figures of authority. The main problems for rice farmers are related to land 
ownership, which necessitates renting cultivable land, and to debt, which exacerbates any 
other problems. Similarly, Sanan highlights that 'a significant number of Thai rice farmers do 
not have enough rice to eat. .. many families are burdened by massive debts .... Unpredictable 
weather, droughts and floods, epidemics and pest infestations are all risks farmers must 
face .... Each year, the government spends millions of baht to shore up rice prices, but it is the 
rice millers receiving low-interest government loans who benefit from these price supports ... . 
Rallies and marches by farmers demanding higher rice prices have had only limited effect ... . 
Some farmers have come to conclusion that their efforts to obtain some influence over rice 
price policies are virtually useless. Some farmers in the Northeast, therefore, have begun to 
seek an alternative which will give them greater security and allow them to continue 
farming. ,30 
Accordingly, the NRGMR has been chosen as a case study, because of its good 
reputation within the Thai political arena. It is an example of a group that emerged, in order 
29 Ngampit Satsaguan (1998) 'Watthanatham khao nai sangkom Thai: Sugsakoranee Banna chungwat Pranakorn 
Sri Ayutthaya (The Rice Culture in Thai Society: The Case Study of Banna, the Province of Ayutthaya', in 
Ngampit Satsaguan (ed) Watthanatham khao nai sangkom Thai lae nana chat (The Rice Culture in Thai Society 
and Other Countries), Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 6-39 [in Thai] 
30 Sanan Chusakul (1996) 'Rice Trading: New Alternatives for Farmers', Thai Development Newsletter, No.30, 
1996,37-39, p.37 
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to promote its self-reliant status in the wake of the country's economic crisis of 1997. The 
NRGMR intended to isolate itself from the market system, because they perceived that the 
capitalist economy was a threat to their way of life. Under the advice from local activists, 
consisting of local schoolteachers in the district of Khemmarat, the NRGMR was formed in 
1997, and is one of the most accepted of farmers groups among Thai academics. The rice 
farmers group was invited to appear on the Laan Baan Laan Maung Programme in 2001, one 
of the most highly regarded programmes of political criticism television in Thailand.3! 
1.5.2 Sugarcane Farmers 
The production of sugarcane originated in the western region of Thailand before 
expanding into the Isan region of Thailand. There are two main organisations that represent 
the interests of sugarcane farmers groups at the level of government, namely the Thailand 
Sugarcane Planters Federation and the United Association of Thai Sugarcane Planters. The 
thesis has chosen to study the Sugar Cane Planters Association of Zone 7 (SCP A), which is a 
member of the Thailand Sugarcane Planters Federation, in order to represent sugarcane 
farmers groups. This is because this group was the first sugarcane farmers group, established 
in 1964, and has subsequently been the most politically active of the sugarcane farmers 
groups. The SCP A represents sugarcane farmers in 4 provinces, namely, Kanchanaburi, 
Ratchaburi, Suphan Buri, and Nakhon Pathom, the country's largest area of sugarcane 
cultivation. In the crop year of 1994/1995, the provinces of Kanchanaburi, Suphanburi and 
Ratchaburi were ranked 1, 2 and 8 respectively in terms of the production of sugarcane, 
which were specifically 6,682,538 tonnes, 5,383,354 tons and 2,428,068 tonnes. From its 
inception, the SCP A successfully negotiated with sugarcane mills over the price of sugarcane. 
This allowed the SCP A to gain a core status within the Thailand Sugarcane Planters 
Federation.32 
31 The Laan Eaan Laan Maung Program (2001), VDO provided by the Krueakhai khon pfoog khao fum maenam 
khong (the Network of Rice Growers of the Mekong River). The programme is presented by Dr Chirmsak 
Pinthong, a reputable economist from Thammasat University who is now a senator. 
32 Office of Cane and Sugar Board (1999b), Cane and Sugar Directory 1998-99, Bangkok: Office of Cane and 
Sugar Board, Ministry oflndustry, pp.38-39 
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Previously, the bargaining power of sugarcane farmers had been most important in 
relation to negotiations with the sugarcane mills. However, after the introduction of the 70:30 
revenue-sharing system in 1982, and of the Sugarcane and Sugar Act B.E. 2527 (1987), 
bargaining power became more important in relation to negotiations with the government. 
This is because the level of government intervention significantly increased, in accordance 
with these changes to the law. Each of the processes involved in the production of sugarcane 
and sugarcane products are strictly controlled by the government, in order to protect against 
the problems of excess supply of sugarcane and excess demand for sugar in Thailand. 
Whether the control of the production of the sugarcane and sugar affects the political 
participation of sugarcane farmers is to be examined. 
1.5.3 Potato Farmers 
The production of potatoes has been concentrated within the northern regIOn of 
Thailand, particularly in the province of Chiang Mai. From the 1960s to the mid-1980s the 
potato had been a minor cash crop in Thailand, and since the late 1970s, the production of 
potatoes was intended to substitute for hill tribe opium poppy crops.33 In 1978, Thailand 
produced only 6,000 tonnes of potato for domestic consumption. During the 1970s, potato 
chips and in addition, U.S. fast food franchises such as McDonalds and KFC were not very 
popular in Thailand, and therefore most potatoes were produced, in order to supply hotels and 
restaurants, as a result of the expansion of tourism. In the late 1980s, the significant growth to 
the potato chip industry in Thailand emerged as a main contributing factor, in relation to the 
expansion of potato production in Thailand.34 
In 1980, due to the excess supply of potatoes, the government applied the policy of 
import restrictions on potato seedlings in April 1980. Thereafter, the import of potato 
seedlings was strictly controlled by the Public Warehouse Organisation.35 This led to the 
33 www.cipotato.orgidataipotato_atlas/asiaithailand.htm#Contributors Retrieved on 6 April 1999 
34 Thongchai Thonguthai (1997) Prawati Munfarang Pun Spunta (History of Spunta Potato), Chiang Mai: 
Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd [Unpublished document in Thai], pA 
35 Thongchai Thonguthaisri (1993) Sahakorn phuplug munfarang Chiang Mai jumkad (Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd), paper presented at the 12th National Vegetable Conference, 31 March - 3 April 
1993, Prince of Songkhla University, the province of Songkhla [in Thctt], p.3 
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problem of excess demand for potato seedlings amongst potato farmers. In 1981, as a direct 
consequence, potato farmers in the district of Sansai, in the province of Chiang Mai, formed 
together as a group, which was legally registered as a co-operative in 1987. This action was 
taken, in order to improve their negotiating power in relation to the government, with 
reference to the problem of the inadequate supply of potato seedlings. In April 1997, this co-
operative was divided into two co-operatives, namely the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-
operative Ltd in the district of Sansai and the Chaiprakarn-Fang Co-operative in the district of 
Fang. With reference to this, the thesis has chosen to focus the study of political participation 
of potato farmers groups on the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, because of 
their inception, experience and expertise in the production of potatoes. 
In the 1990s, multinational corporations (MNCs), namely the Frito-Lay Thailand Co., 
a snack-food division of Pepsi-Cola (Thailand) Trading Co., became more involved and 
influential within the local economy of potato production. This resulted in a farming contract 
system between potato farmers in the district of Sansai and the Frito-Lay Thailand Co. 
Accordingly, the way in which the farming contract has affected the political participation of 
potato farmers groups in the district of Sansai will be investigated and examined. 
1.6 Plan of the Thesis 
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction and 
background, with regard to the overall study. This begins with the discussion of the 
theoretical framework, and the contribution this thesis makes within the arena of political 
studies. An outline of the main arguments is provided in this chapter, and in addition, a brief 
consideration of research techniques is useful, in order to help to illustrate how the research 
was carried out. Furthermore, the case study argument, with reference to the rice, sugarcane 
and potato farmers groups, provides a background, with regard to the subsequent discussions 
in the thesis. 
Chapter 2 provides the main theoretical review of the relevant theoretical approaches, 
with regard to the study of the political participation of Thai farmers. The chapter begins with 
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a discussion in respect of the terminological difficulties in defining the term 'interest group', 
which is used as a main framework in the study. The focus then moves onto a discussion of 
the different literature, with regard to group formation and popular participation, specifically 
pressure groups, social movements, NGOs and civil society. This will lead onto a discussion, 
with regard to the various actors involved in the policymaking process. A review and 
examination, with reference to the literature on the concept of policy network/community, 
will contribute to this argument. The theoretical discussion of this chapter will move onto the 
debate over the Olsonian model, a model that has undermined the traditional pluralist 
accounts. The following section is a critical review of corporatism, which emerged as a 
variant of pluralism. Finally, this chapter will analyse the applicability of the suggested 
western frameworks. A useful reference point to be considered, is that of the Japanese case, 
since there are both similarities and differences with respect to the Western case. With regard 
to this matter, an analysis of state intervention is included, because it is one major area of 
distinction between the Thai and western theories, regarding pressure groups. 
The Thai political culture is the main focus in Chapter 3, because this is a key element 
in understanding the effects of policy in terms of economic and social development, with 
reference to Thai farmers by the state. This has had a direct effect in respect of their attitude 
and enthusiasm with regard to politics, and would help to explain the impact on farmers' 
political participation. The chapter begins with a debate on the concentration of power, and 
then moves into a debate regarding the contemporary political issue of 'money politics', 
which can help to explain the phenomenon of both vote-buying and corruption. The next 
section discusses the concepts of social hierarchy and the patronage system, which will help 
to further develop an understanding of the Thai political culture. These are the domestic 
factors, which have a profound impact on the development of farmers' political participation. 
The chapter also establishes who the important political actors are within the Thai political 
arena. 
Chapter 4 considers which are the relevant factors, with respect to the group 
formation of Thai farmers and their sustainability, and this consideration will include a 
comparative analysis of interest groups, with reference to Thailand and Japan. The societal 
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structures of both countries will be examined, and this will help to explain how the existence 
of hierarchical structure can affect the nature of farmer's group formation in different 
societies. In addition, this will help to explain the response of Thai farmers groups, with 
respect to the domestic impacts considered in Chapter 5, and the global impacts of the 
involvement of the WTO, which are considered in Chapter 6. In addition, Chapter 4 will 
enquire into the political status of rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers groups. 
Chapters 5 and 6 analyse the case studies of the three farmers groups, and this is 
accompanied by the adopted theoretical approaches. The analysis in Chapter 5 assesses 
domestic impacts on the political participation of Thai farmers. Chapter 6 considers the 
global impact on the political participation of Thai farmers. As indicated earlier, global 
institutions have less direct impact on the political participation of Thai farmers than 
domestic considerations. 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion to this thesis, and the successes and failures of rice, 
sugarcane and potato farmers groups will be analysed in accordance with the evidence 
provided from the research. This analysis will predict a trend, with regard to the political 
participation of Thai farmers groups. 
Chapter 2 Theoretical Review 
Introduction 
The main focus of the study on the political participation of Thai farmers in this 
thesis is to analyse the internal dynamics of the various farmers groups, and the external 
dynamics between these very same farmers groups and government, civil society, and 
international institutions. In order to portray a clear picture of Thai farmers and their 
political identity, this chapter will provide the theoretical framework for the thesis. 
Because of the differences among the three groups of farmers in this thesis: rice farmers, 
sugarcane farmers, and potato farmers, the research is informed by a number of relevant 
theoretical frameworks. The comparative study is between farmers groups, and not 
between individual farmers from the three products under study. Therefore, the thesis 
will consult the group theories as the main theoretical framework in order to explain their 
political and non-political functions. 
However, library research suggests that there are not many studies of interest 
groups, either in Thai politics specifically or in Asian politics generally. The lack of 
literature on interest groups could be a result of their weak position within the political 
system, where democratisation has always been disrupted by the military. Accordingly, 
interest groups have not been able to advance their political development in this region of 
the world, to the extent more commonly found in the West. Wilson l argues that the 
Western model of democracy has offered more political space for interest groups to play 
their part in the formation of government policy. Indeed, there is a rich Western literature 
on interest groups, and in fact particularly on farmers groups. 
Studies on interest groups in the West have shown some theoretical relevance to 
the study of Thai farmers groups. However, the research has found that the Western 
concept of interest groups cannot provide a comprehensive explanation in relation to the 
Thai case, which is due to Thailand having such a different political culture, in addition to 
very different social and economic conditions. According to Prudhisan2, personalities, 
1 Wilson, G. K. (1981) Interest Groups in the United States, New York: Oxford University Press, p. viii . 
2 Prudhisan Jumbala (1974) 'Towards a Theory Of Group Formation in Thai Society and Pressure Groups In 
Thailand After the October 1973 Uprising', Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, June 1974, p.540 
friendship networks, and a dependence upon personal contacts between active members 
within interest groups and bureaucrats, are still crucial elements for interest groups as a 
result of the embedded patronage system in Thai society. These elements negatively 
impact on the ability of interest groups to become involved in a democratic process by 
definition which is already at variance with the Western democratic model. He argues that 
the patronage system in Thai society is a kind of anti-hypothesis to the concept of 
Western interest groups in which personal contacts and any other forms of patronage are 
not commonly found. 
Notwithstanding these differences, the Western concept of interest groups can be 
adopted to test the argument on the formation of Thai farmers groups and their 
involvement in the Thai political arena. Olson's theories of 'collective benefit', 'selective 
incentive', 'by-product' and 'intermediate group' provide extra theoretical relevance, and 
will be examined in this chapter. The discussion regarding the study of interest groups in 
the Western literature begins with a terminological debate, since there is still some 
ambiguity in the labelling of groups trying to influence government policy. This 
ambiguity applies in the Thai case also and requires discussion. That the Thai case still 
requires some discussion, helps to explain why there is still a lack of literature on farmers 
groups study in Thai political studies. 
Another hypothesis in this thesis will be to investigate whether domestic and 
global factors have any impact on Thai farmers' political participation. Kamtorn's study 
on Thai agricultural policy claims that, 'in Thailand, a cabinet government under a 
parliamentary system, is responsible for deciding agricultural policies of the country. 
Several integrative systems offer the means for transition to more autonomous decision 
making. One of these is neocorporatism, in which the government might designate a 
national farm organization to represent agriculture ... ,3 Indeed the research has found a 
form of policy community, which is active within the relationships between government 
and sugarcane farmers groups. Following Smith's study in relation to the agricultural 
policy community in Britain4, the Western concept of 'policy community' helps to 
explain the Thai sugarcane farmer case. Thus, this chapter will provide a discussion on 
3 Kamtom Sheepchaiisara (2002) 'Thailand Agricultural Policy: Where can we go from now?', at 
www.thinkcentreasia.orglkamtorniThailand%20Agricultural%20Policy.doc Retrieved on 5 July 2002, p.15 
the policy network/community framework in order to analyse its application to the case 
studies in the thesis. 
Thai farmer groups have so far been unable to affect government policy-making. 
Government intervention in the Thai agricultural sector is not as intense as in the Western 
society. A relationship pattern between government and farmers groups, like the British 
government and the National Farmers' Union (NFU) is not a common concept in the Thai 
agricultural arena. This chapter will study the progress of the political participation of the 
NFU in order to use it as a model to help to explain the case in the Thai political arena. 
However, it is argued that Western models of group participation cannot provide a 
comprehensive framework for understanding Thai farmers groups formation and their 
political activities. One way of resolving this problem is to look to the Japanese model. 
Nokyo is the largest farmers group in Japan, and represents rice farmers, with a similar 
level of influence as the NFU in the United Kingdom. The study of the similarities and 
differences between the NFU and Nokyo, which represent a long history of strong farmer 
representation, can offer a more applicable, if not perfect model, in order to explain the 
case of Thai farmers in the thesis. 
2.1 Pressure Group 
The study in relation to both 'pressure groups' and 'interest groups' is one of the 
more prominent areas for political study. This area of study helps to illustrate the 
imbalance of the distribution of political resources for different members across society. 
This can be the case in either a country with a democratic system, or a non-democratic 
country. According to the 'Pluralist' school of thought, Schwarzmantel argues that 'there 
is no concentration of power either at the level of the state or at the societal level. There 
are a number of centres of power ... ,5 This polyarchy of power offers a political 
opportunity for all members of society to secure and then to advance their interests. 
'Representative democracy is achieved through the network of political parties 
and interest groups which are seen as legitimate contenders for political power (parties), 
4 Smith, M.J. (1992) 'The Agricultural Policy Community: Maintaining a Closed Relations?ip',. in Marsh, 
D. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (eds) Policy Networks in British Government, New York: Oxford UmversIty Press 
or for influence (pressure groupS).,6 However, it has been observed that a country with 
representative democracy can not always distribute political resources effectively. This 
implies a failure of the legitimate contenders for political power (parties, politicians and 
other political actors), which generates a will amongst the popUlation and results in the 
formation of pressure groups. Harrison asserts that the interest groups are "specialised 
consensual mechanisms' shifting some of the burden of consensus formation from elected 
legislative assemblies.' 7 The establishment of interest groups is more common in Western 
society than in Thailand due to the more democratic political environment. 
2.1.1 Study of Pressure Groups in the Western Political Context 
For decades, political scientists have been studying the phenomenon of 'pressure 
groups' or 'interest groups'. However, clearly defining these terms still remains a 
fundamental problem for political scientists conducting research in this field of study. 
Numerous writers in this area have suggested a variety of definitions. Baggott8 
summarises the terminological preferences of many writers in the study of this area. For 
instance, in "Government and Pressure Groups in Britain", by Jordan and Richardson, the 
term 'group' is used instead of the term 'pressure group', which is suggested by the title. 
Marsh, the author of "Pressure Politics: Interest Groups in Britain", Norton, the author of 
"The British Polity", and Wilson, the author of "Interest Group", all use the term 'Interest 
Group'. 
For Greenwald9, the term 'interest group' denotes a combination of individuals 
who seek to pursue shared interests through a framework of agreed actions. Pross 10, 
defines pressure groups as organisations whose members act together to influence public 
policy in order to promote their common interest. The chief function of the pressure group 
5 Schwarzmantel, J. (1994) The State in Contemporary Society: An Introduction, London: Prentice 
HalllHarvester Wheatsheaf, p.54 
6 Ibid., pp.54-55 
7 Harrison, R.J. (1980) Pluralism and Corporatism: The Political Evolution of Modern Democracies, 
London: George Allen & Unwin, p.68 
8 Baggott, R. (1995) Pressure Groups Today, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p.9 . 
9 Greenwald, C. S. (1977) Group Power: Lobbying & Public Policy, New York: Praeger Pubhshers, pp.14-
15 
10 Pross, A. P. (1992, Second Edition) Group Politics and Public Policy, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
p.3 
is to persuade governments to pursue the policies it advocates. Ball and Millard 11 also 
give a similar definition to the term pressure group. In general terms, pressure groups are 
collective social groups, whose members share aims in an attempt to influence policy-
makers and the policy-making process. Grant suggests that, 'The term 'pressure' group 
has always implied the use of some kind of improper sanctioning power, while the term 
'interest' group carries the implication of a narrow sectional group seeking to defend its 
own particular position.' 12 
Whilst endeavouring to obtain a clear distinction between 'interest group' and 
'pressure group', in this area of study, a true and concise definition is not easily found. 
Jordan, Halpin and Maloney argue 'that the real confusion is not caused by assuming that 
almost any kind of organisation will attempt to exert influence, but in labelling every 
organisation engaging in pressure politics as a pressure group.' 13 Indeed, there are a 
number of other definitions, which have been introduced into the study of groups, for 
instance, 'organised interests', 'the lobby', 'public interest groups', and 'vested 
interests'. 14 Jordan, Halpin and Maloney15, have suggested the terms 'pressure participant' 
and 'policy participant', in order to remedy this labelling confusion. The term 'pressure 
participant' is offered as a generic term, intended to describe any organisation, which 
attempts to influence outcomes within the 'pressure system'. They believe that not every 
group can be identified as an interest group, since the difference between 'pressure 
participant', 'policy participant' and 'interest group' phenomena 'are too great to sensibly 
combine. The costs of failing to make distinctions are too great to ignore.' 16 Preferably, 
they reserve the term 'interest group' in relation to those groups and organisations with 
members or supporters, which are both politically relevant and dedicated, with regard to 
their key objectives. The term 'policy participant' is used in relation to those groups and 
11 Ball, A. and Millard, F. A. (1986) Pressure Politics in Industrial Societies: A Comparative Introduction, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp.33-34 
12 Grant, W. (2002) 'Civil Society and the Internal Democracy of Interest Groups', paper prepared for the 
Annual Conference of the Political Science Association of the UK at the University of Aberdeen, April 
2002, p.1 
13 Jordan, G., Halpin, D., and Maloney, W.A. (2004) 'Defining Interests: Disambiguation and the Need for 
New Distinctions?', The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Volume 6 Number 2, May 
2004, 195-212,p.205 .. , . . . 
14 Petracca, M.P. (1992) 'The Rediscovery of Interest Group PolItics, In Petracca, M.P. (ed) The PoiztlCS of 
Interests: Interest Groups Transformed, Boulder: Westview Press, p.5 
15 Jordan, G., Halpin, D., and Maloney, W.A. (2004),p.205 
16 Ibid., p.209 
organisations, which are not dedicated towards political activity.17 In precise tenns, the 
policy participants 'are not interest groups, but adopting a role acting as if they are ... 
Such interventions can be politically significant, but not interest group phenomena.' 18 
With reference to this discussion, the concept of policy participant implies a direct 
tenninological relevance, both in tenns of political opportunity and in political access. 
Grant argues that 'pressure groups offer what may be seen as one of the more accessible 
means of influencing decision-makers .... Pressure groups exert influence on the policy 
process in Britain and at the ED level in a wide variety of ways from direct action protests 
to discussions with ministers. ' 19 Whilst in the United States, interest groups utilise a broad 
spectrum of approaches, both in their lobbying strategies and in the undertaking of their 
research, in order to affect policy outcomes.20 Baumgartner and Leech assert that 
'lobbyists are active in an extremely broad range of circumstances. ,21 
In relation to the United States, the consideration of the lobbying system within 
the study of interest groups could perhaps imply a milder and less direct, yet euphemistic 
variant of the form of patronage existing in Thailand, which is less sophisticated, less 
fonnalised, and cruder in its manifestation. Indeed: 'The 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act 
significantly expanded the reporting requirements for organisations active in Washington 
D.C. For the first time, it required semi-annual reports from each finn or organizations 
active in Washington lobbying activities. ,22 However, the lobbying system in the United 
States does not demand a high level of commitment between lobbyist and client as 
suggested in the relationship, which tends to manifest between patron and client in the 
patronage system in Thailand. In addition, as Hansen argues: 'Close consultation with 
interest groups-granting access-is a congressional strategy for dealing with 
uncertainty. It is a policy of reliance on interest groups for advice and assistance. ,23 
Indeed, this aspect in relation to the study of interest groups in the United States is similar 
17 Ibid., p.205 
18 Ibid., p.208 
19 Grant, W. (2000) Pressure Groups and British Politics, London: Macmillan Press, p.5 
20 Baumgartner, F. R. and Leech, B.L. (1998) Basic Interest: The Importance a/Groups in Politics and in 
Political Science, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 
21 Baumgartner, F. R. and Leech, B.L. (2000) 'Lob~ying Alone or in the ~rowd: The ?istributi~n. of 
Lobbying in a Sample of Issues, paper prepared for dehvery at the Annual Meetmg of the MIdwest PolItIcal 
Science Association, Chicago, April 27-29, 2000, p.4 
22 Ibid., p.5 
to the British case. According to Smith, 'through agenda control not all interests have 
access to the state and certain issues are excluded so that decision-making is biased in 
favour of certain interests. ,24 Accordingly, with regard to the consideration of privileged 
access to policy-makers within the context of Western interest groups, both the United 
States and the United Kingdom cases can inform the conceptualisation of the interest 
group framework in terms of the study of rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers groups in 
Thailand. This nexus can provide a solution to the travelling problem that has resulted 
from the application of the framework, which was developed in the Western context. 
2.1.2 Study of Interest Groups in the Thai Political Context 
The translation of the term 'interest group' in Thai is klum pholprayoch, whilst 
'pressure group' in Thai is klum plugdun or klum itthiphon. In general these terms convey 
a similar meaning regarding interest group studies in the West. The connotations of klum 
plugdun and klum itthiphon also represent a more assertive use of the noun than klum 
pholprayoch, which makes the term more applicable to define the politically active 
groups. The word klum means group and the word itthiphon means influence. Therefore, 
the term klum itthiphon translates closest as 'group influence'. Pasuk25 summarises 
Nidhi's definition of itthiphon as 'the locally-based extra-legal power of village bosses, 
gangsters, godfathers and businessmen, and their modem incarnations as local councillors 
and MPs. ,26 This is because it is used in Thai society and by Thai academics in a negative 
context. To clarify the negative implication of the word itthiphon, the work of Pasuk and 
Sungsidh27 in "Corruption and Democracy in Thailand", states that phu mi itthiphon (men 
of influence) is a formal description for the term jao pho (godfather). They argue that 
. itthiphon may allow jao pho to flaunt the law or protect others from it. A ware of this 
terminological implication, the term klum itthiphon conveys the idea of an influential 
group with both legal and illegal power. Another important fact is that klum itthiphon has 
23 Hansen, lM. (1991) Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919 - 1981, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, p.12 
24 Smith, M.J. (1990) The Politics of Agricultural Support in Britain: The Development of Agricultural 
Policy Community, Aldershot: Dartmouth, pAO 
25 Pasuk Phongpaichit (1999) Civilising the State: State, Civil Society, and Politics in Thailand, Amsterdam: 
Centre for Asian Studies Amsterdam, p.6 
26 Ibid. . 
27 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan (1994) Corruption & Democracy in Thailand, Chiang 
Mai: Silkworm Books, pp.59-61 
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been widely used by Thai journalists describing influential groups under jao pho 
patronage. 
By contrast, the tenn klum pholprayoch has more positive connotations than the 
tenn klum itthiphon. Both of them represent groups that attempt to secure their interests, 
but klum pholprayoch are unlikely to employ either illegal action or illegal power. 
Nonnally, the tenn klum pholprayoch is reserved for the study of Thai business groups, 
for instance in Anek's work.28 The implications of these two tenns in the Thai language 
does not hannonise with the nature of Thai fanners in general due to their political 
weakness, having little influence on government policy-making and the lack of influential 
patrons. Thai people do not describe fanner groups as klum itthiphon, or klum 
pholprayoch. This argument is supported by the absence of evidence from Thai academics 
in conceptualising interest group frameworks to study Thai fanner groups as interest 
groups in the Western context. 
This may lead to the question about how appropriate the interest group framework 
is in conducting a research on Thai fanners' political participation. Clearly, it would be a 
misleading study if the research relied only on a particular framework, while the nature of 
groups is dynamic. Moreover, there are still some strong fanners groups existing in the 
Thai political arena, even though the majority of them are politically weak. The research 
has found that sugarcane fanners groups are politically strong. Ramsai9, affirms that 
Thai sugarcane fanners are the exceptional case in the established pattern of rural political 
weakness. 
However sugarcane fanners are not able to be politically assertive all of the time, 
although it has been found that they are an active group in the Thai political arena. They 
have learnt to adopt some diplomatic approaches to their political participation. More 
non-diplomatic approaches become their option when they find that their diplomatic 
approaches fail to achieve their objectives. Therefore, the term 'pressure group', which 
illustrates a kind of group with proactive and affirmative assertive strategies being more 
28 Anek Laothamatas (1992) Business Associations and the New Political Economy of Thailand From 
Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism, Boulder: Westview Press, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
[ISEAS] 
29 Ramsay, A. (1987) 'The Political Economy of Sugar in Thailand', Pacific Affairs, Vo1.60, No.2, 1987, 
p.248 
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radical and striking, may not be the best description for the sugarcane farmers groups. 
Thus the thesis will study sugarcane farmers groups as an 'interest group'. 
Rice and potato farmers on the other hand, represent the majority of Thai rural 
farmers, whose political influence is rarely evident. Even though rice farmers make up the 
majority of the population of Thailand, they have not been a dominant group in the Thai 
political arena. They have been prevented from converting their numbers into effective 
political influence. The research has found that these two groups are only partly as 
politically active and effective as sugarcane farmers. They are not 'multi-member, 
politically oriented bodies of individuals. ,30 Political assertiveness is rarely seen in their 
strategies. The main aim of their group formations is to take care of their interests and 
improve their self-reliant status. There are few tendencies for these two groups to adopt 
proactive and affirmative assertive strategies to influence policy or pursue government 
assistance, in order to achieve their goal. Accordingly, rice farmers and potato farmers are 
to be studied as 'potential pressure participants'. 
2.1.3 Politics of Insider and Outsider Groups 
The classification of groups into 'insiders' and 'outsiders' is 'to differentiate 
interest group strategies and status in policy development.,31 This distinguishes the level 
of accessibility, which the involved actors have achieved to the necessary information 
within the policy network. The maximising of knowledge regarding the nature of the 
network and other actors within, would allow the actors to function effectively. However, 
access to political power and information 'is one of the advantages unequally 
distributed. .. some groups have better and more varied opportunities to influence key 
points of decision than do others. ,32 
Grane3, classifies groups with privileged access to information as a result of their 
consultative role to government on a regular basis, as insider groups. Thus, they are 
unlikely to adopt assertive political actions against government such as campaigning 
30 Jordan, G. and Halpin, D. (2002), p.21 . . 
31 Maloney, W.A., Jordan, G. and McLaughlin, A.M. (1994) 'Interest Groups and PublIc PolIcy: The 
Insider/Outsider Model Revisited', Journal of Public Policy, 14, 1994: 17-38, p.17 
32 Truman, D.B. (1960) The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, p.322 
protests, since they can already negotiate influentially with government officials. The 
existence of insider groups within government is acknowledged as legitimate. In contrast, 
outsider groups are not able to gain any access to information within the policy-making 
process network at any level. Therefore, their main political strategy has tended to evolve 
towards adopting increased forcefulness, as evidenced by strategies, which involve 
campaigning protests or partisan activities. Accordingly, outsider groups are 'protest 
groups which have objectives that are outside the mainstream of political opinion. They 
then have to adopt campaigning methods designed to demonstrate that they have a solid 
basis of popular support ... ,34 
The notion of insider groups and outsider groups is adopted in this thesis, in order 
to investigate the degree of access to power of Thai farmers. This further explanation will 
help to enhance the classification of the various farmers groups into 'interest group' and 
'potential pressure participants'. Moreover the insider-outsider typology is employed, in 
order to enhance the assessment of the successes and failures of rice, sugarcane and potato 
farmers groups. 
In the classification of group strategies, Grant does not only divide interest groups 
into insider groups and outsider groups. In addition, he classifies subdivisions within 
insider groups and outsider groups into three categories. This begins with subdivision 
within insider groups: 
First there is a category of 'prisoner groups' who find it difficult to break away 
from an insider relationship with government, either because they are dependent on 
government for assistance of various kinds ... , or because they represent parts of the 
public sector ... The other two sub-types of insider group, 'low profile' and 'high 
profile' ... 'low profile' strategy would involve concentrating entirely on behind-the-
scenes contacts with government and not making even routine statements to the mass 
media ... A 'high profile' strategy involves a considerable emphasis on cultivating public 
opinion to reinforce contacts with government.35 
Similarly, Grant classifies subdivisions within outsider groups into three 
categories: potential insider groups, outsider groups by necessity and ideological outsider 
groups. 
33 Grant, W. (2000), p.19 
34 Ibid., p.19 .. 
35 Grant, W. (1989) Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, London: PhIllp Allan, p. 16 
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Potential insider groups are those outsider groups which would like to become 
insider groups but have yet to win government acceptance ... Outsider groups by necessity 
may also wish to become insider groups, but they are less politically sophisticated than 
potential insider groups in term of knowledge of how the political system works ... 36 
Ideological outsider groups do not accept the possibility of achieving change through the 
existing political system. They adopt tactics which place them outside what is regarded as 
the normal spectrum of political activity.37 
Grant38 argues that there are tendencies for groups to advance their status as their 
political skills improve, from potential outsider groups into becoming insider groups, and 
from outsider groups by necessity to be potential insider groups. However, groups are not 
always able to advance favourable access to policy-makers by themselves, since the 'state 
sets the rules of the game for pressure group activity. ,39 In many cases, 'access is created 
by the legislator-politician's need of information and the ability of a group to supply it. ,40 
This is infrequently the case in Thailand, since the relationships between government and 
interest groups are established on the basis of a patronage system. That politicians rely on 
information from groups implies the form of a reciprocal relationship, and is one 
characteristic of the patronage system. The patronage system itself is not a main factor in 
the Western model of group participation. 
For this reason, the typology of insider/outsider in the Western context does not 
provide a sufficient explanation for the study of Thai farmers groups. The advancement of 
their status and the improvement in their political skills within the outsider groups is not 
enough for Thai farmers to achieve insider status. This is because the operation of the 
patronage system effectively prevents groups outside patronage networks from sharing 
and gaining in the benefits of political power. This helps illustrate how Thai farmers 
groups have experienced difficulty in choosing their strategy. 'So it is the nature of their 
demands on the political system that determines their strategy: they do not have a realistic 
choice between inside and outside strategies. ,41 Accordingly, the classification of groups 
into insiders and outsiders will consider the contribution of the patronage system in the 
Thai political arena, since political information is not only what politicians needed to 
know in order to gain votes. Moreover, Thai politicians perceive extending their 
36 Ibid., pp.17 
37 Ibid., p.18 
38 Ibid., p.21 
39 Grant, W. (2000), p.20 
40 Truman, D.B. (1960), p.333 
41 Maloney, W.A., Jordan, G. and McLaughlin, A.M. (1994), p.34 
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patronage network as the real method for gaining votes, as it effectively allows them to 
vote-buy their way to power. 
2.2 Civil Society 
Scholte42 highlights how the term 'civil society' has developed in English political 
thought. In the sixteenth-century, 'civil society' referred to the state, whereas its 
contemporary application tends to contrast civil society and the state. In the nineteenth-
century, Hegel included the notion of the market under the term 'civil society', while the 
contemporary use of the term 'civil society' tends to refer only to the non-profit sector. 
This suggests that through different times and places, definitions of the term 'civil 
society' have varied enormously. This variation points to the contribution of local culture, 
historical background, and social structure in the development of the term. 
In Thai political study, the nature of the development of the term 'civil society' 
has led to some difficulty in making a clear distinction between 'civil society' and 
'interest group'. There is evidence that these two terms have been used interchangeably 
by Thai academics. Prior to the introduction of the term 'civil society' into Thai political 
study, the term 'interest group' was employed as the main theoretical framework in 
studies on student uprisings. This is evidenced by the studies of Prudhisan.43 Ratana44 
claims the student uprising of October 1973 to be the origin of the civil society movement 
in Thailand. Ji45 suggests the notion of 'civil society' as a main theoretical framework for 
the political confrontations between the civilian population and the military government 
in the 1970s, and subsequently, the political turmoil and civil unrest of May 1992. These 
events became a catalyst for contemporary studies on the term 'civil society' in the arena 
of Thai political study. This has subsequently helped to explain the social movements, 
which aimed towards challenging the systematic breakdown of Thailand's democratic 
framework, and aimed towards promoting the Western democratic framework. 
42 Scholte, J. A. (2001) 'Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance', CSGR Working Paper No. 
65/01, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick, p.4 
43 Prudhisan Jumbala (1974), and Prudhisan Jumbala (1987) 'Interest and Pressure Groups', in Somsakdi 
Xuto (ed.) Government and Politics in Thailand, Singapore: Oxford University Press 
44 Ratana Tosakul Boonmathya (1999) 'Prachakhom: Civil Society in Thailand', paper presented to the 7th 
International Conference on Thai Studies (4-8 July 1999), University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, p.98 
45 Ji Ungpakorn (2001) 'October 1976 Massacre Led to Post-May 1992 Reform', The Nation (Internet 
Edition), 6 October 2001 at . 
http://nationmultimedia.com!page.arcview.php3?clid= 11 &id=493 82&usrs .. Retrieved on 16 AprIl 2002 
This terminological challenge to the conceptualisation of the framework, which 
helps to explain the student uprising of October 1973, by both academics of the time and 
contemporary academics, illustrates the dynamics of political study. To a great extent, 
academics have failed to supply concise definitions of the terms 'civil society' and 
'interest group' which can provide a clear distinction between them. Thus, 'Anyone is 
always free to stipulate a definition he/she likes for any term he/she chooses. It is up to 
the rest of us to decide whether or not that definition is helpful. ,46 
Prudhisan47 argues that he does not disagree with the use of the term 'civil society' 
in contemporary Thai political study, since there is no clear distinction between 'civil 
society' and 'interest group'. This is a problem with regard to definitional boundaries. 
This implies that sometimes these terms are used interchangeably, in which Ammar48 also 
agrees. Nevertheless, Prudhisan adds that the study of 'civil society' in Thailand in the 
1990s could be a trend that has already been set by academics, because use of the term 
attracts financial support for their research proposals.49 
Anek50 too has attempted to distinguish the terms 'interest group' from 'civil 
society'. He notes that the study of 'interest groups' is more concerned about the use of 
conflicts and struggles as methods of securing groups' interests, while the study of 'civil 
society' is not only concerned about groups' interests, but it is also concerned about the 
degree of co-operation needed, in order to balance the state power. Accepting this 
definition, the 'civil society' framework can not provide an adequate explanatory 
framework in relation to the study of Thai farmers groups, as it is too broad and 
encompassing. Nevertheless, 'civil society' is still a worthwhile aspect to the study, since 
it can provide explanations with regard to the roles of farmer related promotional groups, 
such as the Assembly of the Poor and groups of local schoolteachers. 
46 Wilson, G. K. (1990) Interest Groups, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.6-7 
47 Interview with Professor Prudhisan Jumbala 
48 Interview with Professor Ammar Siamwalla 
49 Interview with Professor Prudhisan Jumbala 
50 Anek Laothamatas (2000) Civicness and Self-Government, Bangkok: Kobfai Publishing Project [in Thai], 
p.22 
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The Thai word Prachasangkom is the best equivalent for the term 'civil society'. 
Pei-Hsiu Chen51 ciaims that civil society can help provide the fundamental means for the 
development of democracy. By definition, there is a structural tendency within civil 
society to enhance a greater level of democracy. Therefore, organisations within civil 
society are a mechanism for extending opportunities for participation, where citizens may 
develop the skills and effective processes, which help consolidate democracy. A similar 
definition to 'civil society' is offered by Diamond. He defines 'civil society' as ' the 
sphere of voluntary organised social life outside the state and the political arena, where 
many actors are involved in order to protect and enhance their interests. ,52 This is 
illustrated in figure 2-1. 
Source: Diamond, L. (1992), p.7 
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In the 1980s, the expansion of civil society was accommodated by the emergence 
ofNGOs and grassroots organisations. 53 Since then 'civil society encompasses many sorts 
of actors ... In particular, this conception of civil society stretches much wider than 
formally organised, officially registered and professionally administered 'NGOs'. Civil 
society exists whenever and wherever voluntary associations - of whatever kind - try 
deliberately to mould the governing rules of society ... 'civil society' today circulates all 
over the world and is sometimes applied to political practices (like so-called Civic Forums 
at village and district level in Thailand) that derive largely from non-western tradition. ,54 
Accordingly, interest groups should be included in civil society as is illustrated in the 
adapted model, which is portrayed in figure 2-2. 
Figure 2-2 Thai Civil Society 
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Source: Developed from figure 2-1, in order to illustrate Thai civil society 
In the 1990s, civil society played a substantial role within the Thai political arena. 
The rise of civil society is perceived to be largely a result of government policies and 
53 Ratana Tosakul Boonmathya (1999), pp.2-4 
actions, which have discriminated against the population generally and rural farmers in 
particular. However, government discrimination alone cannot adequately explain the rise 
of civil society in the Thai rural context, particularly after the country's financial collapse 
in the 1997. This rising 'localism' is one of the main contributing factors in relation to the 
development of Thai civil society. Pasuk and Baker argue that the importance of locality 
was introduced in the 1980s, but 'This "localism discourse" has largely been ignored by 
mainstream economists and social scientists. ,55 The rural community is regarded as the 
main element, both as a source of value and as a political construct, of the localism 
discourse. 'The discourse made culture (rather than economics, politics, or whatever) the 
area of contestation between the community and outside forces (state, capitalism). ,56 
Hewison57 summanses that localism is characterised by its interest in the 
following issues: self-sufficiency; self-reliance; the rejection of consumerism and 
industrialism; culture and community; power; rural primacy; and nationalism. However, 
the research has found that the notion of self-sufficiency, self-reliance and culture and 
community demonstrate a strong impact on the development of the strategy of rural civil 
society groups, which are significant promotional groups in farmers' group formation. For 
instance, the research includes findings on a group of local schoolteachers in the district 
of Khemmarat, in the province of Ubon Ratchathani, who perceive the improvement of 
farmers' self-sufficiency and self-reliance as a means for farmers groups to develop 
economically and politically. Thus, the impact of civil society and localism on Thai 
farmers groups will be developed in the thesis. 
2.3 Social Movements 
During the 1990s, the study of 'social movements' began in Thailand, in parallel 
with contemporary studies of 'civil society', which resulted directly from the increasing 
number of political demonstrations and protests beginning in the early 1990s. A range of 
recently established groups in the emerging social movement of Thailand have been 
studied by Thai academics, and have been summarised by Pasuk. These include for 
54 Scholte, J. A. (2001), pp.5-6 
55 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (2000) Thailand's Crisis, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, p.193 
56 Ibid., p.l95 .. ., . . 
57 Hewison, K. (2000) 'Resisting Globalization: A Study of Locahsm In ThaIland, The Pacific ReView, Vol. 
13 No.2 2000:279-296, p.285 
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instance, the slum dwellers' movement for housing rights and participation in urban 
development, and the small-scale fishermen in southern Thailand to protect the coastal 
environment. 58 Studies of both 'social movement' and 'civil society' aim to inform an 
understanding of the political participation of people within the society. 
As argued in section 2.2, civil society is primarily concerned with promoting co-
operation between its members, in order to balance the state power, although this could 
imply that civil society tends to consider that actions taken by its members are of 
secondary importance. Conversely, social movements tend to be more focused on the 
understanding of the actions, which are taken by their members, and it is in this regard 
that Pasuk argues that the social movement 'is a collective form of action to contest the 
abuses of political and economIC power, and to change the political and market 
institutions in order to produce a better society.'59 With reference to this, social 
movements tend to give less attention to group organisational structures, and instead, 
focus on promoting group mobilisation. Jordan and Maloney argue that the emphasis of 
social movements has resulted in a perspective, which has 'a lack of hierarchy and formal 
. . ,60 
orgamsatIOn. 
At this stage, it is useful to highlight that the notion of a social movement generally 
combines a number of important elements. To begin with, social movements tend to be 
formed when a group of individuals make a conscious attempt to effect a paradigm shift 
in the social order. In addition, social movements often encompass people from a range of 
social backgrounds who, regardless of their background, would be considered to be 
outside of the network of the policy-making process. These individuals have limited 
political influence, social prestige or personal wealth, and in addition, their interests are 
not normally represented within the political system. Academics who are interested in the 
study of social movements, believe that activists are generally aware that they are 
outsiders in relation to the network of the policy-making process. Accordingly, social 
movements tend to employ highly assertive political strategies such as the 
commandeering of either publicly or privately owned buildings, or the organising of street 
58 Pasuk Phongpaichit (2002) 'Social Movements in Thailand', paper presented at International Conference 
on Thai Studies, Nakhon Phanom, January 2002, p.l 
59 Ibid., p.4 
60 Jordan, G. and Maloney, W.A. (1997) The Protest Business? Mobilizing campaign Groups, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, p.46 
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blockades, in order to attempt to influence government. These strategies are employed in 
preference to attempts to utilise rather less assertive political strategies, such as those, 
which depend on consultation and negotiation through the lobbying process. The 
strategically divergent approaches that are employed by social movements and interest 
groups, suggests the radically different styles, which can be employed in relation to 
political action.61 
With reference to this, the general approach of social movements cannot be fully 
applied to the studies of rice, sugarcane and potato farmers groups in Thailand. The 
empirical evidence of the research as outlined in Chapter 4 reveals that these farmers 
groups only tend to adopt the more assertive political strategies associated with social 
movements, if their attempts at consultation and negotiation with the policy-makers are 
frustrated. The research in relation to farmers groups investigates the process of group 
mobilisation and the associated problems, which are often encountered. Interest group 
theory provides a more applicable analytical framework than social movement theory, 
since it considers the roles of both insider and outsider in relation to the involved actors 
within the network of the policy-making process. Furthermore, although interest group 
theory is a more concise framework, it can regardless, be applied more effectively to the 
study of Thai farmers groups, since it focuses on both group formation and group action. 
2.4 Pluralism and Corporatism 
Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, 
competitive, nonhierarchically ordered, and self-determined (as to type or scope of 
interest) categories which are not specifically licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or 
otherwise controlled in leadership selection on interest articulation by the state and which 
do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective 
categories.62 
This suggests that in the pluralistic political arena, a large number of competing 
groups exist with different interests. Actors or groups are not hierarchically different. 
They operate on the assumption of equality between them. None of the groups have 
privileged access to state information, under the notion of free competition between 
61 Zirakzadeh, C. E. (1997) Social Movement in Politics: A Comparative Study, London: Longman, pp.4-5 
62 Schmitter, P.C. (1979) 'Still the Century of Corporatism?', in Schmitter, P.C. and Lehmbruch, G. (eds) 
Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, London: SAGE Publications, p.15 
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competing interests. Parsons summarises the concept of pluralism as 'participation in the 
great game of politics was open to all. ,63 
Within the pluralistic political arena, groups are a crucial element. According to 
Cawson, 'Underlying most pluralist conceptions is a view of politics as a system, with 
government at its centre. Groups are part of the political system, but not part of 
governmental system.,64 For pluralists, being a member of any group is an individual's 
choice. 'If members are dissatisfied, it is easy for them to 'exit' - leaving the interests 
group to join another organization, switching their interests into a completely different 
arena, or simply lapsing into inactivity. ,65 Academics on the study of pressure groups and 
interest groups accept that pluralism is the best framework to use in the study of pressure 
groups, as the pluralistic framework has established itself over time. As Grant highlights 
'Pluralism offers the most influential and resilient account of the role of pressure groups 
in a democratic society. ,66 However, he points out that the British literature has 
contributed less than the American literature on the study of interest groups under the 
pluralist framework, since 'pluralist theory often seem to reflect a more open, fragmented 
political system than applies in the case of Britain. ,67 
It has been questioned whether an equal distribution of power can exist in any 
democratic society. In many democratic countries, the abuse of state power can still be 
observed which brings about a biased resource allocation, due to a limited number of 
actors within country's economic development policy network. Mills uses the term 
'power elite' to explain this type of political arena. He notes that ' ... the conception of the 
power elite and of its unity rests upon the corresponding developments and coincidence of 
interests among economic, political, and military organizations. ,68 The confrontation 
between the power elite and the pluralistic framework in the American literature in the 
research on the relationships between pressure groups and governments is explicit in the 
63 Parsons, W. (1995) Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p.134 
64 Cawson, A. (1986) Corporatism and Political Theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p.8 
65 Dunleavy, P. and O'Leary, B. (1987) Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy, London: 
Macmillan Press, p.33 
66 Grant, W. (2000), p.41 
67 Ibid. 
68 Mills, C.W. (1956) The Power Elite, New York: Oxford University Press, p.292 
1950s and early 1960s, before the introduction of the concept of 'sub-systems' and 'sub-
governments,69 
In Europe, including the United Kingdom, corporatism emerged in the analytical 
debate in the mid-1970s, contending with the notion of pluralism. 70 The corporatist theory 
argued that 'the modem state plays a highly active part in the formation of both the 
groups and their interests, through its ability to license their existence and either include 
them in the policy-making process or exclude them from it.,7! Accordingly, 'the political 
processes were not open but relatively closed.,n Then Schmitter defines corporatism as: 
a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized 
into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered 
and functionally differentiated categories, recognized and licensed (if not created) by 
the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective 
categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supportS.73 
This definition suggests that corporatism emphasises the role of the state. Cawson 
highlights that 'Corporatism presupposes that state agencies are capable of making and 
delivering bargaining policies .... ,74 Cox75 comments that Schmitter defines corporatism 
as being fundamentally concerned about the political framework of the state, however 
corporatism neglects fundamental concerns regarding the policy-making process, 
including which groups benefit and how policy is implemented. 'It was a statement about 
how interests were represented politically rather than a statement about policy making.' 76 
Accordingly, corporatism cannot provide an adequate explanation for the relationships 
between interest groups and government. 
69 Klijn, E.-H. (1999) 'Policy Networks: An Overview', in Kickert, W.J.M., Klijn, E.-H. and Koppenjan, 
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70 Ibid., p.24 
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There have been many problems regarding the development of the corporatist 
framework. In relation to defining corporatism, there has been little accord amongst 
academics, as Grant argues that 'there was little agreement about what the term meant.' 77 
Groth argues that studies on corporatism have tended towards the tentative and 
fragmented resulting from the emphasis, which was placed on the examination of specific 
empirical studies. Accordingly, 'critical analysis of corporatism appears confined at a low 
level and fails to sketch the broader outlines of corporatism in paradigmatic terms or 
notice similarities between corporatism and other intellectual traditions and constructs 
that inhabit the general field of comparative politics.' 78 Furthermore, the corporatist 
theory itself has yet to develop a sufficient degree of autonomy from pluralism, a theory 
with which it shared many assumptions. 
For Rhodes, 'corporatism provides a rigid metaphor of government-interest group 
relations and that it cannot be extended to sub-central government. The characteristics of 
corporatism such as the aggregation of interests, licensing of groups, monopoly of 
representation and regulation of members, are rarely found in unsullied form.' 79 This 
failure of corporatism to sufficiently explain the relationships between interest groups and 
government has brought about a paradigm shift in the study of relationships between 
interest groups and government through the development of the 'policy 
network/community' framework, which combines both elements of pluralism and 
corporatism. 
2.5 Development of Policy Networks 
This policy-making process involves a set of actors, both governmental and non-
governmental agencies, sharing a common concern and interest regarding particular 
policy issues, due to fragmentation within the policy area. According to Atkinson and 
Coleman, 'policy is seldom completely centralized. Ordinarily, a number of departments 
and agencies can lay claim to one or another instrument in particular policy area. ,80 'The 
network approach considers public policy making and governance to take place in 
77 Grant, W. (2000), p.52 . ..' , 
78 Groth, T.R. (2002) 'Theories of Latin American State and ComparatIve DemocratIzatlOn Studies, paper 
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networks consisting of various actors (individuals, coalitions, bureau, organizations) none 
of which possess the power to detennine the strategies of the other actors. ,81 Accordingly, 
this does not only illustrate the fragmentation within a policy area, but it also indicates the 
dynamic nature of policy-making itself. 
The framework for studying the relationships between interest groups and 
governments offered by the policy network, has been questioned with regard as to 
whether it can provide a different framework to those already offered by pluralism and 
corporatism. Smith argues that the Rhodes and Marsh model 'appears to drift into 
traditional pluralism. ,82 However, Rhodes and Marsh83 have argued that the policy 
network analysis is an alternative option to the pluralist and corporatist models. 
Nevertheless, they admit that these models fail to provided a very realistic explanation of 
relationships between government and interest groups, since 'government - interest group 
relations obviously vary in different policy areas.' 84 This can be perceived to be a result 
of the dynamic nature of policy-making. Accordingly, 'different fonns of policy 
network/community approaches have been elaborated over a period of more than two 
decades.' 85 
2.5.1 Sub-government and the Iron Triangle 
'Sub-government', 'subsystems' and 'iron triangles', are the tenns to have been 
most generally used in the American literature to explain the environment of the policy-
making.86 Ripley and Franklin87 suggest that the sub-governmental mechanism consists of 
small groups of political actors from both governmental and non-governmental agencies. 
These agencies specialise in particular policy areas. Although, there are vast numbers of 
sub-governmental mechanisms and they are politically important, they are not dominant 
80 Atkinson, M.M. and Coleman, W.D. (1989) 'Strong State and Weak State: Sectoral Policy Networks in 
Advanced Capitalist Economies', British Journal of Political Science, 19: 47-67, Vol. 1, 1989, p. . 
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in all policy areas. With regards to sub-governmental literature, only a limited number of 
privileged groups with close links to government were taken into account while the role 
of other interest groups was ignored. Marsh88 therefore, argued that it could not help to 
explain the entire network since many interactions of excluded interest groups had been 
ignored. 
The concept of 'iron triangles' became a critical political debate in the United 
State during the 1950s-1960s. It is a structure linking executive bureau, congressional 
committees and interest clienteles.89 Thus, Peters argues that the concept of 'iron 
triangles' implies 'the existence of three powerful actors ... that could control a policy area 
and limit access by other actors. ,90 This concept of a limited number of relevant actors in 
a particular policy area was attacked by academics in this area of study. ' ... it now appears 
that. .. three powerful actors defining the triangles are no longer able to restrict access to 
the policy process in the way they once could, and many more groups are now playing the 
game of political influence.' 91 'Thus it was not possible to give a static and exhaustive 
listing in a community in the manner of the classic 'iron triangle'. ,92 This is evidenced by 
the empirical study of Jordan, Maloney, and McLaughlin on British agricultural 
policymaking. They claim that, 'We present an image of the agricultural policy making 
which suggests that those involved are not as limited, nor as fixed as the iron triangle 
model suggests. '(Emphasis added)93 Nevertheless the American concept of the 'iron 
triangle' has contributed some fundamental ideas to the British 'policy community'. 
According to Jordan, 
The British notion of policy community owes something to the iron triangle idea (a 
degree of stability and predictability over time, fragmentation limited through 
departmental recognition of participants, effective decisions within sectors, closed debate) 
but it bears some evidence of shifting to the issue network extension in that there is a 
dramatic increase in the number of participants (many more than suggested by 'iron 
87 Ripley, R.B. and Franklin, G.A. (1991, Fifth Edition) Congress, the Bureaucracy, and public Policy, 
California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, pp.6-8 
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90 Peters, G. (1998) 'Policy Networks: Myth, Metaphor, and Reality', in Marsh, D. (ed) Comparing Policy 
Networks, Buckingham: Open University Press, p.27 
91 Peters, G. (1998), p.26 
92 Jordan, G.A (1981), p.l05 . 
93 Jordan, G., Maloney, W.A and McLaughlin, AM. (1992) 'Policy-Making in Agricul.ture: 'Pnmary' 
Policy Communities or Specialist Policy Communities', British Interest Group Project Workmg Paper No.5, 
University of Aberdeen, p.25 
triangle'), decisions are increasingly difficult to make in overcrowded environments and 
more and more groups are claiming the right to be heard.94 
2.5.2 Policy Community as a Specific Type of Policy Network 
The idea of policy community is argued to be the origin for the study of policy 
networks. The empirical research on policy community was largely carried out in the 
United Kingdom. 95 Its concept was developed in British political studies from the 1970s 
onwards.96 Initially, 'Richardson & Jordan ... used the concepts 'policy community' and 
'policy network' interchangeably to refer to closed links to be found between civil 
servants and favoured interest group organizations ... Neither Richardson nor Jordan has 
attempted to categorize policy networks, policy communities .. .into formal typologies. 
They have adopted a relaxed metaphorical usage based on certain characteristics they 
noted within policy-making arena. ,97 At present, the attempts to identify policy network 
and policy community approaches provide 'no agreed definition of either concept, 
nor ... how different types of network might operate under different environmental 
condition. ,98 
Rhodes and Marsh define policy community as 'networks characterized by 
stability of relationships, continuity of a high restrictive membership, vertical 
interdependence based on shared service delivery responsibilities, and insulation from 
other networks and invariably to the general public (including Parliament). They have 
high degree of vertical interdependence and limited horizontal articulation. They are 
highly integrated. ,99 In conclusion, Marsh lOo, Jordan10\ Smith102, Klijnl03, ' ... agree that 
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'community' implies a commonality of interest amongst the interacting groups, and that 
policy communities tend to have stable regularized contact.' 104 This suggests that policy 
community is a stable and predictable policy network. lOS 
'Many of the examples of stable and predictable policy networks are to be found in 
agriculture.,106 Smith argues that 'the agricultural policy is highly integrated. It has very 
restricted membership with shared interests; it has limited horizontal articulation, being 
largely isolated from other networks .... ' 107 He concludes that the British agricultural 
policy community is a closed one. 'This community has included MAFF and the NFU, 
who developed a shared view of the goals of agricultural policy. They have used this 
consensus and institutions of the policy community to exclude other groups and issues 
from the policy agenda.' 108 
However, in the 1980s, Jordan, Maloney, and McLaughlin 1 09 witnessed a 
fundamental change III the British agricultural community, and argued that 'Any 
consensus that existed on agricultural policy has been steadily eroded.' 110 Thus, 
'Agricultural policy networks are more open than simply MAFFINFU interactions and 
include other economically significant interests, who within there own specialist areas are 
as likely to be influential as the NFU - if not more so.' III As a result, it can be argued that 
an increase in the number of actors within a policy community can lead to a decline in the 
stability of the policy community itself, since it produces a more pluralistic environment. 
Accordingly, the policy community framework appears to be more competitive. Would 
this affect the application of the framework to the results of the empirical study conducted 
by Smith? 'Should 'policy community' be restricted to small personalized groups ... or 
based on around commodities ... or can it also refer broader categories ... ? Surely this is an 
empirical not a definitional matter.' 112 From the point of view of Jordan, Maloney, and 
McLaughlin, 'The policy community label is a useful starting point and should not be used 
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as an intellectual straight jacket: practice is likely to discredit any model which is too 
inflexible.' 113 
2.5.3 Policy Networks 
Klijn summarises the contemporary definition of policy networks that 'Policy 
networks are more or less stable patterns of social relations between interdependent 
actors, which take shape around policy problem and/or policy programmes. ,114 The three 
most important characteristics of networks are as follows: 
• Networks exist because of interdependencies between actors; 
• Networks consist of a variety of actors each with their own goals; 
• Networks consist of relations ofa more or less lasting nature between actors I 15 
Fundamentally, the key element in the contemporary study of policy networks is 
based on the resource dependency framework offered by Rhodes. 'Resource dependencies 
- the extent to which different actors depend on each other for resources - are crucial in 
determining which actors dominate different networks and how decision-making proceeds 
within them.' 116 This is a fundamental concept in the study of policy networks in the 
United Kingdom. According to Rhodes, the policy network represents a cluster of 
organisations with shared resources. This implies a level of dependency for member 
organisations within the network. Nevertheless, 'networks have different structures of 
dependencies, structures which vary along such dimensions as membership (for example, 
d ' 117 between levels of government) an resources. 
Rhodes and Marsh claim that the policy network concept is accepted as a meso-
level concept. 'The meso-level of analysis focuses on the variety of linkages between the 
centre and the rage of sub-central political and governmental organizations.' 118 This 
description of the concept implies a neglect of the analysis on the role of state at the 
macro level, and of the interaction between individuals at the micro level. Indeed, Rhodes 
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emphasises that 'power-dependence relations between organizations, IS essential for 
understanding the patterns of organizational relationships, of personal relationships and 
the changing nature of each. (Emphasis added)' I 19 His argument already implies the need 
for integrating the analysis at the micro-level into the policy network concept. 
The isolation of the policy network concept at the meso-level analysis has been 
attacked by the Western academics themselves. For instance, Dowding l20 strongly rejects 
Rhodes and Marsh's argument, namely that involving micro-level analysis makes it 
increasingly difficult to generalize about policy networks. He asserts that 'Whether a 
community can be maintained at the meso level or only at the micro level is a question 
worth empirical investigation.' 121 Mill and Saward affirm that the restriction of the study 
of policy network at the meso level 'is at least questionable whether, in practice, 
explanations can be confined to this level. British and other authors have made some 
attempts to integrate micro, meso and macro levels of analysis (corresponding normally to 
individual actors and groups, policy sectors and national government respectively) .... ' 122 
The concept has been attacked on the account of its imprecise definition, its 
descriptive nature, its inability to explain political change, its underplaying of the 
complexity of relationships, its neglect of the external environment and its lack of 
precision .... Whatever criticisms might be addressed against the Rhodes model, the 
concept of policy networks is still a useful organising tool for mapping out communities 
f . d'f~ l' 123 o actors In I lerent po ICY sector. 
Interestingly, Dowding suggests that 'The concept of policy networks and their 
sub-types can be used at all levels. Models are just descriptions, which denote the 
important structural features of a social situation ... In one model, the actors may be real 
people, in another organizations, in a third social groups or classes. This is the social 
science method. 124 Ignoring the emphasis on the restriction of the meso-level analysis 
then, the thesis can claim legitimacy in fully utilising the policy network framework in 
this study. It is not reasonable to analyse policy-making in Thailand without taking 
macro-level and micro-level analysis into account. This is because policy-making in 
Thailand represents a clear and powerful form of 'top-down' strategy. Hewison asserts 
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that, 'The state's "bottom up" or grassroots development process is no such thing, and is 
never really intended to be other than "top-down.'" 125 Also, personal relationships through 
the patronage system remain a crucial factor in the Thai political arena. Marsh emphasises 
that the Rhodes and Marsh 'model is an ideal type. The actual relationship between 
government and interest in any policy area can be compared to it, but no policy area is 
likely to conform exactly to it.' 126 
2.6 Olson's Group Theory 
"The Logic of Collective Action" written by Mancur Olson, is one of the most 
influential of books regarding the study of interest groups in the Western context. There 
are three main points which have been given attention in this book, namely 'group 
membership', 'privileged group' and 'by product theory', which show some theoretical 
relevance in the study of Thai farmers political participation. In order to investigate the 
applicability of these concepts to the thesis, this section will provide some theoretical 
analysis on these three topics, which have been argued by Olson himself and in the post-
Olson literature. 
The question may arise as to why an individual becomes a group member. The 
pluralist school argues that groups emerge spontaneously when individuals can enjoy 
shared benefits. This argument emphasises the importance of collective benefits as a 
prerequisite for collective actions. Olson summarises the pluralist argument by stating 
that: 'Pluralism tends to create a mood favourable to pressure groups ... primarily because 
it emphasizes the spontaneity, the liberty, and the voluntary quality of the private 
association .... ' therefore, 'private organizations spring up voluntarily and spontaneously 
in response to the needs, beliefs .... '127 However, the assumption of pluralism as a catalyst 
in relation to the importance of collective benefits in group formation is strongly 
challenged by Olson. 
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Olson has categorised the answer to the problem of group formation into two 
categories, namely 'collective benefit' and 'selective benefit'. To Olson, individuals can 
only be motivated to join the group by a 'selective incentive', since individuals are 
regarded as rational decision-makers. Accordingly, rational individuals who join the 
group expect to be treated advantageously in comparison with those who do not. As 
emphasised by Olson: 'The incentive must be "selective" so that those who do not join the 
organization working for the group's interest, can be treated differently from those who 
dO.,128 Therefore, rational individuals would choose to participate in any groups that offer 
a greater than or equal benefit to the costs of membership, because they 'will not act to 
achieve their common or group interests.' 129 Salisbury130 argues that Olson assumes an 
on-going system of group formation, without examining how they are first organised. He 
points out that some organisations were initially organised to alter public policy, that is, to 
secure collective benefits. It is accepted that many of the groups like these have 
tendencies to provide selective incentive benefits in order to retain members. However, 
'we must still account for the initial appearance.' 131 
Olson introduces the importance of economic selective incentives in mobilising 
potential members to join a group, in order to strengthen his argument in relation to 
'selective incentives'. These incentives had previously been described as 'material 
incentives' by Clark and Wilson, referring to 'rewards that have a monetary value or can 
easily be translated into ones that have.' 132 Olson emphasises that 'there is no presumption 
that social incentives will lead individuals in the latent group to obtain collective good .... The 
more important point, however, is that social incentives are important mainly only in the 
small group, and playa role in the large group only when the large group is a federation of 
smaller groups.' 133 The importance of material selective incentives is explained by Clark 
and Wilson through a 'cost-accounting system', where a reduction in taxation and the 
payment of a dividend can act, to effectively reimburse members for the cost of group 
membership.134 The importance of material selective incentives is evidenced in the case 
studies of the rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers groups, and accordingly, this awareness 
128 Ibid., p.51 
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contributes to the understanding of the relevance of material selective incentives III 
relation to the concept of group formation. 
Nevertheless, as Olson asserts: 'Economic incentives are not, to be sure, the only 
incentives ... The possibility that, in a case where there was no economic incentive for an 
individual to contribute to the achievement of a group interest, there might be nonetheless 
be a social incentive for him to make such a contribution, must therefore be 
considered.,135 He explains that social status and social acceptance are not collective 
goods, but groups provide them as selective incentives in order to mobilise potential 
members to join the group and to hold the existing members. 136 The importance of these 
additional incentives has also been emphasised by Clark and Wilson, who refer to such 
incentives, which are devoid of monetary value whilst conferring an element of social 
prestige to potential members, as 'solidary incentives,.137 Regarding this argument, the 
rational choice of different individuals could be defined on the basis of the individual 
needs and attitudes. Therefore, individuals who care more about society, may themselves 
contribute to help providing for the collective benefit, for instance members of 
environmental groups. To groups in this category, 'selective incentive' is a collective one 
that they choose. This implies that in some particular cases, there is no clear boundary 
between collective benefits and selective incentives. 'Organizations can therefore offer 
varied incentives - and members will join for different reasons - not just to save the 
world but to satisfy their own personal needs.' 138 
Furthermore, the economic rational choice approach demonstrates that the 'free-
rider problem' is a main concern for individuals when deciding whether or not to join a 
group. The term 'free-rider' was introduced by post-Olsonian academics, within critiques, 
which related to Olson's work on selective and collective incentives, including 
Dowding139, and Esteban and Ray140. In a similar vein, Olson notes: 
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It is distinguished by the fact that, if one member does or does not help provide the 
collective good, no other one member will be significantly affected and therefore none 
has any reason to react ... since no one in a group will react ifhe make no contribution, he 
has no incentive to contribute. Accordingly, large or "latent" groups have no incentive to 
act to obtain a collective good because however valuable the collective good might be to 
the group as a whole, it does not offer the individual any incentive to pay dues to 
organization working in the latent group's interest or to bear in any other way of costs of 
the necessary collective action. 141 
This not only suggests that 'free-riders' reduce the effectiveness of the group but 
also suggests that small groups can work more effectively than big groups. According to 
Olson, 'The greater effectiveness of relatively small groups-the "privileged" and 
"intermediate" groups-is evident from observation and experience as well as from 
theory ... for example, meetings that involve too many people ... cannot make decisions 
promptly and carefully.' 142 This is due to effective communication and co-operation 
between group members, since 'the members can have face-to-face contact with one 
another.,143 As a consequence, 'smaller groups could act more decisively and use their 
resources more effectively than large group.' 144 Therefore, the privileged and intermediate 
groups have the capacity to solve the problems of co-operation effectively, which leads 
these groups to enjoying a stronger position in negotiations. 
With regard to privileged and intermediate groups, the study of the political 
participation of Thai farmers will examine the contribution of the Thai political culture. 
Accordingly, vertical and horizontal communication will be examined through the study 
of Thai farmers groups, in order to examine the impact of these factors in relation to the 
formation, consensus and sustainability of the groups. This theoretical examination will 
also consider the impact of the patronage system within the Thai political arena, which 
allows sugarcane farmers groups to gain privileged access to the sugarcane policy-making 
process, whilst rice and potato farmers groups remain outside the policy-making 
processes in relation to rice and potatoes. 
In addition, the examination of the privileged position of interest groups within the 
Thai political arena will examine the importance of the roles of both phu mi itthiphon and 
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jao pho. Salisbury argues that 'it has been useful to examine ... the individuals who played 
the key entrepreneurial roles in establishing the groups.' 145 Following Salisbury, the 
research has established that the existence of phu mi itthiphon and jao pho as both the 
most active and influential actors within the sugarcane farmers groups has been a 
significant contributing factor in promoting the connections between the government and 
sugarcane farmers. Accordingly, this has resulted in the establishment of politically 
influential sugarcane farmers groups. 
The introduction of the term 'selective incentive' into his literature, allows Olson 
to develop the 'by-product' theory, that is, 'If the individuals in a large group have no 
incentive to organize a lobby to obtain a collective benefit .... ' 146 Then only an 
organisation with 'a joint offering or "tied sale" of a collective and a noncollective good 
that could stimulate a rational individual in a large group to bear part of the cost of 
obtaining a collective good.' 147 Selective incentive emerges as a significant factor, which 
has impacted on the joining decisions of potential members. In some particular cases, it 
has been found that selective incentives are as significant as collective benefits for 
potential members to take into account when making their decisions. 
2.7 Development of British Farmers Interest Groups 
With regard to government intervention within the agricultural sector in Western 
societies, this has actually enhanced farmers' political influence, which has enabled 
Western farmers groups to become politically active. In general, the active political 
participation of interest groups in Western society is undeniably linked to the Western 
democratic model. 'Freedom of association is a fundamental principle of democracy. 
Democracy permits the existence of groups, but it could also be argued that groups 
contribute to the quality of the decision-making process.' 148 
The debate in this section will focus mainly on studies of British agricultural 
interest groups, because of the level of expertise within this area of study. Richardson 
claims that 'Britain has perhaps the longest established interest group system ... Policies 
145 Salisbury, R.H. (1970), p.63 
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are normally formulated by governments only after the so-called 'affected' interests have 
been consulted. ' 149 Similarly, Harrop asserts, 'close consultation between the 
bureaucracy and organised interests is a characteristic of the policy process in Britain ... 
Pressure groups in Britain are generally strong.' ISO 
This government practice enables interest groups to more fully play their parts in 
having an influence in the British political arena. In certain policy areas, British interest 
groups can use their power to negotiate influentially with policy-makers. For instance, in 
the agricultural policy-making process, the National Farmers' Union (NFU) represents 
farmers' interests effectively. In contemporary British politics, the NFU is one of the most 
effective interest groups. 151 The 1947 Agriculture Act created a legal obligation on the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) 'to consult with such persons as 
appear to represent the interest of the producer.' 152 Accordingly, the connection between 
farmers and government is integrated into the country's legal framework. 'When the 
government increasingly began to intervene in agriculture, it was to the NFU that it 
looked for advice and support. ,153 This form of co-operation between government and the 
main farmers' group in the British case provides some explanation for the failures of Thai 
farmers' political participation. In general, the Thai bureaucrats, technocrats and leading 
academics play the central roles in the agricultural policy network. Chapters 3 and 5 will 
expand this discussion further. 
The NFU and the British Conservative Party had rather close links to each other, 
prior to the NFU claiming political neutrality sometime after the Second World War. This 
was a result of its working experience with the British Labour Party immediately after the 
Second World War, which allowed them to enjoy the benefit of expanded food 
production. Accordingly, the NFU was convinced that it could work with either of the two 
major political parties. 154 This suggests a flexibility of the political strategy of the NFU in 
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order to maximise its members' interests. Indeed, the NFU was formed on the basis of 
improving the position of farmers, by developing their marketing power. In 1970, the 
NFU urged its members to refrain from marketing their stock in order to press the 
Government to raise farm subsidies. 155 At certain periods during its history, the NFU has 
been able to exert its influential power on taxation policy, when it appears to be affecting 
farmers' interests. 156 
The effectiveness of the NFU does not only imply an effective negotiation 
strategy, but the NFU's effectiveness also implies an effective management system within 
the NFU. 157 Accordingly, the NFU is able to effectively balance the range of interests and 
needs of its members, which helps to reduce conflicts between subgroups existing within 
the NFU. However, Grant158 has acknowledged that since the 1970s, the NFU has become 
less able to prevent its own members from taking their own courses of political action, 
despite the complex committee structures within the NFU, which aim to reduce conflict. 
The NFU is not only able to protect its farmer members' interests effectively at the 
domestic level, but it also plays a part at the international level. In the case of British 
farmers, the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) has a direct impact on their incomes. 
Grant claims that 'the Common Agriculture Policy is the most highly developed policy of 
the European Community and it has clearly had an impact on the way in which British 
farmers seek to defend their interests.' 159 As the NFU President, Ben Gill argues that the 
outline of the current reform proposals of the CAP are complex and will have the biggest 
impact in the European Union on British farmers. The main concern of the British 
Government is about the limitation of government support to larger farms, of which there 
are more in the United Kingdom than across the rest of the European Union. Lately, the 
NFU has announced in clear terms that 'the NFU will fight for the interests of this 
. d t d h ,160 country's farmers In Europe an we expect our governmen to 0 t e same. 
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In order to maximise their bargaining power to influence the CAP, the NFU is well 
aware that it must be adequately informed about the CAP policy. The NFU has its own 
small office in Brussels that provides this information. Accordingly, the NFU is able to 
receive full information about policy developments in Brussels and the possible impacts 
on UK agriculture. 161 In both international and domestic political scenarios, the NFU has 
played an influential role. The NFU is effective at persuading the British Government to 
work to its agenda when negotiating CAP with the Council of Agricultural Ministers. 
Grant argues that the most effective political strategy of the NFU, which is used to apply 
pressure over the development of the CAP, is to pursue the British government to adopt 
the NFU's policy as the official agricultural policy of the British government. 162 This 
suggests that the British farmers are very aware as well as responsive to the external 
impact on their interests of the CAP. This helps to demonstrate that access to information 
is an important factor in enhancing a group's effectiveness. This factor is notably lacking 
in the case of Thai farmers and the Thai farmers groups. 
The British NFU demonstrates an advanced form of farmer interest group. The 
NFU would not be able to develop any political influence if it was not well organised and 
financially secure. Grant163 concludes that the NFU has delivered a successful symbiotic 
relationship development between British farmers and the State, even though farmers' 
political weight is limited. There are no farmers groups in Thailand with a comparable 
level of political influence. The level of co-operation between farmers groups and the 
government has not been as advanced in Thailand. The industrial boom of the early 
1980's coincided with the fall in agricultural prices. 164 Consequently, governments 
delayed in taking action to manage this problem for farmers. Successive governments 
emphasised industrialisation at the expense of the agricultural sector, in an attempt to be 
the next 'Tiger economy' in Asia, after recognising the successes of Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. 
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2.8 Development of Japanese Farmers Interest Groups 
Most studies on rice politics in Japan describe the Nokyo as a powerful interest 
group. Neary, argues that 'the influence of N6ky6 (the Federation of Agricultural Co-
operatives) within the MAFF is great ... At regional and national levels the federations 
push for legislative and bureaucratic decisions favourable to agricultural interest and 
. I I . ~ . ,165 parttcu ar y to nce larmmg. Because of the nature of the Japanese political structure, 
most rural Members of Parliament (MPs) rely heavily on farmer constituencies. As a 
result, most MPs are very responsive to farmers' demands voiced through the Nokyo. 
During every election, the Nokyo appears as an unusually powerful interest group, 
which is influential enough to determine whether farmer constituencies either vote or do 
not vote for any particular electoral candidate. Cheng166 claims that the electoral 
organisers of the Nokyo can ensure the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) its position as the 
natural party of government, for as long as the LDP maintains its support for the interests 
of the Nokyo in the area of agricultural policy-making. This allows the Nokyo to integrate 
its vested interests into the political strategies of the LDP. Since the LDP cannot afford to 
ignore rural farmer constituencies, it therefore experiences difficulty in reforming 
agricultural policy.167 The strong protectionist policy towards the rice market has proved 
that the LDP is very well aware of maintaining their vested support to rural farmers in 
order to ensure their hold on power and expand their influence. 
The influence of the agricultural community over policy-making within the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MAFF) has been a major feature post-war politics as the LDP has 
depended on the voters from rural communities almost as much as cash contributions from 
urban-based big business. 168 
Aware of this, the Nokyo is in fact not only politically stronger than farmers, but it 
is right to say that the Nokyo is politically stronger than the LDP regarding the formation 
of agricultural policy, particularly relating to rice policy. Interestingly, the Nokyo do not 
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have to provide any financial support to politicians like other electoral support groups. 
For instance, large Japanese enterprises have been declared as significant financial 
sources for the governing conservative party. 169 This is an unusual political phenomenon, 
where an interest group can exercise its power influentially towards a government without 
providing any financial support to that government. Rather, the government IS the 
financial source for the Nokyo. 'As part of its activities as government agent III the 
agricultural sector, the Nokyo receives direct financial compensation in the form of 
commissions and subsidies. ,170 
The relationship between the Nokyo and the rural rice farmers can be described as 
a reciprocal relationship, since the Nokyo acts as a middleman between rice farmers and 
the government in the Japanese rice market. Rice farmers need to work with the Nokyo in 
order to transfer the rice to the relevant government agencies. The Nokyo gains from this 
as it makes profits from charging rice market, inspection, and warehousing fees, and 
oversees the flow of subsidies from the government to its member farmers. 171 
Nevertheless, a reciprocal relationship in this context does not imply equality between 
farmers and the Nokyo, since the relationship between the Nokyo and the Government 
allows the Nokyo to maintain its position over member farmers. Rothacherl72 argues that 
the influential campaigning power of the Nokyo has proved a reliable benefit to farmers, 
as a result farmers continue to rely on the Nokyo. 
On behalf of co-operative members, Nokyo deals directly with the government 
Bureau of Food Supply, which administers the government buying and selling rice ... 
Nokyo provides banking services and a line of credit to the farmers when they contract 
with the government for the seifumai l73 rice. The farmers receive a down payment that is 
automatically deposited into a Nokyo saving account. 174 
This does not only imply strong connections between the Nokyo and government, 
but it also implies how the Nokyo asserts its role in the Japanese rice market. The Nokyo is 
responsible for many agricultural co-operative activities, which are listed by it and 
monitored by government officials. Although, the Nokyo is not a formal government 
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agency, the government financially supports the Nokyo for working on its behalf. 175 This 
suggests that the Nokyo is informally integrated as a government agency in effect. The 
Nokyo does not qualify as an interest group in the Western perspective, since it is deeply 
involved in government administration and acts as a part of government to some extent. 
Rather, the policy community framework can explain this relationship between 
government and the Nokyo better, since it describes a stable and predictable relationship. 
In addition, the Nokyo can effectively prevent new actors from entering into this policy 
community. 
The effectiveness of the Nokyo is made possible not only by its own strength, but 
the need for self-sufficiency in food has contributed to its position to a significant degree. 
'Food security' has been one of most important national security issues in Japan since the 
end of the Second World War. This is because the Japanese experienced considerable rice 
shortages at the time. 176 Although Japan was able to manage this problem, the country's 
subsequent industrialisation led to a significant decline in its farming families and 
agricultural production. 'As the nation's self-sufficiency rate in food has declined, many 
people argue it is a matter of urgent necessity to support existing genuine farm 
families. ,177 
Demands for a stable supply of rice when full-time farmers are becoming so rare 
in Japan, has necessarily brought about a substantial increase in government subsidies to 
existing farmers. The Japanese government adopts various protectionist policies, in order 
to secure its rice production. This illustrates that rice policy is made on the basis of the 
agricultural protectionist attitude of policy-makers. 178 It is arguable that the consensus on 
this issue between government, consumers, and farmers, creates favourable political 
conditions for an agricultural interest group to operate effectively. According to Chengl79, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery's protectionist attitude ensures farmers 
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that tariff and other trade barriers are maintained in order to protect key agricultural 
commodities. The government generously implements these protectionist policies, and 
this area of policy makes the job of the Nokyo significantly easier. 
Domestic factors appear to be an enhancing element for the operation of the Nokyo 
in Japanese rice politics. However, as Japan is the world's second largest economy, its 
agricultural policy-making is not secure from external influences such as the United 
States, and the WTO. Within the United States, rice farmers lobby enthusiastically, 
placing pressure on their own government to demand that Japan and South Korea 
liberalise their rice markets. 180 After the conclusion of the Uruguay round of the GATT 
talks formally ratified on 15 April 1994181 , the Japanese Government was under pressure 
to revise it rice policy in order to comply with the new WTO rules. 
Indeed, Japan accepted tariffication in the Agriculture Agreement in the Uruguay 
Round, under the provisions of the 'rice clause' 182 in Annex 5 . Japan's 'rice clause' 
allows a delay in the impact of the agreement in its effects on the domestic rice market. 
During the transitional period, the GATT Codes allow the Japanese government to use 
'special safeguards', allowing the use of an emergency tariff program, in order to protect 
their domestic rice markets. This measure would be permitted, if for example, there is 
either a rice import surge or the domestic rice price falls below the average price, 
scenarios, which would harm the domestic rice markets. 183 Approximately six months 
after the signing of the GATT Final Act, on 24 October 1994, the Japanese began to use 
the exemption from applying the use of tariffication in Article 4 by announcing a plan to 
spend ¥ 6,010 billion (£37.79 billion) to help its protected farmers adjust to foreign 
competition. This announcement of the Japanese government indicated a victory for the 
politicians from the rural constituencies who relied on the powerful rural voters. 184 
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182 'The rice c1ause'- Japan must comply with the tariffication requirement at the end of these periods. 
Japan would establish a minimum access quota equal to 4 per cent of its domestic rice consumption, rising 
to 8 per cent by the year 2000 as a result. (Schott, 1.J., assisted by Buurman, 1.W. (1994) The Uruguay 
Round: An Assessment, Institute for International Economics, p.51) 
183 Wolfe, R. (1998) Farm Wars: The Political Economy of Agriculture and the International Trade Regime, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, p.125 andp. 195 , . . 
184 Emiko Terazono and Willam Dawkins (1994) 'Japan Farm Plan Paves Way For Trade Deal, Fmanclal 
Times, 24 October 1994, p.24 
Japans application of the GATT Article 4 exemption, which delays tariffication, is 
not only a good indicator for illustrating the influential power of Japanese farmers on their 
government, but also illustrates the victory of such domestic pressure over the external 
pressure from the GATT/WTO. It is arguable that the unity of the farmer constituency, 
which can be traced back to the influence of Confucianism on Japanese society and will 
be examined in Chapter 4, and in addition, the well-organised and effective 
representatives like the Nokyo, allows Japanese farmers groups to exercise their power 
effectively within the Japanese political arena. As a result, the Japanese government 
continues its high level of domestic support for farmers. According to a report by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), between 2002-2003, 
in Japan the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) averaged US$ 44,740 million. 18S Such a 
high figure suggests that the Japanese case is exceptional even amongst developed 
countries. 
This in fact is the reality of domestic politics in most countries, where national 
interests are the priority in most cases. Governments would do whatever they can justify 
in order to maintain their popularity among their constituencies. On this basis, domestic 
factors seem to be more influential than external factors. The cases of Japanese farm 
protectionist policies imply that the political influence of farmers rises in parallel to 
domestic political concerns when government pays less attention to external factors. This 
is another important fact, which allows farmers groups to successfully develop as active 
political actors within domestic political arena. Thai farmers' political participation is 
quite similar to this. Thus, this political phenomenon will be used to help conceptualise 
Thai farmers' group formation and development. 
However, with a smaller and less developed economy, the Thai government does 
not have the economic resources to provide a high level of domestic support to its 
farmers, as observed in Japan and other developed countries. Therefore, utilising the 
pattern of political influence experienced by the Nokyo and Japanese rice farmers, in order 
to explain the case studies regarding the political participation of Thai farmers groups, 
cannot be successful without considering the similarities and differences in the cultural 
185 Agra Europe, 11 June 2004 
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factors between the Thai and Japanese societies. These factors will be discussed In 
Chapter 4. 
2.9 Applicability of Theoretical Frameworks to Thai Farmers Groups 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse how domestic and global factors can 
affect the political participation of Thai farmers. The research highlights two main aspects 
to the political participation of Thai farmers, namely, group formation, and their 
interaction with government. The research has found that the three chosen cases for study 
which are rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers groups, represent themselves differently. As 
a result, a number of frameworks have shown some theoretical relevance. However, there 
are only three theoretical frameworks, specifically, 'interest group', 'civil society' and 
'policy network/community' which are capable of providing insight and clear 
explanation. The other frameworks that have been discussed in this chapter will not 
simply be rejected however, because they can help to explain certain additional factors 
and enhance the main theoretical framework. 
Thai political studies have placed an emphasis on the role of civil society for at 
least two decades. And it is the stagnation of democratisation over this period, which has 
been a catalyst in the development of civil society. Prawase Wasi186 points out the 
importance of the relationship between the development of organisations within civil 
society and the Thai democratisation. In addition, the more powerful that civil society in 
Thailand becomes, then the sooner democratisation will be established. The more 
democratic the political arena becomes, then the more pluralistic it will be, and therefore, 
the political opportunity for farmers is increased. The research has observed a significant 
role for civil society in helping farmer group formation. Accordingly, the impact of civil 
society with regard to creating a democratic political arena, which can enhance the 
political opportunity for farmers is examined in order to provide a fundamental 
understanding of farmers groups. 
The literature on 'interest groups' and 'policy network/community' has not been 
well developed in the study of Thai politics. In the study of Western politics, the literature 
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has steadily advanced, and there is strong evidence regarding existing groups and their 
influence with government. Therefore, the western literature can be usefully consulted, in 
order to isolate and develop an appropriate model, which can help to provide an adequate 
explanation with regard to the case studies. 
In order to examine the formation of Thai farmers groups, and the domestic and 
global impact on them, Olson's group theory can be usefully adopted. One of the most 
controversial discussions regarding group formation, and provided by Olson, is the 
argument on 'collective benefit' and 'selective incentive'. Olson argues that 'selective 
incentive' emerges as the most influential factor regarding the decision making of 
potential members. This argument is not normally accepted by Western academics with 
reference to the study of interest groups in the West. For instance disagreeing with 
Olson's 'selective incentive' theory also led March 187 to disagree with Olson's 'by-
product' theory. They argue that 'For public interest groups the by-product explanation is 
unconvincing.' 188 However, this argument is based mainly on Western empirical studies, 
and is not valid for the chosen Thai case studies. This is largely due to the different 
cultural backgrounds of Thailand and the West. 
The societal structure of Thailand is generally described as a 'loosely structured' 
one. This concept has helped both Thai and Western academics to perceive a stereotype of 
Thai people as self-seeking individualists. Therefore, at the interpersonal level, personal 
wishes and norms influentially affect personal decision-making. This suggests that the 
Thai people have a characteristic, which can lead to unpredictable outcomes in decision-
making. 189 Being highly individualistic implies that there is less of a sense of obligation to 
the society, and less of a tendency for group formation. Furthermore, this suggests the 
Olson theory can be applied to the Thai case, since 'collective benefit' may not be 
effective in attracting potential members to join the group. This can be observed in the 
rice, sugarcane and potato farmers groups. Only the sugarcane farmers groups apply in 
Olson's argument, because he emphasises the relevance of 'selective incentive' with 
186 Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 30 July 1998, at www.bangkokpost.net Retrieved on 19 November 
2001 
187 Marsh, D. (1976) 'On Joining Interest Groups: An Empirical Consideration of the Work of Mancur 
Olson', British Journal o/Political Science, 6, 257-271 
188 Ibid., p.79 
189 Mulder, N. (2000) Inside Thai Society: Religion Everyday Life Change, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 
pp.43-44 
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regard to large groupS.190 However, the thesis will not ignore the impact of 'selective 
incentive' on rice and potato farmers groups, and in addition will examine them further. 
According to Mulder, "loose structure' interpretations inevitably fail to explain 
the undeniable institutional continuity of Thai society through centuries to the 
present. ... ,191 Consequently, understanding group formation in Thailand requires more 
than Olson's explanation. The Thai political culture, namely the 'patronage system', 
'social hierarchy', bunkhun (a deep sense of obligation based on the Buddhist belief 
system), and vote-buying, all have to be taken into account in order to inform Olson's 
framework. These factors will be used to help examine various impacts on farmers' group 
formation and their relationship with the government. 
In order to study the interactions between interest groups and the government, the 
policy network/community framework is best employed. Rhodes and Marsh conclude that 
'the American literature has concentrated upon the micro-level, dealing with personal 
relations between key actors rather than structural relations between institutions.' 192 The 
focus of the American policy network literature on the sub-governmental level implies a 
relevance to the political participation of Thai farmers, due to its emphasis on personal 
relationships at the micro-level. But the limit on the number of actors involved in the 
policy network framework in the American literature is a problem when applying the 
framework to the Thai case. 
The British framework for the policy network/community provided by Rhodes and 
Marsh is more flexible than the American equivalent. However, its emphasis on the meso-
level of analysis fails to provide a complete explanation with regard to the Thai case. This 
is because it is not reasonable to analyse policy-making in Thailand without taking macro-
level and micro-level analysis into account. In Thailand, popular political participation is 
profoundly affected by the patronage system, where personal connections are essential. 
Moreover, the concentration of decision making within the government requires analysis 
at the macro-level, in order to clarify its relationship with farmers groups. However, 
Dowding argues that 'There is no reason to restrict policy networks to the micro-level and 
190 Olson, M. (1974, Fourth Edition), p.134 
191 Mulder, N. (2000), p.43 
192 Rhodes, R.A.W. and Marsh, D. (1992), p.7 
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there may be wider and more interesting generalizations to be found at the meso- or 
macro-levels. Let empirical research decide this rather than make definition demands at 
the 'theory' stage.' 193 This understanding helps to illustrate that the policy 
network/community can be adapted as an analytical instrument to apply with regard to the 
thesis case studies. 
In order to help provide a clear explanation with regard to the case studies, the 
research has consulted the literature on Japanese and British agricultural interest groups. 
These prove to be useful sources of evidence, as both countries have established and 
powerful agricultural interest groups. Winter notes that 'the NFU played a crucial role in 
the policy formulation process and in facilitating a relatively smooth implementation of 
policy.,194 With regard to Japanese politics, Neary notes that 'The influence of N6ky6 
(the Federation of Agricultural Co-operatives) within the MAFF is great ... At regional 
and national levels the federations push for legislative and bureaucratic decisions 
favourable to agricultural interest and particularly to rice farming. ,195 An understanding of 
the success of these two farmer interest groups would benefit the conceptualisation of the 
study as a contrast to the relative weakness of farmer interest groups in Thailand. 
193 Dowding, K. (1994), p.64 " 
194 Winter, M. (1996) Rural Politics: Policies for Agriculture, Forestry and the EnVIronment, London. 
Routledge, p.127 
195 56 Neary, I. (1995), p. 
Chapter 3 Thai Political Context 
Introduction 
Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political 
action ... it is useful to refer to this as the political culture. 1 
The idea of the political system in every country is unique, and this is because the 
political development in each individual country is distinct. For instance the Western 
democratic framework that has been adopted by most Asian countries is applied 
differently, and each country has experienced variations on this model, in terms of degree 
and characteristics. Never does this reflect an identical pattern of democracy, because 
every country has differences in political background, societal structure, belief systems, 
and culture. These differences contribute a great deal to the development of their political 
systems. Accordingly, the political analytical frameworks adopted in anyone country 
cannot perfectly explain the political system of another country. 
The Western political framework has to be adapted, in order to be applicable, with 
reference to the unique condition of the Thai political arena. Specifically, this is because 
the relationship between the Thai farmers and government has been established in a 
different political and cultural environment to that of the West. In order to solve this 
problem, with regard to the theoretical framework, a cultural adaptation is applied, in 
order to implement the analysis of the case studies under the Western political 
frameworks. 
Almond and Powell state that, 'Political culture is the pattern of individual 
attitudes and orientations toward politics among members of a political system.,2 
Accordingly, Harrison argues that the political obligation, and constitutional roles of 
actors within the political system are a result of the political culture, whereas 'society'S 
1 Almond, G.A. (1956) 'Comparative Political Systems', Journal of Politics, Vo1.l8, August 1956, 391-
409, p.396 . 
2 Almond, G.A. and Powell, G.B. (1966) Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, p.50 
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history, common values, social structure and norms, and commonly recognised symbols, 
are all factors which may be linked with predisposition in a society towards various kinds 
of political beliefs.' 3 
In order to study how the political culture has established within the Thai political 
arena, this chapter will begin the discussion regarding the Thai political history, because 
this will provide fundamental background understanding, with regard to Thai politics and 
its contribution, with respect to the contemporary Thai political culture. The discussion 
regarding Thai political culture is concerned with three main elements, namely, 'the 
concentration of political power', 'money politics', and 'social hierarchy and the 
patronage system'. 
The discussion regarding the concentration of power will focus on the 
examination of the Riggs 'bureaucratic polity' model. This is because the bureaucracy 
has been at the centre of Thai political power since the bureaucratic reforms of King 
Chulalongkorn in the late 1880s. Although, the decline of the bureaucratic polity has 
been observed since the 1970s, it has contributed a great deal to the Thai political culture. 
The power of the bureaucracy in the Thai political history, has had a direct connection to 
the existence of 'money politics' and 'social hierarchy and the patronage system', and 
this connection still exists today. This is because the concept of the bureaucratic polity 
model implies a closed policy network, where bureaucrats and military officials have 
almost absolute power in policy-making. Therefore, actors outside the network must 
establish connections with those already inside the network, in order to gain admission to 
the channels of political access. One of the most common and effective tools in Thai 
politics is money, hence 'money politics'. In the Thai political context, money has been a 
crucial element in sustaining the negative influence of corruption and patronage system. 
These two factors will be used to explain the political behaviour of the political actors 
within the Thai political arena, specifically, the 'military', 'businessmen', 'technocrats' 
and 'Thai farmers'. 
3 Harrison, R.I. (1980) Pluralism and Corporatism: The Political Evolution of Modern Democracies, 
London: George Allen & Unwin, p.16 
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In order to explain the distribution of power amongst the actors, this chapter will 
introduce the concept of the 'policy community' framework. With reference to this, the 
analysis will focus on the co-operation between government and business groups in 
contemporary Thai politics. This is important because the power of businessmen emerged 
as an influential factor, in respect of the Thai political changes of the 1980s. With 
reference to this, this chapter will examine the applicability of the framework, as to 
whether this can provide a full explanation for the relationships between the government 
and businessmen. This will also include an analysis of the impact of this network, on the 
exclusion of Thai farmers from the policy-making process. 
The final section of this chapter will examine the role of the Assembly of the Poor 
as an organisation within Thai civil society. A primary consideration will be to 
investigate as to whether the Assembly of the Poor is a real alternative to the status quo, 
in terms of helping Thai rural farmers to improve their political opportunities. 
Accordingly, the applicability of the policy community model in terms of the relationship 
between the Assembly of the Poor and the Thai government will be considered. When the 
Assembly of the Poor emerged in 1995, the role of civil society was the main area of 
political debate in Thai society. The Assembly of the Poor portrays itself to be the true 
representative of the rural poor people, but are they truly representative? Indeed, the Thai 
government has occasionally accused the Assembly of the Poor of being paid by those 
who oppose the government, in order to protest against the government. 
3.1 Thai Political History 
Historically, Thailand has not been colonised by any other country, which is in 
contrast to all other countries in the southeast Asian region. However, Thailand has not 
always been able to resist unwelcome Western attention. In 1855, King Mongkut, the 
Fourth Rama was compelled to sign the 'Bowring Treaty' in order to avoid a full-scale 
colonisation by the British Empire. The Bowring Treaty contained many unfair elements, 
such as the fixing of import duties at 3 per cent for all commodities, which Britain 
exported into Thailand. This was the lowest level of import duty of all Asian countries at 
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that time. However, the Bowring Treaty also helped speed up the integration of Siam into 
the world trade system.4 Pasuk and Bakers, argue that sugarcane was the first product to 
gain from the Bowring Treaty, in respect to Thailand's exports. The treaty was 
instrumental over this period, when considering the dramatic fifteen years of growth in 
the export of sugarcane. 
In 1885, a group of Western-educated princes and officials submitted a lengthy 
petition to King Chulalongkorn outlining the immediate problems facing Siam6 and 
suggesting that a constitutional monarchy be instituted to help solve these problems. This 
document criticized the excessive centralization of political authority .... It recommended 
that a more broadly-based political structure be established as the only way to save Siam 
from being colonised by the imperialist West. Among other recommendations, the 
petitioners proposed the establishment of an elected parliament although they agreed that 
parliamentary government was not yet an issue of immediate priority. These princes and 
lesser officials argued that the ordinary Siamese people had to be involved in public affairs 
so that 'happiness, progress and justice could be equally enjoyed'. 7 
This understanding helps to reveal how there was an established hierarchy in Thai 
society, which excluded the ordinary people and only began to be addressed during this 
period. In the late 1880s, Thailand began to reform the bureaucracy, beginning with 
partial, gradual modernisation strategies rather than full-scale political reforms. These 
reforms introduced a centralised bureaucratic system, which significantly increased the 
power of government agencies. 8 It is inarguable that the form of power structure, which 
was established at this time, allowed bureaucrats to abuse the state power with ease, and 
to emphasise their own patronage networks. Indeed, Pasuk and Sungsidh assert that King 
Chulalongkorn's bureaucratic reforms can hardly be accepted as a complete replacement 
of the traditional sakdina system, or feudal system. This is because 'the apex of the 
governmental pyramid was still the king. This ensured that relationships within the 
bureaucracy were still very largely tinged by the pre-existing royal and feudal culture.,9 
4 Akira, S. (1996) Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, pp.16-21 
5 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999) Thailand: Economy and Politics, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, p.15 
6 Thailand was known as Siam until 1939. 
7 Chai-Anan Samudavanija (1987a) 'Political History', in Somsakdi Xuto (ed) Government and Politics in 
Thailand, Singapore: Oxford University Press, p.26 
8 Ibid., pp.26-27 
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Full-scale political reforms were delayed until the bloodless revolution, which 
ended the Somburanayasithirath system, or absolute monarchy, during the reign of King 
Prajadhiphok, the Seventh Rama in June 1932, and was led by a self-styled representative 
group, the Khana Rasadorn, or People's Party. The Khana Rasadorn was established by 
a select group of elite, western educated government officials and military officers, 
supported by a military unit in the Bangkok area. Subsequently, this group led the 
country into adopting a new political system where the King was no longer to have 
absolute power and everybody would be subject to the same laws. IO By 10 December 
1932, a permanent constitution was promulgated by the King. However, the King and the 
Thai monarchy still have an informal ability to influence Thai politics up to the present 
day. Hewison argues that the contemporary monarchy is now an important and central 
institution, and political actor. He asserts that King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the Ninth 
Rama, 'has the ability to intervene in the nation's political affairs in a manner which has 
altered the course of events considerably.' 11 
Between 1932 and 1973, was the longest period in which the military dominated 
the Thai political arena. Over this period, either a military government, or an improperly 
elected or quasi-democratic government was relying mainly on the support of the 
military. Moreover, the majority of the prime ministers and cabinet ministers in these 
governments were active or retired civilian bureaucrats and military officers. 12 Funston, 
asserts that 'Various military-dominated governments then prevailed most of the time 
through to the 1970s, aided by the ideology of the Cold War and the accompanying US 
military assistance.' 13 It has been estimated that Thailand rec~ived an enormous amount 
of military aid from the United States during 1970-1972, averaging over US$l 00 million 
9 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan (1994) Corruption & Democracy in Thailand, Chiang 
Mai: Silkworm Books, p.8 
10 Nual-La-Or, Manit (1997) Karn Maung Thai Yook Sunyalak Rat-Thai (The Thai Politics: The Era of 
identity of the Thai State), Bangkok: Rung Raung Rat Printing [in Thai], p. 31-33 
II Hewison, K. (1997) 'The Monarchy and Democratisation', in Hewison, K. (ed) Political Change in 
Thailand: Democracy and Participation, London: Routledge, p.58 
12 Anek Laothamatas (1988) 'Business and Politics in Thailand: New Pattern of Influence', Asian Survey, 
Vol. XXVIII, No.4 April, 1988: 451-470, p.451 
13 Funston, J. (2000) 'Political Reform in Thailand: Real or Imagined?', Asian Journal of Political Science, 
Volume 8, Number 2, December 2000: 89-108, p.90 
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per year. 14 The enforcement of the military's political power severely damaged the 
process of Thai democratisation. When challenged, the military would suppress attempts 
to further this process. 
The confrontation between the university students and the military regime in 
October 1973 was a defining moment in the struggle for democracy in Thailand. In the 
two decades after this confrontation, the Thai political system would become more stable, 
and the excessive influence of Thai bureaucrats declined steadily, in accordance with the 
increasing role of civil society over this period. However, the support of the military 
would still be needed by governments in order to endorse their power, until the May 
unrest of 1992. 
The Thai political system was known as a 'semi-democracy' in the decade after 
the democratic movements of 1973-1977. Under this system, the Thai political structure 
changed significantly. The roles of the urban businessmen became more and more 
important with regard to the country's political system, both directly and indirectly. 15 
Particularly during the period 1986-1996, Thai businessmen undertook an active political 
role in order to ensure that their interests were represented in the policy-making process. 
Several Thai business associations emerged as powerful pressure groups. Consequently, 
the influence of the Thai bureaucratic polity was weakened. 16 Callahan and McCargo 
argue that 'a bureaucratic polity characterized by limited popular participation has been 
challenged in recent years by the manifest rise of civil society. At the same time business 
interests have assumed growing political importance, challenging the traditional pre-
eminence of government officials and military officers.' 17 
14 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999), p.324 
15 Ibid., pp.451-452 
16 Bello, W., Cunningham, S. and Li Kheng Poh (1998) A Siamese Tragedy Development and 
Disintegration in Modern Thailand, London: Zed Books Ltd, p.13 
17 Callahan, W.A. and McCargo, D. (1996) 'Vote-Buying in Thailand's Northeast: The July 1995 General 
Election', Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVI, No.4, April 1996: 376-392, p.376 
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However, Sukhumbhand18 argues that the increasingly pluralistic political arena 
in addition to rapid economic growth in Thailand directly benefits the major political 
parties, since these factors enable these parties to develop connections with extra-
bureaucratic groups and business in particular, at the national, provincial and local levels. 
This creates a favourable political arena for urban businessmen to extend and strengthen 
their connections with government, whereas benefits of the increasingly pluralistic 
political arena going to rural people and farmers in particular is rarely observed. 
Therefore, Gohlert argues that, 'Pluralism, a major element in Western political 
democracy, remains a surface phenomenon in Thailand.' 19 Power was and is still limited 
to the elites. Farmers and other rural people have noticed that it is very hard for them to 
approach government, because bribery is always needed and they cannot afford to offer 
bribes in order to develop personal connections with those who are in positions of power. 
Today, Thai people are very concerned with the idea of decentralisation of power. 
They are hoping that the application of the new constitution, promulgated on 11 October 
19972°, can bring the Thai society into a new political era, with equality for all. The 
origins of this process, which resulted in the 1997 Constitution, were the events of the 
May unrest of 1992, where the urban middle-class challenged the military regime, under 
Prime Minister Suchinda Kraprayoon. This experience had a substantial impact on 
contemporary political reforms in Thailand. The event helped to increase popular 
political awareness, not only in urban areas but in rural areas too. Since this occasion, the 
people have demanded more decentralisation of political power, and Thai academics such 
as Prawase Wasi21 , have strongly suggested an increasing role for Thai civil society in 
order to balance the state power. The concentration of political power has an established 
history, with respect to Thailand, throughout the history of the country. The 
democratisation of Thailand, which began in 1932, has not to date effectively changed the 
structures within the political arena, and how it is distributed between the involved actors. 
18 Sukhumbhand Paribatra (1993) 'State and Society in Thailand: How Fragile the Democracy?" Asian 
Survey, Vol. XXXIII, No.9, September 1993: 879-893, pp.882-883 . 
19 Gohlert, E. W. (1991) Power and Culture: The Struggle Against Poverty in Thailand, Bangkok: WhIte 
Lotus, p.16 
20 Pari chart Siwaraksa, Chaowana Traimas and Ratha Vayagool (1997) Thai Constitutions in Brief, 
Bangkok: Institute of Public Policy Studies, p.I 
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That this process has not yet achieved a fully realised democratisation within Thailand 
has enabled bureaucrats to maintain their influence over the Thai political arena. This can 
be explained through the particular historical background of Thailand specifically, the 
way in which political power was concentrated at the centre. As a consequence, the 
formation of policy communities between the government and interest groups are limited 
to those interest groups, which have closed connections with elite bureaucrats and 
politicians, through the patronage system. 
3.2 Concentration of Thai Political Power 
It is 71 years since Thailand adopted the Western democratic framework, in order 
to help to redistribute political power amongst its people. Since then, Thai people might 
have experienced more freedom and political opportunity, as the main concern of the 
Western democratic framework is of 'a variety of individual rights - of free speech, 
association, the suffrage and so on .... ,22 However, there is no strong evidence to support 
the argument that the Thai people are more able to enjoy a substantial improvement in 
their freedom and political opportunity than before the reforms took place in 1932, and 
this is a result of the enduring high concentration of political power. Indeed, the political 
power was never truly redistributed. Instead, it has only been transferred indirectly, from 
the Thai monarchy to the Thai political elite. In Riggs' opinion, 'The absolute monarchy 
was overthrown, and the center of power moved from the throne into the hands of a 
ruling circle of commoners. ,23 With reference to this, a small number within the political 
elite, namely bureaucrats and military officials, find it easy to abuse power for their own 
interests. 
The concentration of political power in Thailand has been described as a unique 
case. Accordingly, Riggs offers a specific analytical model of 'bureaucratic polity' to 
21 Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 30 July 1998, at www.bangkokpost.net Retrieved on 19 November 2001 
22 Beetham, D. (1996) 'Theorising Democracy and Local Government', in King, D. and Stoker, G. (eds) 
Rethinking Local Democracy, London: Macmillan, p.29 ..' 
23 Riggs, F. W. (1966) 'The Bureaucratic Polity as a Working System in ThaIland', In Ravenhtll, J. (ed) 
Political Economy of East Asia 3: Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines and Thailand, Volume 
II, Aldershot: Edward Elgar publishing Limited, p.303 
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explain it. This model was most accepted with regard to explaining the nature of the Thai 
policy-making process from the 1960s to the early 1970s. If the ' bureaucratic polity ' 
model assumes that 'power rests fundamentally, in the Thai polity, in the bureaucracy, 
then it is not surprising that development project should arise within the ministries, nor is 
it surprising that they should not reflect any ground swell of popular demand from the 
provinces. ,24 According to Riggs, 'Of 237 men who served in Thai cabinets between 
1932 and 1958, a total of 184 may be classified as career officials, compared with 38 
who were not nonofficials . An additional 15 men cannot be classified at present in either 
category because adequate information is not available. Of the career officials, 100 were 
civil servants and 84 were military officers. (Emphasis added)'25 
Figure 3-1: Distribution of Power in Power Elite and Bureaucratic Polity Models 
Elite Elite Bureaucrats and military officials 
Bureaucrats with connection to elite 
Mass of Population Mass of Population 
A: Power Elite Model B: Bureaucratic Polity Model 
Source: Developed from the figure illustrating elitist and pluralist views of power in Hague, R. , Harrop , M. 
and Breslin, S. (1992, Third Edition), p .15 
Theoretically, the notion of 'bureaucratic polity ' implies some shared elements 
with the notion of 'power elite' . Fundamentally, these two theories place an emphasis on 
the analysis of the concentration of the political power with reference to a small number 
of elite. The elitist theorists argue that the abuse of political power by the elite groups can 
be regarded as an obstacle of real democracy, 'in the full sense of government by (and not 
just for) the people. ,26 Similarly, the bureaucratic polity model exists to explain the power 
of the Thai bureaucrats and military officials who adversely affect Thai democratisation. 
24 Ib·d 1 ., p .312 
25 Ib·d 1 ., p.295 
26 Hague, R. , Harrop, M. and Breslin, S. (1992, Third Edition) Comparative Government and Politics: An 
Introduction, London: Macmillan, p .13 
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The distribution of political power is illustrated through a pyramid model, in the 
perspective of the elitist theorist, with a small group of key military, economic and 
political leaders located at the top of the pyramid as illustrated in figure 3-1A. These 
groups control all major decision making in most policy areas, in order to secure their 
own interests.27 The explanation can also describe the distribution of power within the 
bureaucratic polity model in figure 3-1B. In addition to the power elite model 
explanation, the bureaucratic polity model also suggests the existence of lower rank 
bureaucrats with strong connections to the elite as a result of the hierarchical system. As 
Riggs explains: 
The bureaucracy as a ruling group, therefore, constituted, but a tiny fraction of the 
total population. At its core were the dozen or two who, at any given time, were cabinet 
members. The next larger circle consisted of perhaps a thousand special-grade and high 
military officers, followed by another two or three thousand men holding key 
administrative posts, being drawn gradually closer to the inner circle. Outside this circle 
one found more than 25,000 career men with good prospects, the rank-and-file 
administrators, all of whom expected to move up gradually in term of salary and status, 
and some of whom expected, in due time to join the more influential and rewarding inner 
circle.28 
However, neither the bureaucratic polity model nor the power elite model can 
adequately explain the distribution of the political power in Thailand from the early 
1980s onwards. This is because of the major political uprising by approximately ten 
thousand students in 1973. This event changed the nature of Thai politics forever, and 
was described as a great challenge to the military regime and was indeed acknowledged 
as the beginning of the Thai political transition.29 This led the increase in the role of 
'extra-bureaucratic groups, such as business groups and technocrats. According to 
Hewison, 'By the 1980s, however, analysts came to regard 'bureaucratic polity' as an 
inappropriate description of a society experiencing rapid growth and massive social 
change. The rise of a powerful and increasingly independent business class and the 
decline of the military contradicted the modeL ... Analysts saw the bureaucratic polity 
27 Greenwald, C. S. (1977) Group Power: Lobbying & Public Policy, New York: Praeger Publishers, p. 300 
28 Riggs, F. W. (1966), p.311 
29 Doner, R.F. and Anek Laothamatas (1994) 'Thailand: Economic and Political Gradualism', in Haggard, 
S. and Webb, S.B. (eds) Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalisation, and Economic 
Adjustment, Oxford: Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press, pp.416-416 
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being replaced by a system where business had far more autonomy.,30 Chai-Anan31 
argues that Riggs had already observed a direct relationship between the military and 
businessmen, but Riggs did not emphasise this relationship in his study in relation to 
bureaucratic polity. 
However, to completely ignore the examination of this relationship would be to 
misunderstand the situation, since the role of Chinese-Thai businessmen has been explicit 
throughout Thai history. Akira32 notes that those businessmen had already asserted their 
economic power over government policymaking through personal connections. Military 
officials and other bureaucrats were invited to become board members and shareholders 
of Chinese-Thai owned firms in the 1950s. This is normal business practice in Thailand. 
This practice has become a pattern for elite politicians and bureaucrats to establish their 
wealth, and continues today. This process in tum allows businessmen to establish 
channels of influence within the policy-making process. It can be argued that the network 
of the policy-making process of the 1950s did leave some space for interest groups to 
participate. Nevertheless, farmers groups were not included, since they were politically 
and economically weak. 
Although the decline of the bureaucratic polity has been viewed as a positive sign 
with regard to the Thailand's democratisation, the distribution of political power is still 
concentrated amongst the political elite and their business partners. This is because of the 
lack of democracy at the provincial and local levels. However, in 1994 the administrative 
structure at the local government level began the process of decentralisation, and this 
offered hope to farmers groups in their attempts to increase their level of political 
participation. In accordance with the Tambon Administrative Organisation Act of 1994, 
the existing sub-district councils (sapha tambon) were upgraded nation-wide to Ongkan 
borihan suan tambon (Or Bar Tor), or Tambon (Sub-district) Administrative 
30 Rewison, K. (200Ib) 'Thailand: Class Matters', Working Papers Series No.8, May 2001, South East 
Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong, p.4 
3) Chai-Anan Samudavanija (1 987b), p.97 
32 Akira, S. (1996), p.l37 
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Organisations (TAO) between 1994-1997.33 The mam aIm of initiating TAOs is to 
decentralise administrative power from Bangkok to the local level, and to enable the local 
people to solve their own problems with the expectation that they can more effectively 
serve themselves. Indeed, it is believed that problems should be solved by local people, 
rather than those from the centralised bureaucracy who have a limited understanding of 
local issues. 
However, after almost a decade of TAOs, there has not been a significant change 
in the quality of living for people in rural areas, because the TAO committees have 
lacked absolute administrative authority, and final decisions are still made by the central 
government. According to a study of TAOs by the World Bank, with respect to rural 
development in Thailand, 'they remain extremely weak, lack transparency in decision 
making, and require significant capacity building before becoming meaningful agents of 
rural development and community participation. ,34 As was reported, a survey by the 
Ministry of the Interior, in relation to the operation of all 6,745 TAOs in 75 provinces, 
stated that 3,423 TAOs (50.75 per cent) failed to meet the government standards, due to a 
severe level of corruption. In the report, it was also claimed that politicians at the 
grassroots level operate in the most corrupt manner. 35 
Similarly, Kowit36 also sees the lack of transparency and the level of corruption as 
the main obstacles, with regard to the development of the TAO structure and of 
democracy at the local level. He argues that the operation of the TAO structure is on the 
basis of a bureaucratic system, which is a disrupting influence. Although the TAO 
structure was established with respect to concept of civil society, the government exhibits 
a dominant control over its operational function. Accordingly, it is arguable that the 
TAOs perform like any another government agency, rather than being an organisation, 
33 Nelson, M.H. (2000) Local Government Reform in Thailand with Some Comparative Perspectives, 
Bangkok: Center for the Study of Thai Politics and Democracy [CSTPD], King Prajadhipok's Institute, p.5 
34 Rural Development and Natural Resource Sector Unit of the World Bank (2000) Beyond the Crisis: A 
Strategy for Renewing Rural Development in Thailand, Bangkok: World Bank, p.9 
35 Prachachart Business (Internet Edition), 3 April 2002, at www.matichon.co.th [in Thai] Retrieved on 6 
April 2002 
36 Kowit Poung-ngam (2001) 'Naewnome Or Bor Tor nai anakot (Tendency of the TAO in the Future)" 
Siam Rath Weekly Review, 23-29 March 2001 [in Thai], p.40 
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operated by and for the people. 'As dominant rural groups are becoming state 
functionaries, their position is increasingly determined by more powerful agents of the 
state. ,37 
The results achieved by TAOs have improved little since the upgrading of the 
sapha tambon to the TAO structure, where these locally-based organisations only act in 
response to the central government influence, rather than the needs of the rural people. 
Turton argues, 'At times, in previous years, sub district projects were required to 
correspond with province level development plans. In some cases the sapha tam bon had 
as little as one week to respond to official directives. Yet the council still has no 
independent source of revenue or independence as a district legal entity. ,38 Tanet39 
suggests that the government should offer more opportunity for the people to work with 
the TAOs and decrease the state's power over the TAOs, otherwise a real decentralisation 
of political power will not be seen in Thailand. 
3.3 Money Politics: Corruption and Vote-buying 
Thai politics is characterized by a vicious cycle spawned by the need for money. 
Because political positions are acquired largely through vote-buying, candidates are 
expected to accumulate fund from campaign donations. To be able to buy votes 
effectively, candidates need to be generous and maintain strong connections with local 
and provincial canvassers. Once elected, that individual has to protect the interests of his 
or her voting power base, and so must raise money to pay for future campaign cost.40 
In Thailand, people recognise that corruption and vote-buying are embedded at 
the root of Thai politics. Corruption and vote buying are intrinsically linked. Several 
studies have revealed that vote buying is one of the main causes of the severe problem of 
corruption in the country's political system. These studies have also demonstrated that 
corruption and bribery are deeply embedded at every level of the bureaucracy and of the 
37 Hart, G. (1989) 'Agrarian Change in the Context of the State Patronage', in Turton, A., Hart, G., and 
White, B. (eds) Agrarian Transformations, Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, p.36 
38 Turton, A. (1987) Production, Power and Participation in Rural Thailand: Experiences of Poor 
Farmers' Groups, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, p.84 
39 Interview with Dr Tanet Charoenmuang 
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political system. 'Corruption in Thai politics is nothing new. Corruption charges and 
corruption cases have been an intermittent feature of Thai politics scene for many years,' 
say Pasuk and Sungsidh.41 
It is difficult to say whether it is vote buying, which causes corruption, or whether 
it is corruption, that causes vote buying. These problems are linked in a downward spiral. 
Corruption and vote buying are not unique problems to Thailand, since they have and do 
occur in most developed and developing countries. However, in developing countries, it 
is generally more ofa problem than in developed countries. Nevertheless the nature of the 
Thai culture may make these problems to some extent, more difficult to resolve than in 
other countries. The formation of the patronage system, which is a factor in many 
personal relationships, has worsened the problem, since it reinforces the patronage 
network. Undoubtedly, rural people are exploited as a result. 
Although, it is believed that there is a level of corruption in every government of 
Thailand, according to the data represented in table 3-1 and table 3-2, the most obvious 
case was the corruption of the administration of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, in 
the period of August 1988 - February 1991. According to Kulick and Wilson, 'Prime 
Minister Chatichai, who was a regular target for allegations of corruption, would 
sometimes reply: "Where is the evidence? Where are the receipts?" These transactions 
are, by there very nature almost impossible to prove .... '42 In the media the Chatichai 
administration became known as the 'Buffet Cabinet' government. The heavy corruption 
in the Chatichai government led to the coup of February 1991, by the military regime 
(which later called itself the National Peace Keeping Council, or NPKC). The NPKC 
used the level of government corruption as the justification for the coup, by citing this 
corruption in the Chatichai government as an obstacle to economic development. 
40 Bidhya Bowomwathana (2000a) 'Thailand in 1999: A Royal Jubilee, Economic Recovery, and Political 
Reform', Asian Survey, Vol. XL, No.1, January/February 2000: 87-97, p.94 
41 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan (1994), p.1 . 
42 Kulick, E. and Wilson, D. (1992) Thailand's Turn: Profile ola New Dragon, London: MacmIllan, p.37 
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Table 3-1 Estimated Value of Corruption by Bureaucrats (million baht/year) 
Sanya-
Ministry Sarit Thanom Kriangsak Prem Chatichai 
Government Government Government Government Government 
1960-63 1964-73 1974-81 1981-88 1988-90 
Interior 20 68 232 430 1148 
Agriculture 44 20 720 1566 2194 
Education 28 92 352 1102 1072 
Communication 68 366 960 1596 2512 
Public health 8 32 144 280 364 
Others 108 420 1584 2144 4388 
Total 272 1180 3996 7120 11676 
As % of budget 2.77 5.34 4.93 3.59 4.05 
As % ofGDP 0.44 0.90 0.84 0.70 0.66 
Note: The corruption amount is estimated as 20 per cent of the ministry budget for capital items and 
purchase of materials and equipment. 
Source: Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan (1994), p.38 
Table 3-2 Assets Seized from Leading Politicians on Grounds of Corruption (million baht) 
1. Seized assets 
2. Average per year 
3. (1) as % of capital 
expenditure in budget 
4. (1) as % of annual 
government budget 
5. (1) as % ofGDP 
Sarit 
1957-63 
604 
86.3 
6.3 
0.9 
0.14 
Thanom 
Prapat 
1964-73 
600 
60.0 
1.0 
0.3 
0.05 
Source: Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan (1994), p.40 
Chatichai 
+ministers 
1988-90 
1900 
633.3 
1.1 
0.2 
0.04 
Chatichai 
Alone 
1988-90 
284 
94.8 
0.2 
0.03 
0.01 
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Indeed, during the Chatichai government, the Thai economy had a very high 
profile. In fact, the average growth rate of the economy was over 10 per cent per year.43 
The GDP grew by as much as 13.2 per cent in 1988, falling only marginally to 12.0 per 
cent in 1989, and to 10.0 per cent in 1990, although the rate had fallen back to 7.9 per 
cent by 1991.44 The fast growing nature of the economy over this period is another 
explanation for the high rate of corruption in the Thai economy at that time. The 
government initiated many projects involving high levels of expenditure, which allowed 
elite bureaucrats and politicians to exploit these projects with the use of bribery. Several 
projects were distributed amongst the businessmen who had close personal connections 
with those particular elite politicians and bureaucrats. Virat Watthanasiri45 of the 
committee of the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) views the particular 
social structure of Thai society as an explanatory factor in the relatively high level of 
corruption. He has stated that various forms of relationship, notably family relationships 
or personal relationships, or even krengchai (mindfulness and reserve) in Thai society, tend 
to promote corruption, particularly in the bureaucratic system. 
There is an open awareness within Thai society that many elite bureaucrats and 
politicians generate their assets through bribery. This form of corruption does not take 
place at the stage of policy implementation. Rather, it starts at the stage of policy 
formation. It is argued that 'almost all projects with budget set aside were "occupied" by 
cronies of state officials ... Newcomers would find it hard to win a project as official 
would make every effort to block their entry. ,46 This helps to illustrate how corruption 
can operate effectively in Thai society as a result of the patronage system, since many 
government officials tend to abuse state power for personal gain. 
43 Far Eastern Economic Review (1992) Asia 1992 Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic Review, p.209 
44 Bank of Thailand (1990) Annual Economic Report 1990, Bangkok: Bank of Thailand, 
Bank of Thailand (1991) Annual Economic Report 1991, Bangkok: Bank of Thailand, 
Bank of Thailand (1997) Annual Economic Report 1997, Bangkok: Bank of Thailand, 
Bank of Thailand (1998) Annual Economic Report 1998, Bangkok: Bank of Thailand 
45 Matichon Weekly (Internet Edition), 28 August 2000, at 
http://202.183 .211.5/weekly/weekly.asp?selectdate=2000108/28&stid=674 Retrieved on 1 January ~OO 1 
46 Amornrat Mahitthirook Onnucha Hutasingh and Anjira Assavanonda (2000) 'Graft Rots Fabnc of the 
Nation: Everyone Takes a'Slice, From Ministers to Junior-Level Staff', Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 14 
September 2000, at www.bangkokpost.netitoday/140900_NewsOl.html Retrieved on 14 September 2000 
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As was reported in relation to a Thai Chamber of Commerce University survey, 
approximately 79 per cent of the businessmen surveyed said that it was not uncommon to 
bribe bureaucrats. About 57 per cent of the total engaged in kha nam ron nam cha or 'tea 
money' or bribes, in order to ensure that they would be awarded contracts. The level of 
bribery varied depending on the value of the project. The businessmen surveyed said that 
they included the bribes within their investment costs. The survey also revealed that the 
businessmen would be willing to pay an additional 12.5 per cent in tax if it would 
eradicate the problem of corruption.47 They believed that some of the bribes received 
were meant for vote-buying in the following elections, or were compensation for the 
costs of the previous elections. 
You have to pay for votes ... That's the way it is here. If you don't it could be very 
hard to get elected.48 
- Samuen Janmanee, a kamnan, in the province ofUdon Ratchathani, the Isan region-
The political implication is a severe level of vote-buying in Thailand. The 
fundamental explanations for vote buying are poverty, a low level of education, and an 
lack of political awareness. Particularly with regard to the problem of poverty, during the 
general election of 1995, it was reported that in the Isan region (the northeastern region 
of Thailand), many people considered vote-buying to be a way of earning a little extra 
income from the organisers. Supporters of some MP candidates were offering to pay as 
much as 3,000 baht for a household of several eligible voters, with payments to 
individual voters ranging from 200 to 700 baht. Indeed, between 100,000 and 200,000 
baht could buy a whole village. Vote-buying was concentrated in the period 2 days before 
the election.49 In the northern region, candidates paid between 50 baht and 500 baht per 
head. In the province of Chiang Mai, some voters received payments of up to 1,000 baht 
47 The Nation (Internet Edition), 29 August 2000, at 
http://electricasia.com!backissue/Tuesday/headline.shtml?Tuesday&29082000&hd5.txt Retrieved on 29 
August 2000 
48 Fairclough, G. (1995a) 'Town and Country: New Political Party Aims to Bridge Rural-Urban Gap', Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 2 February 1995, p.20 
49 Murray, D. (1996) 'The 1995 National Elections in Thailand: A Step Backward for Democracy?', Asian 
Survey, Vol. XXXVI, No.4, April 1996: 361-375, p.368 
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for their votes. It is estimated that more than US$ 1 billion was spent on vote-buying in 
the 1995 elections alone. so 
Vote-buying can take other, more subtle forms than buying directly from voters. 
Electoral candidates may, instead, make donations to local temples or village groups. For 
instance, during the election campaign in 1995, Amnuay Virawan, the Nam Thai Party's 
leader, spent heavily on his campaign in the Isan region. It is reported that he made many 
large donations to Buddhist temples and offered food and clothing for free. In one 
instance he donated 140,000 baht to build living quarters for monks at a temple in the 
province of Khon Kaen. Kamnan Samuen Janmanee says 'I think Mr Amnuay has a 
bright future in politics ... He's very generous. ,SI This explicitly demonstrates how Thai 
politicians can attempt to legitimise their vote-buying schemes to make them more 
acceptable to local people, and also how local people can be very receptive to this form of 
vote-buying. With reference to the general election in January 2001, money remained the 
crucial element in the winning of elections by candidates. As was reported, there was a 
suggestion that 'candidates handed out so much money ... Gifts of food and clothing were 
so abundant that poor laborers could assemble new wardrobes and stock their pantries for 
months.,s2 
Many academics have argued that poor education is at the root of every structural 
problem in Thai society. Poor levels of education have been an obstacle against political 
development for many years, because it creates the opportunity for vote-buying. 
Politicians find that vote-buying practices easily mobilised in rural areas, where people's 
education is generally inferior to those living in urban areas. Since, 'those with higher 
educational attainment seem to have a greater sense of political efficacy. ,S3 Callahan and 
McCargo note that 'rural voters with limited education often feel obligated to candidates 
50 Vatikiotis, M. and Fairclough, G. (1996) 'Mission Impossible', Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 
November 1996, p.16 
51 Fairclough, G. (1995a), pp.19-20 
52 Rajive Chandrasekaran (2001) 'Stopping Traditional Gifts, Thailand Tries to Halt Custom of Vote-
buying', International Herald Tribune, 3 January 2001, p.3 
53 Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. (1997) The Protest Business? Mobilizing Campaign Groups, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, p.ll1 
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who have made payments to them and are inclined to support them at the ballot box. ,54 
Furthermore, uneducated or poorly educated people generally take lower income jobs. 
People earning less than they need to pay for essential items are soon in debt, and debt is 
a serious problem for Thai farmers. It is estimated that by 1998/1999, 55.32 per cent of 
agricultural households were indebted as shown in table 3-3. Many political parties have 
attempted to show their concern, with regard to farmers' debts. Debt relief programs have 
become a policy of many political parties, in order to gain popularity amongst the rural 
vote. Although, many people still believe that debt relief programs are difficult to 
implement, they took the Thai Rak Thai Party (TR T: Thai Loves Thai) to victory in the 
elections of January 2001. 
Table 3-3 Percentage of Agricultural Households in Debt as a Proportion of the Total Number of 
Agricultural Households Between 1970/1971-1998/1999 
Item 1970171 1971172 1976177 1978179 1980/81 1982/83 1986/87 1988/89 1990/91 1991/92 1995/96 1998/99 Increasing 
rate % 
Households 3,645,000 3,787,000 3,974,000 4,378,000 4,468,000 4,689,000 5,030,000 5,040,132 5,073,471 5,130,531 5,502,782 5,513,855 
Indebted-
Households 1,662,000 1,038,000 1,550,000 1,914,265 1,131,702 1,176,137 1,129,091 1,279,000 1,408,000 1,729,831 2,857,993 3,050,412 
Indebted-
Household 
(per cent) 45.60 27.41 39.00 43.72 25.33 25.08 22.45 25.38 27.75 33.72 51.94 55.32 
Source: Agricultural Economics Association of Thailand under the Royal Patronage in associate with The 
Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives (2000) 'Neesin kasetakom krai dolae (Who is responsible for 
farmers' debts?)', unpublished document for the seminar on farmers' debt, 7 September 2000, Central 
Grand Plaza Hotel, Bangkok [in Thai] 
Local wealthy people provide many of the loans in the rural areas. Sometimes, 
these people are called jao pho (the godfather) or phu mi itthiphon (men of influence). 
Hundreds jao pho and phu mi itthiphon actively participate within the Thai political arena 
by developing their personal relationships with politicians. Jao pho, who are not 
themselves politicians, can nevertheless help to secure an MPs' seat in the House of 
Representatives by determining the voting behaviour within their area of influence. Jao 
pho and the MPs have a reciprocal relationship, and the connections betweenjao pho and 
the politicians, who include some elite military officials and bureaucrats, allow jao pho to 
54 Callahan, W. A. and McCargo, D. (1996), p.379 
1.53 
2.21 
0.67 
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'maintain their status above the law in order to further their business interests, both legal 
and illegal. ,55 Sombat also agrees, with regard to this point. He asserts that 'Elected 
Politicians became another source of protection for the chao pho56, while the chao pho 
supplied finances and organization for the campaign efforts of the elected politicians. ,57 
With regard to the patronage system, the relationships between jao pho, politicians, and 
rural people, is a mainstream characteristic in Thai society. Rural people are powerless to 
prevent their own exploitation under the patronage ofjao pho and elite politicians. 
Thai political studies suggest that electoral candidates cannot simply approach a 
village in order to buy up the votes from the villagers. Vatikiotis and Fairclough argue 
that 'To be successful, MPs ... must enlist the help of influential locals who, because of 
their position in the community, are able to deliver votes. Known as hua khanaen, or 
heads of voters ... ,58 Similarly, Sombat claims that in order to secure their victory in the 
election, those electoral candidates must build up their own election network. 'This 
network is made up of those hua khanaen, or 'voting chiefs' able to influence the votes of 
the villagers ... the hua khanaen system has long been a part of local elections .... 59 
Additionally, Anek60 asserts that local patronage networks within small 
parliamentary constituencies implement the operation of vote-buying in rural areas. Thus, 
personal connections with either jao pho or kamnan are needed. Many jao pho began as 
kamnan, and in many cases, kamnan were involved in the electoral system as hua 
khanaen because of their large financial resources and personal connections with the 
local villagers. The political participation of kamnan is illegal because they are 
government officials, yet this is nevertheless widespread. 61 This is the case because most 
of hua khanaen have strong connections with politicians, and they believe that the 
55 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan (1994),pp.58-59 
56 The tenn chao pho is equivalent to the termjao pho. It is a preference of the author of the original work 
to spell it that way. However, through out the thesis the term jao pho is used in order to maintain the 
consistency. 
57 Sombat Chantomvong (2000) 'Local Godfathers in Thai Politics', in McVey, R. (ed) Money & Power in 
Provincial Thailand, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS] and Silkwonn Books, p.83 
58 Vatikiotis, M. and Fairclough, G. (1996), pp.l6-17 
59 S ombat Chantomvong (2000), p.83 
60 Fairclough, G. (1995a), p.20 
61 Vatikiotis, M. and Fairclough, G. (1996), p.l7 
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political patronage of politicians can secure their interests. Accordingly, they can ignore 
the fact that their political participation is in breach of the law. 
The notorious jao pho of the province of Chonburi, 'Kamnan Bo' or Somchai 
Khunpluem, has a strong political connection to the Chart Thai Party. He has been 
strongly backing his son's political career, and his son, Sontaya Khunpluem is a Chat 
Thai Party MP, who is a Minister of Science in the Thaksin Government. This is evidence 
in support of the argument of Pasuk, Sungsidh, and Sombat, with regard to the influential 
role of jao pho in the Thai political arena. Additionally, hua khanaen do not have to be 
kamnan. Hua khanaen, could in fact be anyone with itthiphon (influence) and barami 
(charisma) or those who hold a respectable position in society. However, in most cases 
hua khanaen are people with itthiphon, since itthiphon enables hua khanaen to work 
effectively in controlling votes for specific electoral candidates. 
With regard to the dictation of local voting behaviour by jao pho, they introduce 
the notion of bunkhun to remind local people of their generosity when they were lent 
money. Indeed, it could be argued that what jao pho used, was more like itthiphon or 
influence, rather than the idea of bunkhun. According to Callahan and McCarg062 
bunkhun refers to indebtedness, with respect to the benevolence of others. Indeed 
bunkhun implies a deep sense of obligation between the two parties, on the basis of a 
reciprocal relationship. Moreover, they argue that bunkhun can be considered to be the 
predominant factor, with respect to vote-buying. This is because bunkhun 'implies the 
presence or absence of a moral element in the relationship. ,63 
Callahan and McCargo also relate their argument with respect to this issue, to the 
influence of Buddhism in Thai society. This factor is important because 90 per cent of 
people in Thailand are adherents to Buddhism. Thus, it can be argued that 'Many devout 
Buddhists, especially older people, believe that failing to vote for a candidate who had 
62 Callahan, W. A. and McCargo, D. (1996), p.379 
63 Mulder, N. (2000) Inside Thai Society: Religion Everyday Life Change, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 
p.4S 
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paid them must be a bab-an act of demerit. ,64 However, observations on contemporary 
Thai politics suggest little relevance to the concept of bab with regard to the increasing 
phenomenon of vote-buying. Itthiphon seems to play a more significant role in this 
matter, since itthiphon of jao pho and hua khanaen refers to their illegal power. 
Accordingly, once voters have received money from them, they will not risk their own 
lives challenging these powers. Moreover, rural poverty appears more relevant when 
explaining the enduring nature of vote-buying in Thailand. Murray argues that Isan 
people perceive it as another source of household income during the election.65 With 
regard to this matter, it can be argued that they vote for the candidate, who pays them, in 
order to show their loyalty, because they may hope for more money in the next election. 
Accordingly, in this context, concerns regarding bab are of little importance. 
The structural and cultural factors in Thai society are perceived as crucial 
elements when analysing the problems, with respect to corruption and vote-buying in 
Thailand. These problems are very complicated, and the government believed that the 
solution should come from those at the grassroots of the societal structure. There were 
serious attempts to improve rural people's lives through education and economic 
development in the rural areas. The government believes that improving the quality of 
people's lives would lead to a reduction in corruption and vote-buying. 
MacDonald is right to argue that the operation of money politics in Thailand is a 
result of its ineffective legal system and its informal networks.66 However, after the 
introduction of the 1997 Constitution, the government launched many anti corruption and 
anti vote-buying schemes, including the NCCC, in an attempt to cleanse Thai politics of 
these problems. These schemes have been partially effective, for instance, in dealing with 
the case of the powerful politician Major-General Sanan Kachornprasart, the secretary-
general of the Democratic Party and the Minister of Interior in the Chuan government of 
November 1997 - February 200l. In an investigation, he was found to have fabricated a 
64 Callahan, W. A. and McCargo, D. (1996), p.379 
65 Murray, D. (1996), pp.368-369 
66 MacDonald, S.B. (1998) 'Transparency in Thailand's 1997 Economic Crisis', Asian Survey, Vol. 
XXXVIII, No.7, July 1998: 688-702, p.692 
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45-milIion-baht loan in his ministerial declaration of assets and liabilities, by the 
Constitution Court working with the Election Commission and the NCCC. As a result of 
this investigation, on 10 August 2000 the Constitution Court reached a unanimous guilty 
verdict against Major-General Sanan, and forced him to suspend his political career for 
five years from 2000-2005, in accordance with the new election laws of the 1997 
Constitution.67 'This was the first time a minister had been forced out by legal process. 
And this is not any minister, but the second most powerful post in the cabinet, and the 
political manager of the ruling coalition. One Thai paper headlined the event as a 
"revolution". ,68 
Thai people are not without hope when contemplating the state of their country's 
politics. They believe that that MPs are more likely than before to be the representatives 
of the people. However there are still politicians with vested interests due to embedded 
money politics and cronyism. Correspondingly, Montesano argues that the appointments 
to the cabinet in the Thaksin government, 'signalled a continued reliance on the money 
politics of the recent past.69 The survival of money politics is undeniably a result of the 
hierarchical characteristic in Thai society, which enables the patronage system to operate 
effectively. According to Rose-Ackerman, the realm of vote-buying in money politics 
occurs when politicians accept illegal campaign contributions from supporters then use 
these contributions in order to payoff voters on an individual basis. 'These systems are 
nominally democratic, but they have much in common with older traditions of 
patronage. ,70 Thus, social hierarchy and patronage are to be discussed in more detail in 
order to clarify their connections to corruption and vote-buying, which would help to 
explain the political weakness of Thai farmers considered in the thesis. 
67 Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 11 August 2000, at 
http://www.bangkokpost.netlll0800/110800_NewsO l.html Retrieved on 11 August 2000 
68 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (2000) Thailand's Crisis, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, p.131 
69 Montesano, M.J. (2002) 'Thailand in 2001: Learning to Live With Thaksin?', Asian Survey, Vol. XLII, 
No.1, lanuarylFebruary 2002: 90-99, p.91 
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3.4 Social Hierarchy and the Patronage System 
In Thai political culture, socialization processes seem to instil faith in people. 
Thais have been taught to respect, obey, or trust persons according to their birth, age, and 
merit. Within the family, unquestionable deference is due in terms of relative age; 
outside, it is due in terms of age, nobility, wealth, power, knowledge, and religious or 
governmental position.71 
This explanation typically reflects the interactions amongst individuals throughout 
everyday life in Thai society, in which the social hierarchy is clearly defined. The 
hierarchical characteristic is one of the main elements in Thai society, and its strong 
influence on the development of the Thai political culture is undeniable. Thinapan 72 
claims that traditional beliefs are extremely influential in contemporary Thai political life. 
An obedient society with clearly defined hierarchical relationships, generations of Thai 
people have been taught to respect those in a position of seniority, in terms of age, socio-
economic status, social class and education. Therefore, electoral candidates who are 
supported by local leaders or kamnan, the schoolteacher, or the abbot of the local temple, 
are able to gain support from villagers.73 This system is having an adverse impact on the 
development of the Thai political culture. 
Historically, the intense social hierarchy is a result of the sakdina system in 
Thailand, which allow aristocrats and elite bureaucrats to maintain their superior status 
over ordinary Thais. Mark, notes that 'The Sakdina system in Thailand was a system of 
social hierarchy in place officially until this century, with remnants still existing in 
different parts of contemporary Thai society.' 74 Although, the sakdina system does not 
formally exist in contemporary Thai politics, the patronage system can be perceived as a 
modem form of the traditional sakdina system. The patronage system reflects the vertical 
relationship of the Thai hierarchical structure, and in addition reflects the implication of 
70 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999) Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.137 
71 Thinapan Nakata (1987) 'Political Culture: Problem of Development of Democracy', in Somsakdi Xuto 
(ed) Government and Politics in Thailand, Singapore: Oxford University Press, p.181 
72 Ibid., p.168 
73 Callahan, W. A. and McCargo, D. (1996), p.379 
74 Mark Tamthai (2001) 'Thailand: Sakdina System and Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy' at 
www.ahrchk.netlhrsolidimainfile.phpI1999vo109n0611018/ Retrieved on 27 August 2002 
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inequality between actors in the patronage system, as experienced in the hierarchical 
structure. 
Thailand has integrated itself into the world political and economIC arenas, 
however social hierarchy still remains a crucial element. This enables the Thai political 
elite to maintain their political and economic privilege effectively. As Thinapan suggests, 
'In the Thai system, the value of personal equality or egalitarianism tends to be absent 
and there is no institutionalized concept of individual rights.' 75 The concept of the 
Western democratic model offers human rights, which have not yet been incorporated in 
to the Thai case. Accordingly, this helps to explain the continuing adverse treatment of 
the rural farmers by government. 
Prior to the student uprising of 1976, popular resistance against the state power 
was rarely seen. 'Thais react to leadership problems not with open resistance, but with 
passive evasion.' 76 This is the Thai cultural value of non-involvement. 'If, therefore, one 
finds the actions of officials oppressive, unjust, or lacking in legitimacy, would it not be 
better to sit back and ignore the problem than to become personally involved in a 
situation which could not help but be frustrating, humiliating, or costly? ,77 
The traditional value of non-involvement combined with a politically unaware 
population continues to enhance the development of state-patronage. Rural people tend to 
oblige to the superiority of the elite, due to the difference in status. 'In the Thai 
bureaucracy, hierarchical relationships reach their climax in the form of authoritarian 
rule: 'A superior was entitled to defence and obedience; a subordinate was expected to 
defer and obey'.' 78 Within the Thai bureaucratic system, Riggs affirms that' Seniority, it 
is true, does provide a fundamental criterion for promotion. ,79 
75 Thinapan Nakata (1987), p.181 
76 Ibid., p.182 
77 Riggs, F. W. (1966), p.326 
78 Thinapan Nakata (1987), p.180 
79 Riggs, F. W. (1966),p.327 
89 
When seniority in status is considered to be such an important element in the 
bureaucratic system of promotion, the effectiveness of the Thai bureaucratic system is 
diminished. Since many bureaucrats judge by this criterion, a meritocracy for hard 
working people is discouraged. In the contemporary bureaucratic system seniority 
remains a significant factor in many government agencies. Seniority endorses all levels of 
patronage system, since senior and junior government officials seems can share 
reciprocal benefits. As patrons, senior officials are responsible for their junior clients, 
whilst junior clients tend to serve their patrons in order to gain favours. The patronage 
system not only exists within the bureaucratic system, as in addition it exists within most 
societal sectors. 
The term 'patronage system' refers to the vertical reciprocal relationships between 
members of society, where patrons supervise clients under their patronage. The 
discussions, with regard to the patronage system in this section, will focus mainly on its 
connection to Thai politics. This is because 'Thai politicians depend heavily on business 
support. Patronage politics, particularly in the countryside, boosts both political spending 
and cronyism mentality of asking favour from the powerful. ,80 Accordingly, Laid81 
simply defines the patronage system as the formation of a network of influence, where 
money is utilised in order to gain business and political opportunity and in addition, to 
gain protection from unwelcome government intrusion. 
Accordingly, the patronage system can be perceived as a main factor, with regard 
to the expanding money politics and level of corruption in Thailand. Money is not only 
used in order to gain admission to the channels of political access, as MPs spend large 
sums of money, with respect to their hua khanaen within the patronage networks, in order 
to obtain votes. More than 90 per cent of MPs would be voted into office by voters in the 
provinces, thus rural patronage networks were able to dominate the 1995 election.82 This 
suggests a strong connection between the patronage system and vote-buying in the Thai 
80 Asiaweek, 3 November 2000, p.49 
81 Laird, 1. (2000) Money Politics, Globalisation, and Crisis: The Case of Thailand, Singapore: Graham 
Brash, p.242 
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political culture, where politics is perceived to be a profitable investment by the involved 
actors, notably, politicians and their clients such as hua khanaen, businessmen and jao 
pho. 
The existence of social hierarchy and patronage within the Thai political culture 
impacts adversely on the progress of the process of democratisation in Thailand. 
According to Laid, 'Patronage is anti-democratic. It distorts the development process. 
Decisions based on patronage often over look better, more rational courses of action-
and often result in more harm than good to the country and people. ,83 For this reason, it 
can be argued that the existences of both social hierarchy and the patronage system are 
largely responsible for the political weakness of Thai farmers. Accordingly, the study on 
farmers' political participation will not ignore these crucial features, in respect of the 
Thai political culture because they can provide some explanation, with regard to domestic 
impacts on Thai farmers' political participation. 
3.5 Political Actors within the Thai Political Arena 
As the role of the bureaucrats in Thai politics declined in the early 1980s, the 
power of successive Thai governments became stronger. The country's economic policy-
making was firmly in the hands of government agencies, with advice and implementation 
from technocrats and businessmen. However the network of policy-making is not only 
confined to government agencies and their advisors. There are many other involved 
actors within the network of the policy-making process, including politicians and 
technocrats, academics, urban businessmen, military officials, trade unions, pressure 
groups, and foreign interests. These actors participate in economic policy-making through 
lobbying or exerting their influence either through the parliamentary system or through 
personal contacts.84 This participation implies the distribution of power from the state to 
82 Fairclough, G. (1995b) 'Rural Reality: Politicians Secure Votes With Money, Favours', Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 29 June 1995, p.16 
83 Laird, 1. (2000), p.241 
84 Pasuk Phongpaichit (1992), pp.422-423 
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other involved actors, through the development of a policy community for business 
interests. 
3.5.1 The Military 
The dominance of the military in Thai politics has been acknowledged by the Thai 
people since the military coup in 1932. Many studies of the Thai military power by 
academics such as Elliott85, Suchit86, and Pasuk and Baker87, suggest that the substantial 
military assistance from the United States to Thailand during the Vietnam War, 
contributed to the complete dominance of the Thai military from the 1950s until the 
1970s. Elliott portrays a clear picture of the political environment in Thailand at that 
time, that 'the 1960's and 1970's, was characterized by the consolidation of the ruling 
class under military hegemony... and its connection with finance capital in the world 
capitalist. These developments emerged alongside the United States of America's 
Military occupation of Thailand .. , ,88 
As is represented in table 3-4, between 1950-1963 the U.S. military assistance to 
Thailand totalled US$ 414,992,000, an average of US$ 29,642,285 per year. The data in 
table 3-4 shows the contribution of the U.S. military to the labour market in rural areas of 
Thailand, particularly in the Isan region, where most U.S. troops were based. The income 
earned working for the U.S forces was of a different scale, when compared to those 
working in other sectors of Thai economy. Elliott notes that 'a painter or truck driver 
could expect to earn up to 24,700 baht per year ... Local wages in Korat89 at that time 
were as low as 1,500 baht for six months.' 90 
85 Elliott, D. (1978) Thailand: Origins of Military Rule, London: Zed 
86 Suchit Bunbongkam (1998) 'The Military and Democracy in Thailand', in May, R.J. and Selochan, V. 
(eds) The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific, Bathurst: Crawford Housing Publishing 
87 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999) 
88 Elliott, D. (1978), p.114 
89 Korat is the informal name ofthe province ofNakhon Ratchasima in Isan region 
90 Elliott, D. (1978), p.l32 
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Table 3-4 U.S. Military Involvement in Thailand, 1950-1976 
Year* 
1950-63 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Number of Thai 
Nationals Employed by 
U.S. Forces 
2 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
28,500 
30,300 
43,750 
37,100 
35,800 
32,300 
27,200 
31,000 
32,700 
n.a. 
Number of U.S. Troops 
in Thailand 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
6,500 
34,400 
44,400 
47,600 
44,100 
36,100 
30,200 
43,500 
35,000 
n.a. 
3 
U.S. Foreign Military Sales 
to Thailand 
(thousands of dollars) 
1,215 
4 
2 
3 
12 
15 
5 
13,724 
3,307 
5,981 
n.a. 
n.a. 
4 
U.S. Military Assistance 
Programme to Thailand 
(thousands of dollars) 
414,992 
52,734 
35,224 
40,765 
43,077 
10,364 
n.a. 
n.a. 
5 
1976 [United States' military occupation of Thailand officially ended] 
*Refers to calendar year in columns 2 and 3; and fiscal year in columns 4 and 5 
Source: Elliott, D. (1978), p.131 
The U.S. military assistance made a considerable impact on both Thai society and 
military development, but benefited the military elite the most, due to the strengthened 
political power of the military elite through the military development of the armed forces. 
As Suchit argues that 'During the 1950s and 1960s civilian political forces were 
unorganized, fragile and unable to challenge the military ... The modernization and 
strengthening of the armed forces has led only to an increase in the political power of the 
military elite, strengthening their advantage in the struggle for state power. ,91 Indeed, this 
helps to explain how the military elite was able to abuse the state power effectively, 
which allowed them to thrive in the Thai political arena throughout the 1950s and until 
the 1970s. 
During the administration of Prime Minister, General Kriangsak Chomanan 
during the period of November 1977 - February 1980 was in power, he was also the 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Ramsay argues that 'One of his major tasks 
91 Such it Bunbongkarn (1998), p.51 
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during 1978 was to develop a stronger base of support in the armed forces ... Kriangsak 
approved a 15.8% increase in military spending in 1979 and emphasized that government 
would give first priority to military security.' In fact, he did not only strengthen his power 
within the military, as he also extended his political connections with businessmen and 
the bureaucracy.92 This can be argued as being the origin of the intense involvement of 
businessmen entrepreneurs and technocrats in the Thai political arena from the 1980s 
onwards. 
High-ranking military officials have always tried to play an important role in the 
network of the policy-making process, in order to defend the interests of the military. It is 
widely believed that the secret military budget has been accessed to contribute to the 
assets of many high-ranking military officials. According to Pasuk and Baker, 'the 
military's main source of funds for enrichment and political investments came from the 
secret fund and from commission on arms purchases. ,93 Previously, in the early 1980s the 
Thai military had challenged the network of the policy-making process in order to defend 
the size of the military budget and to defend specific military interests. This was most 
evident after the United States' military reduced financial support to the Thai army in the 
mid 1970s, and the Thai military forces experienced in their opinion, insufficient 
financial support as a result. 94 
The most recently experienced explicit military sanction of the Thai political 
system was the coup d'etat of 13 February 1991, led by the NPKC with accusations of 
massive levels of government corruption.95 The people were reluctant to accept the coup 
d'etat regardless of the massive corruption of the Chatichai government, because they 
wanted the democratic process to be allowed to resolve such problems. Subsequently, the 
leaders of the coup d'etat invited a well-known businessman and former civil servant 
Anand Panyarachun, to form an interim government, formed on 2 March 1991, and a 
92 Ramsay, A. (1979) 'Thailand 1978: Kriangsak-The Thai Who Binds', Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No.2, 
February 1979: 104-114, p 104 and p.106 
93 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999), p.350 
94 Pasuk Phongpaichit (1992), p.422 
95 Khien Theeravit (1997) Thailand in Crisis: A Study of the Political Turmoil of May 1992, Bangkok: 
Thailand Research Found and Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkom University, p.6 
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general election was arranged for 22 March 1992, later won by the Samakkitham Party, 
who were pro-military. They then invited General Suchinda Kraprayoon, one of the coup 
d'etat's leaders, to be Prime Minister. This provoked many people, especially university 
students and the urban middle-class, and then developed into a violent confrontation 
between the military and the people. The Thai economy itself was affected, when a 
military crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators left at least fifty people dead on the 
streets of Bangkok and hundreds more missing.96 
More violence was averted when the King intervened and Prime Minister 
Suchinda resigned. Afterwards, many high-ranking military officers came out to 
announce that the military should withdraw from the political arena to allow the elected 
politicians to deal with the country's political and economic problems.97 The subsequent 
lower profile of the military allowed the country's process of democratisation continue 
more smoothly. Suchit Bunbongkarn98 argues that in contemporary Thai politics, the 
military is more responsive to the democratic norms, and evidence suggests that they are 
leaving behind their corrupt practices and involvement in business. Troop numbers and 
military expenditure have been reduced significantly. 
However, this could be too optimistic a view, with regard to the political role of 
the military at the present day. The connections between the Thaksin government and the 
military elite fails to support Suchit's argument. In the Thaksin government, General 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, the Minister of Defence, is in the cabinet in order to represent 
the military's interests. He approved three big budget military projects worth a total of 
1,037,760,519 baht, (US$ 25,944,013, at 40 baht per US$ 1) suspiciously perhaps, whilst 
the Prime Minister was on a working trip aboard. The media questioned the transparency 
of these projects at the time.99 This scenario can be viewed as a normal phenomenon in 
Thai politics, where the elite can further their own interests. 
96 Webb, 1. (1992) Country in Brief Thailand September 1992 .. Department of Foreign Affair and Trade 
Canberra, ACT, 2600, p.8 
97 Murray, D. (1996),pp.361-362 
98 Tasker, R. (1999) 'Military Make-Over', Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 November 1999, p.28 
99 Matichon (Internet Edition), 21 November 2001 at 
www.matichon.co.thlmc_news.asp?nfile=p0103211144&sele .. Retrieved on 21 November 2001 
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3.5.2 The Businessmen 
The economIC downturn resulting from the May unrest of 1992 led to a 
considerable increase in the role of businessmen and the urban middle-class within Thai 
politics. These groups have promoted themselves, both directly and indirectly, in order to 
more fully participate within the network of the policy-making process. Almost all of the 
leading political parties have persuaded well-educated businessmen to join them. The 
elections of July 1995 were notable, with many wealthy businessmen running as 
candidates, for instance Amnuay Viravan, who formed his own party, the Nam Thai 
(Thai Leadership) Party, or NTP. Notably, Thaksin Shinawatra, the telecommunications 
tycoon, was invited to be the leader of the Palang Dharma Party, in place of its founder 
Chamlong Srimuang in order to promote the party's image more effectively. 100 
Thaksin first ran for election as an MP in 1995, becoming the Deputy Prime 
Minister in charge of Bangkok's traffic and transportation lOI , in the Banham Government 
of July 1995 - September 1996. He promised to solve Bangkok's traffic problems within 
six months or resign his position. However, he did not solve these problems and neither 
did he resign. Although Thaksin was initially unsuccessful in terms of his political 
career, this was not something that he would abandon. In July 1998 he founded his own 
party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT). It is true that Thaksin is a very successful entrepreneur, but 
nevertheless, many academics still have doubts as to whether he can successfully apply 
his manifest business talent to the country's administration. 
Regardless, Thaksin has had a very high profile in Thai politics since 1998. This 
high profile was reinforced by the landslide victory of his TR T party in the general 
election of 6 January 2001. The TRT gained 248 out of 500 seats in the House of 
Representatives. 102 The success of the TR T in this election owes much to the TR T' s 
agricultural policy, namely the 'one village one million baht', or village fund project; the 
100 Murray, D. (1996), p.365 
101 Thai Government Official Website, at www.thaigov.go.thlgeneral!cabinlthaksin-e.htm Retrieved on 7 
February 2003 
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moratorium of farmers' debt for three years; and 'thirty baht for all medical treatment'. 
'Mr. Thaksin knows he has to keep the countryside happy' emphasise Pasuk and 
Baker. I03 Rural farmers see the TRT as a new hope in terms of Thai agricultural 
development. This hope and expectation is based on an only limited knowledge of 
Thaksin's business successfulness. It is accepted that as successful businessman of a new 
generation, Thaksin became a hero to many Thai people. 
When considering the role of businessmen in the economIC policy-making 
process, it is important to examine the significant role of the Chinese-Thai, since they 
have already proved themselves to be frequently successful, with reference to their 
business interests. Dixon suggests that 'The Chinese community in Thailand was well 
established in the early nineteenth century and exercised a considerable measure of 
control over trade and non-agricultural production.' 104 According to Akira105, in the early 
1950s Chinese-Thai families formed the most substantial business empires in Thailand. 
With reference to this, the political patronage of the elite military officials contributed 
substantially to the success of the Chinese-Thai. This understanding helps to reveal a long 
history, with regard to the development of the patronage system within the Thai political 
arena, a form of relationship, which allowed involved actors to abuse the state power for 
their own interests. The protection provided by the military elite has been a persuasive 
factor, with regard to the political participation of Chinese-Thai businessmen, in order to 
protect and ensure their interests. However, there is no evidence to suggest that a form of 
policy community was established between Chinese-Thai businessmen and government. 
Rather, the relationship only amounted to a loosely based network, which was bonded by 
the patronage system without the involvement of representative organisations. From 
1970s until the economic crisis of 1997, it was estimated that 50 Chinese-Thai families 
dominantly controlled most of Thailand's wealth. After the crisis, a number of Chinese-
102 Divjak, C. and Symonds, P. (2001) 'New Thai Cabinet Loaded with Businessmen, Bureaucrats and Ex-
generals', at www.wsws.orglarticles12001lfeb2001lthai-f20.shtml Retrieved on ] 6 May 2002 
103 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (2001) 'To Understand Thaksin's Rise, Consider How Thais See 
Him', International Herald Tribune, 20-21 January 2001, p.lO 
104 Dixon, C. (1999a) The Thai Economy: Uneven Development and Industrialisation, London: Routledge, 
B·65 
05 Akira, S. (1996), p.138 
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Thai families have dramatically dropped to four or five families, which are still able to 
control the big business. 106 
Table 3-5 Businessmen in Thai cabinets, 1963-1986 
Prime Minister Beginning Number of Per cent Date of Cabinet Businessmen Total 
Sarit Feb. 1963* 0 0.0 14 
Thanom I Dec. 1968* 1 5.6 18 
Thanom II Mar. 1969 1 4.0 25 
Sanya I Oct. 1973 4 14.3 28 
Sanya II May. 1974 3 9.7 31 
Seni Feb. 1975 8 16.7 30 
Kukrit Mar. 1975 16 59.3 27 
Seni Apr. 1976 11 35.5 31 
Thanin Oct. 1976 1 5.0 17 
Kriangsak I Nov. 1977 2 6.1 33 
Kriangsak II May. 1979 9 20.9 43 
Kriangsak III Feb. 1980 5 13.2 38 
Prem I Mar. 1980 17 45.9 37 
Prem II Jan. 1981 12 30.0 40 
Prem III Dec. 1981 17 41.5 41 
Prem IV May. 1983 21 47.7 44 
PremV Aug. 1986 21 47.7 44 
Source: Anek Laothamatas (1988), p.454 
* The dates for the first two entries in table 3-5 appear to contradict the data provided on the official Thai 
Government website, www.thaigov.go.thlgenerallprime/preprime_e.htm Retrieved on 23 August 2002 
As the data represented in table 3-5 shows, businessmen's participation within the 
Thai political arena has grown at a fluctuating rate, since the beginning of the first 
government of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn. The role of the businessmen has 
been regarded as a positive contribution by successive Thai governments. The business 
groups did not emerge as interest groups, attempting only to influence government, but 
moreover they behaved as an equal partner, which the government must take into 
account. Accordingly, they were able to participate more effectively within the Thai 
political arena. With reference to the data in table 3-5, by the time of the Prem IV and 
106 Crispin, S.W. (2000b) 'Election Trade-off', Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 December 2000-4 
January 2001, p.18 
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Prem V governments, almost half of the ministers in the cabinets were well-known 
businessmen. 
More recent data is not currently available, however information from the Thai 
parliament provides a brief personal background of individual Thai ministers. This data 
indicates that the profiles indicating towards the involvement of businessmen have not 
greatly changed in these intervening years. In summary, during the periods of Prime 
Minister Chatichai Choonhavan (April 1988 - May 1991), Prime Minister Anand 
Panyarachun (February 1991 - April 1992), Prime Minister Suchinda Kraprayoon (April 
1992 - May 1992), Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai (September 1992 - July 1995, and 
November 1997 - November 2000), Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa (July 1995 -
November 1996), Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (November 1996 - November 
1997), and Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (February 2001 - present) the number of 
businessmen in the cabinets varied between 30-45 per cent. 107 
During the first government of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond between March 
1980 - March 1983, a policy alliance between government and businessmen was 
established. According to Pasuk and Baker, many well-known Bangkok businessmen 
were elected in the general election of 1980 and became major actors in the Prem 
government, such as Boonchu Rojanasathien, the third president of Bangkok Bank 
between 1977-1980, from the Social Action Party. 'Boonchu proclaimed that 'we should 
. db' ,108 Th' It d . co-operate between prIvate an government to ecome one . IS resu e III more 
effective and efficient co-operation between policy-makers and businessmen. The 
organisation that represents the interests of businessmen is the Joint Public Private 
Consultative Committee (JPPCC). The JPPCC was launched on 30 June 1981, and aimed 
to solve the economic problems resulting from the oil crisis and economic recession of 
1979-1980. 109 
107 Office of the Prime Minister (2001) Prawat nayokrattamontri (The Biography of the Thai Prime 
Ministers), Bangkok: Office of the Prime Minister 
108 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999), pp.l49-150 . . . 
109 Manoot Watanakomen (1989) Joint Public and Prlvat~ Consultatlv~ Com~lttee: The Study of its 
Management, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research InstItute [TDRI] [m ThaI], p.l 
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According to Manoot11O, during the initiation of the JPPCC, Thailand was facing 
both domestic and external problems, notably the increase in competition from the world 
market, problems with regard to agricultural productivity, and bureaucratic procedures 
which were incompatible with the country's business development. These factors pressed 
the government to initiate the JPPCC, in order to enhance economic development through 
its programme of industrialisation. Moreover, it can be argued that the JPPCC was 
initiated because of a reciprocal relationship, which involved the resource dependency of 
government and access to the businessmen. 
Box 3-1 The Joint Public Private Consultative Committee 
Administrative Structure 
1. National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)-Secretariat department of the 
JPPCC 
2. Ministry oflnterior- taking care of the JPPCC at the Provincial Level. 
3. The Thai Chamber of Commerce 
4. The Association of Thai Industries 
5. The Thai Banker Association 
Committees 
1. Prime Minister (Chair) 
2. Ministers of Finance 
3. Minister of Agriculture and Co-operative 
4. Minister of Commerce 
5. Minister oflndustry 
6. Minister of Communications 
7. Minister to the Prime Minister's Office 
8. Deputy Minister of Communications 
9. Representative from the Secretariat of the Prime Minister 
10. Representative from The Thai Chamber of Commerce 
11. Representative from The Association of Thai Industries 
12. Representative from The Thai Banker Association 
Source: Summarised from Manoot Watanakomen (1989), pp.55-60, and Appendix 1 
According to the data represented in Box 3-1, there are no representatives of 
fanners in the JPPCC, and there have never been, since its inception. This neglect of 
fanners' representation is a result of the emphasis placed on the policy of industrialisation 
in the 1980s. As a direct result, the policy community has been limited to those involved 
in the business sector. The relationship between the government and businessmen was 
110 Ibid., p.10 
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directly consolidated through the function of the JPPCC. During monthly meetings of the 
JPPCC chaired by the Prime Minister, business groups were able to share their views 
with the most senior of officials. At this point, Muscat notes, 'It was understood that the 
JPPCC was not to be used for lobbying related to the interests of any individual company. 
Only matters of general public or business interest would be discussed. 111 However, 
evidence suggests that the JPPCC acted as a conduit for business demands on the 
government. The businessmen then enjoyed the opportunity to lobby for favourable 
policy outcomes through the JPPCC. However, the JPPCC also helped the Prem 
governments to gain fundamental support, with regard to both political liberalisation and 
economic reform during the 1981-1984 period. 112 The JPPCC has been effective, with 
regard to providing useful and welcome advice to successive governments. Moreover, 
much of the advice of the JPPCC has been enacted into law. l13 
Anek views an attempt to institutionalise the relationship between government 
and businessmen by the initiation of the JPPCC as a corporatist arrangement. He argues 
that 'Rather than playing a minimal role, the government has been active in the creation 
of the JPPCCs and the promotion of peak business organizations and provincial chamber 
of commerce.' 114 Nevertheless, Anek accepts that the JPPCC cannot represent the ideal 
model for corporatism. 115 As he identifies, that, 
However, unlike the extreme case of state corporatism, business persons and firms 
are not required by law to join any trade association, and associations in turn are not 
required to join any higher-level or apex organization. There is not limitation the number 
of trade associations as there is for chambers of commerce, and a larticular trade or 
industry is allowed to have more than one representative association. ll 
Also intriguing-as the national JPPCC has been accepted by the government as 
the most important and most regularized top-level channel of communication with the 
business sector-is in fact that the government has in effect accorded the most important 
peak status to the three associations represented on the JPPCC instead of to the Board of 
III Muscat, RJ. (1994) The Fifth Tiger: A Study of Thai Development Policy, New York: M.E. Shape and 
United Nations University Press, p.183 
112 Haggard, S.M. (1998), p.91 
II) Pasuk Phongpaichit (1992), pA23 
114 Anek Laothamatas (1992) Business Associations and the New Political Economy of Thailand From 
bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism, Boulder: Westview Press, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
[ISEAS], p.154 
lIS Ibid., p.92 
116 Anek Laothamatas (1988), ppA63-464 
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Trade. This is so even through two of these peak organizations-the Thai Bankers and 
the Association of Thai Industries-are no more than normal trade associations, enjoying 
not statutory status as peak bodies at all. The crucial point here is that the government has 
allowed the emergence of unofficial peak bodies and a relatively free competition among 
several peaks. 1 17 
This evidence suggests that the notion of policy community can provide a better 
explanation than that of the corporatist model in this case, because it provides a more 
flexible framework to explain the relationship between the government and interest 
group. This is because there is free competition between actors within the framework. In 
addition, Thai businessmen do not only assert their political power at the ministerial 
level. Some of them have shown an interest in direct political participation at all levels of 
the government bureaucracy, and this in tum has enabled them to develop several policy 
communities. 
A study by Anusorn, with reference to political business cycles in Thailand, 
shows that a significant number of businessmen contested for seats in the House of 
Representatives between 1986-1992 and since then, the numbers have increased steadily. 
According to table 3-6 in the general elections of July 1986, 630 or 16.50 per cent of 
electoral candidates from a total of 3,813, were businessmen. By the general elections of 
March 1992, the number of candidates who were businessmen had almost doubled since 
1986. This figure of 1,149 from a total of 2,851 candidates, equated to 40.30 per cent. 
They were the largest group in these elections, with 165 seats. Since 1986, businessmen 
have gained the most representation in parliament of all occupational groups. A 
significant number of businessmen MPs affirm strong links with business groups, within 
the economic policy network. Accordingly, business interests are secured by their 
political strength. Thus, Anusorn' s comment on the relationship between businessmen 
and vote-buying, with reference to the elections of September 1996 is justified. 'As the 
biggest and usually richest group of candidates, businessmen were likely to spend more 
th h b . ,118 an any ot er groups on vote uymg. 
117 Ibid., p.464 
118 Anusorn Limmanee (1999) Political Business Cycles in Thailand, 1979-1992: General Election and 
Currency in Circulation, Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkom University, p.81 
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Table 3-6 Electoral Candidates and MPs by Occupation, 
1986-1992 Dates of General Elections 
July 27, 1986 July 24, 1988 March 22, 1992 September 13, 1992 
Occupation Candidates MPs Candidates MPs Candidates MPs Candidates MPs 
Businessmen 630 86 661 132 1149 165 1006 129 
Govt. officials 277 24 238 42 282 40 186 27 
Lawyers 436 32 527 43 281 37 261 34 
Politicians 96 41 167 72 179 70 267 133 
Farmers 288 12 380 23 335 10 239 11 
Private Employees 588 8 660 4 411 10 370 6 
Others 1041 103 891 35 214 28 88 20 
No Information 438 41 88 6 
Total 3813 347 3612 357 2851 360 2417 360 
Source: Anusom Limmanee (1999), p.80 
In the early 1990s, the role of the JPPCC In government policy-making was 
diminished. 119 However the fading influence of the JPPCC does not suggest a decline in 
the strength of the relationship between government and businessmen. This is because the 
patronage system in Thailand provided a favourable political environment, in which 
businessmen developed a new policy community. As experienced, with regard to the 
Thaksin government, the absence of the JPPCC has not affected the relative political 
power of urban businessmen. Crispin claims that 'Plenty of people with their big-business 
interests have queued up behind Thaksin.' 120 Indeed, the Thaksin cabinet features many 
leading businessmen. For instance, the Minister of Industry Suriya Jungrungreangkit is a 
millionaire car parts dealer, and a Minister of Transport and Communications Pracha 
Maleenont is a senior executive of media group BEC World. In addition, the Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Labour and Social Welfare Dej Boon-Long is a textile 
tycoon, and the Minister of Commerce Adisai Bodharamik is heavily involved in the 
telecommunications business. 121 In addition to Thaksin, these men have been major 
financial contributors to the TRT election campaign. As Greenwald argues, 'Large 
119 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1997) 'Power in Transition: Thailand in the 1990s', in Hewison, K. 
(ed) Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, London: Routledge, p.28 
120 Crispin, S.W. (2001) 'Old Boys' Reunion', Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 January 2001, p.20 
121 Daily News, 18 February 2001 [ in Thai] 
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business often see campaIgn financing as a buffer to protect themselves against 
government action. "It is not so much that we want something done for us, as that we 
want to avoid having something done to us." ... ,I 22 
The significant number of businessmen within the Thaksin government confirms 
the continued development of businessmen's political participation, through the 
patronage system. The Thai government has been very supportive of businessmen's 
participation within Thai politics. But conversely, a supportive state role, with respect to 
the political participation of rural people, is seldom evidenced in Thailand. Although 
Prapat Panyachatiraksa, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives in the 
Thaksin government, has described himself as a farmer, he should be categorised 
differently to the majority of small-scale farmers in Thailand. Instead, he should be 
defined as an agri-businessman. 
The deficiency of active political participation by Thai farmers and Thai farmers 
groups has only resulted in unfavourable treatment by successive governments. Most 
policies issued by businessmen-ministers favour the industrial sector, in order to advance 
their own interests, whilst ignoring the agricultural sector. This is evidenced in a 
statement by J ayasankar Shivakumar of the Bangkok office of the Wodd Bank, who 
claimed that 'cabinet posts were used to served the vested interest of politicians to repay 
favours and feed patronage network instead of national development.' 123 Indeed, while 
the development of the agricultural sector has been addressed through the NESD plans, 
which were established in 1961, this has not been translated in practice. This is in part, 
because Thai farmers have insufficient power to influence the Thai government in order 
to issue policies in their interest, especially when compared to the power of the 
businessmen to influence industrial policy. 
12 J 
- Greenwald, C. S. (1977), p.l44 
123 Crispin, S.W. and Vatikiotis, M. (2000) 'A Moment of Truth For Democracy', Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 9 November 2000, p.19 
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3.5.3 The Technocrats 
The role of the Thai technocrats has developed alongside the institutions of 
modem economic management, namely, the establishment of the Bank of Thailand in the 
early 1940s, and the formation of the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB) in 1959. In the early years after the formation of these two important economic 
development institutions, the technocrats' roles were only typical of technicians and 
supporting experts. Nevertheless, during the 1970s, the Thai technocrats began to develop 
their roles. The emergence of a new generation of technocrats, who were educated and 
trained overseas, particularly in the United States and Japan, provided a wider 
perspective, with regard to the economy and its potential. 124 With the decline of the 
power of the bureaucrats, the technocrats were then better able to playa more important 
role within the economic policy-making process of Thailand. 
Bowie and Unger note that 'under Prime Minister Prem, technocrats were able to 
increase their control over macroeconomic policymaking.' 125 The role of Thai technocrats 
had been reinforced during the Prem governments of the 1980s. This happened because 
Prem recognised the benefits in utilising the technocrats and businessmen to participate 
within the economic policy-making process, with the Thai government's recognition of 
the successes of the four 'Asian Tigers' of South-Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong. Pasuk and Baker126 assert that the dramatic economic transition of the 1980s, led 
to the strengthening of the relationship between the technocrats and urban businessmen. 
They acted together to accelerate the change of economic strategy towards the model of 
the 'Asian Tigers'. This development greatly boosted the role of the technocrats, whose 
skills were needed in order to supervise the changing direction of Thai economic 
development. This in tum led to the hiring of technocrats by many large firms, in order to 
strengthen their relationships with the government and to gain access to the channels of 
124 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1997), pp.26-27 
125 Bowie, A. and Unger, D. (1997) The Politics of Open Economies: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.l43 
126 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1997), p.27 
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political power. It can be argued that the role of technocrats during the Prem era was 
hugely influential on economic policy-making outcomes. 
Although the role of technocrats and businessmen fluctuated in the 1990s, they 
are still a crucial element in terms of Thai economic development. Ammarl27 notes that 
the power of the high profile technocrats in the Bangkok of Thailand was terminated in 
1997. Interestingly, businessmen appear to cope with the changing nature of Thai politics 
better than most technocrats do. This could be perceived to be a result of the reciprocal 
interests of elite politicians and businessmen. Consequently, they have to maintain their 
connections in order to secure their interests. The World Bank argues that having only a 
small number of technocrats within the network of the policy-making process enables 
corruption to operate. Accordingly, the World Bank has suggested that the Thai 
government should hire more technocrats from outside the bureaucracy, in order to 
improve strategic planning at cabinet-level. 128 Similarly, Ammarl29 urges Thai 
technocrats to increase their political role today, in order to balance the state's power. 
The Thaksin government explicitly argues for a limited role for technocrats. 
Prime Minister Thaksin is easily irritated by academic critiques on his economic and 
social developmental policies. Thaksin defines such critiques from Ammar Siamwalla, a 
prominent economist of the TDRI and other academics as unconstructive criticism, which 
has a negative psychological impact on the Thai people and foreign investors alike. 130 In 
addition, Thaksin has also attacked both the domestic and international media for their 
negative criticisms of his policy strategies. Indeed, the Nation Multimedia Groups had its 
army-owned radio frequency license withdrawn, after it criticised Thaksin and his 
government. 131 Shawn Crispin and Rodney Tasker, of the "Far Eastern Economic 
127 Matichon (Internet Edition), 28 July 2002, at www.matichon.co.th Retrieved on 28 July 2002 
128 Crispin, S.W. and Vatikiotis, M. (2000), p.19 
129 Matichon (Internet Edition), 28 July 2002 
130 SUkanya Lim (2001) 'Economic Debate: Ammar Takes Vow of Silence', in The Nation (Internet 
Edition), 19 November 2001, at www.nationmultimedia.com/page.news.php3?clid=2&theme=A&usrsess= 
Retrieved on 19 November 2001 
131 www.cnn.coml2002IWORLD/asiapcflsoutheastl03/06/thailand.mediaiindex.html Retrieved on 10 March 
2002 
106 
Review", had their Thai visas revoked, as a result of publishing articles on businesses run 
by Thaksin's family and other articles concerning the Thai royal family.132 
When Thai governments have acted with excessive power over society, and have 
limited the active participation of other involved actors within the democratic process, the 
development of civil society and consequently that of democracy has been threatened, 
and the introduction of the 1997 Constitution did not prevent this from happening. Civil 
society must be able to operate freely without government interference, in order to 
balance the power of the government. Although the civil society framework recognises 
technocrats and farmers groups as a part of civil society, these two groups are in fact, 
politically and economically unequal. Technocrats are academic and well-educated 
people, while most Thai farmers have had little opportunity, with respect to their 
education. Yet, the government is able to challenge the political participation of the 
technocrats whose position is stronger than that of the farmers. Due to their lack of 
political influence, it may be argued as to whether there can be any chance for farmers to 
challenge the state power. 
3.5.4 The Thai Farmers 
One common explanation to why Thai farmer-organisations, such as agricultural 
co-operatives and farmer-groups, often fail is that the internal structure of the 
organisations has not been working effectively. Farmers have lacked a sense of belonging 
to the organisation, there has been no element of control on the part of the members, and 
consequently it has been possible for corrupt leaders to remain in charge. A contributing 
explanation is that the state has been too authoritarian in its attempt to promote and 
h .. 133 support t e orgamsatIOns. 
This experience is a result of highly individualistic character of Thais and their 
cultural attitude of non-involvement. As a result, there are not many examples of farmers 
groups that operate continuously, over time. In Thailand, Thinapan claims that 'Group 
action occurs mainly in the form of informal, spontaneous, and cooperative associations 
132www.cnn.coml2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeastl02/26/thailand.journoslindex.html Retrieved on 10 
March 2002 
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and it disappears as soon as the immediate objective has been achieved.' 134 However, the 
lack of a sense of belonging is not the main reason to explain the failure of the Thai 
farmers groups, as the role of the state must also be taken into account. 
In this regard the state is seen as the main obstacle, with respect to farmer group 
formation. Historical evidence reveals the existence of the Farmers' Federation of 
Thailand (FFT). The FFT played a crucial role in accelerating the political participation 
of farmers. It was the first organised farmers representative group in Thailand, and was 
established after the first gathering of Thai farmers at Sanam-Luang in Bangkok, on 19 
November 1974. 1,200 farmers from the midland, northern, and Isan regions were 
present, and the demonstration aimed to pressure the Sanya government to take serious 
action, with respect to farmers' problems, including issues regarding rice prices, land and 
debt. 135 
The FFT emerged at a time when communism was developing across Asia. In 
Thailand, the government attempted to suppress the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) 
through the Anti-Communist Act, during the late 1950s and early 1960s. 136 The United 
States also supported the anti-Communist campaign in Thailand, by providing financial 
support to the Thai military. The government was suspicious of the FFT, believing that 
they were influenced and supported by communist groups, from both inside and outside 
of Thailand. They specifically accused members of the FFT of being communists, or of 
supporting the movement of the CPT. For instance, Sithon Yotkantha, a Vice President of 
the FFT, was accused of being a communist and was assassinated. 137 The FFT existed for 
133 Omberg, L. (1999) 'Potato Fanners' Organisation in Thailand: A discussion on the prerequisites of the 
formation and survival of fanner-organisations', paper presented to the 7th International Conference on Thai 
Studies (4-8 July 1999), University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, p.2 
134 Thinapan Nakata (1987), p.185 
135 Nitirat Sapsomboon (1999) 'Kwampenma lea prawat phunum sahaphan chaorai chaona heang prathet 
Thai (The Legacy and Biography of Leaders of the Farmers' Federation of Thailand)" in Naruemon 
Thabchumpon and Nitirat Sapsomboon (eds) Senthang Chaona Thai Rumlueg 25 Pee Sahaphan Chaona 
Chaorai Haeng Prathet Thai (The Road o/Thai Farmers: Memorable 25 Years o/the Farmers' Federati?n 
of Thailand), Bangkok: Sumnugpim Mulanithi Deg (Children Foundation Printing) and Sumnugplm 
Mulanithi Komolkeemthong (Komolkeemthong Foundation Printing), pp.139-140 . 
136 Morell, D. and Chai-Anan Samudavanija (1979) 'Thailand's Revolutionary Insurgency: Changes III 
Leadership Potential', Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No.4, April 1979: 315-332, p.316 
137 Morell, D. and Chai-Anan Samudavanija (1979), pp.323-324 
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only five years, and the end of the federation's activities came with the murder of their 
last leader, Jamras Muangyarm. Forty-eight FFT leaders were assassination targets. A 
total of 33 leaders were reported killed, five disappeared and all of the remainder were 
injured in assassination attempts. l38 This episode has had a significant impact on the 
organisation of Thai farmers since then, and many have feared joining farmers groups 
because of the potential threat of state oppression. 
Table 3-7 Occupational Distribution in the House of Representatives 
During the Period of 1933-1992 (per cent) 
Bureaucrats & 
Date of Election Business Retired Lawyers Farmers Other 
Bureaucrats 
Nov. 15, 1933 19.2 34.6 26.9 10.3 9.0 
Nov. 7,1937 19.8 51.7 16.5 5.5 6.5 
Nov. 12, 1938 22.0 39.6 16.5 7.7 14.2 
Jan. 6, 1946 20.8 44.8 17.7 7.3 9.4 
Aug. 5, 1946 11.0 61.0 18.3 4.9 4.8 
Jan. 29, 1948 22.2 34.4 28.3 6.1 9.0 
Jun. 5, 1949 33.3 19.1 28.6 4.8 14.2 
Feb. 26, 1952 20.3 27.7 35.8 3.3 12.9 
Feb. 25, 1957 26.3 28.8 27.5 6.9 10.5 
Dec. 15, 1957 27.5 26.3 23.1 8.1 14.0 
Feb. 10, 1969 45.7 20.6 16.0 5.5 12.2 
Jan. 26, 1975 34.6 12.3 17.5 8.6 27.0 
Apr. 4, 1976 29.4 22.2 11.8 5.7 32.9 
Apr. 22, 1979 37.2 18.4 13.6 8.6 22.2 
Apr. 18, 1983 38.3 10.2 10.2 4.3 37.0 
Jui. 27, 1986 24.8 6.9 9.2 3.5 55.6 
July 24, 1988* 37.0 11.8 12.0 6.4 32.8 
March 22, 1992 * 45.8 11.1 10.3 2.8 30.0 
September 13, 1992* 35.8 7.5 9.4 3.1 44.2 
Source: Anek Laothamatas (1988), p.454 
* Updated information from Anusorn Limmanee (1999), p.80 
According to the statistical data of table 3-7, farmers have always been under-
represented in the country's policy-making process. From 1933 and 1992, farmers' 
representatives in the House of Representatives fluctuated between 10.3 and 2.8 per cent, 
a figure which has steadily declined. These figures are low when compared to the 
contribution of farmers, with respect to the country's labour force, an average of more 
138 The Nation (Internet Edition), 16 August, 1999, 
htttp:11202.44.251.4/nationnewsI1999/199908119990816/48161.htmI Retrieved on 16 August, 1999 
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than 50 per cent between 1981-1995.139 With the result of the election of March 1992 , 
after the coup d'etat in 1991 by the NPKC, farmers only accounted for 2.8 per cent of 
seats, while businessmen won a substantial 45.8 per cent of seats. The contribution of 
farmers to the country's labour force was as high as 59.88 per cent over this period, and 
many had expected a move towards a greater representation for farmers, in the wake of 
the military coup. Moreover, the May Unrest of 1992, which academics have perceived to 
be a catalyst for the development of civil society at that time, did not have a substantial 
impact on the voting behaviour of the Thai people. The overall result was almost a repeat 
pattern, with only a slight change in the overall numbers. Farmer representatives gained 
only 11 of the 360 seats in the House of Representatives, 140 or only 3.1 per cent. At the 
same time, businessmen gained 35.8 per cent. With only a small share of the vote, farmer 
representatives were therefore not able to defend farmer's interests through the poIicy-
making process. Furthermore, the limited number of the farmer representatives in the 
House of Representatives can also be blamed on the Thai legal system, which makes the 
condition that MP candidates must at least hold a university degree. 
The political participation of Thai farmers had been declining smce the 
assassinations of the leaders of the FFT, when in 1992, a group of small-scale farmers in 
the provinces of the Isan region organised themselves as the Isan Assembly of Small-
scale Farmers, and other farmers' organisations were formed subsequently.141 In 1995 the 
Assembly of the Poor was formed, in order to fight against the suffering of the poor, and 
specifically to fight against the negative effects of the dam projects in the Isan region. 
The emergence of the Assembly of the Poor illustrates an impressive example of group 
formation for poor rural people. Nevertheless, it cannot be perceived to be representative 
of farmers across Thailand, because most of the Assembly of the Poor's members are 
Isan people who have suffered the most from government action and inaction. 
Consequently, they were therefore motivated to establish their own assembly, in order to 
improve their collective power, since the founders of the Assembly of the Poor came to 
139 See Table 5-1 in Chapter 5 
140 Anusom Limmanee (1999), p.80 
141 The Nation (Internet Edition), 16 August, 1999, at 
htttp:11202.44.251.4/nationnews/19991199908119990816/48161.htmI Retrieved on 16 August, 1999 
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believe that collective action would achieve more than individual action. As Olson 142 has 
argued, a number of individuals with a common interest or sharing a single purpose or 
objective can only advance that interest effectively, through collective action. 
Unorganised action will not enable them to advance their common interest, as only 
collective action through organisation, will allow individuals to advance their collective 
or common interest. 
The emergence of the Assembly of the Poor has brought Thai Politics into a new 
era. It has helped to promote the level of political awareness, with respect to the poor, and 
has encouraged them to participate in the Thai political system more enthusiastically than 
in the past. It is clear that the Assembly of the Poor will fight for the rights of fanners and 
rural people, and increase the benefits to them. In order to help to achieve this goal, the 
assembly has been convincing both its members and potential members to join together, 
in order to increase their collective bargaining power. They now realise that otherwise, 
the government will not respond to their demands, and their problems will never 
addressed satisfactorily. 143 
The existence of the Assembly of the Poor within the Thai political arena and its 
achievement in improving the general awareness of the needs of rural communities has 
not yet been translated into effective change, significantly changing rural people's lives. 
Whilst rural people's demands are now starting to be heard, a positive effect from the 
government is rare. The demands of the Assembly of the Poor range from social welfare 
for fanners and the wider public, to compensation for those displaced by government 
projects and establishment of village development funds. 144 The ineffectiveness of the 
Assembly of the Poor is in part, a consequence of the negative way in which the 
government continues to view them. Crispin has argued that 'Many government officials 
continue to view rural protests with suspicion, either as politically motivated or as 
142 Olson, M. (1971), p.l-7 
143 The Nation (Internet Edition), 10 December 1997 at 
http://202.44.251.4/nationnews/1997 /199712/1997121O/19744.html Retrieved on 18 March 1998 
144 Asiaweek, at www.cnn.comiASIANOW/asiaweekl07/1128/cs4.html Retrieved on 15 July 1999 
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opportunistic attempts to wrest funds from state coffers.' 145 Correspondingly, the 
government remains reluctant to respond positively to the demands the Assembly of the 
Poor, and farmers more generally. 
Many protests by farmers, which take place in Bangkok, appear to achieve 
government promises to intervene, with regard to specific problems, in order to help the 
farmers. However, these promises are nearly always broken. Indeed, the Assembly of the 
Poor tends to presume that every agreement that has been made by the government, or its 
representative, or even with the Prime Minister, is not necessarily trustworthy. The 
Assembly of the Poor has stated publicly, that the government has been insincere, with 
regard to helping them. At one of the largest protests ever held in Bangkok in 1997, the 
Assembly of the Poor submitted a list of 121 problems to the government. The 
government negotiated a settlement with respect to 18 cases or 15 per cent of these 
problems. The Assembly of the Poor accused Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh of 
lying to the public, when he claimed that the government had solved approximately 90 
per cent of the problems. 146 
However, the Assembly of the Poor does not work alone. In addition, a number of 
NGOs also support them with technical support and advice. Moreover the Assembly of 
the Poor has received substantial financial support from the middle class, and believes 
that middle class political support is crucial to its long-term success. In the year to mid-
March of 1997, the Assembly of the Poor had received donations of about 700,000 baht 
from the middle class, in cash and in kind. 147 The financial support from the middle class 
clearly implies that the social gap in Thai society is not as large as the income gap, which 
exists. 
The financial support of the middle class reduces the financial constraints on the 
Assembly of the Poor, since otherwise it would be hard for the Assembly of the Poor to 
145 Crispin, S.W. (2000), p.21 
146 The Nation (Internet Edition), 24 February 1997, at 
httpI1202.44.251.4/nationnewsI199711997021199722411993 .html Retrieved on 18 March 1999 
112 
raise funds from its members. Nevertheless, external support and advice alone cannot 
make the Assembly of the Poor work effectively. The existing structure of the Assembly 
of the Poor is only loosely based and requires a re-evaluation of its system of 
administration and of its structure in order to strengthen its collective power. A 
reorganisation would strengthen its position to influence the government more 
effectively. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Numerous studies of political development in Thailand have particularly 
emphasised the roles of the military, businessmen and technocrats, due to their central 
roles within Thai political arena. Most studies have adopted the traditional Thai culture as 
a foundation, in order to help to conceptualise a framework to explain the various 
interactions within Thai society and the political environment. The culture of Thai society 
has had a significant impact on the development of the contemporary Thai political 
culture, since politics is an important aspect to the society. 
Prior to the 1980s, military officials along with their bureaucratic colleagues 
dominated Thai politics. Their monopolistic political power severely damaged the 
process of democratisation in Thailand, and only produced yet more political instability. 
However in the 1980s, the Thai political system stabilised and the influence of the 
military and bureaucrats declined steadily when Thai businessmen undertook an active 
political role, in order to ensure that their interests were represented within the network of 
the policy-making process. Callahan and McCargo have recognised the increasing role of 
businessmen as an aspect to the increasingly pluralistic political arena within Thailand. 148 
Nevertheless, this does not imply that political power is evenly distributed across 
every group within Thai society. In the 1980s power was preserved by and for privileged 
groups, which were namely the military, bureaucrats and businessmen. Handley claims 
147 The Nation (Internet Edition), 15 March 1997, at 
http://202.44.251.4/nationnewsI1997/19970311997031512989 .html Retrieved on 5 February 1998 
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that 'Big business also retained a centre of political, with firm alliances to the military 
and bureaucracy.' 149 In 1992, the confrontation between the military and civilian groups 
led to a decline in political power of the military. Military power has been replaced by the 
financial power of the business groups, with the patronage system forming the basis for 
this transfer of power, which excluded farmers' representation. The influence of such 
financial power was observed in the landslide victory of Thaksin, the telecommunication 
tycoon's TRT party, in the general elections of 6 January 2001. Thaksin's cabinet 
consists of between 30-45 per cent elite businessmen, which strongly implies the 
existence of cronyism as another aspect to the patronage system, where horizontal 
relationships and close connections between businessmen allow them to exploit the state 
power at the expense of the people. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the Thai political arena has tended towards the 
bipolar, rather than the pluralistic. Within the bipolar arena, state power is distributed 
between government and business groups. Unprivileged Thais, including farmers in 
particular, have never been able to share in the state power, because money is required, in 
order to gain political access. 'Because money now plays a crucial role in elections, the 
electoral process has effectively excluded many people who may have the potential to 
become effective politicians, but who lack the financial means to contest elections. ,150 
Laid, Pasuk, Baker and Sungsidh recognise money politics to be one of the main 
characteristics of Thai politics. The network of money politics is operated with the 
assistance of the social hierarchy and patronage systems within Thai political culture. In 
order to buy the votes of constituencies, politicians need to develop their own networks, 
which consist mostly of hua khanaen and jao pho. A huge amount of money is spent not 
only on vote-buying but is, in addition, also spent on maintaining extensive patronage 
networks. This environment only encourages further corruption, which continues to 
148 Callahan, W.A. and McCargo, D. (1996), p.376 
149 Handley, P. (1997) 'More of the Same?: Politics and Business, 1987-1996', in Hewison, K. (ed) 
Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, London: Routledge, p.98 
150 Surin Maisrikrod and McCargo, D. (1997) 'Electoral Politics: Commercialisation and Exclusion' in 
Hewison, K. (ed) Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, London: Routledge, p.140 
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damage the political development of Thailand towards the Western democratic 
framework. 
The contemporary debate on Thai political development focuses on the high level 
of corruption and, in addition, the inactive role of civil society. Thai academics and those 
who are familiar with the Thai political culture, tend to believe that an active role for civil 
society could help to balance the state power more effectively, because the Thai legal 
system has failed to solve these problems. Even in the case of murder, Thais often believe 
that the rich and well-connected can avoid justice. IS 1 'Real change will require a 
fundamental overhaul of the way Thailand is governed, clearing corruption and giving 
people more say in local administration.' IS2 
151 The Economist, 2-8 March 2002, A Survey a/Thailand, p.3 
152 Vatikiotis, M. and Fairclough, G. (1996), p.16 
Chapter 4 Group Formation of Rice, Sugarcane and Potato Farmers 
Introduction 
Before one can properly examine both the political power and participation of 
Thai farmers groups, one has to understand the specific process of group formation, and 
in addition, the key contributing factors, with respect to their sustainability within the 
Thai political arena. With reference to this, Olson's group theory will be employed as a 
main theoretical framework, in order to examine both the membership and mobilisation 
of Thai farmers groups. Olson's book, "The Logic of Collective Action" has dominated 
this area of discussion since pUblication in 1965, and has subsequently brought Western 
academics into the debate regarding collective incentives and selective incentives. 
Olson's emphasis on the effectiveness of selective incentives over collective incentives in 
mobilising collective action has been strongly challenged in the post-Olsonian literature. 
However, with reference to the case studies of rice, sugarcane and potato farmers 
groups in Thailand, Olson's argument corresponds with the research findings. 
Accordingly, this chapter will challenge the claims of inapplicability of selective 
incentives, with respect to group formation and their sustainability in the post-Olsonian 
literature, by utilising the empirical evidence obtained from the case studies of rice, 
sugarcane and potato farmers groups. In addition, the examination of Thai farmers group 
formation utilising Olson's group theory will include factors, with reference to both Thai 
society and Thai political culture. 
This chapter will begin in section 4.1 by examining the general case of Thai 
farmers group formations and the degree of tendency for individuals to join, with regard 
to the historical and cultural impacts. In this respect, the examination will introduce the 
case of Japanese farmers' interest groups, in order to provide some comparison to the 
Thai case. Thailand and Japan have shared elements, with regard to both their social 
hierarchy and patronage systems. However, this section will examine why these very 
same social elements have impacted differently on farmers group formations in both 
116 
Thailand and Japan, introducing the contributions of Confucianism and Buddhism. 
Nevertheless, this section will not fully examine the political power of Japanese farmers 
groups, as a further analysis with reference to this issue is to be discussed in Chapter 6. 
In section 4.2, both the National Economic and Social Development Plans and 
their impacts on the development of the agricultural sector of the economy will be 
considered. This will help to explain the impact of a specific Western development 
framework on the livelihoods of the Thai farmers in the case studies. However, because 
general international arguments in relation to agricultural exceptionalism have yet to be 
applied within Thailand, as to whether these arguments have begun to impact on the 
political participation of Thai farmers groups will also be examined. Furthermore, the 
consideration of agricultural exceptionalism in this respect will incorporate into the 
analysis, the specifics of the Thai political culture. As previously examined in Chapter 3, 
the political culture, which manifests within the Thai political arena has been considered 
to be the main contributing factor in relation to vote-buying, which has led to the 
continuing political weakness of Thai farmers groups in general. Section 4.3 will examine 
the contributing factors, with regard to rice, sugarcane and potato farmers group 
formations, in accordance with the data from the field research in Thailand, and this 
section will facilitate a comparative study of these three groups in section 4.3. 
4.1 Historical and Cultural Impacts on the Group Formation of Farmers 
in Thailand and Japan 
The agricultural sector of the Thai economy remains heavily reliant on its labour 
force. There is only a minority of rural families with an adequate supply of labour, 
needed, in order to achieve their potential levels of agricultural production. The market 
has begun to demand an increase in the labour force, particularly since the Thai economy 
was integrated into the world agricultural market, which resulted in a dramatic expansion 
in Thai agricultural production. Rice production for instance, was already labour 
intensive when it was grown domestically for family consumption. Its transformation into 
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a more heavily marketed product increased the demand for labour in the production of 
rice, which led to interdependence between Thai farmers, in respect of their labour force. 
This interdependence within the agricultural sector of the economy is not a unique 
case to Thailand. Indeed, this is a normal characteristic of rural villages across Asia. 
Hayami and Kikuchi 1, illustrate that the families of farmers in rural Asian villages were 
historically, too small to deal with the varying uncertainty of external problems, with 
regard to agricultural production. These problems included flooding in nearby crop fields, 
water shortages, and inadequate warehousing, and accordingly, collective actions where 
needed. This has resulted in the development of reciprocal relationships because of this 
interdependence of the agricultural labour force. 
In Thai society, long khaek keaw khao was one of the most established of rural 
cultures, and refers to the reciprocal exchange of labour and interdependence between 
rice farmers in rural areas. This culture has traditionally strengthened the relationship 
between rural people, and in addition, has promoted unity within rural villages. Perhaps 
surprisingly, this reinforced interdependence of the labour force did not lead to a high 
level of tendency for farmers to develop these connections and to establish farmers 
groups. In this respect, Shigetomi2 and Prudhisan3 argue that social organisations and 
other established groups are virtually absent from the Thai political arena, because of the 
loosely structured nature of the Thai society. Most group formations are based on 
reciprocal relationships, and as a result they are both unstable and impermanent, because 
these reciprocal relationships are formed with the notion of the Buddhist concept of 
bunkhun. As such, 'These relationships rely heavily on emotional factors, therefore 
people's relations can easily change, and constant patterns of behavior in social 
relationships are difficult to form. ,4 
1 Hayami, Y. and Kikuchi, M. (1986) Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads: An Economic Approach to 
Institutional Change, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, p.12 
2 Shigetomi, S. (1998) Cooperation and Community in Rural Thailand: An Organizational Analysis of 
Participatory Rural Development, Tokyo: Institute Of Developing Economies, p.27 
3 Prudhisan lumbala (1987) 'Interest and Pressure Groups', in Somsakdi Xuto (ed) Government and 
Politics in Thailand, Singapore: Oxford University Press, p.112 
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A Thai develops mutual obligations and relationships with the persons he 
encounters in life, but is not driven as members of many other societies are to bundle 
them into groups, which can then be labeled for ease of deciding how to treat them-and 
the labels may then become in flexible. There is vertical hierarchy, but not horizontal 
groupings. 5 
With reference to this, the vertical reciprocal relationships help to both establish, 
and in addition to reinforce the patronage system in the Thai society. However, this form 
of hierarchical, superior-inferior reciprocal relationship does not only exist in Thailand, 
as it is observed in most other Asian countries. Neher6 and Hood7 have accepted this to 
be a part of the Asian political culture, which developed from Confucianism, and helps to 
explain the Asian style of democracy or 'soft authoritarianism' and the formation of the 
patronage system. Neher highlights that 'Throughout Asia, "exchange bonds" determine 
power, status, authority relations, and the citizen's role in society. These exchanges 
constitute rewards and values, which one person provide for another in exchange for like 
benefit. A person who has command over resources attains power over others who need 
those resources but have only limited access to them. ,8 In this respect, Hood describes the 
structure of power as hierarchically intense. 'Leaders provide goods and services, and 
loyal clients provide political and economic support. ,9 This form of relationship was still 
observed in Japan from the post-war years until the second half of the 1980s, where the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) relied heavily on the rural vote. This enabled Japanese 
farmers groups and their representative, Nokyo, to exercise their power and carry 
influence within the network of the agricultural policy-making process. IO However with 
the decline of the LDP in 1993, the relationship between the LDP and Japanese farmers 
groups including Nokyo has also declined. This decline is largely a result of three main 
factors, namely, an increase in the awareness of consumers of unreasonable prices for 
domestic agricultural products in the mid 1980s, the end of the 38 year monopoly power 
4 Shigetomi, S. (1998), p.8 
5 Kulick, E. and Wilson, D. (1992) Thailand's Turn: Profile ola New Dragon, London: Macmillan, p.67 
6 Neher, C.D. (1994) 'Asian Style Democracy', Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No.11 November, 1994: 949-
961 
7 Hood, SJ. (1998) 'The Myth of Asian-Style Democracy', Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVIII, No.9 September, 
1998: 853-866 
8 Neher, C.D. (1994), p.950 
9 Hood, SJ. (1998), p.856 
10 Iwai, T. (1997) 'Japan's Agricultural Politics at a Turning Point', in Jain, P. and Inoguchi, T. (eds) 
Japanses Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy?, Hong Kong: Macmillan, p.186 
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of the LDP government in 1993 11 , and in addition, the impact of the conclusion of the 
GATT Uruguay Round on the liberalisation of the Japanese rice market. Further 
discussions in this regard will be developed in Chapter 6. 
The relationship between the government and farmers groups in Japan can be 
explained by the inspiration of Confucianism on both Japanese society and political 
culture. Confucianism emphasises the value of the group over the individual, which starts 
within the family, and this creates inferiors who are obliged to superiors. 12 According to 
Neher, 'Obligations to superiors were the cement of the Confucian order. These 
obligations were translated into differential and unquestioning toward those in 
authority.,13 Consequently, obligations and hierarchical structures can smooth 
interactions between members of society, and this leads to a harmonisation of society. 
Accordingly, Confucianism can help to generate and enhance co-operation within 
society. Ishida14 observes that this tendency for individuals to join groups has been a 
fundamental factor, with respect to the societal structure in the rural communities of 
Japan, since the Meji Restoration in 1868. This is because agricultural production was 
concentrated in rice, which is labour intensive in production. 'Villagers had to work 
together very closely during specific periods when a large work force was needed-such 
as for the gathering of grass for fertilizing and feeding livestock, the securing of irrigation 
water, the transplanting of rice, and of course harvesting. ,15 
The production of rice in Japan by its very nature requires more interdependence 
of labour than in Thailand, since 'rice farming in Japan initially developed in fan-shaped 
terraces in the valley bottoms and intermountain basin. Such topography renders local 
cooperation effective in controlling a water supply based on small streams.' 16 By 
contrast, rice production in Thailand spread through the Chaophraya Delta in the central 
11 Hoh, M. (1994) 'Kome Kaikoku and Japanese Internationalization', Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No.11 
November, 1994: 991-1001, p.994 
12 'Confucianism and Japanese Growth', at www.cyberesays.comlHistory/33.htm Retrieved on 22 February 
2003 
13 Neher, C.D. (1994), p. 954 
14 Ishida, T (1989) Japanese Political Culture, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, p.9 
15 Ibid., pp.7-8 
16 Hayami, Y. and Kikuchi, M. (1986), p.22 
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region, and the river valleys of the northern region and along the Mekong River in the 
lower lsan region. I7 Therefore, there is a generous water supply easily available to Thai 
farmers, in contrast to the experience of Japanese farmers who over time have through 
necessity developed to be an interdependent labour force. 
This interdependence in Japan has over time, helped towards the development of 
a distinctive form of social cohesion between the people in rural areas, where rights and 
obligations within local groups are crucial elements. Hayami and Kikuchi 18 perceive this 
to be a main factor in allowing rural societies in Japan to exist in a close societal 
structure, in distinct comparison to the loose societal structure of Thailand. Accordingly, 
the level of tendency for individuals to join groups is higher in Japan than in Thailand. 
Confucianist academics often perceive the difference in the societal structures in 
Thailand and Japan to be a direct result of the adherence to Confucianism in Japan, and 
its absence in Thailand. However, the emphasis on harmonious co-operation and a highly 
structured social hierarchy in Confucianism does not imply anything that does not already 
exist in the rural societies of Thailand. This is because of the notion of bun and bab in 
Buddhism, which teaches adherents the importance of being generous to others and to 
avoid negative actions has also resulted in a harmonious co-operation within Thai 
society. Buddhism is different from Confucianism in the sense that hierarchical 
relationships within society are not emphasised. However, the influence of social 
hierarchy in Thailand is already intense, as a result of the sakdina system. Accordingly, 
neither the existence nor absence of Confucianism can adequately explain a level of 
tendency for individuals to both form and join groups, in Thailand and Japan. 
Nevertheless, the different roots to both Thai and Japanese social hierarchy have 
impacted differently, with regard to the political participation of rural farmers in both 
countries. Confucianism places an emphasis on social hierarchy, where the inferior must 
be obedient to the superior, and in addition, the superior must take care of the inferior. 
Simone and Feraru emphasise that 'all the Confucian-influenced countries subscribed to a 
17 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999) Thailand: Economy and Politics, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, p.3 
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hierarchical model of a benevolent father-figure monarch, assisted by meritorious 
officials, ruling over loyal and obedient subjects, setting an example for them of virtue 
and upholding the moral order so fundamental to a civil society.' 19 Accordingly, Neher 
concludes that 'With its stress on hierarchy and reverence for those in power, Confucian 
favors authoritarian rule but its emphasis on harmony, stability, and consensus, it fosters 
democracy. ,20 Therefore, it can be argued that Confucianism enables the creation of a 
favourable political environment, in which Japanese farmers can establish interest groups. 
The influence of Confucianism on Japanese rural society declined as a result of 
the significant changes, which took place across Japanese society after World War II, 
with Japanese farmers becoming more profit-oriented and with the increasing importance 
of non-agricultural incomes to the rural population. However, the notion of individualism 
rather than society failed to fully manifest itself, and it can be argued that the influence of 
Confucianism within Japanese rural society persists to a certain extent. As outlined by 
Mulgan, who summarised Fukutake's study of Japanese rural society in the early 1970s, 
, ... the farmers' self-centred character did not develop into fully fledged individualism 
because the patriarchal system remained to some extent and agricultural communities did 
not disappear entirely. Critically farmers did not sufficient production capacity to operate 
completely independently of traditional agricultural communities. To this extent, farmers 
retained their essential community character developed in the past, and hence agricultural 
communities still strove to uphold their principles, existence and identity. As a result, 
agricultural organisation like Nokyo remained as organisations for all farmers although 
they only served the interests of some. ,21 With reference to this, it is important to 
consider the influence of Confucianism both in terms of the unity of Japanese farmers 
and the degree of political influence of Nokyo when examining Japanese farmers groups. 
Mulgan confirms that 'Nokyo's political standing has rested very much on the loyalty of 
18 Hayami, Y. and Kikuchi, M. (1986), p.20 
19 Simone, V. and Feraru, A. T. (1995) The Asian Pacific Political and Economic Development in a Global 
Context, Longman, p.223 
20 Neher, C.D. (1994), p.953 
21 Mulgan, A.G. (2000) The Politics of Agriculture in Japan, London: Routledge, p.311 
122 
its farming members based on cooperatives customs and social ties in rural communities 
as well as on its corporatised status as an administrative arm of the government.,22 
With regard to Thailand, the form of social hierarchy that manifests has limited 
the political opportunity for farmers groups. This is because the social hierarchy takes its 
root from the somburanayasidhirath (absolute monarchy or god-king), and the sakdina 
system. Within this system, authoritarian groups were able to exercise power freely, for 
their own interests. As a result, superiors can exploit inferiors with ease. Therefore, social 
hierarchy has emerged as a negative factor, with respect to the formation of Thai farmers 
groups. Moreover, it has implied the concentration of the structure of power, which 
obstructs the process of Thai democratisation. 
In both Thailand and Japan, social hierarchy has been a contributing factor, with 
regard to the patronage system, and this has led to the high level of money politics in the 
political arenas of both countries. The form of money politics in Japan is different from 
that of the Thai case. Most political scandals in Japan are with reference to the 
connections between elite politicians, for instance the case of Muneo Suzuki, a senior 
member of the LDP. Suzuki was arrested on 19 June 2002 on the allegation of accepting 
¥ 5 million (US$ 40,000) in bribes from a lumber company in his constituency, on the 
northern island of Hokkaido.23 
The connection between businessmen and elite politicians, which promotes 
corruption, exists also in Thailand. In addition to the form of money politics found in 
Japan, in Thailand this also includes vote-buying in rural areas. The absence of vote-
buying within the Japanese political arena, strengthens the political influence of Japanese 
farmers groups and increases the level of tendency for farmers to join these groups. Their 
influence is strengthened because these farmers have experienced the situation where 
their collective action has allowed them to negotiate effectively and constructively with 
rurally based MPs from the LDP, through the Nokyo. Negotiations referred to the policy 
22 Mulgan, A.G. (2000), pp.648-649 
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of protectionism, with regard to the market for rice, in addition to other policies of 
agricultural development. This reveals a high level of political awareness, with respect to 
Japanese farmers groups, and it can be argued that the patronage system in Japan does not 
have a significant adverse impact on Japanese farmers groups. 
By contrast, rurally based MPs in Thailand do not play an active role in protecting 
the interests of rural farmers, as instead, they choose to represent the interests of ruraljao 
pho who are their hua khanaen in general elections. According to Hewison and 
Maniemai, 'The pattern of seeking financial support from business has meant that the 
chao pho are finding their positions and wealth legitimized, even when gained through 
illegal activities. This is happening through their support of legal parties and the linking 
of representative politics and democracy. Arguably more significant than money, the 
chao pho and business people provide the organization and network required for electoral 
politics. ,24 The reciprocal relationship between MPs and businessmen has helped MPs to 
secure their seats in the House of Representatives through vote-buying. 
In this respect, Ammar affirms that 'It is now widely expected that politicians will 
bring projects into their constituencies. It is widely expected that such projects will 
generate side benefits to the rural elite, who are quite active in the construction business. 
It is therefore widely expected that when the politicians and the rural elites are up for 
election, money will flow and votes will be bought. (Emphasis added)'2s This situation 
adversely affects the political participation of Thai farmers groups, and it is observed that 
the level of tendency for Thai farmers to form groups is low, because farmers experience 
that their groups are not as well acknowledged as business groups are by the government. 
This is because of the very closed network of the patronage system between government 
23 The Economist (Internet Edition), 20 June 2002, at 
www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=1194776 Retrieved on 22 July 2002 
24 Hewison, K. and Maniemai Thongyou (2000) 'Developing Provincial Capitalism: A Profile of the 
Economic and Political Roles of aNew Generation in Khon Kaen, Thailand', in McVey, R. (ed) Money & 
Power in Provincial Thailand, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS] and Silkworm 
Books, p.20 1 
25 Ammar Siamwalla (1997c) 'Can a Developing Democracy Manage its Macroeconomy? The Case of 
Thailand', in Thailand Development Research Institute (ed) Thailand's Boom and Bust, Bangkok: Thailand 
Development Research Institute [TDRI], p.72 
124 
and businessmen in the Thai political arena, which has never offered Thai farmers the 
political opportunity offered to farmers within the Japanese political arena. 
4.2 Economic and Social Developmental Policies in Thailand, and Their Impacts on 
the Development of the Agricultural Sector 
In 1950, the Thai government established the National Economic Council (NEC). 
The NEC worked on behalf of the government in conducting research, with regard to 
economic development, in order to help to establish an overall framework for the 
government to adopt within the decision making process of its policy of economic and 
social development. However, the economic development plans established by the NEC 
lacked clear and comprehensive national objectives, and this led to problems, with regard 
to implementation in practice. Consequently, westernised technocrats within the NEC 
argued the case for the government to request assistance from the World Bank. In 1957, a 
mission from the World Bank arrived in Bangkok, in order to assess the Thai economy 
and to provide the government with recommendations, with reference to its 'national 
economic planning system' .26 
In 1959, and in accordance with the recommendations of the World Bank, the 
Thai government established the National Economic Development Board (NEDB). 
Before long, the NEDB would place more emphasis on the challenge of social 
development, and consequently in 1972, its name was changed to the National Economic 
and Social Development Board (NESDB). The NESDB was responsible for developing 
policy frameworks, which manifested as the five-year National Economic and Social 
Development Plans, although the first of these plans actually lasted for six years. The 
latest NESD plan is the ninth of these, and commenced in 2002.27 It is important to 
summarise the NESD plans, in order to illustrate how they have impacted on Thai 
farmers groups. With reference to this, the examination of the first and second National 
Economic Development Plans will be emphasised, because they established the 
26 National Economic and Social Development Board [NESDB], at 
www.nesdb.go.thihistorylhistory_e.html Retrieved on 5 August 1999 
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framework for economic and social development inspired by Western economics. This 
strategy has resulted in both positive and negative outcomes, with respect to the 
development of Thai farmer group formations. 
The First National Economic Development Plan (NED) between 1961-1966 
emphasised the policy of import-substitution in an attempt to develop the economy and 
its basic infrastructure, which included 'transport, communications, power, social and 
public services, and agriculture. ,28 In accordance, government expenditure in the 
infrastructure and construction sectors increased significantly at the rates of 22.3 per cent 
and 17.8 per cent respectively.29 During the Second NED Plan, between 1967-1971, the 
government remained committed to the development of basic infrastructure.3o The main 
source of financial support in the development of basic infrastructure was from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).31 In addition, it is also 
clear that in the 1960s, government expenditure, with regard to the development of basic 
infrastructure gained substantially, when the United States based their military across the 
Isan region and the central region of Thailand during the Vietnam War. 
The improvement to the basic infrastructure in the 1960s had positively promoted 
the development of the agricultural sector. Somporn and Nipon32 argue that the 
improvements made to the irrigation system, enabled rice farmers to produce rice twice a 
year and in addition, the improvements to the road network nation-wide provided farmers 
with better access to their markets. At that time, 'if one asks villagers, rich or poor, 
whether they would like to have their villages have better access to roads-the central 
27 Ibid. 
28 Warr, P.G. (1993) 'The Thai Economy', in Warr, P.G. (ed) The Thai Economy in Transition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p.30 
29 Ibid., p.30 
30 National Economic and Social Development Board (2001) Sarup wiwattanakarn khong phan phatthana 
setthakij lae sangkom hang chat (The Summary of the Development of the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan), [in Thai] at www.nesdb.go.thlInteresting_menuiplanl_8Ibottombar.html Retrieved on 
22 November 2001 
31 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999), p.l28 
32 Sompom Isvilanonda and Nipon Poapongsakom (1995) Rice Supply and Demand in Thailand: The 
Future Outlook, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute [TDRI], p.6 
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conduit for the market-they will almost to a man answer "yes". ,33 With the 
improvements to transportation, the costs of production within the agricultural sector 
reduced considerably, and farmers began to participate more fully within their markets. 
Over this period, the contribution of the agricultural sector to the Thai economy was 40 
per cent of GDP, with 80 per cent of the labour force employed within this sector. The 
agricultural sector enabled the Thai economy to maintain its high growth rates throughout 
the 1960s.34 Specifically, in 1961, the export value of agricultural products contributed 
84.37 per cent to the foreign exchange earnings of Thailand. In addition, rice contributed 
36 per cent to the total foreign exchange earnings in the same year.35 
However, accelerating the economic growth rate in the agricultural sector was not 
the primary intention with the development of the basic infrastructure. This was actually 
intended in order to safeguard the country against the communist insurgency, which was 
then permeating Asia, and in addition to facilitate the transfer of resources from the 
agricultural sector into industrial sector. According to Christensen, Ammar and Pakorn36, 
the development of both the roads and the railroads in the 1960s and 1970s was not a 
government response to the existing demands of the rural people. Rather, they were built 
in order to introduce this potential to the rural people, in accordance with the 
recommendations of the W orId Bank. 
The high levels of government expenditure, with regard to the development of 
basic infrastructure provided the opportunity for corruption in several projects. A newly 
elected group of MPs from the general election of 1969, presented 'evidence of large-
scale corruption in contracts under the Highways and Irrigation Departments, including 
the alleged embezzlement of US$l million from cement contracts for dam 
33 Ammar Siamwalla (1992) 'Myths, Demons and the Future of Thai Agriculture' in Poonsin 
Wongkolthoot (ed) (1999)Krobrob 60 Pee Arjarn Ammar (60 Years Professor Ammar), Bangkok: Thailand 
Development Research Institute [TDRI], p.246 
34 Akira, S. (1996) Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, pp.I-2 
35 Sompom Isvilanonda and Nipon Poapongsakom (1995), pA 
36 Christensen, S.R., Ammar Siamwalla and Pakom Vichyanond (1997) 'Institutional and Political Bases of 
Growth-Inducing Policies in Thailand', in Thailand Development Research Institute [TDRI]( ed) Thailand's 
Boom and Bust, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute [TDRI], p.47 
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construction. ,37 This type of corruption became a normal phenomenon in Thailand, and 
persists to the present day, significantly affecting the development of the basic 
infrastructure. These effects have been felt in the development of the agricultural sector, 
and have been observed within the province of Ratchaburi, where the sugarcane farmers 
group in the research is located. The discussion regarding this issue will be developed at a 
later point within this chapter. 
The average rate of economic growth between 1958-1973 was 7.2 per cent.38 This 
enabled the government to significantly increase its expenditure, with regard to the 
development of the educational system. Pasuk and Baker39 argue that the government 
policy of development within the primary educational system of 1920, was only properly 
implemented after the 1932 revolution by the Khana Rasadorn, whose core members 
were a Western educated elite. Nevertheless, primary education was still only available in 
the main provincial towns, such as Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Khon Kaen. The much-
needed expansion of the primary educational system beyond the provincial towns and out 
into the rural villages, actually only began to take place in the 1960s as a result of the 
increasing government revenues. By the 1970's, the government had also extended the 
period of compulsory primary education from four to six years. 'The consequent rise in 
the quality of the labor force played a major role in the increased productivity of 
agriculture in the 1960s and the 1970s. ,40 
However the development of the educational system in the 1960s was not the 
main government priority. Government expenditure in most sectors concentrated on the 
improvements to basic infrastructure. This was evidenced by the budget allocations of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC), where there was less provision made 
available for technological transfer in agricultural production, than that made available 
for agricultural infrastructure. Throughout the 1960s, the government allocated between 
37 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999), p.300 
38 Ammar Siam walla (1997b) 'The Thai Economy: Fifty Years of Expansion', in Thailand Development 
Research Institute [TDRI](ed) Thailand's Boom and Bust, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research 
Institute [TDRI], p.9 
39 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999), pp.368-369 
40 Christensen, S.R., Ammar Siamwalla and Pakorn Vichyanond (1997), p.47 
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40-60 per cent of the agricultural budget for the development of agricultural 
infrastructure. Of the remainder of this budget, only '12 to more than 16 % to extension 
and technological transfer, 6% to 8% to research and development, more than 8% to 14% 
for resources procurement, and the remainder to general administration,.41 Both 
insufficient and inadequate research, with regard to the formation of the agricultural 
policy of the MOAC resulted in delays to the further development of the agricultural 
sector. This is evidenced by 'a growing awareness amongst NESDB planners of the 
increasing problems of regional disparity and poverty in the rural areas. ,42 
The unavailability of lending credit from the formal sector, accessible to farmers 
in rural areas, through either government credit or bank loans, is another explanation, 
with regard to the ineffectiveness of the agricultural sector in improving its productivity. 
This can help to explain the persistent level of rural poverty experienced throughout the 
1960's. The problems traditionally experienced by farmers, with regard to rural credit had 
often provided the opportunity for those in the informal lending sector, such as kamnan, 
phuyaiban and jao pho to exploit farmers with loans of excessively high interest rates. 
During the period of the First NED Plan, the government became more aware of this 
specific problem. There was an increased effort to restructure the rural credit system, in 
order to help farmers to improve their financing and consequently increase their 
productivity, through opening up the formal lending sector. With regard to this, at the end 
of the First NED Plan in 1966 the government initiated the Bank of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC).43 Throughout the implementation of the Second 
NED Plan, 'the BAAC grew at the moderate speed and succeeded in establishing 
branches in fifty-eight out of Thailand's seventy-one provinces. ,44 
41 Yamada, J. (1998) 'Capital Outflow from the Agriculture Sector in Thailand', paper from the Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund, Tokyo, Japan, p.6 
42 WaIT, P.G. (1993), pp.30-31 
43 Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, Thailand, at 
www.baac.or.thlaboutlhistorylhistory.htm Retrieve on 20 March 2003 
44Ammar Siamwalla, Chirmsak Pinthong, Nipon Poapongsakorn, Ploenpit Satsanguan, Prayong Nettayarak, 
Wanrak Mingmaneenakin and Yuavares Tubpun (1993) 'The Thai Rural Credit System and Elements of a 
Theory: Public Subsidies, Private Information, and Segmented Markets', in Poonsin Wongkolthoot (ed) 
(1999) Krobrob 60 Pee Arjarn Ammar (60 Years Professor Ammar), Bangkok: Thailand Development 
Research Institute [TDRI], pp.129-130 
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During the Third National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESD) 
between 1972-1976 and the Fourth NESD Plan between 1977-1981, more emphasis was 
placed on improving the provision of rural credit, in order to solve the problems 
regarding income disparity, social services in rural areas, and in addition to promote 
economic development. Accordingly, in 1975, the government ordered the BAAC to 
increase its agricultural loans to 3.5 billion baht from the level of 2.65 billion baht in 
1974.45 The BAAC dominated agricultural credit, by becoming one of the main sources 
to farmers. According to the ADB, by 1996, a total of 85 per cent of farmers borrowed 
from the BAAC, or about 82 per cent of all agricultural households.46 
In 1975, the government passed a regulation obliging commercial banks to divert 
at least 5 per cent of their lending to agricultural enterprises. This ratio was raised to 13 
per cent in 1979, of which 2 per cent could be loans to agribusiness. In 1987, the 
proportion was raised to 20 per cent, with coverage widened to include agriculture, 
agribusiness, and rural industries. As most commercial banks found it is difficult to 
administer loans to small and medium peasants, they preferred to lend to big 
agribusinesses or to make degosits with BAAC, which in tum lent mainly to 
agribusinesses or big cultivators. 
However the formal lending system for most small-scale farmers, either through 
the BAAC or commercial banks, has remained difficult to access since the inception of 
the BAAC. Most loan proposals by these farmers are disapproved by both the BAAC and 
commercial banks, because they cannot provide proof of their debt repaying capacity, 
with the only asset very often being their land titles. With reference to this, Ammar et al. 
argue that, with regard to long-term loans, many farmers prefer to borrow from the 
informal lending sector at higher rates of interest, because 'if the creditor forecloses on 
the loan, the borrowing farmer stand a better chance to lease his land back from the 
creditor than if he had borrowed from the formal sector. ,48 Nevertheless, it appears that 
there are not many farmers who have the capacity to lease back their land. 
45 Ammar Siamwalla, Chirmsak Pinthong, Nipon Poapongsakorn, Ploenpit Satsanguan, Prayong 
Nettayarak, Wanrak Mingmaneenakin and Yuavares Tubpun (1993), p. 130 
46 Asian Development Bank (1997) Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors 
on a Proposed Loan to the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives for the Rural Enterprise 
Credit Project in the Kingdom of Thailand, Asian Development Bank [ADB], p.l9 
47 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999), p.60 
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In the wake of the economic crisis of 1997, access to the formal lending sector 
became more difficult for farmers because every Thai bank experienced problems, in 
terms of their liquidity within the financial market, even including the Bangkok Bank the 
largest bank in Thailand. As a result, the informal lending sector is the only option now 
open to small-scale farmers even though the interest rates are very high. In the crop year 
of 1998, often stricken farmers were compelled to borrow money from the informal 
lending sector at interest rates such as 12 per cent per month.49 According to the research, 
the informal lending sector is more intensively involved with sugarcane farmers than 
either rice or potato farmers, and this is observed with the role of quota men in quota 
groups of sugarcane farmers. With reference to this, the informal lending sector can be 
regarded as a contributing factor, with respect to the formation and expansion of the 
patronage system in rural areas. 
Although during the Third NESD Plan, the government strongly supported the 
policy of agricultural development,SO at the stage of implementation, this policy gained 
less attention from the government than did the policy of industrialisation. This was 
indicated by a dramatic increase in the level of co-operation between successive 
governments and businessmen, who were active in all areas of manufacturing and 
agribusiness,s 1 whereas such co-operation between these same governments and Thai 
farmers was rare. The lack of Thai farmers' representatives can help to explain both the 
failure of the policy of agricultural development, and the political weakness of Thai 
farmers groups. As seen by Ramsay's examination of the Kriangsak government in 1979: 
Despite Kriangsak's stated commitment to help farmers, they received little benefit 
from his government. Only half of 1,600 million baht ($78,816,000)52 allocated for 
drought relief early in the year was actually spent, and did little to offset income losses to 
farmers estimated at 6,800 million baht ($334, 968,000). A program to have the Bank for 
48 Ammar Siamwalla, Chirmsak Pinthong, Nipon Poapongsakorn, Ploenpit Satsanguan, Prayong 
Nettayarak, Wanrak Mingmaneenakin and Yuavares Tubpun (1993), p. 135 
49 Jeremiah Paknawin-Mock (1998) 'Shattering the Rice Bowl', Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 25 June 
1998, at www.bkkpost.samart.co.thlnewslBpachiveIBPI9980626/250698_News23.html Retrieved 22 July 
2000 
50 National Economic and Social Development Board (2001) 
51 Christensen, S.R., Ammar Siamwalla and Pakorn Vichyanond (1997), p.30 
52 Ramsay calculated this by using the exchange rate of20.30 baht per US$ 1, before the devaluation of the 
baht in 1984 and again in 1997 
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Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) take over farmers' debts from private 
lenders at low rates of interest helped only a small minority of farmers. While 68,000 
farmers had registered debts of 2,010 million baht ($99,012,600) the BAAC could 
assume only 406 million baht ($19,999,560) of the debts. In September the government 
announced plans to buy rice at 2,400 to 2,700 baht ($119 to $134) per metric ton to 
stabilize rice prices and store buffer stocks to eliminate extreme price fluctuations. 
Similar attempts in the past have had little success and have benefited mainly larger 
farmers who could afford to transport their rice to government purchasing centers. 53 
Throughout the period of the Fifth NESD Plan between 1982-1986 and the Sixth 
NESD Plan between 1987-1991, successive governments continued to emphasise the 
policy of industrialisation. However they did begin to decentralise political power to the 
local level, in order to improve the self-reliant status of people in rural areas. 54 During the 
Sixth NESD Plan the government began to place more emphasis on the development of 
agribusiness, in an attempt to reduce the problem of income disparity between the rural 
and urban areas.55 However, the high growth rate of the Thai economy throughout the 
1980s encouraged the government to prioritise the policy of industrialisation. 
The Seventh NESD Plan between 1992-1996 and the Eighth NESD Plan between 
1997 -2001 were more concerned, with regard to the level of popular participation within 
the Thai political arena, and in addition with the sustainable growth of the Thai economy. 
Over the period, the role of civil society was heavily considered, in order to more fully 
integrate the Seventh and Eighth NESD Plans. However, Day-cha Siripat argues that 'the 
government did not really seek public opinion about the policy changes and return to the 
same development direction of rapid economic growth. ,56 
The emphasis placed on the policy of industrialisation since the Fourth NESD 
Plan onwards, has been a catalyst for governments to provide more training, in order to 
increase the skilled labour force available to the industrial sector. In the 1980s, more than 
53 Ramsay, A. (1979) 'Thailand 1978: Kriangsak-The Thai who Binds', Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No.2, 
February 1979: 104-114, p.l09 
54 Rigg, J. (1991) 'Grass-Roots Development in Rural Thailand: A Lost Cause?', World Development, 
V 01.1 9, No.2/3, 1991:199-211, p.200 
55 Christensen, S.R. (1992) The 1992 Year-End Conference: Between the Farmer and the State: Towards a 
Policy Analysis of the Role of Agribusiness in Thai Agriculture, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research 
Institute [TDRI], p.6 
56 Watershed Vol.5, No.3 March-June 2000, p.l3 
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80 per cent of the labour force had only a primary education or less. 57 The government 
perceived this to be an obstacle, with regard to its policy of industrialisation, whereas the 
low level of education in the agricultural sector has rarely been addressed. Accordingly, 
government has encouraged students to study engineering and science, because the policy 
of industrialisation has expanded the construction and manufacturing sectors. In response 
to the shortage of engineers and scientists, the government increased the number of 
scholarships for students to study abroad for a higher degree, because of inadequacies, in 
terms of laboratories, teaching staff and equipment, available in Thailand.58 With 
reference to these problems, the government proposed the Universities Science and 
Engineering Education Project to the World Bank, in order to seek loans to finance this 
project, and received US$ 143.3 million. The World Bank approved this loan on 13 May 
1997.59 
The general direction taken by the eight NESD Plans help to indicate why a low 
priority is given to the agricultural sector within Thailand. Significantly, insufficient 
consideration has been given to the general international arguments relating to 
agricultural exceptionalism. This has to a great extent, limited the political influence of 
Thai farmers, where vote-buying and money politics are evident as the dominant 
characteristics within the Thai political arena. As argued in Chapter 3, politicians 
continue to depend on vote-buying, in order to succeed electorally, thereby impacting on 
the voting strength of a range of groups within civil society. In the context of Thai 
farmers groups, that this arrangement continues to persist, has suppressed their ability to 
utilise effective strategies, in order to achieve positive outcomes through their 
negotiations with the government. 
57 World Bank (1996) 'Investing in Future: Education reform in Thailand', Press Release No:96/45/EAP, at 
http://web. worldbank.orglWBSITEIEXTERNALINEWS/0"contentMDK:200 14822-menuPK:34466-p 
Retrieved on 4 April 2003 
58 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1998) Thailand's Boom and Bust, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 
~.147 
9 World Bank (1997) 'World Bank Provides US$143.3 Million for Thailand's Education Sector', News 
Release No. 97/J348/EAP, at www.worldbank.org/htmllextdr/extmeI1348.htm Retrieved on 4 March 2003 
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According to Skogstad60, there are two fundamental elements, which can ensure 
that the agriculture sectors of countries receive exceptional treatment by their respective 
governments. Primarily, government intervention within the agricultural sector, in order 
to maintain a safe and secure food supply for the country has strategic geo-political 
relevance, promoting the enduring nature of organisations such as Nokyo and the NFU. 
Secondarily, the government must be fully aware of the special interests and 
requirements of farmers, because the agricultural sectors of national economies are 
subject to unique and uncontrollable factors, which result from unpredictable weather 
conditions and imperfect markets. Accordingly, government intervention can be justified, 
in order to help farmers who are disadvantaged by incomes, which are both more 
unstable and lower than those outside of the agricultural sector. 
With regard to these elements, the absence of agricultural exceptionalism in 
Thailand can be considered to be a contributing factor in relation to the decision-making 
of rural voters. With reference to the interviews with the rice, sugarcane, and potato 
farmers groups, there is a general awareness that the government does not prioritise the 
country's agricultural sector. Accordingly, farmers do not normally vote on the basis of 
considerations that relate in some way to their agricultural production activities. Instead, 
the ubiquitous presence of vote-buying has a significant influence on the decision-making 
of the agricultural voters, which has significantly reduced the potential for Thai farmers 
to develop political influence. There exists a significant imbalance in the Thai electoral 
system, which negates the opportunity for farmers groups to improve their political 
opportunity and to take advantage of their collective demographic, in order to maximise 
their political representation. Rather, vote-buying of the poor, rural, farming population 
determines the way in which this section of the electorate is represented, something, 
which may have little to do with the interests of farmers or their priorities. Accordingly, 
the immediate financial implication of the personal windfall, which is available to 
individual farmers through vote-buying, sacrifices the potential future benefit of 
mobilising and consolidating a unified and representative independent political voice. 
60 Skogstad, G. (1998) 'Ideas, Paradigms and Institutions: Agricultural Exceptionalism in the European 
Union and the United States', Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vo!.11, 
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On balance, the contribution of the NESD Plans since its inception in 1961, has 
been one of a more negative than positive impact, in terms of the development of the 
agricultural sector and the political participation of farmers. Firstly, this is partly a result 
of the failure at the implementation stage of the policy framework, where the policy of 
agricultural development remains a theoretical framework, which the government has 
been reluctant to implement. Secondly, this is also a result of the structure of the Thai 
political culture, with respect to money politics and the patronage system, which have 
both significantly influenced the orientation of government policy. It has been observed 
that between the 1980s-1990s, the policy of economic development exposed the 
reciprocal benefits between elite businessmen and politicians. Rigg has affirmed that: 
The reasons why development plans in Thailand are rarely implemented in any 
systematic fashion are numerous. Of great importance are the nature and functioning of 
the Thai bureaucracy and Thai society. After being produced by the NESDB, a national 
development plan has to run an obstacle course of influential interest groups - among 
them the army, politicians and civil servants .... Ministers can ignore planing objectives 
presented by the NESDB and pursue policy of their own. It is significant in this regard 
that the national development plans lack statutory enforcement and are not biding in 
terms of budget allocation. This "provides much leeway to the line ministries to interpret 
and exploit the plan as a useful reference only when they find it beneficial to do so." 61 
This characteristic of the Thai bureaucracy has been one of the main obstacles to 
the political participation of Thai farmers, because this has allowed elite bureaucrats and 
politicians to abuse state power for their own interests. 
4.3 Characteristics of Rice, Sugarcane and Potato Farmers Groups 
In general, the emergence of interest groups has been argued to be an indication 
of the need for collective action, in order to achieve collective positive outcomes. Olson62 
notes that the majority of interest groups have one shared economic objective, which 
furthers the interests of their members. Individuals look to the benefits of collective 
action, when they cannot protect and advance their collective interests. Accordingly, 
No.4, October 1998: 463-490, p.468 
61 Rigg, J. (1991), p.201 
62 Olson, M. (1974, Fourth Edition) The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
pp.5-7 
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group action is needed, in order to perform this function on their behalf. By contrast, 
whenever individuals can secure and advance their interests without depending on a 
group, they tend to find that groups are unnecessary. 
A case in point is the example of farmers' interest groups, which can establish in 
response to low prices of agricultural products. In this context, temporary groups are 
formed spontaneously, and will cease to exist when the price demands are achieved. The 
achievement of higher prices not only benefits the group members, as in addition this 
benefits non-members as well. The equality in individuals enjoying the benefits of public 
goods leads to the problem of the 'free-rider' when mobilising collective action. 'There is 
a general agreement that, because of the free-rider problem, individuals will tend to 
contribute lower level of "action" (money, effort, time and so on) the larger the group to 
which they belong.,63 Accordingly, Olson64 argues that collective incentives cannot 
always attract potential members to join the group. Consequently, groups tend to offer 
selective incentives, in order to attract potential members, members, which he describes 
as rational individuals. 
However, Marsh65 offers a critique of Olson's argument. He illustrates the 
inapplicability of this concept through empirical evidence, which exists in Western 
studies. Marsh opposes Olson's emphasis on the importance of selective incentives, by 
using evidence from his empirical study of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). 
He argues that, 'It is clear that, while Olson's model would predict that individuals or 
firms would join economic interest groups almost exclusively for the services the groups 
offer, my analysis would suggest that in the case of the CBI this is an over-simplification. 
Certainly many large and medium-sized firms seem to join the organization to obtain the 
collective good. How can one explain the inconsistency between Olson's prediction and 
myevidence?,66 
63 Esteban, 1. and Ray, D. (2001) 'Collective Action and Group Size Paradox', American Political Science 
Review, Vo1.95, No.3 September 2001: 663-672, p.663 
64 Olson, M. (1974, Fourth Edition), pp.50-51 
65 Marsh, D. (1976) 'On Joining Interest Groups: An Empirical Consideration of the Work of Mancur 
Olson', British Journal o/Political Science, 6, 257-271 
66 Marsh, D. (1976), p.265 
136 
Figure 4-1 Characteristics of Rice, Sugarcane and Potato Farmers Groups 
Strong '--_____ 1 Weak 
Source: Data from field research 
• Rice farmers refer to members of the Krueakhai Khon Ploog Khao Lum Maenam Kong (NRGM-
Network of Rice Growers of the Mekong River) in the Province ofUbon Ratchathani 
• Sugarcane Farmers refer to members of the Sugar Cane Planters Association of Zone 7 in Province of 
Kanchanaburi 
• Potato farmers refer to members of the Chiang Mai Potato Grower Co-operative Ltd. In Province of 
Chiang Mai 
The issue of the mobilisation of potential members to join groups, has been a 
controversial area, with respect to the study of interest groups. To understand this area, is 
a fundamental step towards more comprehensively understanding the nature of both, the 
actions of and the powers of these groups. Accordingly, the examination of Thai farmers' 
group formation, and the level of tendency for Thai farmers to join groups will emphasise 
the issues of both collective incentive and selective incentive. However, the examination 
of other contributing factors specified in figure 4-1, will not be ignored. The explanations 
given in accordance with figure 4-1 will focus individually to consider each group of 
farmers, and not each group characteristic, because the group characteristics are not 
always perfectly discrete. 
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4.3.1 Rice Farmers 
"In the past, rice cultivation was an activity for the whole community, now it is 
a matter of each individual. The sense of sharing is rarely found in modem farming. 
Farmers tend to think of their own benefit before lending a hand to the others." 
- Mrs Thob Soison, Rice Farmers in the Province ofPhetchaburi-67 
Traditionally, rice farmers in Thailand would establish a reciprocal exchange of 
labour based on a moral obligation, stemming from their Buddhist beliefs. However, this 
relationship has been gradually transformed into a commercially driven reciprocal 
relationship, resulting from the new adherence to capitalism and consumerism, impacting 
adversely on the livelihoods of rice farmers. Agricultural labour is no longer freely and 
fairly exchanged, as instead, money has become the primary means of exchange for the 
agricultural labour force amongst farmers. This transformation of the rural economy in 
Thailand has been recognised to be an example of the impact of global capitalism by the 
Network of Rice Growers of the Mekong River (NRGMR). The NRGMR argue that 
capitalism has not brought about real development to their villages.68 Most rural farmers 
in the areas of the NRGMR are still very poor like other rural farmers in the Isan region. 
According to the World Bank, 44 per cent of the rural population of Thailand live in the 
Isan region. This is the poorest region of Thailand, with almost 20 per cent of the 
population living below the poverty line.69 
The NRGMR argue that the policy of economic and social development during 
the administration of Prime Minister Sarit Dhanarajata between February 1959 -
December 1963 has continued to have significant adverse impacts on rural farmers. The 
Sarit government governed the country through two mottoes. Firstly, namlai firesawang 
hontangsadoug, which closely translates as 'abundant water supplies, reliable electricity 
supplies and an efficient road network'. And secondly, ngan-kue-ngern ngern-kue-ngan 
67 Chompoo Trakullertsathien (1998) 'Rice and Rituals', Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 16 December 
1998 at www.bangkokpost.netlI612981161298_0utlookOl.html Retrieved on 18 January 1999 
68 Interview with Mr Thongsuan Sodapakdi 
69 Rural Development and Natural Resource Sector Unit East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank (20,00) 
Beyond the Crisis: A Strategy for Renewing Rural Development in Thailand, Bangkok: World Bank, p.Xl 
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bandansuk, which closely translates as 'work provides money, which brings happiness'. 70 
The policies of economic development of the Sarit government were virtually reflected in 
these two mottoes and in the First NED Plan, in terms of the development of 
infrastructure as previously mentioned in section 4.1. The NRGMR assert that the 
capitalist mottoes of the Sarit government have changed the self-sufficient rural economy 
into a capitalist economy, and as a result, their capacity for self-reliance was reduced. 
The capitalist economy induces rice farmers to over spend on unnecessary consumer 
products, and this has resulted in a dramatic increase in rice farmers' debts.7l With 
reference to this, Ammar asserts that: 
At its most extreme, the silent penetration of the market is supposed to be an 
insidious conspiracy on the part of the "Bangkok Establishment", or the World Bank or, 
more generally, world capitalism ... farmers do not have any free choice as to whether 
they wish to participate in the market. They are, it would be claimed, sucked into the 
market and trapped in it by indebtedness and by material attractions such as television 
sets and refrigerators .... The argument that farmers are fooled into market participation 
by material attraction exemplifies the kind of gross paternalism which used to be the 
prerogative of Bangkok middle-class when discussing rural matter ... 72 
Chairat asserts, that the Sarit capitalist mottoes have contributed profoundly to 
'the rapid change in the attitude of Thai people from the previous emphasis on merit 
(bun) making and accumulating according to the teaching of the Buddha to the 'modem' 
emphasis on money and profit-making,... materialism and consumerism, which are 
against the Buddhist ideal of simplicity and basic subsistence way of life, have become 
much valued under the name of 'development,' 'modernisation,' 'Westernization,' and 
'Americanization.,73 This would intrude on the rural culture of interdependence and 
reciprocal relationships, which in tum has affected the level of tendency for rice farmers 
to participate in the process of group formation. 
70 Network of Rice Growers of the Mekong River (200 1) Panpheenphu cheewit kasetakorn 
sukarnphungpaton-eng tamnawtang praratchadumri (Life Reform Plan for Farmers in Order to Achieve 
Self-reliant Status, Following the King's Speech), Ubon Ratchathani: Network of Rice Growers of the 
Mekong River [in Thai], pp.1-2 
71 Interview with Mr Thongsuan Sodapakdi 
72 Ammar Siamwalla (1992), pp.246-247 
73 Chairat Charoensin-o-Iarn (1988) Understanding Postwar Reformism in Thailand: A Reinterpretation of 
Rural Development, Bangkok: Duangkamol, p.181 
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The failure of the policy of economic and social development has resulted in the 
accumulation of many problems, with respect to rice farmers. Out of frustration for the 
position they found themselves in, which primarily involved persistently low rice prices, 
during the early 1990s, involved rice farmers who would later establish the NRGMR, 
joined several protests of thousands of rice farmers, which were held in Bangkok. In 
1992, these same involved rice farmers participated in the protest, which took place in the 
province ofKhon Kaen, of approximately 5,000 farmers from the Isan region, and was an 
attempt to focus attention in relation to the problem of land titles. 74 However, such ad hoc 
protests, deprived of both formal and informal access to the channels of political power 
of the elite politicians, failed to deliver the rice farmers their claim for government 
assistance. This failure only confirmed to individual rice farmers, various rice farmers 
groups, and the involved rice farmers who would later establish the NRGMR in 
particular, of their outsider status. Their assertive political strategy, which manifested in 
the form of the protests, did not deliver them the access to the network of the rice policy-
making process, as a result of their political weakness, and more specifically, their 
absence of connections within the patronage system. This was the catalyst in the 
formation of the NRGMR on 1 April 2001. Thongsuan75 argues that the members of the 
NRGMR believe that this rice farmers group will promote their self-reliant status, which 
will help to establish some degree of political influence within the network of the rice 
policy-making process and beyond. 
Accordingly, in the early stages after the formation of the NRGMR, the primary 
objective of successfully establishing a self-reliant group, emerged as a collective benefit, 
in order to mobilise farmers in the sub-district of Khampom, where the NRGMR is 
located, and farmers in sub-districts nearby, to become members. However, farmers in 
sub-districts outside of Khampom have shown a low level of tendency to join the 
NRGMR, because they continue to believe that this group would not bring about a 
significant improvement to their livelihoods.76 
74 Interview with Mr Juntee Phonjun 
75 Interview with Mr Thongsuan Sodapakdi 
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Moreover, the livelihoods of rural fanners in Thailand, which are dependant on 
labour intensive agricultural production techniques, leave these fanners with very little 
spare time to commit elsewhere, because they cannot afford to pay for the costs of either 
labour or machinery. In addition to their work, rural fanners as parents, have to take care 
of their families and children. With reference to these factors, joining a rice fanners 
group involves a variety of social opportunity costs, even if membership is free. 77 These 
are the principal obstacles to the development of collective action through the NRGMR. 
In an attempt to compensate for these obstacles, the NRGMR has begun to 
introduce projects involving producing their own organic fertilisers, organic rice 
production, and in addition, community shop schemes, in order to mobilise potential 
members and to retain their memberships. These projects are helping to reduce the rice 
fanners costs of production and therefore the standard of living. Both the organic 
fertiliser and organic rice production projects, aim to reduce the application of chemical 
fertilisers and pesticides. 
When the research was conducted, this project was helping to phase in organic 
production and to phase out the chemicals involved in current agricultural production 
techniques simultaneously. The motivation for this was initially to reduce the costs of 
production, and the result is that the rice is not yet certifiable for organic markets. 
However, one of the future aims of the NRGMR is to achieve organic status, in order to 
produce rice, which can command a higher price in the rice market. The primary 
motivation ultimately, is to effectively buy their own autonomy from the Thai 
government, rice mill middlemen, and the cycle of debt of the infonnal lending sector, 
through the success of the NRGMR. The community shop uses its purchasing power, in 
order to buy basic goods at wholesale prices, which can then be sold at less than the 
market price, such as food, soap, kreung sangkatan (packaged Buddhist temple offerings) 
and fuel. The availability of cheap fuel is important to the fanners, because 
76 Interview with Mr Boonsam Promdhama 
77 Interview with Mr Juntee Phonjun 
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mechanisation has replaced animal labour In nce production, and this reqUIres a 
significant amount of fuel to operate. 78 
Overall, the NRGMR perceives that these activities will help to promote the 
group's overall objective of achieving self-reliant status. In this respect, the organic 
fertilisers, organic rice production, and community shop projects of the group are 
selective incentives, which the group provides, in order to promote the collective benefit 
of achieving self-reliant status. 
The research has shown that rice farmers, who joined the NRGMR because of the 
attractions of its selective incentives, have contributed less overall to its activities and 
many of these members have tended to free-ride the group as a result. 79 The benefits of 
the selective incentives in this context are not the primary motives, when considering 
why active members remain in the group, contributing both time and effort. Rather, the 
Buddhist teaching, in respect of generosity towards other people, has been understood to 
encourage members to contribute to the group. Thongsuan80 argues that Buddhist 
teachings have helped significantly, with regard to creating harmony within the group, 
and this has helped to reduce the concerns of active members, in terms of the problem of 
the free-rider amongst members generally. This is in contrast to Olson's perspective, with 
respect to collective benefit and selective incentive, as he argues that 'Only a separate 
and "selective incentive" will stimulate a rational individual. .. to act in a group-oriented 
way.,81 
The very high degree of horizontal relationships and very low degree of vertical 
relationships between members, within the NRGMR, significantly contributes towards 
the group's harmony. This is because most members of the NRGMR are just like other 
rice farmers in rural areas across Thailand, whose education and finances are poor, and 
therefore there is generally an equal level of status amongst them. The average level of 
78 Interview with Mr Samam Bumpen 
79 Interview with Mr Thongsuan Sodapakdi 
80 Ibid. 
81 Olson, M. (1974, Fourth Edition), p.51 
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education of the members of the NRGMR is 4 years of compulsory primary education. 
The problem of poor education, with respect to members of the NRGMR can be 
explained by the inadequate provision of compulsory education in rural areas of Thailand 
generally, and in addition the high cost of education beyond the compulsory level. 
The government policy of industrialisation has since the 1970s, taken skilled 
labour out of the agricultural sector, and is another explanation for the low level of 
education of members of the NRGMR, and the agricultural sector more generally. More 
recent generations with higher levels of education now tend to leave their provinces, in 
order to work for better pay in the factories of the more industrialised provinces, 
surrounding Bangkok and Bangkok itself. At the time of the research, the majority of the 
members of the NRGMR were over 40 years old, and included many elderly villagers. 
They are of the generations that experienced problems, with regard to a lack of access to 
education. According to the World Bank, 'In 1965 the participation rates in Thailand 
were 78 percent in primary school, 14 percent in secondary school, and 2 percent in a 
higher level education. ,82 
Furthermore, as rice production in Thailand continues to be labour intensive, the 
primary source of labour for rural farmers are their family members. Accordingly, the 
cost-benefit analysis within rice farmers' families, has led farmers to decide that their 
children achieving a higher level of education is less important, than ensuring that their 
children work for them. This was because there has traditionally been little advanced 
technology applied within rice production. Farmers have only tended to follow a 
technique of production, which has been passed through the generations. The low level of 
education within the rice farmers' families generally, has prevented farmers from 
adopting new technology in the production of rice. 
At the national level, a poorly educated rural population is perceived to be an 
obstacle to the development of the Thai democracy, and the government and the media 
82 Warr, P.G. and Bhanuphong Nidhiprabha (1996) Thailand's Macroeconomic Miracle: Stable Adjustment 
and Sustained Growth, Kuala Lumpur: World Bank! Oxford University Press, p.31 
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tend to link this issue with a high level of vote-buying in the rural areas. However, this 
belief oversimplifies the true situation, as the research has found that a poorly educated 
rural population is not the only explanation, with regard to the problem of vote-buying. In 
addition, the constitution of the internal democracy within the NRGMR reveals how a 
low level of education is not the complete explanation, with regard to the failure of 
democracy within the Thai political arena. 
Within the constitution of the NRGMR, all members of the committee are 
appointed through a free and fair system of one vote per member, and no jao pho exist 
within its administrative system, in order to exploit the members for their personal 
advantage. The NRGMR employs a small administrative office of 5 staff, namely, one 
manager, one accountant, one salesman, and two security staff. The group has its own co-
operative, which acts as its main source of financial revenue, namely, the Sahakorn 
kankaset palang samaggi satree lumnum Khong, which closely translates as the 
'Women's United Agricultural Co-operative of the Mekong'. The co-operative set the 
fixed price of 10 baht per share, which generated 5,539,200 baht through the sale of its 
shares to its members in 2002. In addition, the NRGMR has received a significant 
amount of financial support from the government. According to the 5-year operational 
report of the NRGMR in 2002, the group received a total of 2,500,000 baht from the 
government between 2001-2002, in order to help to finance their Rice Market Project. 
This project included the expense of building a rice silo, a drying area for the harvested 
rice, a lorry for rice transportation and other basic factors in rice trading. 83 The financial 
support from the government maintained the liquidity of the group over this period, and 
without this help the project would have both been delayed, and dependant on the 
informal lending sector and the problems associated with this form of indebtedness. 
The structure of the administrative system of the NRGMR has significantly 
benefited from the help of local schoolteachers, led by Thongsuan Sodapakdi.84 They 
83 Network of Rice Growers of the Mekong River (2001), p.5 and p.? 
84 Network of Rice Growers of the Mekong River (2000) Prawati kwampenma of Krueakhai khon ploog 
khao fum maenam khong (The Legacy of the Network of Rice Growers of the Mekong River), Ubon 
Ratchathani: Network of Rice Growers of the Mekong River [Leaflet in Thai] 
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have not only played a significant role, with respect to the early stages of the group 
fonnation of the NRGMR, but have in addition, contributed to the establishment of 
connections, which the NRGMR now has with both university academics and bureaucrats 
at the local level. The university academics have provided technical assistance to the 
group, and as technocrats have provided the group with access to elite bureaucrats and 
the higher levels of government. Accordingly, on 1 May 2001 Thongsuan and his wife 
Benjaporn Sodapakdi as representatives of the NRGMR were able to arrange a meeting 
with Prapat Panyachatiraksa, a Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives from 
2001-2002, in order to discuss the specific problems encountered by the groUp.85 
Although this evidence suggests that the political influence of the NRGMR has 
improved, it is not sufficient evidence when arguing that the NRGMR has become a truly 
influential fanner's interest group. The NRGMR remains politically weak, because as a 
fanners' interest group, it has not yet established fonnal access to the network of the 
policy-making process. The NRGMR remains a potential pressure participant, with the 
opportunity to progress to become an interest group. Through the establishment of 
connections with phu mi itthiphon,jao pho and/or local businessmen, the NRGMR would 
be able to develop their restricted relationship, with respect to elite politicians. 
Nevertheless, the meeting between the representatives of the NRGMR and the Deputy 
Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives was a positive step, with regard to establishing 
channels of political access to the network of the policy-making process. This helps to 
suggest that the NRGMR can gradually develop its position as that of outsider to be that 
of insider, through its approach of asking for technical and financial assistance, when 
combined with its autonomous status and clear organisational framework. In this respect, 
the government granted them financial support, not because of their political pressure, but 
because the government wanted to implement its existing policy of supporting rural 
development, through well organised groups at the local level. 86 
85 Interview with Miss Benjapom Sodapakdi 
86 Interview with Mr Thongsuan Sodapakdi 
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4.3.2 Sugarcane Farmers 
In the past, the sugar mill would limit sugarcane prices. Purchases by each mill 
were different without standards or specific requirements.... The growers had no 
opportunity to negotiate the price unless there was an increase in some seasons of 
sugarcane demand to produce sugar and the world market prices. The price of sugarcane 
would increase depending on the conditions of business competition among the sugar 
mills. 
Sugar mills have always taken advantage of the sugar prices. This resulted in cane 
growers joining together to create negotiating power over purchase prices, fair treatment, 
and enable them to survive. 87 
This conflict between the sugarcane farmers and the sugarcane mills acted as a 
catalyst for the advantages of collective benefit, in the formation of the first sugarcane 
farmers groups in the late 1950s. This initial attempt to begin to establish their 
negotiating power began with the formation of small groups of farmers in the province of 
Chonburi, where Thailand's sugarcane cultivation was concentrated. By 1964, the first 
sugarcane farmers group in Thailand was established, and the Sugar Cane Planters 
Association of Zone 7 (SCP A) was formed, which consisted of sugarcane farmers from 
the provinces of Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi, Suphanburi and Nakhon Pathom. 88 These 
four provinces are in juxtaposition, and therefore the geographical concentration of the 
sugarcane farmers was regarded as a contributing factor in enabling the SCP A to both 
establish and then to develop successfully. These 4 provinces remain the centres of 
sugarcane production in Thailand today. As illustrated in table 4-1, the average 
production of sugarcane within the members of the SCPA was 13.27 million tonnes, 
between 1995-2000. 
By late 1960s, the SCP A were in a position to negotiate successfully with the 
sugarcane mills, in order to raise the price for their sugarcane.89 This success in the 
collective action of the SCP A was a significant mobilising factor, with respect to the 
level of tendency for sugarcane farmers to join the SCPA, at this relatively early stage in 
its existence. When the price of sugarcane fell, the SCP A would take instant action 
87 Office of the Cane and Sugar Board (1999b) Cane and Sugar Directory 1998-99, Bangkok: Office of the 
Cane and Sugar Board, Ministry of Industry, p.38 
88 k kd' . Interview with Mr Bancha Na asa IseVl 
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through the utilisation of both their insider and outsider strategies. In such a 
circumstance, initially the SCP A would mobilise its insider strategy of negotiation with 
the sugarcane mills. With the failure of its insider strategy, the SCP A would then 
mobilise its outsider strategy of protesting at the sugarcane mills.90 The SCP A was 
limited in effectiveness as a farmer's interest group, because if these limited options 
failed, then there was no other strategy available for them to adopt. 
Table 4-1 Members, Production, and Revenue of the Sugar Cane Planters Association 
of Zone 7 (SCP A), Between 1995-2000 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
Number of members 
80,000-83,000* 
80,000-83,000* 
80,000-83,000* 
80,000-83,000* 
80,000-83,000* 
80,000-83,000 * 
80,000-83,000* 
83,200 
Sugarcane Production 
(million tonnes) 
14.02 
14.57 
15.81 
9.59 
13.12 
13.l1 
12.34 
13.61 
Contribution to SCP A 
per tonne (baht) 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Total SCPA Revenue 
(million baht) 
28.04 
29.14 
31.62 
19.18 
26.24 
26.22 
24.68 
27.22 
*Precise figures for the pre-2002 SCPA membership is not known, however this figure is estimated to have 
varied between 80,000-83,000 members. 
Source: From Information Provided by the Sugar Cane Planters Association of Zone 7 and the Rajburi 
Sugar Co., Ltd. 
However, problems in terms of the price of sugarcane were significantly reduced 
after the introduction of the '70:30 revenue-sharing system' in 1982, which is outlined in 
box 4-1. This system resulted in a significant reduction in the conflict between sugarcane 
farmers and sugarcane mills, with regard to the problem of the price of the sugarcane, but 
did however, transfer much of the remaining pressure from the sugarcane farmers from 
89 Ramsay, A. (1987) 'The Political Economy of Sugar in Thailand', Pacific Affairs, VoI.60, No.2, 1987: 
248-270, p.252 
90 Interview with Mr Vithet Yamprayoon 
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the sugarcane mills and onto government. Nevertheless, sugarcane farmers protests were 
significantly reduced overall. 91 
Box 4-1 70:30 Revenue-Sharing System 
In 1980, the price of sugarcane in the world market was as high as US$ 0.40 per pound (approximately US$ 0 .80 
per kilogram), which led to a very significant difference between the domestic and export prices. The domestic 
price of sugar was as low as 8 baht per kilogram, whereas the export price was 20 baht per kilogram. 
Consequently, most sugarcane mills tried to export as much as possible of both their raw and refined sugar, 
which exhausted the domestic production of sugarcane. The high price allowed sugarcane mills to buy from 
sugarcane farmers at apparently high prices of between 650 to 750 baht per tonne. However, sugarcane farmers 
only later found out that the prices that they received were not high when compared to the export prices, which 
sugarcane mills achieved. The inadequate information obtained by sugarcane farmers, with regard to the changes 
in the world market, enabled sugarcane mills to take advantage at the sugarcane farmers ' expense. 
The dramatic increase in the price of sugarcane in the 1980/1981-crop year, brought about the problem of excess 
supply in the following crop year, because many fanners transferred to the production of sugarcane. As a result, 
the supply of sugarcane increased by 12 million tons in the 198111982-crop year, as did the level of world 
production, attracted by the new high price. However, due to the consequence of over supply the price crashed to 
only 250 baht per tonne that year. The price failed to recover for a number of years, and soon sugarcane farmers 
groups protested heavily, in order to pressure the Thai government to solve this problem. This became a critical 
point in the transformation of the Thai sugarcane industry. In order to address the problem of the price of 
sugarcane, in 1982, the Deputy Minister of Industry Jirayu Isarangkul na Ayudhaya, who himself was educated 
in Australia, suggested that the management of the sugarcane industry in Australia may be applicable to 
Thailand. This led to the introduction of the 70:30 revenue-sharing system in the sugarcane industry. 
The formula for the 70:30 revenue-sharing system is as follows: 
Where 
Pc = 0.7 (Rl+Rz) 
Qc 
Pc = price of sugarcane per metric tonne 
Rl 
Rz 
Qc 
= net proceeds from domestic sale 
= net proceeds from export sale 
= total sugarcane quantity crushed in each season 
Net proceeds = Gross proceeds minus sale expense and taxes 
Under the 70:30 revenue-sharing system, 70 per cent of revenues go to sugarcane farmers and 30 per cent go to 
sugarcane mills. As a result, this system significantly reduces the problem of price conflicts between the two 
groups. With reference to the 70:30 revenue-sharing system, the determination of the price of sugarcane is 
divided into two stages: 
1. Preliminary price of sugarcane: At the beginning of the season, forecasts of revenues from domestic sales 
and exports, and of sugarcane quantity will be made. Calculation of preliminary, from forecasted figures 
will be made accordingly. The provisional sugarcane price is to be announced in early December each year. 
2. Final price of sugarcane: At the end of the following September, when proceeds from domestic sales and 
exports, and of sugarcane quantity crushed in the season become known, calculation of final cane price will 
be made accordingly. The fmal price of sugarcane will be announced in October each year. 
Source: Interview with Mr Rachai Chusilpkul and Office of the Cane and Sugar Board (1999a), p.22 
17 years after of the introduction of the 70:30 revenue-sharing system, a large 
scale protest of over 10,000 sugarcane farmers was only once observed, in February 
91 Ibid. 
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1998.92 Between 1995-2000, there were only three protests by the SCPA against the 
government, with regard to the price of sugarcane, and furthermore, there were no 
significant conflicts observed between sugarcane farmers and sugarcane mills.93 In this 
significant respect, collective action has been required less since 1982, than in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Since the late 1980s, members have observed a significant decline in the role 
for the SCP A, which has raised the question amongst sugarcane farmers, as to whether 
they should either join or remain within the SCPA.94 
Over time, the SCP A has offered its members a series of selective incentives in 
addition to the collective benefit of achieving a higher price for sugarcane. This is 
because the SCP A has become aware of the problem of the free rider; in that achieving 
increased sugarcane prices for its members will also benefit non-members. However, the 
problem of the free rider evidently does not have much impact on the decisions of the 
existing sugarcane farmers, as to whether they should remain with, or leave the SCP A. 
There are only a limited number of sugarcane farmers who are not members in the 
provinces of Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi, Suphanburi and Nakhon Pathom, the provinces 
of the SCP A. With reference to this, the legal system has played a significant role in 
producing the level of tendency sugarcane farmers have in joining the SCP A, because the 
production of sugarcane is strictly control by the government. 
After the introduction of the 70:30 revenue-sharing system, the government 
further modernised the sugarcane industry by introducing the Sugarcane and Sugar Act 
B.B. 2527 (1984), which superseded the Sugar Act B.E. 2511 (1968).95 The Sugarcane 
and Sugar Act B.E. 2527 introduced a more systematic management system to the 
sugarcane industry. As a result, today the production of both sugarcane, and sugarcane 
into sugar, are strictly controlled by the government. Nevertheless, this government 
92 Yuthana Priwan and Woranuj Maneerungsee (1998) 'Sugarcane Planters to Demonstrate in Bangkok', 
Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 30 January 1998, at 
www.bkkpost.samart.co.thlnewsIBPachiveIBPI9980130/300198_News02.html Retrieved on 22 July 2000 
93 Interview with Mr Naradhip Anantasuk 
94 Interview with Mr Lek 
95 Office of the Cane and Sugar Board (1984) Sugarcane and Sugar Act B.E. 2527, Bangkok: Office of the 
Cane and Sugar Board, Ministry ofIndustry, p.1 
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control appears to be a positive contributing factor, with regard to the sugarcane farmers 
group formation. 
Box 4-2 provides extracts from the act, and includes Section 11 of the act, which 
states that a sugarcane farmer can only become a member of a committee at the Office of 
the Cane and Sugar Board if they join an officially registered sugarcane farmer 's 
organisation of the government registration scheme. Accordingly, the act became an 
instrument for the SCP A and other officially registered sugarcane farmers groups to use 
as a selective incentive to sugarcane farmers. 
Box 4-2 Sugarcane and Sugar Act B.E. 2527: Sections Related to Sugarcane Farmers 
Section 11 The representativeS of sugarcane planters and representative of sugar factories shall meet the 
following qualifications: 
(l) Thai nationalitY; 
(~) not being a political official or not having held a position in politics; 
(6) not being a member of a political party or official of a political party. 
The representative of sugarcane . planters must be a sugarcane planter who is proposed by the 
institution of sugarcane planters in consideration of the proportion of supplies of sugarcane of the 
members of each institution, and must not be a committee member, manager, official or employee of 
sugar factory. 
Section 35. Anyone growing sugarcane for supply to sugar factories must be registered as the sugarcane planter. 
The registration per paragraph one shall follow the rules prescribed by the Committee. 
Section 36. The Sugarcane planters shall: 
(1) act in compliance with the rules and announcements made by the Committee; 
(2) report on the quantity of sugarcane to be delivered to the leaders of sugarcane planters group or 
sugarcane factory on the form and following the procedures and period of time as will be 
prescribed by the Sugarcane Committee. 
Section 37. The sugarcane planters must grow sugarcane in the quantity as fixed by the Committee. 
In case of the production of sugarcane being higher or lower than that fixed by the Committee, or 
non-production · of same as has been reported, necessary action will be taken under the regulations 
prescribed by the Committee. 
Section 38. The lea.ders of sugarcane planters group must register as the leader of sugarcane planters group. 
The registration per paragraph one and the revocation of the registration must follow the regulations 
prescriQed by the Committee. 
Source: Office of the Cane and Sugar Bpard (1984), pp.18-19 and pp.21-22 
Being a member of a committee at the Office of the Cane and Sugar Board does 
not only allow a sugarcane farmer to represent the interests of all sugarcane farmers. In 
addition, it is an opportunity to further their own personal interests and social position, 
through recognition as a member of such a committee. Therefore, this selective incentive 
is a social incentive to sugarcane farmers , because 'people are sometimes also motivated 
by a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, and other social and physical 
150 
objectives. ,96 According to Olson, 'The possibility that, in a case where there was no 
economic incentive for an individual to contribute to the achievement of a group interest, 
there might nonetheless be a social incentive for him to make such a contribution must , 
therefore be considered. ,97 
The evidence of this selective incentive as a form of social incentive can be more 
commonly observed amongst quota men than amongst ordinary sugarcane members of 
the SCPA. This is because most quota men are either wealthy or phu mi itthiphon (men of 
influence), who are aware that being recognised at the national level within the Thai 
political arena, can promote their connections with elite politicians. This is possible 
because of the patronage system within the Thai political culture. 
Throughout the whole period of the 1970s and 1980s, one of the most significant 
of selective incentives was the improvement made to the roads in the areas of SCP A 
members. Although it has been argued, that during the First and Second NED Plans, the 
government emphasised improvements to basic infrastructure, corruption and the 
patronage system led to the uneven development of infrastructure in rural areas. Road 
transportation is essential to sugarcane farmers. Between 1968-1983, the SCPA spent 
43,486,788 baht in improving sugarcane transportation routes in the provinces of 
Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi, Suphanburi and Nakhon Pathom.98 These improvements 
significantly lowered the time of transportation between sugarcane farmers and the 
sugarcane mills, which helps to preserve the freshness of sugarcane, a crucial factor in 
obtaining the best price for sugarcane. The fresh delivery of sugarcane after harvest 
maintains the level of CCS (Commercial Cane Sugar)99, which in sugarcane will steadily 
decline. 
96 Olson, M. (1974, Fourth Edition), p.60 
97 Ibid. 
98 Montol Kongkeaw (1986) Settakij numtalsai nai changwat Kanchanaburi (The Sugarcane Economy in 
the Province of Kanchanaburi), research report submitted to the Department of Teacher Education, 
Ministry of Education [in Thai], p.151 
99 CCS means sucrose in the cane which can be refined into a form of pure white sugar (pure white sugar 
100 net litre) if milling and purification method are used according to standards. From Office of Cane and 
Sugar Board (1999a), Cane and Sugar Industry in Thailand: 1998-99, Bangkok: Office of Cane and Sugar 
Board, Ministry ofIndustry, p.44 
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Most sugarcane is both harvested and transported to the sugarcane mills though 
the quota men, who each control a 'quota group'. The quota men obtain licenses to 
supply sugarcane by arrangement of the sugarcane mills, and normally only large-scale 
sugarcane farmers can obtain these licenses as registered as 'the leader of sugarcane 
planters group' (Section 38 of the Sugarcane and Sugar Act B.E. 2527). This arrangement 
helps sugarcane mills to ensure the supply of sugarcane throughout the sugarcane-milling 
season.
lOO Quota men normally have between 20-30 small-scale sugarcane farmers within 
their quota groups, in order to enable them to meet their obligation to the sugarcane mills 
of at least 3000 tonnes. 101 
However, the research has found that large-scale production of sugarcane is not 
the only main factor, with regard to obtaining licenses with the sugarcane mills. In 
addition, quota men tend to be either wealthy and phu mi itthiphon, or those with strong 
connections to phu mi itthiphon. These quota men are usually powerful and capable of 
using their power to manipulate small-scale sugarcane farmers into joining their quota 
group, which then allows them to supply more sugarcane to the sugarcane mills. During 
the research, it was stated that some quota men can even supply in excess of 100,000 
tonnes of sugarcane, and this capacity significantly enhances the power of these quota 
. h' h . d t 102 men WIt In t e sugarcane In us ry. 
Some of these most powerful of quota men have used this opportunity, in order to 
establish their own political careers. In his study of sugarcane farmers groups in 
Thailand, Ramsayl03 has revealed that several of the most powerful sugarcane farmers 
were members of the House of Representatives. Both powerful sugarcane farmers and 
sugarcane mills were financial contributors to political parties. Specifically, in 1983, 
three of the four MPs representing the constituencies of the province of Kanchanaburi 
were these powerful sugarcane farmers themselves. 
100 Interview with Mr Vithet Yamprayoon 
101 Interview with Mr Sumeth Leelasuwannaket 
102 Interview with Mr Bancha Nakasakdisevi 
103 Ramsay, A. (1987), p. 256 
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Financial influence is an essential factor in the ability of quota men to operate, 
because they must be able to provide facilities to the sugarcane farmers, both in terms of 
credit and in transportation of the sugarcane. Each year quota men need to be capable of 
investing at least 600,000-700,000 baht in the production of the sugarcane of their 
members. 104 In addition, quota men are also responsible for administrating the 'ngern-
kyeo' or pre-planting finance, which is credit supplied by sugarcane mills to sugarcane 
farmers, to be used for working capital in the production of sugarcane. This finance is 
normally paid in the form of post-dated cheques, which sugarcane farmers short of 
liquidity, cash at less than face value at the commercial banks. 105 
The sugarcane milling season normally takes place between November and April, 
and the local labour force needs to be supplemented by labour brought in from Isan 
region. This is necessary because each quota man needs to both harvest and transport to 
the sugarcane mills at least 3,000 tonnes in a carefully co-ordinated operation. The 
transportation of sugarcane generates a significant amount of income to the quota men 
over this period. The standard price for transportation is 120 baht per tonne, which 
includes the labour cost involved in the harvesting of sugarcane. It is normal to see the 
illegal overloading of sugarcane on lorries, in order to speed up the process of 
transportation. Being phu mi itthiphon or having strong connections with phu mi itthiphon, 
significantly benefits the quota men, because this can help in reducing the costs incurred 
through fines and bribes. 106 
Delays in the harvesting of sugarcane will effect the level of CCS in sugarcane, 
and this can be very costly to quota men. If they cannot harvest the sugarcane of the 
sugarcane farmers in their quota groups, the sugarcane farmers may decide to join other 
quota groups. The departure of sugarcane farmers from a quota group will affect the 
capacity of quota men to maintain their licenses with the sugarcane mills. 
104 Interview with Mr Sa-ngiam Pookpusa 
105 Office of Cane and Sugar Board (1999a) Cane and Sugar Industry in Thailand: 1998-99, Bangkok: 
Office of Cane and Sugar Board, Ministry of Industry, p.68 
106 Interview with Mr Sa-ngiam Pookpusa 
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Some quota men have attempted to solve the problem, with regard to the 
inadequate labour supply over the period of harvest, and have bought sugarcane-
harvesting machines. However, these machines cannot work in all weather conditions. 
Particularly after rain, these machines cannot operate effectively in muddy fields, and so 
quota men find them a poor investment. As a result, the quota men remain highly reliant 
on labour. 
The transportation of labour force from the lsan region to the central region 
normally costs approximately 30,000 baht per quota man. The SCP A provides the quota 
men with licenses to transport labour, which lorry drivers have to present to highway 
police checkpoints. This became an effective selective incentive for quota men to become 
members of the SCP A.I07 However, quota men have revealed that a 20 baht note is 
needed in addition to the license, because of the corruption of highway policemen along 
the roads between lsan and the central region. This is because they cannot afford the time 
involved in stopping at every highway police checkpoint in declaring their licenses, 
which would only delay the harvesting of the sugarcane. Nevertheless, they still find that 
the license is needed in the rare case of encountering a highway policeman who does not 
accept bribes. 1 08 
The SCP A also provides its members with a healthcare service as a selective 
incentive. Between 1972 to 1977, the SCP A built the Magaraksa Hospital in the district 
of Tamaga, in the province of Kanchanaburi, with a budget of 40 million baht. 109 
Government provisions of healthcare services are often inadequate. Sugarcane farmers 
can receive cheaper healthcare services than would otherwise only be available within the 
private system, through private hospitals, which have agreements with the SCP A. This 
service would not normally be provided to the members of other farmers groups in 
Thailand, because most farmers groups are neither as financially secure nor as well 
organised as the SCP A. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Interview with Mr Sa-ngiam Pookpusa, Mrs Yupin Meetrong and Mr Lek 
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Although the SCP A has been able to provide a variety of both collective and 
selective incentives to its members since it was established, one negative selective 
incentive has emerged from the excessive influence, which phu mi itthiphon carry within 
the SCP A. This problem namely involves the attempts made by the SCP A to force 
sugarcane farmers outside of the SCP A, inside the group. Both quota men and sugarcane 
farmers can be targeted, however quota men are usually targeted first because within this 
hierarchical system, control over the quota men will result in effective control over the 
sugarcane farmers. Quota men in the province of Ratchaburi have observed non-members 
of the SCP A experiencing various strategies of coercion. One such strategy involves the 
deliberate puncturing of lorry tyres during the harvesting season. Although sugarcane 
farmers outside of the SCP A very often do not normally believe in the benefits of joining, 
and perceive the involvement of phu mi itthiphon negatively within the SCP A, the 
potential of the threat to them is far more damaging than these perceived costs of joining 
the SCP A. 110 
An influential group of quota men established the SCP A. The first president was, 
III 1964, Mongkol Keepanich a wealthy, respectable and locally powerful quota man. 
Sompop and Kanoksak111 argue that his economic and political power at the local level, 
in addition to his family background and political connections have to be considered, in 
order to explain his status within the SCP A. Mongkol' s cousin was General Boonchu 
Juntarubegkha, the then head of the Royal Thai Air Force. His brother was Kamchad 
Keepanich, a high-ranking bureaucrat within the Department of Public Relations of the 
Office of the Prime Minister. In addition, Mongkol was a close friend of General Pong 
Punnaka, the Minister of Industry. Sompop and Kanoksak assert that Mongkol' s political 
connections explain the survival of the SCP A throughout the periods of military 
government in the 1960's and 1970's, when farmers group formations would not 
normally survive. For instance, with the example of the FFT, which was also a farmers 
group, the expansion of the government's anti-Communist campaign of the 1960s and 
109 Montol Kongkeaw (1986), p.151 
110 Interview with Mr Lek 
III Sompop Manarungsan and Kanoksak Kaewthep (1987) Utsahakam numtal nai prathet Thai (Sugarcane 
Industry in Thailand), Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkom University, p.1 0 I 
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1970s led to the assassinations of many of the leaders of the FFT, and its consequential 
collapse soon after. 
The SCP A is structured with a high concentration of vertical relationships. Many 
committees of the SCP A are of phu mi itthiphon, who are not sugarcane farmers 
themselves, and some committees only cover a few areas of sugarcane production. I 12 
The members of the SCP A can be categorised into three main levels, namely the level of 
the executive committee, the level of the quota men, and the level of the sugarcane 
farmers. The level of the executive committee is the most powerful, with most of the 
financial and political power within the SCP A. The level of the quota men is less 
powerful, with some financial, but less political power, and some quota men, whilst 
wealthy are politically inactive. The level of the sugarcane farmers is the least powerful, 
with little financial or political power. Whilst their influence is limited within the SCP A, 
the research has found that they remain in a considerably stronger position than both rice 
and potato farmers. 
This relatively good financial status as SCP A members provides these sugarcane 
farmers with an improved access to education for them and their children. Most quota 
men have at least completed a high school education, with some quota men with a 
university degree 1 13, which is already above the national average for farmers. The 
average level of education for sugarcane farmers within the SCP A is 4 years of 
compulsory education. 114 With respect to the transferring of labour forces with a good 
level of education to work in factories, this is less of a problem in terms of sugarcane 
farmers than with either rice or potato farmers. This is because of the higher incomes 
earned by sugarcane farmers. Many quota men believe that they can earn more within the 
sugarcane farming industry of the agricultural sector, than within the industrial sector. liS 
112 Interview with Mrs Araya Arunanondchai, Mr Atichat Wipadapisut and Mr Vithet Yamprayoon 
113 Interview with Mrs Yupin Meetrong 
114 Interview with Mr Naradhip Anantasuk 
115 Interview with Mr Sumeth Leelasuwannaket 
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The high levels of education of the quota men have enabled the SCP A to establish 
a well administered system. At its head office in the province of Kanchanaburi, there is a 
fully equipped office suite with modem office technology and a computer network. There 
is a SPCA legal department, which supports its co-operation with the government and 
other related legal issues impacting on sugarcane farmers. In order to strengthen its 
relationship with its members, the SCP A has 24 branches in 4 provinces. The members 
within each branch's administration directly vote for the president of their branch. 116 
At the head office of the SCP A is based the overall president, who is voted for by 
all members of the SCP A. The president works with 48 committees, which are headed by 
the 24 branch presidents, in addition to 8 elected, and 16 appointed by the president of the 
SCP A.117 This system is evidence of an undemocratic internal democracy, because the 16 
committee heads appointed by the president, are frequently phu mi itthiphon with strong 
connections to the president. The patronage system is an important factor within the 
administrative system of the SCP A, and this reduces the effectiveness of the overall 
administrative system in terms of the progress of the SCP A. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that the internal democracy of the SCP A reflects the Thai political arena at the 
micro level. 
The phu mi itthiphon are involved within the sugarcane industry, due to its 
profitable status as an industry, and in addition their involvement is encouraged within 
SCP A specifically, because of the generous financial resources of the SCP A itself. With 
reference to table 4-1, the main source of revenue for the SCP A is through the 
commission from the sale of sugarcane at 2 baht per tonne, for all of the sugarcane sold 
by sugarcane farmer members. This has enabled the SCP A to generate a large amount of 
money, peaking at 31.62 million baht in 1997. The average revenue of the SCPA over the 
period between 1995-2002 was 26.54 million baht. 
116 Interview with Mr Naradhip Anantasuk 
117 Ibid. 
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In the 1990s, sugarcane farmers found clear evidence of corruption within the 
SCP A. A source, who asked not to be named confirmed: 'I don 't know where the money 
has gone, since I haven't seen any development of the roads in the area I live. Also, most 
of the improvements of the roads are seen in the areas where the executive committees of 
the SCP A live.' This perception is both discouraging farmers from remaining within the 
SCPA and new farmers from joining. Over time, this factor could weaken the strength of 
the SCPA. 
Box 4-3 Thailand Sugarcane Planters Federation 
The desire for an increase in the bargaining power amongst various sugarcane farmers groups, brought about the 
establishment of the Thailand Sugarcane Planters Federation in 1975. 
Objectives 
1. To be a co-operative center for cane growers, sugarcane institutions, sugar mills and the government. To 
provide representation for associations, institutes, and Thai cane growers to negotiate sugarcane prices, and 
also to provide representation in co-operation with the government, sugar mills, etc. 
2. To promote production and sale of sugarcane and sugarcane products, both domestically and aboard. 
3. The promotion of technology, development of sugarcane planting, trade and research, regarding the 
production of sugarcane. 
4. To act on behalf of the federation of members under the laws and traditions of Thailand. 
5. Promotion of charity, public morals, culture, sports, health, and entertainment under democratic principles. 
Past Activities 
The Thailand Sugarcane Planters Federation played a significant role in the 198111982 push for the government to 
address the problems of sugarcane farmers. This led to the creation of the 70:30 Revenue-Sharing System. 
Members 
1. Sugar Cane Planters Association of Zone 7 (SCPA) 
2. Chonburi Agricultural Career Group Association 
3. Prachaub-Petchburi Cane Planters Association 
4. Kampangpetch Cane Planters Association 
5. Burirum Cane Planters Association 
6. Eastern Agricultural Association 
7. Suphanburi Agricultural Support Career Association 
8. North Eastern Cane Planter Association 
9. Nakornsawan Agricultural Promotion Association 
10. Lopburi (Ta Luang) Cane Planters Association 
Source: Office of Cane and Sugar Board (1 999b), pp.38-39 
Nevertheless, the research has found that sugarcane farmers agree overall, that the 
existence of phu mi itthiphon within the SCP A enables it to establish channels of political 
access to the network of the policy-making process, more effectively than would 
otherwise be possible. The SCP A is a member of the Sahaphan chaorai oi haeng prathet 
Thai or Thailand Sugarcane Planters Federation, and therefore, the SCPA does not play 
an isolated role in pressuring the government to respond to the sugarcane farmers ' 
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demands. With the establishment of this coalition at the national level, as outlined in box 
4-3, their negotiating power has been significantly advanced. 
In promoting their negotiating power, the SCP A is aware that the assertive 
political action that it has adopted as a main actor within the Thailand Sugarcane Planters 
Federation has not pressured the government as effectively as it desired. This is in part 
because there are many other interest groups within the network of the policy-making 
process, with regard to sugarcane. Many of these other interest groups, including 
sugarcane mills, food and drink manufacturers, have conflicts of interest with sugarcane 
farmers' interest groups, including the SCP A.IIS 
The SCP A acknowledges that within the Thai political arena, groups with 
powerful backers are always better off. Accordingly, the group has an allocated annual 
budget, with regard to the advancement of their connections with elite bureaucrats and 
politicians, which is promoted as a positive strategy contrasting with the patronage 
system. When there is some kind of transfer of power, for instance after a general 
election or with the promotion of an elite bureaucrat, the SCP A will, when strategically 
relevant, present a gift or organise a party, in order to celebrate these appointments. 1 19 
The SCP A argues that such involvement is only what is customary within the 
Thai political culture, and in addition that they do not support any particular party or any 
specific bureaucrats, and that they are politically uninvolved. I20 However a truer 
reflection of this position would be to suggest that the unstable nature of the Thai 
political arena would make such a strategy impractical in any case, so therefore, the 
position that the SCP A takes is purely one of pragmatism and expediency. 
The SCPA amongst others within Thailand Sugarcane Planters Federation, 
constitute the most powerful farmers interest group coalition in Thailand. With reference 
to this, the SCP A can argue that its political strategies are well planned. They have 
118 Interview with Mr Rachai Chusilpkul and Mr Naradhip Anantasuk, 
119 Ibid. 
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achieved respect amongst from within the network of the policy-making process, through 
applying its insider strategies before attempting to apply its outsider strategies. However, 
through its relatively strong position as a farmers group, it can afford this courtesy to 
some extent. When the price of sugarcane is low, the SCP A and the coalition of the 
Thailand Sugarcane Planters Federation will seek to negotiate with the government first. 
Only when they are sure that the negotiations have not produced the government 
response, with respect to their demands, will they then resort to the cruder mechanism of 
protesting. 121 
4.3.3 Potato Farmers 
As a result of the controls placed on the import of potato seedlings in 1980, by the 
government agency, the Public Warehouse Organisation, there was an immediate 
shortage of potato seedlings. In 1981, potato farmers formed the Klum Thammachart 
(Group of Nature), which was officially registered in 1982 as the first potato farmers 
group in Thailand. There were a total of 15 members of the Klum Thammachart, based in 
the district of Sansai, in the province of Chiang Mai, who attempted to pressure the 
government into importing more potato seedlings from abroad. However, the formation 
of this, the first potato farmers group did not initially result in any improvements to their 
negotiating power, with respect to the government. 122 
However, the group continued to gam support, and expanded into mostly 
neighbouring districts in the years that followed. Under the guidance of the Department 
of Co-operatives Promotion and the Department of Agricultural Extension of the MOAC, 
members of the Klum Thammachart in the districts of Sansai, Maetang, Maerim and Fang 
were encouraged to officially register, in order to qualify for an allocation of potato 
seedlings. Registration as the Potato Growers Co-operative, was completed on 7 April 
1987, with a total membership of 4,665. 123 
120 Ibid. 
121 Interview with Mr Naradhip Anantasuk 
122 Interview with Mr In-om Pothacharoen 
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The location of the Potato Growers Co-operative based in the district of Sansai 
created problems, with regard to the administration of the district of Fang and the sub-
district of Chaiprakam, because these districts were located at a travelling distance of 
approximately 150 kilometres away from the district of Sansai. Eventually, in order to 
solve this problem, on 6 October 1997, the Potato Growers Co-operative decided to 
separate into two co-operatives, namely the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd 
in the district of Sansai, with 3,617 members, and the Chaiprakam-Fang Co-operative in 
the district of Fang, with 1,033 members. 124 
The examination, with respect to the group formation of potato farmers groups 
will focus on the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, from its 1997 inception 
onwards, because it is the most significant potato farmers group in Thailand. The Chiang 
Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd and the Chaiprakam-Fang Co-operative have 
successfully arranged to share the potato seedlings among their districts across the 
province of Chiang Mai, avoiding any conflict between the two co-operatives. 125 
With reference to the establishment of the Potato Growers Co-operative, the 
objective of an adequate supply of potato seedlings was a successful collective benefit, 
which mobilised the level of tendency for potato farmers to join. However, the 
significance of this collective benefit has declined since the expansion of the contract 
farming system throughout the 1990s. This system works because potato chip companies 
provide a valuable amount of potato seedlings to the potato farmers who hold contracts 
with them, and this largely reduces the problem of inadequate potato seedlings. 126 
Between 1994-1995 bmberg127, found that in the province of Chiang Mai, seven 
potato chip companies held contracts with farmers. According to bmberg, these 
companies had strongly competed, in order to expand the number of potato farmers 
124 Chiang Mai Potato Co-operative Ltd. (1998), p.l 
125 Ibid., p.2 
126 Interview with Mr Plean Chuansuk 
127 Ornberg, L. (1999) 'Potato Fanners' Organisation in Thailand: A discussion on the prerequisites of the 
formation and survival of fanner-organisations', paper presented to the 7th International Conference on 
Thai Studies (4-8 July, 1999), University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, p.7 
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holding contracts with them in the district of Sansai, due both the production skill and 
experience of potato farmers in this district. As a part of the contract, these companies 
provide potato seedlings, technical assistance, and a guaranteed market for the potato 
farmers. 
Omberg argues that 'In the 1994-95 season it was possible for farmers in San Sai 
district to bargain for a higher prices of potatoes and the companies tried to outbid each 
other in offering different types of advantages to the farmers.' !28 However, this argument 
fails to consider the significance of the monopoly power the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co., the 
U.S-based multinational company, which is the snack-food division of Pepsi Cola 
(Thailand) Trading Co., holds within the local economy of the district of Sansai. 
Sunan affirms that 'we have never been able to bargain with Frito-Lay, because 
we are not the only suppliers of potato to them. If we refuse to supply them potatoes, they 
don't care, because they can just buy from potato farmers in the other provinces in this 
region. Also, the number of potato farmers is increasing every year, because it is better 
than growing garlic and onion.' !29 Moreover, the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. is further 
developing its share of the potato chip market, passing 50 per cent in 2001 13°, and is 
already further targeting its operation across southeast Asia. 
The research found that in the district of Sansai, most members and non-members 
of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd hold contracts with the Frito-Lay 
(Thailand) Co., and therefore the company is in a strong position to negotiate with 
farmers. In addition, the contract offered by the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. is favourable, 
because its offers for potato seedlings, technical assistance, pre-credit and price of 
potatoes, are overall, more favourable than all other companies.!3! Furthermore, the 
competitiveness of the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co., with regard to the contract farming 
128 Ibid., p.7 
129 Interview with Mr Sunan Mornlert 
130 SUkanya Jitpleecheep (2001) 'Potato Shortage Caps Chip Sales', Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 16 
March 2001, at http://scoopbangkokpost.co.thlbkkpostl200Ilmarch2001/bp200 1 0316116030 1 ... Retrieved 
on 11 September 2001 
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system, significantly reduces the political power of all potato farmers. In 2000, the Frito-
Lay (Thailand) Co. held contracts with 6,000 farmers in the provinces of Chiang Mai, 
Chiang Rai, Lamphun and Tak, in the northern region of Thailand. 132 With this 
understanding, potato farmers in the district of Sansai cannot develop their negotiating 
power, because the company no longer only bases its supply from within the district of 
Sansai. 
With the improvement to the problem of inadequate potato seedlings, a problem 
that began with the controls introduced by the Public Warehouse Organisation in 1980, 
by the mid-1990s, the level of tendency for potato farmers to join the Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd had, as a result, declined. This improvement was due to two 
main factors, both through the success of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative 
Ltd, and in addition through the involvement of potato chip companies, especially the 
Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. 
However, although the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. has contributed towards solving 
the problem of inadequate potato seedlings, this is not to argue that they have always 
treated the potato farmers fairly. The potato farmers in the district of Sansai have argued 
that they should have received better prices for their potatoes from the Frito-Lay 
(Thailand) Co. With reference to the problem of the price of potatoes, the Chiang Mai 
Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd is not powerful enough to effectively negotiate for a 
fairer price with the Frito-Lay Thailand Co. Instead, the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-
operative Ltd has only been a channel of communication between the Frito-Lay Thailand 
Co. and potato farmers, for instance in helping to arrange the farming contract system. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd 
cannot effectively provide collective benefits to mobilise potato farmers in the district of 
Sansai to join the group. 
132 Phusadee Arunmas (2000) 'Hot Chips Boost New Crop', Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 21 February 
2000, at http://scoopbangkokpost.co.thlbkkpostJ2000Ibp2000 _feblbp20000221121 020( ... Retrieved on 11 
September 2001 
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In order to compensate for this failure, the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-
operative Ltd has introduced a series of selective incentives. Although, it has been argued 
that the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. provides potato seedlings to potato farmers, they must 
still pay for the cost of these imported potato seedlings, which normally costs farmers 
approximately 3,000 baht per year. Moreover, the quality of potato seedlings provided by 
the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. and other companies are poor. To reduce the cost of potato 
seedlings, to compensate for the poor quality of potato seedlings, and in addition, to help 
with the problem of the inadequate supply of potato seedlings, in 2000, the Chiang Mai 
Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd built a cool-room. The provision of the cool-room has 
enabled potato farmers to produce more potato seedlings by themselves, because by 
storing potato seedlings in the cool-room, they can prevent the potatoes from rotting, 
which results from Thailand's hot climate. 133 
The period of production for potatoes in the district of Sansai is between October 
and March, which is winter in the northern region of Thailand. Therefore, between April 
and September, farmers produce others crops, in order to increase their income, such as 
com, rice and broccoli. Rice is normally grown for family consumption, while com and 
broccoli are the other main cash crops for potato farmers. Accordingly, the Chiang Mai 
Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd provides cheap com seedlings to potato farmers. 
However, this is not a significant selective incentive that the Chiang Mai Potato Growers 
Co-operative Ltd can successfully use, in order to mobilise the level of tendency for 
potato farmers to both remain in and join the group. 
Within the research, the most successful selective incentive offered by the Chiang 
Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, was the provision of loans charging a low interest 
rate. This selective incentive was successful, because the credit provided to potato 
farmers who held contracts with the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. were tied specifically to the 
production of potato, whereas potato farmers also need money for other purposes. Many 
potato farmers within the district of Sansai are already burdened with large loans from the 
BAAC, and are not eligible to ask for more loans. Therefore, the provision of credit from 
133 Interview with Mr In-om Pothacharoen 
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the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd is their best option, with regard to 
sustaining their liquidity, and they must join, in order to qualify for the loans. I34 During 
its budget in the fiscal year of 1999/2000, the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative 
Ltd provided 5,408,694.65 baht in loans to its members. 135 
Additional significant selective incentives offered by the Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd include the provision of cheap fertiliser and pesticide in 
helping to mobilise the level of tendency for potato farmers to join the group. The 
selective incentives of cheap loans, fertilisers, and pesticides, actually generate valuable 
revenues to the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd. 
The largest source of revenue to the group is the initial membership fee of 50 
baht, and in addition, the selling of shares to its members at the price of 10 baht per share, 
with all members holding at least 50 shares. 136 In 2000, this revenue totalled 7,167,420 
baht. The same year, the group made a profit on its loans to its members of 205,873 baht, 
and its total profit including profits from the sale of cheap fertiliser and pesticide, was 
1,367,051.74 baht. These profits are used, in order to finance the administration of the 
group, and in addition to subsidise other projects such as the building of the cool-room. 
The remaining profits are returned back to the shareholders of the Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd, in the form of a dividend. I37 This evidence suggests that the 
Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd is a financially secure farmers group. 
The profits of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd help to illustrate 
its success, in terms of its administrative system. This success owes much to its internal 
democracy working with the guidance from the local government officials at the 
Department of Agricultural Extension and the Department of Co-operatives Promotion in 
the district of Sansai. The members freely elect the president and 14 committee members. 
134 Interview with Mr Sawasdi Boonterm 
135 Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd (2000) Rai-ngan kitjakan prachumpee (Annual Report), 
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The term of each presidency and committee is two years, with a maximum of two terms. 
After the first year, lots will be drawn and half of the committee members will leave. 138 
The Chiang Mai office of the Department of Co-operatives Auditing of the 
MOAC, controls the finances of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd. 139 
This was felt to be necessary, because the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd 
experienced the problem of corruption, when previous to 1997, it existed as the Potato 
Growers Co-operative. 140 
The Department of Agricultural Extension and the Department of Co-operatives 
Promotion in the district of Sansai are able to provide further assistance to the Chiang 
Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, with respect to the low level of education of the 
group's of potato farmers. In 2000, whilst 80 per cent of potato farmers had received a 
compulsory level of education, only 20 per cent had received a higher level than the 
compulsory level of education. With reference to this issue, the problem of the transfer of 
the labour force from the agricultural sector to manufacturing sector, which is observed in 
the NRGMR, is also observed in the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd. 
Potato farmers generally, argue that only the older generations want to work in the potato 
fields. However, the younger generations of villagers who have high school 
qualifications, are in a position to work in the factories, and are less likely to work in the 
potato fields. Working in the factories is better, both in terms of income and working 
environment, when compared to working outside in the hot climate of Thailand. 141 
With a comparable level of education and financial status, the relationship 
between potato farmers within the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd is 
horizontally formed. The assistance, which the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative 
Ltd received from local government officials, does not suggest that the group can 
effectively establish channels of political access to the network of the policy-making 
138 Ibid, p.6 
139 Ibid, p.IS 
140 Interview with Mr PramuaI Jai-ngem 
141 Interview with Mr Prabhand Boontorm 
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process at the national level, in relation to the issue of the import of potato seedlings. This 
is because of the nature of the hierarchy within the Thai bureaucratic system, and as a 
result, 'the "bottom-up" process that the decision-making tree sets out a minimum of 20 
steps from village to Cabinet and back, a process taking at least 18 months.' 142 
In 1998, potato farmers experienced problems, with respect to both pests and 
diseases attacking their crops. Accordingly, they reported to the Department of 
Agricultural Extension in the district of Sansai, in order to seek financial and technical 
assistance from the government. The response arrived almost a year later, when they 
received instructions to deal with their problems in the form of an official letter. 143 The 
delay to the response from the government can be seen to be a result of the high level of 
concentration of political power, and in addition, the lack of personal connections 
between potato farmers and elite bureaucrats and politicians. 
Potato farmers are not normally politically active. In the 1990s, potato farmers in 
the district of Sansai only protested twice in front of the Department of the Agricultural 
Extension in the district of Sansai, even though they had experienced many problems, 
with regard to both the potato price and the inadequate supply of potato seedlings. 144 
These potato farmers have shown a reduced tendency to adopt assertive political 
strategies, because they perceive this to be economically unwise, and in addition, they 
argue that they have observed very few successful cases of farmer protests. 
For potato farmers in the district of Sansai, in the province of Chiang Mai, which 
is 697 kilometres distance from Bangkok, to protest in front of the House of Parliament 
like, for example, the Assembly of the Poor, would be very costly in terms of 
transportation. Furthermore, they also argue that organising to protest means leaving their 
fields whilst their crops need attention. They realised that protesting will significantly 
142 Rewison, K. (1993) 'Nongovernmental Organisations and the Cultural Development Perspective in 
Thailand: A Comment on Rigg (1991)" World Development, Vo1.21, No.1 0, pp.l699-1708, 1993, p.l702 
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affect their production, which will in tum affect their income, and consequently, they will 
increase their indebtedness. 145 
Accordingly, the analysis of potato farmers reflects the traditional value of non-
involvement and the political ignorance of the Thai people, which adversely affects both 
the political levels of participation and influence of potato farmers. Consequently, they 
remain a 'potential pressure participant' within the Thai political arena, because the 
Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd is a non-political farmers group, which can 
on occasion, be mobilised into political action through a change to their position. 
Although the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd has remained 
politically inactive, an increase, with regard to its self-reliant status can be observed. This 
is the case, specifically with reference to the issue of adequate potato seedlings, and in 
addition, the expansion of the potato chip industry in Thailand. These can be considered 
to be contributing factors, with respect to mobilising the political involvement and 
negotiating influence of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd. This is 
because many members have argued that the negotiating influence of their co-operative, 
with respect to potato chip companies is relatively weak. With reference to this, the 
Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd has discovered that it needs to improve its 
negotiating influence, and for this to be used as another collective benefit, in order to 
both retain and expand its memberships. Accordingly, collective action within the Chiang 
Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd is a by-product of selective incentives. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In Thailand, that people from a young age are brought up to respect older people, 
and in addition, people of a lower social rank are taught to respect people of a higher 
social rank, is one characteristic Thai society shares with adherents to Confucianism. 
145 Interview with Mr Sunan Momlert 
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Mulder146claims that this fonn of order within society steadies social interactions, and 
furthennore, that it reduces the innate overt nature of conflict between individuals. 
Accordingly, social hierarchy appears to be a contributing factor, with regard to the good 
behavioural conduct within Thai society. However, this fonn of good behavioural 
conduct does not promote the human rights of all individuals within the society, because 
it has been established with the premise of inequality between individuals. Rural fanners 
have suffered under this system, existing with a submissive level of status within the Thai 
political arena, a position where government and other influential actors can easily 
exploit them. Accordingly, this can be considered to be a contributing factor, with regard 
to the scarcity of influential fanners interest groups in Thailand. 
The case studies on the group fonnation of rice, sugarcane and potato fanners 
groups in Thailand illustrate the importance of the selective incentives over collective 
benefits in general tenns. In joining the rice, sugarcane and potato fanners groups, which 
were observed within the research, fanners do not have to bear undue and unaffordable 
costs. With reference to both the Network of Rice Growers of the Mekong River 
(NRGMR), and the Sugar Cane Planters Association of Zone 7 (SCP A), there is no 
membership joining fee. Within the NRGMR there are no costs for the fanners to bear at 
all. Within the SCP A, the membership joining fee is effectively included within the 
commission from the sale of sugarcane at 2 baht per tonne for all of the sugarcane sold 
for nonnally between 400-600 baht per tonne, by the sugarcane fanner members. With 
respect to the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, there is a 50 baht 
membership-joining fee, however, this fee provides such real benefits to the fanners as to 
make it more than worthwhile to them. 
With respect to joining fanners groups, the opportunity cost is the main concern 
in tenns of rice, sugarcane, and potato fanners. This is because their contribution to the 
groups' activities will mean forfeiting time, which would otherwise be used in 
agricultural production. However, the provisions of cheap credit, and cheap fertiliser and 
pesticide, have emerged as attractive selective incentives to both the members of the 
146 Mulder, N. (2000) Inside Thai Society: Religion Everyday Life Change, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 
p.46 
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NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, because these selective 
incentives are so necessary for these farmers in their production. 
With the government already providing farmers in general with cheap fertilisers, 
the provision of cheap fertiliser by both the NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers 
Co-operative Ltd should not significantly mobilise the level of tendency for rice and 
potato farmers to join these groups. However, the government provision of cheap 
fertiliser to farmers in rural area appears to be ineffective at the stage of implementation, 
as is commonly experienced in many other areas within the government policy of 
agricultural development. 
The crucial explanation in this regard is the severe problem of corruption within 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC). In October 2002, a government 
programme of fertiliser distribution began in the Isan region, for farmers affected by 
flooding in late 2001. In November 2000, a large-scale fertiliser scandal emerged. 
'Farmers have filed a police complaint against the Department of Agricultural Extension 
and the Co-operative Community of Thailand for distributing fake compost under a 367-
million-baht flood relief aid scheme.' 147 Moreover, there exists a large network of 
corruption within the MOAC, involving bureaucrats and politicians, across junior and 
senior staff. This Isan fertiliser scandal is nothing when compared to other corruption, of 
which the public is as of yet unaware. 148 
The high level of corruption within the MOAC adversely affects the political 
participation of fanners groups, because large-scale agribusiness groups can establish 
channels of political access far better than can farmers groups. This has allowed the 
MOAC to establish a powerful patronage system with large-scale agribusiness groups, 
which exploits the traditional value of non-involvement and the political ignorance of 
farmers. The research has determined that the establishment of farmers groups has been 
147 Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 6 November 2002, at 
www.bangkokpost.netlNews/06Nov2002_news05.html Retrieved on 6 November 2002 
148 Phuchatkan (Internet Edition), 15 November 2002, [in Thai] at 
www.manager.co.thlasp-binlprintnews.asp?newsid=20000000 1 0339 Retrieved on 16 November 2002 
170 
an attempt to challenge this imbalance. The challenges of the problems of corruption and 
the patronage system within the Thai political arena have revealed the range of ways, in 
which the rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers groups have responded. A useful 
explanation is the balance between their members, in terms of horizontal and vertical 
relationships between members. 
The research has established that farmers groups, which have not sought either 
political connections or influence, specifically the NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd, believe that they can better promote their own interests, than 
rely on the government. Accordingly, they have emerged as non-political farmers groups 
with the objective of promoting their own self-reliant status, in preference to attempting 
to influence the government. Therefore, they do not qualify in terms of the Western 
concept of interest group, and for this reason, they are classified within the category of 
'potential pressure participants.' 
In contrast, the SCP A was specifically formed, in order to improve the negotiating 
power of sugarcane farmers, with regard to sugarcane mills, and in addition, to gain more 
support from the government. The SCPA has successfully influenced the Thai 
government into enacting laws that would benefit them, and accordingly, the SCP A 
qualifies, with regard to the Western concept of an interest group. 
Within the NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, the 
relationships between their individual members are established horizontally, because of 
their equable status, in terms of their shared low levels of education and poor financial 
position. With reference to this, they cannot effectively participate within the Thai 
political arena, because financial resource is a crucial factor in the establishment of 
channels of political access, within the patronage system. This is the main contributing 
factor, with regard to the political weakness of both the NRGMR and the Chiang Mai 
Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd. For this reason, they have formed non-political farmers 
groups and remain outside of the Thai political arena, as potential pressure participants. 
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In terms of the SCP A, the involvement of various sub-groups of sugarcane 
farmers have significantly contributed to its political power. With reference to this, the 
wealthy and phu mi itthiphon have played particularly significant roles in helping the 
SCP A to establish its channels of political access, though their personal and already 
established connections to elite bureaucrats and politicians. Both the wealthy and phu mi 
itthiphon do not perceive corruption and the patronage system to be problems, with 
respect to sugarcane farmers promoting both their and the group's political influence, and 
both their own and their group's interests. Moreover, these are individuals who can 
exploit the plight of the Thai political culture. 
In addition, the importance of selective incentives over collective incentives in 
Thai farmers groups formation, implies that the absence of agricultural exceptionalism 
impacts on the group formation and political weakness of Thai farmers. Firstly, the Thai 
agricultural sector has not been a priority for the government, for a country, which is a 
leading exporter of agricultural products. With a productive agricultural sector, which 
makes Thailand both self-sufficient and a net exporter in terms of its agricultural sector, 
the Thai government has tended to direct its focus away from agriculture, and towards 
emerging sectors of the economy in search of the higher growth rates, which can be 
achieved within the industrial sector of the economy. Secondly, the existence of 
agricultural exceptionalism within Western societies suggests high levels of domestic 
subsidies within their agricultural sectors. As domestic subsidies in Thailand are very low 
in comparison with both Western countries and Japan, selective incentives, which can be 
provided by farmers groups, more significantly impact on the decision-making process of 
farmers in joining farmers groups, than do collective incentives. 
Accordingly, it is a combination of both the absence of agricultural 
exceptionalism, which farmers would otherwise benefit from, as evidenced by the 
examples found in Western countries and Japan, in addition to the existing political 
weakness that farmers continually experience. This weakness can be attributed to the 
nature of the Thai political culture, specifically the phenomenon of vote-buying. If 
farmers groups became sufficiently mobilised to successfully challenge the ubiquitous 
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problem of vote-buying, then the farming demographic could demand a more involved 
relationship with both government and the political establishment more generally. 
Consequently, the group mobilisation, which farmers have developed largely 
autonomously, in order to further their political cause of more recognition by 
government, has for the most part, been found to be ineffectual. Both additional financial 
and human resources are usually required by farmers groups, in order to promote group 
mobilisation and positive outcomes for their members. Civil society has begun to take on 
this role, in the absence of a convincing measure of government commitment. The 
promotion of group mobilisation through the contribution of civil society has been 
evidenced in the experience of the NRGMR, which has, in collaboration with local 
schoolteachers achieved significant, tangible benefits. 
Through the consideration of the successes of the NRGMR, SCP A, and the 
Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, in terms of their organisational structures 
and through the activities, which tangibly benefit their members, it has been evidenced 
that selective incentives playa highly significant role within all three farmers groups. In 
this regard, the selective incentives have been utilised, in order to solve the problems of 
mobilisation, which all three farmers groups have been challenged with resolving. This 
understanding and realisation is a significant finding and contribution towards the further 
understanding of the development of the political participation of Thai farmers, in order 
to better predict future trends in this regard. The directions being taken by the three 
farmers groups do suggest that Thai farmers groups more generally, can both develop the 
ability, and possess the motivation to mobilise group formation, in order to further their 
own interests. 
Chapter 5 Domestic Impacts on the Role of Thai Farmers 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the contribution of the agricultural labour force 
towards the country's overall labour force averaged 59 per cent between 1981-2000.1 
Generally, this figure ought to be high enough for individuals to join to form interest 
groups, in order to challenge the government over issues of agricultural policy. However, 
this is not the case within the Thai agricultural sector. Influential interest groups are rare 
within the Thai agricultural sector, since most farmers groups are politically inactive. 
Consequently, with regard to agricultural development, the farmers representative groups 
do not normally have a chance to participate within the network of the policy-making 
process. In this respect, the examination of the political participation of farmers groups in 
this chapter will focus on the impact of domestic factors. 
The examination of domestic impacts, with regard to the political participation of 
Thai farmers groups will, in this chapter, be illustrated though the discrete vertical 
relationships each of the rice, sugarcane and potato farmers groups have with the Thai 
government. The examination regarding the domestic factors will consider the Thai 
political culture, because this will help to more fully understand the roles of the actors 
within the Thai political arena. In this respect, the Western concept of policy 
network/community and an understanding of interest groups will be introduced to 
accompany this examination. However, the emphasis on the meso-level analysis in the 
Western model of policy network/community cannot be perfectly applied as a 
framework, with respect to the Thai case. This is because the patronage system with other 
forms of personal connections, are significant factors, with regard to the establishment of 
relationships between interest groups and government, in the Thai political context. 
Consequently, if the framework is applied without any adaptation, it cannot transfer 
appropriately, in the study of the political participation of Thai farmers groups. 
Accordingly, the Western concept of policy network/community will be adapted, by 
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placing more emphasis on the micro-level analysis. With respect to the Rhodes model of 
policy network/community, this chapter 'distinguishes between networks and 
communities according to the closeness of the relationships involved.,2 
This chapter will begin in section 5.1, by discussing the impact on Thai farmers 
groups of the imbalances in the government policies on economic and social 
development, which led to the economic crisis of 1997. In section 5.2, the role of the 
government, with regard to both its policies on agricultural development and in addition, 
the problem of corruption will be addressed. A comparative study will consider how the 
policy-making process has evolved, from earlier government administrations, to the most 
recent government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. In section 5.3, the 
government's role will be examined, with specific attention to the three case studies of 
farmers groups, and their political participation. This discussion will help to classify the 
status of rice, sugarcane and potato farmers groups, with respect to their strategies and 
negotiating powers. 
5.1 Economic Fallout and Localism 
The result of the increased emphasis placed on the policy of industrialisation since 
the early 1980s did not produce substantive, lasting economic and social developmental 
benefits. This became clear within Thai society, after the economic crisis of 1997. 
Throughout the 1980s, Thailand enjoyed high rates of economic growth, accelerated by 
the rapid expansion of its industrial sector. According to figure 5-1, during the period 
between 1981-2000, the contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP steadily decreased, 
from 21.36 per cent in 1981 to 9.12 per cent in 2000. Over the same period, in the 
industrial sector, the figures were 22.64 per cent and 33.42 per cent respectively, showing 
therefore, a steady increase. 
I See figure 5-1 
2 Rhodes, R.A.W. and Marsh, D. (1992) 'Policy Networks in British Politics: A Critique of Existing 
Approaches', in Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (eds) Policy Networks in British Government, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, p.18 
175 
Figure 5-1 Labour Forces and Contribution of GDP in Agricultural and Industrial Sector 
From 1981-2000 
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Over this period, the increase in incomes for workers within the industrial sector 
over those within the agricultural sector resulted in an overall fall in the number of 
workers within agriculture and an overall rise within industry, as represented in figure 5-
1. Narongchai, Dapice and Flatters argue that 'an increase of about a half-million jobs 
directly associated with manufactured export growth in the 1985-89 period. Because this 
was not large relative to total labor force growth, there was little problem in finding the 
workers .... It will become necessary to "pull" workers from agriculture, with possibly 
important effects on wages and the distribution of income. ,3 
This decrease in the contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP, resulted in a 
general decrease in farmer 's incomes. Between 1981-1986 the mean per capita income of 
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agricultural households fell by 4.4 per cent,4 which increased the number of Thai people 
living in poverty from 23 per cent in 1980, to 29.5 per cent by 1985-1986.5 The decline in 
the prices of agricultural products on the world markets during the 1980s, was a 
significant factor, with regard to decreasing farmer's incomes. 6 
The decrease in farmer's incomes increased both rural poverty and income 
disparity between the rural and urban populations, which continues to the present day. 
Between 1992-1996, the per capita income within agriculture was as low as 13,925 baht, 
compared to the per capita income in non-agriculture of 127,102 baht.7 Accordingly, 
within the rural areas, where two-thirds of the total population live and more than 90 per 
cent of which are farmers, remain the poorest areas of the country. 8 
The decrease in income of the rural population not only impacts adversely 
economically, but also impacts adversely on farmers groups, both politically and socially. 
This occurs largely because the decrease in the household income forces farmers into 
debt, in order to sustain their families' liquidity, and consequently education and 
healthcare are less affordable to farmers. These issues, with respect to the rural 
population, help to explain why the TRT became so popular in the general election of 6 
January 2001. 
The falling significance of the agricultural sector, with regard to its decreased 
contribution to the GDP, is another explanation for the low level of government attention, 
with respect to the development of this sector. The agricultural sector generated less 
government revenue during the economic boom of the 1980s, which directly reduced the 
3 Narongchai Akrasanee, Dapice, D. and Flatters, F. (1991) Thailand's Export-Led Growth: Retrospect and 
Prospects, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute [TDRl], p.27 
4 Dixon, C. (1999a) The Thai Economy: Uneven Development and Industrialisation, London: Routledge, 
p.220 
5 Narongchai Akrasanee, Dapice, D. and Flatters, F. (1991), p.28 
6 Ammar Siamwalla (1996) 'Thai Agriculture: From Engine of Growth to Sunset Status', TDRI Quarterly 
Review, VoUl No.4 4 December 1996, at www.info.tdri.or.thIlibrary/quarterly/textld96_1.htm Retrieved 
on 12 February 2001 
7Thai Rak Thai Party (200 1) Agricultural Policy in Brief, 
at www.trtp.org/National-'policY/fl11lfllWlfl.20p2%20(eng).htmRetrieved on 2 May 2001 
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government's already decreased level of acknowledgement of Thai farmers groups. 
Accordingly, this weakened the political participation of Thai farmers groups. 
However, after the economIC crisis of 1997, the agricultural sector received 
increased attention from the government, because the depreciation of the Thai currency at 
this time made Thai agricultural products more competitive on the world market. 
According to the Bank of Thailand9, during the second half of 1997 the export of 
agricultural products overall, dramatically increased by 47.1 per cent when compared to 
the growth rate in the equivalent period of 1996. Specifically, the export of rice and 
sugarcane increased by 66.4 per cent and 115.5 per cent respectively. 'This makes the 
rice ... suddenly more important to the national economy.' 10 
In the aftermath of the crisis, the government announced that the agricultural 
sector could save the country, because the significant fall in the baht over this period gave 
Thailand a comparative advantage in this sector. However, in the 1998 fiscal year, the 
government decreased its expenditure within the agricultural sector by 25.6 per cent, 
whereas its expenditure within the industrial sector decreased by only 0.5 per cent. 
Consequently, government expenditure within the agricultural sector reduced from 
83,964.3 million baht in the 1997 fiscal year, to 62,475.7 million baht in the 1998 fiscal 
year. 1 1 
Nevertheless, the 1997 birthday speech of King Bhumibol, a speech, which 
regarded a self-sufficient economy as a solution to the Thai economic crisis, pressured 
the government into placing more emphasis on the agricultural sector. The King stated 
that 'I have often said that a self-sufficient economy does not mean that each family must 
8 Rural Development and Natural Resource Sector Unit of the World Bank (2000) Beyond the Crisis: A 
Strategy for Renewing Rural Development in Thailand, Bangkok: World Bank, p.xi and p.3 
9 Bank of Thailand (1997) Annual Economic Report 1997, Bangkok: Bank of Thailand, p.20 
10 Vatikiotis, M. (1997a) 'The Good Earth: Rural Economy Shows Strengths Despite Financial Crisis', Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 23 October 1997, p.20 
11 Sauwalak Kittiprapas and Chedtha Intaravitak (2000) 'Social Responses to Economic Crisis in Thailand: 
Some Evidence During 1997-99', in Thailand Development Research Institute (ed) Social Impacts of the 
Asian Economic Crisis in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, Bangkok: Thailand 
Development Research Institute [TDRI], p.80 
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produce its own food, weave or sew its own cloths. This is going too far, but I mean each 
village or each district must have relative self-sufficiency. Things that are produced in 
surplus can be sold, but should be sold in the same region, not too far so that the 
transportation cost is minimized.' 12 Consequently, both the government and Thai 
academics worked to change their approach to the agricultural sector, using the King's 
speech as a guideline. Pasuk and Baker highlight that: 
Quotations appeared on billboards outside government offices. The whole speech 
was quickly printed and distributed .... Even more striking was the reception, especially 
in rural Thailand. Anyone visiting villages in early 1998 could not avoid being stuck by 
the frequency with which key words and phases from the speech would appear in 
conversations with farmers-particularly pho yu pho kin (enough to eat and live-self-
sufficiency) and thritsadi mai or "new theory," which became the shorthand reference to 
the king's idea. Partly of course this reflects the great respect for the king and the success 
of the official effort at dissemination. 13 
According to the research, there was evidence to show that the Network of Rice 
Growers of the Mekong River (NRGMR) worked, in order to harmonise themselves with 
the aims of the King's speech, in terms of the trend towards a self-sufficient Thai 
economy. This was less observed within both the Sugar Cane Planters Association of 
Zone 7 (SCP A), and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd. The NRGMR 
produced mottoes, adapted from aspects of the King's speech with their own objectives. 
These were displayed in front of their office as seen in pictures 5-1 and 5-2. 
12 King Bhumibol Adulyadej (1997) Royal Speech Given to the Audience of Well-wishers on the Occasion 
a/the Royal Birthday Anniversary at the Dusidalai Hall, Chitralada Villa, Dusit Palace, 4 December 1997, 
at www.kanchanapisek.or.thispeechesI199711204.en.html Retrieved on 7 December 2000 
13 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (2000) Thailand's Crisis, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, p.194 
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Picture 5-1 Example of an NRGMR motto. This motto (pictured in blue script) asks Thai farmers to believe 
in the King's long term economic vision for self-sufficiency. 
Picture 5-2 Example of an NRGMR motto. This motto asks people to use Thai products, in order to 
promote the King's economic vision for self-sufficiency. 
Source: Pictures 5-1 and 5-2 were taken at the time of the interviews with members of the Network of Rice 
Growers of the Mekong River, the district of Khemmarat, the province of Ubon Ratchathani, 2 May 200 1. 
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The moves towards the concept of the self-sufficient economy within Thai 
society, aims to improve the agricultural sector through the utilisation of watthanatham 
chum chon (local culture) and phumpanya thongthin (local wisdom), and this has led to 
the political debate regarding 'localism'. These two terms were widely used throughout 
the early 1980s and 1990s.14 The ideology of watthanatham chumchon emphasises 
culture and local history, which integrates non-economic issues into the ideas of localism, 
specifically, the idea of rural village development. In rural villages the beliefs In 
superstition and ritual are contributing factors, with respect to the establishment of 
watthanatham chumchon. This is most clearly observed within the production of rice, 
because rice production has developed as a part of Thai history, over thousands of years, 
whereas the production of both sugarcane and potato have little historical background 
within Thailand, and both only began to be produced in the twentieth century. This can 
explain the deficiency of watthanatham chumchon within sugarcane and potato farmers 
groups. 
Historically, Thai people have been taught to 'respect every single grain of rice'. 
In some rural families, children were punished for not eating all of the rice on their plates. 
This resulted from the belief that to do so would upset Mae pho sop, the goddess of rice. 
Rice farmers believe that Mae pho sop is very fragile and easily scared. Therefore, they 
perform phitee tham kwan khao or a rice offering ceremony, in order to both calm Mae 
pho sop and to invite her to stay in their paddy fields. I5 This is only one of many rituals 
within the superstition and ritual culture of rice production. According to the study by 
Ngampit I6 regarding rice culture within Thailand, there are 27 stages in the production of 
rice within rural villages, and 16 of these stages are cultural ceremonies, which aim to 
both show respect for and ask for help from the supernatural, in the production of rice. 
14 Pasuk Phongpaichit (1999) Cultural Factors that Shape Governance in South-East Asia, Essay written 
for UNESCO, p.6 
15 Chompoo Trakullertsathien (1998) 'Rice and Rituals', Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 16 December 
1998 at www.bangkokpost.netlI612981161298_0utlook01.html Retrieved on 18 January 1999 
16 Ngampit Satsaguan (1998) 'Watthanatham khao nai sangkom Thai: Sugsakoranee Banna Chungwat 
Pranakorn Sri Ayutthaya (The Rice Culture in Thai Society: The Case Study of Banna, the Province of 
Ayutthaya', in Ngampit Satsaguan (ed) Watthanatham khao nai sangkom Thai lae nana chat (The Rice 
Culture in Thai Society and Other Countries), Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University [in Thai], p.3! 
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Whilst watthanatham chumchon can indirectly help villagers to contribute 
towards the process of development and in addition, promote self-reliance, phumpanya 
thongthin can directly contribute as an instrument in village development. I7 This can be 
observed within the NRGMR, who began through the creation of their own group culture, 
the boon kumkhaoyai, which has at its heart, the objective of collecting rice from its 
members to sell, in order to finance the group.I8 The boon kumkhaoyai is an annual group 
event, which reinforces group co-operation. The NRGMR group culture of the boon 
kumkhaoyai was created from the integration of watthanatham chumchon into their 
process of development, and this has benefited the NRGMR, in terms of its group 
formation. 
According to HewisonI9, watthanatham chumchon is a consequence of a system 
of beliefs, production, and social living. Watthanatham chumchon is established in terms 
of the gentle nature of the rural people in Thailand, which is strongly influenced by their 
adherence to Buddhism. Therefore, watthanatham chum chon works to smooth the 
interactions between members, to reduce conflicts, and to promote farmers' obligations to 
theNRGMR. 
Within the case studies of farmers groups in the research, in terms of group 
formation, only the NRGMR have fully applied watthanatham chumchon. There was 
little clear evidence to suggest that watthanatham chumchon exists as a contributing 
factor, in terms of group formation and sustainability, within the SCP A and the Chiang 
Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd. Both of these groups have experienced different 
societal, cultural, and political environments, and as a result they perceive the value of 
watthanatham chumchon differently. 
With respect to the case of the SCPA, which is a particularly successful farmer's 
interest group in Thailand, the watthanatham chumchon is not a contributing factor in its 
17 Rewison, K. (1993) 'Nongovernmental Organisations and the Cultural Development Perspective in 
Thailand: A Comment on Rigg (1991)" World Development, Vo1.21, No.lO, 1993, p.1703 
18 Interview with Mr Samam Bumpen 
19 Hewison, K. (1993), p.1703 
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success. The SCP A is located in the central region of Thailand, close to Bangkok, where 
capitalism and consumerism are concentrated. It can be argued that in terms of the SCP A, 
watthanatham chumchon has been exchanged with this new culture. However, this is not 
to argue that the NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, at a 
distance from Bangkok are not affected by the capitalist and consumerist cultures. 
Indeed, they have experienced the negative impacts of capitalism and consumerism, but 
to a lesser degree than those less distant from Bangkok. 
The group formation of the SCP A was driven by economic interest rather than 
watthanatham chumchon, whereas the idea of local culture acts as a connection between 
members of the NRGMR, reinforcing the relationship between their members. The 
NRGMR enjoy the annual cultural event the boon kumkhaoyai, which is traditionally 
Thai, with Buddhist monks reciting religious mantras for a good harvest, and everyone 
contributes food to share. With regard to the SCP A, there is an annual festival, where 
there is a concert and prize draw, with food provided by the organisers. This event is not 
derived out of any cultural background of the local people, however, this lack of 
watthanatham chumchon does not weaken the group and its effectiveness, in the case of 
the SCPA. 
The Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd was formed with a high level 
of technical assistance from local offices of the MOAC, without utilising watthanatham 
chumchon. However, the research discovered through comparing the attitudes of 
members of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, that when compared with 
the NRGMR, the failure to utilise watthanatham chumchon has resulted in a reduced 
sense of both belonging and obligation to the group. Accordingly, many members of the 
Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd have become less willing to contribute to 
group activities. 
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5.2 Thai Agricultural Policy-making and Political Participation of Farmers 
In common with most countries, Thai agricultural policy emphasises intensive 
farming production techniques, in an attempt to increase the overall level of production 
within the agricultural sector. This fact strongly implies that the economic arguments of 
the state, rather than arguments in terms of the welfare of the rural population drive the 
network of the policy-making process, which informs government decision making. Most 
agricultural policy decision making is based on the assumption that an increase in 
agricultural production would lead to an increase in farmers' incomes. 
However, there is no proper framework in place, in order to ensure the interests of 
farmers within the agricultural market, and this has been the catalyst for the development 
of farmers groups. Once farmers become dependent on the market system, they can no 
longer avoid its risks. It is broadly perceived that the market system has failed to cope 
with the excess supply of many agricultural products, particularly with regard to rice, 
which remains the key agricultural product of Thailand. The government did decide to 
attempt to control the price of rice within the domestic market, instead of controlling its 
level of production2o, but this policy failed to deal with the excess supply. Government 
policy-makers have acknowledged the failures of government policies in solving the 
problems of farmers. To date, policies, which have been implemented, have failed to 
work effectively, since policy-makers within central government developed most of their 
policies with a limited knowledge of the problems of rural people. The policy-makers 
only learnt about the problems experienced by farmers through documents provided by 
government agencies. 
In general, the policy-making of the Thai government must comply with the 
framework of the NESD Plan. Each plan is conceptualised, controlled and assessed by 
the NESDB. However, Pasuk argues that 'Formally it has no role in either decision-
making or implementation, but exists to formulate indicative five-year plans to guide 
20 Warapom Suravadi (Editor), and Udom Kerdpibul (Translator) (1993) Kusarobai Kai Khao, Kobfai 
Publishing,[in Thai] [Translated from Panayotou, T.(ed) Reader on Food and Agriculture], p.ll 
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economic strategy.,21 This means that government agencies and elite bureaucrats are key 
actors within the network of the policy-making process. There are 4 core agencies, with 
regard to the development of economic policy, namely the NESDB, the Fiscal Policy 
Office of the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Thailand, and the Bureau of the Budget. 
The directors of these core agencies sit permanently in the Council of Economic 
Ministers. These core agencies are reliable sources of both information and analyses for 
the government. Warr22 argues that at the ministerial level, either a minister makes policy 
decisions individually, or minister's act collectively, relying mainly on the information 
and analyses provided by these 4 core agencies. 
All macroeconomic policy decisions are made by the Thai government, whilst 
complying with the framework of the NESD Plan. Theoretically, ministers are 
responsible for macroeconomic policy-making, however, in practice the four core 
agencies are the key actors, with regard to macroeconomic policy decision making. Neher 
asserts that, 'These agencies, all crucial to the kingdom's economic development, have 
been able to act autonomously, apart from the patron-client relations that pervade Thai 
officialdom and society. ,23 
As illustrated in figure 5-2, the cabinet is the centre of government. The cabinet is 
responsible for co-ordinating the work of the ministries and government departments. 
The work of both local government and state enterprises are within the responsibility of 
central government. Local government is under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, 
with the exception of Bangkok and Pattaya, where governors are elected. In all other 
provinces, the Ministry of the Interior appoints provincial governors directly from senior 
bureaucrats. 'With this direct line of command, the central government is able to control 
21 Pasuk Phongpaichit (1992) 'Technocrats, Businessmen, and Generals: Democracy and Economic Policy-
making in Thailand', in Ravenhill, J. (ed) Political Economy of East Asia 3: Singapore, Indonesia. 
Malaysia, The Philippines and Thailand, Volume II, Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p.421 
22 Warr, P.G. (1993) 'The Thai Economy', in WaIT, P.G. (ed) The Thai Economy in Transition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp.28-29 
23 Neher, C.D. (1994, Second edition) Southeast Asia in the New International Era, Oxford: Westview 
Press, p.57 
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local government administration. Clearly, the Thai system of government IS highly 
centralised. ,24 
Figure 5-2 Structure of Policy-making Process 
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Source: Warr, P. and Bhanupong Nidhiprabha (19%), p.70 
24 Warr, P.G., and Nidhiprabha, Bhanupong (19%) Thailand' Macroeconomic Miracle : Stable Adjustment 
and Sustained Growth, Kuala Lumpur: World Bank! Oxford University Press, pp. 68-70 
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Although, the benefits of decentralisation are wildly acknowledged within Thai 
society, the initiation of the Tambon Administration Organisation (TAO) by the 
government in 1997, which aimed to decentralise power from central to local government 
was a poor example of this idea. The TAO was intended to both help with the problems 
of rural people, and in addition report back to central government. However, the 
existence of a number of appointed bureaucrats from central government within the TAO, 
has significantly reduced the effectiveness of the operation of the TAO. Accordingly, the 
TAO has operated in the manner of a government agency, rather than representing the 
people at the local level as was intended. This is because the nature of the bureaucracy of 
the TAO facilitated the operation of both the patronage system and corruption within it. 
With regard to the development of agricultural policy, there are 5 core agencies, 
the MOAC, the NESDB, the Fiscal Policy Office of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry 
of Commerce, and the Ministry of Industry, which also complies with the NESD Plan. 
Two of these agencies, namely the NESDB, the Fiscal Policy Office of the Ministry of 
Finance, are in addition, core agencies within the development of economic policy. The 
NESDB does not have autonomous executive powers with respect to the NESD Plan, and 
must consult with all core agencies before launching each NESD plan.25 Consequently, 
this procedure enables government agencies to launch policies within the framework of 
the NESD Plan. 
Figure 5-3 illustrates the agricultural policy-making process, showing that farmers 
are not involved at the executive level of this process, because 'The Thai society has a 
negative attitude towards the poor. They condemn the poor of being lazy, of gambling, 
drinking and overspending. ,26 This attitude towards the poor in Thailand has been a main 
factor, adversely influencing government decision making, with regard to agricultural 
policy. In addition, the poor level of education is another obstacle, which diminishes the 
political opportunities of farmers. The government uses this fact to justify the exclusion 
25 Email interview with Miss Thunyaros Sanguanhong 
26 Nipon Poapongsakorn, Viroj NaRanong and Adis Israngkul Na Ayudhaya (2002) Final Report: The 
Process of Formulating Poverty Reduction Strategies in Thailand, Bangkok: Thailand Development 
Research Institute [TDRI], p.48 
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. 
of farmers from the network of the policy-making process. Consequently, government 
actors are unaware of the real problems that farmers face, and this is unfair because it is 
the government, which has failed to provide them with an adequate level of education. 
Academics tend to oppose government arguments, which punish farmers for not being 
educated by limiting their political opportunity. Taner7 argues that poor rural farmers 
could learn if given the opportunity to do so. 
Figure 5-3 Agricultural Policy-making Process 
The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) 
The NESD Plan 
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Source: Created from provided information and interviews 
An examination of the interactions between these five core agencies is not a main 
concern. Instead, the discussion of the agricultural policy-making process will move 
towards the agricultural policy of the TRT party, because this is an example of the 
interaction between farmers and government, since the TRT party formed the government 
27 Interview with Dr Narong Petprasoet, and Email interview with Dr Tanet Charoenmuang 
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m February 2001. The TRT party argues that farmers were invited to participate 
throughout the development of the TRT party's agricultural policy, and in addition, 
claimed that the participation of farmers enabled the party to introduce policy that would 
meet farmers' demands.28 
The political agenda of the TR T party has meant promoting the case for the rural 
population. The TR T party has publicised the need to address issues, with respect to the 
problems of the rural farmers, which has helped farmers to feel more included within the 
Thai political arena than ever before. The TRT also invited many leading academics from 
well-known universities in Thailand, notably Chiang Mai University, in addition to senior 
and junior bureaucrats, businessmen, and people involved within the agricultural sector 
including NGOs. 
The TRT party argued that previous government agricultural policies were based 
on the Western concepts of agricultural development, where chemical fertilisers, 
pesticides and other chemical products were used heavily within the agricultural sector. 
Within Thailand, this did not only result in an increase in the cost of agricultural 
production, but in addition, this also impacted adversely on the environment. 29 According 
to Nipon, Ruhs and Sumana, 'Pesticide-related environmental degradation includes the 
contamination of groundwater, a reduction of biodiversity, and the destruction of 
beneficial insects which help control pests. ,30 
Research conducted for the TR T party, resulted in two important promises made, 
in order to attract the rural vote during the general election campaign of 2001, which the 
TRT party went on to win. These were the 'village fund project' or 'one village one 
million baht', and the moratorium on farmers' debts for three years. The TRT party 
argues that the village fund project would stimulate the economy at the micro level, 
28 Interview with Mr Prapat Panyachatiraksa 
29 Centre for the Study of Problems and Agricultural Policy, Thai Rak Thai Party (2001) Paprau~ nayoba~ 
kaset khong pak Thai Rak Thai (Agricultural Policy o/the Thai Rak Thai Party), Bangkok: That Rak ThaI 
Party [Unpublished Material in Thai], p.1-6 
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which in tum would benefit the economy at the macro level. The TR T party expects the 
village fund project to be more effective than the Miyazawa plan of 1999, introduced by 
Chuan Government of November 1997 - February 2001. 
Farmers are very receptive to the agricultural policy of the TRT party as a route to 
improving their livelihoods. As a result, their agricultural policy enhanced the popularity 
of the TR T party among rural farmers, even though farmers could not know if the 
promises would be kept. 31 Moreover, it was generally unclear as to whether these policies 
could be implemented, and notably, these doubts were present within the academic 
community. 
In terms of the TR T party election promise of 'one village one million baht', a 
policy, which began to be implemented in 2001, there is a warning lesson to be learnt 
from the experiences of the Miyazawa Plan, which aimed to stimulate domestic demand 
through job creation. In 1999, Thailand received a share of US$ 1.45 billion from the 
total fund of US$30 billion, which Japan established, in order to help to stabilise the 
economic position across eastern Asia, in the wake of the economic crisis of 1997.32 
Through the Miyazawa Plan, the Chuan government allocated 7,400 million baht 
to the Department of Local Administration, in the Ministry of the Interior, with 100,000 
baht to be distributed to most sub-districts nation-wide.33 However, this money was not 
spent effectively and corruption was endemic. Within the sub-district of Pou, in the 
province of Nan, most of the 100,000 baht distributed was spent on road improvements, 
which allowed kamnan and local bureaucrats to gain kha nam ron nam cha or bribes from 
projects.34 The NRGMR fear that the 'one village one million baht' project promised by 
the TRT party, could be victim to the same corruption, which undermined the Miyazawa 
3~ipon Poapongsakom, Ruhs, M. and Sumana Tangjitwisuth (1998) 'Problems and Outlook of Agriculture 
in Thailand', TDRI Quarterly Review, VoLl3 No.2, June 1998, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research 
Institute [TDRI], p.6 
31 Interview with Mr Wanchai Lai 
32 Sauwalak Kittiprapas and Chedtha Intaravitak (2000), p.83 
33 Ibid. 
34 Interview with Mr Suban Charapok 
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Plan, where the money was channelled away from the villages, and to kamnan and local 
bureaucrats. 35 
Tanee6 argues that whilst the TRT party's agricultural policies will not 
dramatically advance the development of the agricultural sector, it is a positive step. He 
believes that the village fund project of the TRT party would enhance the political 
participation of farmers within the Thai political arena, because each village is given a 
one million baht loan from the government. Each village must establish a committee to 
manage this fund, and rural farmers can therefore participate in the programme of village 
development. Tanet believes that either success or failure, with regard to village fund 
management would be good for rural farmers, since this is a 'learning by doing scheme'. 
Such a learning curve would enable them to evolve and to strengthen, to emerge to be 
more influential within the Thai political arena. 
In order to implement the village fund project, the TRT party introduced the 'one 
village one product' project. The TRT party adopted this policy of development from 
ideas, which initially became established in Japan. The success of this policy in Japan 
was achievable because of the contribution of the production capacity of small 
enterprises, married to a high level of domestic demand for local products.37 
The development of the 'one village one product' project began in Japan in the 
late 1970s, and was based on the theory of comparative advantage, because 'the most 
striking feature of the "one village-one product" movement is its totemistic quality, 
which serves to distinguish one group from another .... ,38 However, only 58 villages 
produced a single product, as most produced two or more products. With regard to Japan, 
a major problem in relation to the development of the one village one product strategy is 
the marketing of products, because there are not many products, which can be 
35 Interview with Mrs Benjapom Sodapakdi 
36 Email interview with Dr Tanet Charoenmuang 
37 Waranee Kunawasen (2001) 'Critics Slam Thaksin's Reforms', The Nikkei Weekly, 29 January 2001, 
~.20 
8 Knight, 1. (1994) 'Rural Revitalization in Japan: Spirit of the Village and Taste of the Country', Asian 
Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No.7, July 1994: 634-646, p.638 
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successfully marketed. As a result, Japanese villagers 'became increasingly tempted to 
abandon their own special product in favor of the more successful product line of their 
. hb ,39 nelg ors. 
Indeed, this problem has already been experienced in Thailand, in for example, 
the province of Phayao, where in one sub-district, some villagers changed production 
from containers woven out of bamboo and grass reeds, to more profitable areas. 40 With 
reference to the problems experienced in both countries, to be successful, Thailand 
should pay more attention, with respect to the promotion and marketing of the village 
products. The policy of the Thaksin government has only provided financial support to 
the 'one village one product' project, neglecting to ensure that village products have 
secure markets. 'Thailand's domestic market is small and local industry would be forced 
to rely on exports competing against countries such as China or Vietnam. If Thai 
products are not competitive, the policy will be a huge waste of the budget. .. ,41 
Box 5-1 The Thaksin Verdict 
In December 2000, Mr Thaksin Shinawatra was indicted for intentionally concealing assets worth more than 
US$232 million by the National Counter Corruption Commission. The case was due to the transferring of his stock to 
his maids and driver, when he was a minister in a previous government. If he were found guilty by the Constitutional 
Court, he would be forced to leave office and his political career would be suspended for 5 years according to the 1997 
constitution. The available evidence indicated that he would be found guilty. Strangely, he won the case with the 
slimmest of margins (8-7). It is undeniable that his victory was helped by the popular support of pressure campaigns 
against the Constitutional Court. Although the verdict has disappointed many people, particularly academics, it did not 
surprise many people. Everyone recognises the power of 'money politics' and 'men of influence' in Thailand. 
Source: International Herald Tribune, Sat-Sun 13-14 January 2001, p.4 and 
www.time.comlAsia/news/collumnlO.9754. 170511 ,00.html 
After taking office on 9 February 2001, the Thaksin government implemented 
most of the campaign promises of the general election of 2001, before the conclusion to 
the trial for corruption. As is illustrated in box 5-1, this approach was criticised as a 
cynical political strategy of the Prime Minister Thaksin and his TR T party, in order to 
maintain his popularity, at a time that he was facing corruption charges. 
39 Knight, 1. (1994), p.639 
40 Manager (Internet Edition), 18 April 2003, at 
www.manager.co.thlpoliticslPoliticsView.asp?NewsID=4697548348306 Retrieved on 19 April 2003 
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With regard to the TR T party's agricultural policy, Sungsidh 42 argues that it is 
very unclear as to whether this government policy can develop both a strong agricultural 
sector and a self-reliant status for farmers, in the long term. He argues that the 
programmes to accelerate economic development through either the village fund project 
or 'one village one product', would not strengthen the fundamentals of agricultural 
production. Introducing farmers to the market system means exposing them to the 
uncertainty of the market system, and the government therefore has to be aware of the 
adverse impacts, which markets can have on farmers. He believes that if farmers enter 
markets when unprepared to compete with others, they would easily lose out. Indeed, he 
believes that within a self-reliant economy, farmers do not have to attach their fortunes to 
either markets or government assistance. 
Nevertheless, farmers have been fully integrated into the agricultural market, 
since the government opened up the agricultural market, by improving roads in rural 
areas in the 1960s and 1970s, a situation, which is difficult for them to be extricated 
from. 'Before roads arrived at the villages, the cost of their participation in the market 
would be inordinately high, and that is why they have stayed out. When the road came, 
the cost fell considerably, and they began to participate in the market. ,43 The importance 
of the market for agricultural products therefore, cannot be denied. Even though, the 
market system results in much uncertainty for weak competitors like farmers, they must 
still rely on the market, in order to sell their products. Consequently, to isolate farmers 
from the market system is not a realistic solution, because 'the fact remains that roads are 
there, and the markets are there. .. are we to ask farmers to tum their backs on them? As 
long as these facilities are available, farmers have found it worthwhile to produce crops 
which they never intended to consume and sell them in exchange for food and the will 
continue to do so. ,44 Accordingly, the active political participation of rural farmers within 
the network of agricultural policy-making process is needed, in order to achieve the 
41 0 Waranee Kunawasen (2001), p.2 
42 Matichon Weekly (Internet Edition), 27 September 2001, at www.matichon.co.thlweekly/ Retrieved on 
27 September 2001 
43Ammar Siamwalla (1992) 'Myths, Demons and the Future of Thai Agriculture' in Poonsin Wongkolthoot 
(ed) (1999) Krobrob 60 Pee Arjarn Ammar (60 Years Professor Ammar), Bangkok: Thailand Development 
Research Institute [TDRI], p.246 
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policy of agricultural development, which will meet with farmers' demands, because 'the 
farmers' choice-and their capacity to make a reasoned choice-should be respected. ,45 
With reference to this, the failures in the development of the agricultural sector, 
which adversely affect the economic position and political participation of Thai farmers, 
are consequences of government policy failures, which interfere with the market system. 
The Thailand Development Research Institute argues that the failure of the government to 
adequately invest, with regard to agricultural research, has significantly adversely 
impacted, with respect to the development of Thai agricultural sector. 'In Thailand, there 
is a functioning agricultural research system. More could of course be spent on it ... the 
example of new crops, animals and varieties being recommended to farmers which ended 
up disastrously suggest that not enough trials were conducted to test out the 
recommendations before they are actually administrated to the farmers. ,46 
For instance in 1989, the MOAC launched three new projects, namely the plastic 
cow project47, the silkworms project, and the Paitong (bamboo shoots) project48, in order 
to convince farmers to switch products, which they traditionally produced, to these three 
products. It became clear that these projects had failed to increase the incomes of the 
farmers. Furthermore, it was reported that farmers in 30 provinces engaging in the 
Paitong project were forced into severe indebtedness.49 These failures were due to lack of 
research into the information, which would be required by the farmers, in order to be able 
to be successful in terms of agricultural production and to make informed decisions, with 
44Ibid. 
45Ibid., p.247 
46Thailand Development Research Institute (1995) Agricultural Diversification/Restructuring of 
Agricultural Production Systems in Thailand, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute [TDRI], 
f'185 
7 The MOAC introduced a project, where farmers mated their Thai cows with Australian cows. However, 
the farmers were unable to support the voracious appetites of the imported animals. The underfed heifers 
could not then reproduce, earning the nickname of 'plastic cows'. (Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 
February 1995, p.l6) 
48 The MAOC convinced many farmers that they would be better off by producing Paitong, since this was 
highly demanded by the market. However, farmers experienced technical problems in production and the 
Paitong died before the harvest season, leaving the farmers with nothing to sell. (Phuchatkan Raisapda 
(Manager Weekly), 9-15 April 2001) 
49 Phuchatkan Raisapda (Manager Weekly), 9-15 April 2001, [in Thai], p.4 
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regard to risk assessment. Ammar50 criticises the role of the MOAC, believing that the 
ministry forces its own agenda, without providing alternatives. He asserts that the 
government always assumes that it is right, and that the farmers must be wrong, which 
creates the problems associated with these projects. 
According to the study of Nipon, Ruhs and Sumana51 , the 'Restructuring 
Agricultural Production Systems' (RAPS) introduced in late 1993 is another case of 
policy failure for the government and the MOAC. The RAPS aims for the reduction and 
the replacement of the production of rice, cassava, coffee, and pepper, with the 
production of higher value agricultural products, such as selected vegetables, flowers, 
fruit, and in addition, milk cows. 
Nipon, Ruhs and Sumana52 asserted that this policy failed firstly, because the 
government was incapable of making correct predictions, with regard to the prices of the 
agricultural products, which they wanted farmers to grow, in order to replace the four 
products targeted for the reductions. Indeed, the prices of rice, cassava, coffee, and 
pepper had in fact, already increased between the introduction of RAPS in 1993 and 
1994. Additionally, the introduction of the new replacement crops came with inadequate 
levels of technical assistance. Finally, with the exception of rice, the domestic prices for 
all major crops, including the new replacement crops, are determined by the prices of 
agricultural products in the world market. This is because, as is normal for a country in 
the world market, Thailand has little influence over the prices of agricultural products. 
The MOAC has acknowledged that agricultural policy over the past two decades 
not only failed to deliver real development to the agricultural sector, but moreover, it also 
adversely affected farmers' livelihoods. It has been argued by many, including 
government officials, academics and NGOs, that farmers should be free to make their 
50 Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 February 1995, p.16 
:~ Nipon Poapongsakorn, Ruhs, M. and Sumana Tangjitwisuth (1998), pp.8-9 
Ibid., p.9 
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own choices, in terms of agricultural production. The policy of agricultural development 
should only be regarded as a guideline, and not a regulation for farmers to follow. 53 
Furthermore, Ammar argues that farmers should be allowed to make autonomous 
decisions, with regard to their own agricultural production, because 'they alone know 
best what is good for them. The government could serve farmers' interests best, primarily 
by opening up the rage of options that are available to them, and secondarily, by making 
more resources available to them, but refraining from interfering in farmers' decision to 
produce or not to produce something. ,54 This evidence suggests that supportive policies 
would benefit farmers more than theses such persuasive policies do, since this would 
enhance farmers' strength, and empower them towards a more self-reliant status. 
Corruption, which is an endemic problem within Thai society, notably within the 
political arena, also permeates the implementation of government policies, with regard to 
agricultural development, rendering them less effective in terms of achieving their 
objectives. With regard to the Thaksin government, Prime Minister Thaksin declares a 
strong will to attack the problem of corruption, but nevertheless, a high level of 
corruption has been observed within this government. A case in point was the fertiliser 
scandal, which emerged in November 2002 and two leading TRT party MPs were 
accused of being involved. Namely, Chucheep Harnsawat, the Minister of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives between February 2001 - October 2002, and Withaya Thienthong, who 
is the brother of Sanoh Thienthong, the leader of the influential faction within the TR T 
party, the Wang Nam Yen.55 
Because of the instability of the Thai political system, where government 
administrations frequently change and cabinet reshuffles are common, when combined 
with the endemic level of corruption, which is acknowledged, this adversely affects the 
implementation of agricultural development. This is manifested with the introduction of 
53 Interview with Dr Ampon Kittiampon 
54 Ammar Siamwalla (1992), p.249 
55 The Nation (Internet Edition), 12 November 2002, at 
www.nationmultimedia.com!page.print.php3?usrsess=l&id=4038&clid=1 Retrieved on 12 November 2002 
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short-term, poorly realised projects of a questionable motivation by elite bureaucrats and 
politicians, where the opportunity is taken to abuse the initiation of projects, for 
individual purposes and gain. At the first available opportunity, when in executive 
authority, elite bureaucrats and politicians will at once initiate projects with large budgets 
and force them through. This is because they recognise the instability of the political 
system, and the transitory nature of their own positions. This situation can only persist 
whilst farmers are excluded from the network of the policy-making process, where the 
process would be more open to scrutiny by the farmers themselves. 
Properly conducted agricultural research can be considered to be an obstacle to 
corruption, because of the time frame, which research needs, in order to be fully 
completed. As a consequence of this endemic corruption, the importance of this step 
within the policy of agricultural development, is largely ignored by the government. 
Overall, it can be argued that the level of government corruption, with regard to 
agricultural development programmes, is similar to that of economic development 
programmes within other government ministries and agencies. 
5.3 Interactions between the Policy-makers and Thai Farmers 
This section will examine how rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers groups can 
participate within the network of the policy-making process. With regard to the Thai 
political culture, the patronage system is an important contributing factor, with respect to 
the formation of personal connections between interest groups and government. 
Therefore, this section will highlight the impact of the patronage system, with respect to 
the political participation of Thai farmers groups and the formation of the policy 
community between farmers groups and government. 
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5.3.1 Interactions between the Policy-makers and Rice Farmers 
The 1930s were a period of transition, in terms of the rice industry. Chinese 
businessmen began to take an active part in the Thai rice market, and so the market 
system became more important to rice farmers in Thailand. These Chinese businessmen 
were divided into the 'Big Five' families, namely, Wanglee, Lamsam, Bulasuk, Bulakun 
(Mahboonkrong) and Iamsuri, who would come to dominate the rice trade in Thailand.56 
The expansion of Chinese influence into the Thai economy at that time, was a catalyst for 
state intervention, with regard to economic activity and furthermore, the promotion of the 
policy of 'economic nationalism,.57 However, in November 1938, the Phibun government 
organised the 'Borisat Khao Thai Chamkat' or Thai Rice Co., Ltd. (TRC), which was 
involved with the 'Big Five' families,58 and this co-operation was strongly established. 
Pridi Panomyong was the Minister of Finance, who recommended that the 
Phibun government establish the TRC. According to Pasuk and Baker,59 the Pridi group, 
consisting of various associates of Pridi, was not reluctant to co-operate with Wanglee, 
Lamsam, and Bulasuk, the big rice-trading families actively. Ma Bulakun, a member of 
the Bulakun family became the managing director of the TRC. The business interests of 
the 'Big Five' rice trading families were enhanced and secured under the political 
patronage of the Pridi group, while the position of rice farmers' interests remained 
unclear. 
This high level of influence, with regard to the position of the TRC enhanced its 
economic status as a rice exporter, attributable to the protection provided by the 
government combined with its monopolistic position, with respect to rice exports. Since 
the 1930s government interventions, with regard to the rice industry have steadily 
increased,60 and the interests of Chinese businessmen through the patronage system have 
56 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999), p.lll 
57 Akira, S. (1989), pp.1 06-1 09 
58 Ibid., p.125 
59 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, C. (1999), pp.120-121 
60 Akira, S. (1989), pp.126-127 
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been advanced, with second, third and forth generation Chinese-Thai businessmen, the 
descendants of the immigrant Chinese. 
The historical development of the Thai rice trade, during which time the policy 
community between the government and the Chinese-Thai businessmen was established, 
can help to inform an understanding, with regard to the negative impact on rice farmers, 
which resulted from the lack of a policy community between the government and rice 
farmers. Apichai61 argues that the rice farmers' lack of political participation within the 
Thai political arena has reinforced policies, which are more responsive to the demands of 
government than those of rice farmers. For instance, the policy of an export tax on rice or 
'rice premium', was introduced in 1950, to become one of the main sources of 
government revenue.62 Between 1955-1965, the rice premium contributed 12.3 per cent 
to the total revenue of the government.63 In 1974, the government received 3,275 million 
baht from the rice premium, which was the highest figure since the rice premium had 
been introduced. After 1981, the contribution of the rice premium progressively 
decreased because of the decline in the price of rice on the world market, between 1982-
1986. The Prem government acknowledged the adverse impact of the rice premium on 
rice farmers, and began the process to remove the rice premium on low quality rice, in 
January 1986. By 1 February 1986, the government had removed the entire rice 
premium.64 
The revenue generated by the rice premium, was one of the main sources of 
government expenditure, with respect to the inception of the policy of industrialisation in 
the early 1960s. It is notable that most government revenue was generated by the 
61Apichai Puntasen (1996) Pattana chonnabot Thai: Samutai lae mug, nawkid tidsadee laepab ruam khong 
kan pattana (Thai Rural Development: Theory and Perspective on Development), Bangkok: Mulanithi 
Poompanya, [in Thai], pp.113-115 
62 Bentrand, T. (1980) Thailand: Case Study of Agricultural Input and Output Pricing, World Bank Staff 
Working Paper No.85, World Bank, p.40 
63 Ammar Siamwalla (1975) 'A History of Rice Policies in Thailand', in Poonsin Wongkolthoot (ed) (1999) 
Krobrob 60 Pee Arjarn Ammar (60 Years Professor Ammar), Bangkok: Thailand Development Research 
Institute [TDRI], p.15 
64Kietchai Wesadabandhu (1987) 'Nayobai khao (Rice Policy)" in Rosrin Kuknang (ed) Kumue butra 
kasetakorn 'Khao' (Handbook for Farmers' Son 'Rice') Bangkok: Kasetsart University [in Thai], pp.142-
143 
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agricultural sector throughout the 1960s and 1970s, when government expenditure, with 
regard to the development of the agricultural sector was relatively low. Overall, during 
this period, there was a capital outflow from the agricultural sector generally, and this 
provided the funds for the capital inflow into the industrial sector. 
According to Apichai65 , it was the Department of International Trade, Ministry of 
Commerce, which collected the rice premium throughout its duration. Revenue generated 
by the rice premium was not included within the annual government budget, because it 
was considered to be supplementary government revenue outside of the annual budget, 
and consequently, the government could appropriate this revenue, and its usage. This use 
of government revenue, without the proper controls offered by the annual government 
budget, could easily lead to corruption. In this regard, he draws attention to the 
corruption, which was evidenced among bureaucrats and politicians within the MAOC 
and the Ministry of Commerce. He noted that there were influential groups within the 
MAOC, which benefited from the rice premium at the rice farmers' expense, through the 
misappropriation of these funds. 
As illustrated in figure 5-4, the structure of the political economy of rice in 
Thailand, appears to be an obstacle to the development of the political participation of 
rice farmers, because of the unequal distribution of economic and political resources. 
Maintaining the domestic price of rice at a level, which is artificially lower than the world 
price, benefits the government's policy of industrialisation because this transfers labour 
out of the agricultural sector, and into the industrial sector. The consequent increase in 
the supply of labour within industrial sector enables factories to maintain the cost of 
labour at an artificially low level also. Furthermore, in terms of the case study of the 
NRGMR, this has disrupted the development of agricultural production directly, in 
addition to the problem also experienced, with a better-educated supply of labour 
transferring to the industrial sector. 
65 Apichai Puntas en (1996), pp.115-117 
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Figure 54 Structure of the Political Economy of Rice 
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In addition, the government's attempts to maintain a low price for rice within the 
domestic market, an undertaking, which began in the 1950s, has been a useful resource in 
gaining popularity amongst many ordinary voters. In this respect, the large number of 
rice farmers in Thailand, were considered to be less important than the consumers of rice, 
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in the perception of the government. This is in contrast to the case of Japan, where rice 
farmers who are only a low proportion of the population, have received a high level of 
attention from the Japanese government. That the domestic price of rice in Japan is 
generally 10 times higher of than the world price does not significantly impact on the 
popularity of the Japanese government among the consumers of rice. In addition, it was 
reported that 'In Japan rice sold for as much as 120 baht per kilogramme ... compared 
with as little as 15 baht in Thailand,66. The Japanese are willing to pay such a high price 
for domestically produced rice, because they want to maintain the country's food security 
policy. 'Furthermore, the total amount of money spent on rice by the Japanese today is 
too small to be of concern. Yet even urbanites, who otherwise resent their taxes being 
used for rice farm subsidies, are opposed to rice importation. ,67 Furthermore, Zhao has 
affirmed that: 
Farmers have conducted intensive campaigns against liberalisation of agricultural 
trade by not only lobbying politicians and bureaucrats, but also by generating public 
support. For example, N6ky6 has mounted a series of successful campaigns to forge a 
"community of interests" between city consumers and rural producers, playing on fear of 
fear of presence of food additives and agricultural chemical in imported foods. As a 
result, farmers received support from a broad rage of social circles including consumer 
organizations, such as the Housewives' Association with its four million members. The 
community support added more strength to the farmers' social network aimed at 
protecting agricultural interests.68 
In this respect, the unity between the Japanese and their nationalist belief, which 
is a result of the influence of Confucianism, is a contributing factor, with regard to the 
development of the political power of Japanese rice farmers and the Nokyo at the national 
level. This factor is combined with the understanding that the Japanese have, with regard 
to the importance of maintaining the supply of rice. This is because of the inadequate 
supply of rice experienced by the Japanese after the Second World War, and in addition, 
the decline in the number of rice farmers, after the successful redevelopment of Japan 
after the war. Many rice farmers in Japan, stay within the agricultural sector because of 
66 Suphaphan Plengmaneepun (1999) 'Rice Desserts Among Ways to Boost Prices', Bangkok Post (Internet 
Edition), 4 January 1999, at www.bangkokpost.netl040199/040199_Business03.html Retrieved on 18 
January 1999 . 
67 Ohnuki-Tierney, E. (1993) Rice as Self: Japanese Identities Through Time, New Jersey: Pnnceton 
University Press, p.9 
68 Zhao, Q. (1995) Japanese Policymaking: The Politics Behind Politics, Informal Mechanisms and the 
Making of China Policy, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, p.35 
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the government's incentive policy. In 2001, the Japanese government paid '¥ 21,000 per 
1,000 sq. meters of rice paddy on condition that farming continues for five years. ,69 
In contrast, Thai people have never experienced the problem of inadequate 
supply, with regard to rice, and accordingly, both the Thai people and the their 
government do not need to consider this problem, regardless of whether the economic 
and social welfare of rice farmers are considered or not. Between 1961-1991, rice 
occupied 59.72 per cent of the cultivable land, and contributed to 52.93 per cent to crop 
revenues.
70 Between 1961-1991, 48.04 per cent of rice was produced the Isan region, 
23.61 per cent of rice was produced in the central region, 22.70 per cent of rice was 
produced in the northern region, and 5.65 per cent of rice was produced in the southern 
region.7l Between 1994-1997, rice production averaged 14,128,000 tonnes, of which 
8,522,000 tonnes were for domestic consumption, and 5,572,000 tonnes were exported. 72 
This does not only suggest that rice farmers can help the country to maintain an adequate 
supply of rice, as moreover, Thailand is a leading exporter of rice in the world market. 
Although the contribution of rice to the Thai economy is significant, this has not 
been converted into empowering rice farmers to fully participate within the Thai political 
arena, and this is because as a group, they are scattered across the country. Therefore, the 
geographical dislocation of the rice farmers could contribute to the explanation of why 
there is an absence of rice farmers' interest groups at the national level, in Thailand. 
However, this factor becomes less relevant, when the success of the rice farmers' group 
formation at the national level, in Japan is considered, because rice farmers in Japan, like 
in Thailand, are not concentrated within any particular region of the country. In Japan, of 
the estimated 3.64 million farms, approximately 2.83 million or 80 per cent, are rice 
69 The Nikkei Weekly, 29 January 2001 
70 Sompom Isvilanonda and Nipon Poapongsakom (1995) Rice Supply and Demand in Thailand: The 
Future Outlook Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute [TDRI], p.33 
71 ' Ibid., p.36 
72 Economic Research Service, USDA (1999) International Agricultural Baseline Projections to 
2007IAER-767, Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture [USDA], p.64 
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farms, which are scattered throughout the country.73 In this respect, the role of powerful 
farmers' interest groups, like the Nokyo, and in addition, the advanced communication 
systems available in Japan, can provide some explanation as to the irrelevance of 
geographical factors, with regard to the political influence of Japanese farmers. 
Godwin argues that, 'When it come to mobilizing citizens for grassroots lobbying, 
the telephone becomes important.' 74 The degree of access to technology for rice farmers 
in Thailand is very low, when compared to farmers generally within Japan and the United 
Kingdom. With regard to the United Kingdom, the NFU has its own website. Japanese 
and Western farmers can access telephones, computers and the Internet, in order to 
advance both their group formation and group sustainability. In Thailand only the middle 
class and well-educated people within the urban areas use such advanced communication 
technology commonly. Being unable to utilise such technology is the obstacle to the co-
operation of rice farmers at the national level. 
The argument concerning the relationship between the geographical concentration 
of farmers and their political participation is supported by the protests of rice farmers 
from the central region, between 1985-1986, which were in relation to the price of rice. 
According to Apichai and Montri75, the protest involving 1,500 rice farmers against the 
rice policy of the Prem government, began on 9 December 1985, and was held in front of 
the Provincial Hall in the province of Suphanburi. 
The Chart Thai Party, an opposition party, had played a significant role in 
mobilising this action. The Chart Thai Party announced to its farming constituency on 24 
December 1985 that the party would pressure Koson Krairiksh, the Minister of 
Commerce, to resign as a result of his failure to solve problems, with regard to the price 
of rice. On 29 December 1985, more than 1,000 rice farmers from the provinces of 
73 Minagawa, Y. (1996) 'Price Policy on Rice, Wheat and Barley', in Asian Productivity Organization (ed) 
(1998) Agricultural Price Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Report of an APO Seminar 22 October-1 
l10vember 1996, Tokyo, Japan, Tokyo: Asian Producti~i~y Organization, p.68. . ., ,. 
4 Godwin, R.K. (1992) 'Money, Technology, and PolItIcal Interests: The DIrect Marketmg of PolItIcs In 
Petracca, M.P. (ed) The Politics o/Interests: Interest Groups Transformed, Boulder: Westview Press, p.309 
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Kamphangphet, Chai Nat, Phitsanuloak, Singburi, Ang Thong, and Suphanburi, gathered 
outside the house of Prapat Pothasuthon, a Chart Thai MP of Suphanburi, in order to 
debate their political strategy. They agreed to take their protest to Bangkok, and 
consequently, on 6 January 1986, 3,000 farmers protested in the capital. As a result, 
Kosol resigned on 16 January 1986, and furthermore, this was also a contributing factor, 
with regard to the removal of the rice premium in February 198676. This protest would 
significantly damage both the stability and the popularity of the Prem government. 
The success of this protest benefited rice farmers across Thailand. Those rice 
farmers from both the central and all other regions, which did not participate in the 
protest, can be classified as free riders in accordance with Olson's group theory. 
However, what might be considered in technical economic terms to be 'free riding', is 
manifested in the Thai case, through a lack of information and resources that would allow 
rice farmers across the regions of the country to participate. Even though there are other 
factors prompting group protest, in this case rice farmers are free-riding by default rather 
than desire. 
The involvement of the MP Prapat Pothasuthon and the Chart Thai Party, 
illustrates that the political influence of the rice farmers in the central region, was not 
only a result of their geographical concentration, but in addition, that the role of 
politicians is also important. This example does not only reveal the political influence of 
rice farmers, as moreover, this also reveals how the Chart Thai Party could mobilise the 
collective action of rice farmers for the mutual benefit of both the rice farmers and 
themselves. A significant contributing factor, with regard to the success of the Chart Thai 
Party in mobilising the collective action of rice farmers, is the involvement of and its 
strong connections with phu mi itthiphon and jao pho. However, in 1991, the Police 
Department blacklisted 6 Chart Thai Party MPs, because of their status asjao pho.77 
75 Apichai Puntasen and Montri lenwitthayakan (1988) Kanmuang ruangkhao: nayobai, praden, lae 
kwamkadyang (Rice Politics: Policies, Issues and Conflicts), Bangkok [in Thai], pp.53-55 
76 Ibid. 
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It is questionable whether the interests of the rice farmer constituencies were a 
priority for the Chart Thai Party, because Thai people generally recognise that for its 
success, this party is mainly reliant on vote-buying, and is known to be corrupt. 
According to the research of Pasuk and Sungsidh78, with regard to public attitudes 
towards corruption, 53.5 per cent answered by naming the Chart Thai Party, when asked 
the question: 'Thinking of corruption what political party do you think of?' In the general 
elections of 24 July 1988, the Chart Thai Party won the most seats, with 87 of the 357 
seats in the House of Representatives, and formed a coalition government under Prime 
Minister Chatichai between August 1988 - February 1991.79 It became evident that the 
Chart Thai Party had abused the collective power of the rice farmers in the central region, 
in order to form a government, as Thai politicians recognise that being an opposition 
party can only damage both their patronage networks and their potential for corruption. 
According to Apichai8o, the Chatichai government did not promote any policies that 
would benefit rice farmers or any other farmers groups, because the government had to 
primarily consider the many business interest groups, which were involved, since they 
were the financial backers of the Chart Thai Party. 
In June 2000, the media questioned the allocation of 11.60 billion baht on the 
paddy silos project, because more than half of the proposed sites of the project were in 
the central region of Thailand, within the constituencies of the Chart Thai Party. The 
Minister of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, Prapat Pothasuthon, the Chat Thai 
Party MP from the province of Suphanburi, had played a significant role in pushing this 
project forward. The MOAC had planned to build 66 paddy silos in 24 provinces. 'Of 
these, 31 costing 5.5 billion baht will be allocated in 20 provincial strongholds of the 
77 Sombat Chantornvong (2000) 'Local Godfathers in Thai Politics', in McVey, R. (ed) Money & Power in 
Provincial Thailand, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS] and Silkwonn Books, p.6.3 
78 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan (1994) Corruption & Democracy in Thailand, ChIang 
Mai: Silkworm Books, p.157 
79 Chart Thai Party, at www.chartthai.or.thlhistorylhist7-6.html [in Thai] Retrieved on 28 March 2003 
80 Apichai Puntas en (1996), p.128 
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Chart Thai Party. Suphan Buri, in particular, will have eight silos the most of any 
province, costing 1.3 billion baht. ,81 
The Chart Thai Party claimed that this project would benefit rice farmers, because 
they could then store their rice when the price goes down, in order to sell when the price 
goes up. However, not many rice farmers can afford to delay the sale of their rice, 
because of the problem of liquidity. They must normally sell their rice at the best current 
market price, immediately after the rice has been harvested. 82 Accordingly, the Chuan 
Government rejected this project on 11 July 2000, with Prime Minister Chuan arguing 
that the project was unnecessary and that its cost was too high. 83 During this period, it 
was estimated that Thailand was utilising only 50-60 per cent of its existing silo storage 
capacity, and accordingly, there was no shortage of storage space for rice. 84 
Furthermore, this project had by-passed the regular approval procedures. The 
MOAC pushed ahead with the project without consulting relevant agencies, including the 
Rice Committee, the Ministry of Finance, the Budget Bureau and the NESDB. 
Regulation demands that every government investment project costing more than 500 
million baht must be first examined by the NESDB.85 With reference to this situation, if 
the project had started, construction companies with strong links to the Chart Thai Party 
would benefit more than the intended beneficiaries, the rice farmers would. 
If there existed a well-organised and politically motivated rice farmers group, they 
would have the opportunity to benefit from the support of the Chart Thai Party. As is 
observed in the case study of the SCP A and in addition, its links with the Thailand 
Sugarcane Planter Federation, sugarcane farmers can utilise their connections with phu 
81 Phusadee Arunmas and Wichit Sirithaveeporn (2000) 'Silo Sites Fuel Suspicion of Political Bias', 
Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 22 July 2000, at www.bangkokpost.netl220600/220600_Business01.html 
Retrieved on 11 July 2000 
82 Phusadee Arunmas and Wi chit Sirithaveeporn (2000) 
83 Chatrudee Theparat, Phusadee Arunmas, and Pradit Ruangdit (2000) 'Chart Thai Silo Scheme Lies in 
Ruins, Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 11 July 2000, at 
www.bangkokpost.netitodayI110700_News01.html Retrieved on 11 July 2000 
84 Kazmin, A.L. (2000) 'Thailand Rice Silo Plan Under Fire', Financial Time, 22 June 2000, pA2 
85 Chatrudee Theparat, Phusadee Arunmas, and Pradit Ruangdit (2000) 
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mi itthiphon and jao pho and in addition, elite bureaucrats and politicians, in order to 
further their own objectives. The rice farmers protest in 1985-1986 was an example of a 
temporary rice farmers group, formed on an ad hoc basis, without the continuing 
development associated with the formation of a more influential farmers' interest group, 
and this because of their political weakness. In this respect, if the MP of the constituency 
of the NRGMR were more supportive, with regard to their political participation, then 
this would significantly advance the political participation of the NRGMR at the national 
level. Consequently, their status of potential pressure participant could progress to that of 
interest group, which would allow them to develop their own policy community between 
themselves and elite bureaucrats and politicians, and this was experienced in the case of 
the SCP A and with other sugarcane farmers groups. Furthermore, the meeting between 
the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the representatives of the 
NRGMR, which was outlined in Chapter 4, implies the existence of a loose policy 
network between the NRGMR and the government. However, progression to the 
development of a closed and stable policy community, which could produce tangible 
benefits through influencing government would be the next stage, with regard to the 
advancing political status of the NRGMR. 
The research has confirmed that at the sub-governmental level of the Rice Policy 
Committee or Kor Nor Khor (Kana kammakan nayobai khao), no rice farmers interest 
groups are involved. The Rice Policy Committee is responsible for all policies relating to 
rice, and their remit includes authority, with regard to price guarantees and price 
subsidies, and assistance to rice farmers, with regard to the production of rice. The Rice 
Policy Committee is under the direct supervision of the Department of Internal Trade, 
within the Ministry of Commerce. During the Chuan government between September 
1992 - May 1995, the policy of agricultural development was very much concerned 
about price stability, with regard to agricultural products. The government acknowledged 
that the problems, with regard to price fluctuations and marketing are the most significant 
for farmers. 86 
86 Department of Internal Trade (2000) Khana kammakan nayobai khao (The Rice Committees), 
Department oflnternal Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Bangkok [Pamphlet in Thai], pp.3-4 
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According to the report from the Rice Policy Committee of 14 December 1999, 
committee members consisted entirely of elite bureaucrats and politicians, in addition to 
other government officials. The main actors include one of the Deputy Prime Ministers, 
who acts as chairman of the committee, also the Minister of Agriculture and Co-
operatives, and in addition the Minister of Commerce who acts as an assistant to the 
chairman.87 Within this system, there is the potential for the elite bureaucrats and 
politicians to overtly influence the Rice Policy Committee, in order to benefit rice 
exporters who are within their patronage network, whilst the interests of farmers are 
forgotten. This implies the adverse impact of concentrated political power within the Thai 
political arena. 
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87 Secretariat Department of Rice Committee (1999) Akasarn prakorb Kam Prachum Khana Kummakam 
Nayobai Khao Krungtee 112543: Document for Rice Committee's meeting 111999, 22 March 1999, at the 
Ministry of Commerce, Secretariat Bangkok: Department of Rice Committee [Unpublished Document ill 
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209 
It has been argued that the involved actors within the Rice Policy Committee are 
elite bureaucrats and politicians, and other government officials, which implies a limited 
access to the committee for extra-bureaucratic groups. However, the patronage network 
specifically between the involved actors within the Rice Policy Committee with rice 
exporters and rice millers, is a form of policy community, enabling access to the policy-
makers, and this is a requirement for being able to significantly influence the decision 
making process of the government. 
Figure 5-5 illustrates that with the exception of rice farmers, every actor within 
the policy community of rice enjoys a reciprocal relationship, with two-way 
communications between actors. Indeed, with the example, which has been established, 
the policy community between rice exporters and government, specifically the Ministry 
of Commerce in particular, since the 1930s. This actual relationship has continued to 
develop, because rice exporters recognise that the Ministry of Commerce has played an 
important role in manipulating the price of rice, information, which they hope to obtain, 
and additionally, in terms of the government, rice exporters have information, which they 
need. Ammar and Suthad argue that: 
At the very least, this ministry is the most important source of information 
concerning future price movements. Exporters on the inside track can obtain this 
information, and stand to gain very substantial rewards. On the other hand, bureaucrats in 
the ministry needed information from traders, because most government measures were 
directed at the export point and because in its G_to_G88 business the government had to 
keep tabs on what was going on in the private trade. Given this mutual need for 
information, the only choice the Ministry faced was whether the consultations should be 
formal--with the Rice Exporters' Association--or informal--with a favoured subset of 
exporters. Regardless of the choice, the result was that the decision-making process 
enabled export traders to have a disproportionate say in the formulating of policies. 89 
In 1995, rice exporters rather than rice farmers felt the benefits of the government 
policy of preventing the second paddy price from falling. The government agreed to 
award US$ 10 per tonne as compensation to exporters of medium and low quality rice, 
88 G-to-G refers to Government to Government 
89 Ammar Siamwalla and Suthad Setboonsarng (1989), pp. 57-58 
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whilst there was no compensation paid at all to rice farmers. 9o The compensation scheme 
was used as an incentive for rice exporters to buy medium and low quality rice, in order 
to increase the domestic price of the rice. 
Indeed, the exporters had already gained from the increases in the export volumes 
of medium and low quality rice from Thailand to many countries in Asia, including the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, especially after the economic crisis in Asia, which 
began in Thailand in July 1997. Consequently, '25 per cent broken rice', costing US$ 250 
per tonne, became more popular in these countries. Demand for fragrant rice, which cost 
US$ 500 per tonne declined, because the purchasing power of these export destinations 
significantly declined in the aftermath of the crisis. In the first eight months of 1998, 
Thailand exported 1.168 million tonnes of '25 per cent broken rice' to Indonesia and 
142,792 tonnes to the Philippines. Before the financial crisis, the Philippines was mostly 
importing the higher-grade '5 per cent broken rice' from Thailand.91 The percentage of 
rice, which has been damaged during the milling process, refers to the grade of the rice. 
With regard to the study of Apichai, in figure 5-5, he includes the role of kamnan 
and phuyaiban between rice millers and rice farmers. However, the research has found 
that many rice mills are own by kamnan and phuyaiban, and accordingly the research has 
classified them under the same category. Moreover, rice farmers have established a 
higher level of direct contact with rice millers than previously experienced. Therefore, 
rice trading at the local level suggests the diminishing role for kamnan and phuyaiban. 
According to the case study, the NRGMR have recognised that the rice millers have been 
acting as middlemen within the rice market. This does still adversely affect them, because 
rice mills continue to minimise their purchase price. 
It has been observed that rice mills, which are owned by kamnan or jao phD, are 
as politically powerful as rice exporters, within the policy community of rice. This is 
90 Somporn Thapanachai (1995) 'Farmers' Group Proposes System of Benefit Sharing', Bangkok Post, 23 
March 1995, p.20 
211 
because certain large rice mills owned by kamnan or jao pho can indicate the price of rice 
in the domestic market, for example, Borisat Chaophraya ta reu kamnan trong chumkad 
or Ta khao kamnan Trong, owned by kamnan Trong Ongchaiwattana, in the province of 
Nakhon Sawan. The Department of Internal Trade, which is responsible for regulating the 
price of all agricultural products, including rice, applies the price of rice at the Ta khao 
kamnan Trong as one of the standard prices for domestic rice trading, because this mill is 
one of the main centres for the domestic rice market. 92 
In general, rice farmers are individually too weak to bargain for higher prices 
from the rice mills. This is not only because they are politically weak and without well-
organised interest groups, but also because of their shortage of knowledge, with regard to 
the quality of their rice, with prices dependent on both quality and moisture content. 
Accordingly, there is a high level of opportunity for rice mills to suppress the prices of 
rice at the expense of rice farmers. 93 
The evidence shows that powerful rice mills, owned by kamnan or jao pho can 
obtain government subsidies for domestic rice prices more than rice farmers can. These 
subsidies are not only obtained through the low purchase prices procured from farmers 
and the subsequent sale to the government at the higher guaranteed prices, as 
furthermore, this includes advantages obtained through corruption, as a result of the 
reciprocal relationship between the rice mills and elite bureaucrats and politicians. The 
government launched an investigation, in relation to rice subsidies, after it was 
discovered that rice reported to be in storage by some mills did not exist, because the rice 
mills had not actually bought this rice from the farmers. Another incidence was the under 
reporting of excess rice, which occurred because the rice millers had bought rice from 
91 Achara Pongvutitham (1998) 'Low-grade Rice Becomes Popular', The nation (Internet Edition), 28 
August 1998, at http://203.146.51.4/nationnews/1998/199809/19980928/32362.html Retrieved on 22 
November 1998 
92 Department ofIntemal Trade, Ministry of Commerce, at www.dit.go.thlhighlightlcenter_market.htm [in 
Thai] Retrieved on 10 March 2003 
93 Interview with Mr Roon Arnaga 
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farmers at low prices and placed the rice in hidden storage. The rice millers had been 
expecting higher subsidies from the government in the future. 94 
The NRGMR is fully aware of the power of both the rice exporters and the rice 
mills. Accordingly, they have built their own rice mill, in order to solve the problem of 
having to deal with the middlemen in the rice market. However, it is not only the 
middlemen, which generate problems, with regard to rice. In order to improve their 
economic and political status, the NRGMR, in addition to other rice farmers have to more 
fully participate within the network of the rice policy-making process. This will not only 
allow them to better represent their interests more directly, with respect to the country's 
policy-makers, but in addition, it will also allow them to watch for corruption within the 
government policy relating to rice. 
5.3.2 Interactions between the Policy-makers and Sugarcane Farmers 
The sugarcane production performed poorly as an industry, when it began in the 
1920s, so perhaps surprisingly, it would later become one of the country's leading export 
products. Nevertheless, its contribution to the Thai economy remains less significant than 
rice. However, as a result of the government assistance programmes to establish 
sugarcane production during the 1920s and 1930s, resource allocation within the 
sugarcane industry is better now than within the rice industry, and this is due to its 
sustainable development. During its early development, the government acknowledged 
the importance of the sugarcane industry. As a result in 1937, the government established 
Thailand's first sugarcane mill, in the province of Lampang.95 
In 1942, the government established a second mill, which was in the province of 
Uttaradit, and in addition, the Thai Export Promotion Co., Ltd was established. This 
company was firstly under responsibility of both the Ministry of Industry and the 
Ministry of Finance, when in 1947 it was transferred to the direct supervision of the Thai 
94 Bangkok Post, 3 April 2001, p. 1 
95 Bertrand, T. (1980), p.53 
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Sugar Organisation, within the Ministry of Industry. The Thai Sugar Organisation was 
responsible for the co-operation between the public and private sectors, with regard to 
sugarcane production, and in 1953, the Thai Sugar Industry Co., Ltd was established, 
with responsibility for the import and export of sugar. 96 
A considerable increase in the number of sugarcane mills in the late 1950s, led to 
the excess supply of sugarcane within the domestic market. Accordingly, the Office of 
Sugar Industry Support Fund was established through the Sugar Industry Act B.E. 2504 
(1961), in order to manage the problem of excess supply. The Sugar Act B.E. 2511 
(1968), enabled the Ministry of Industry to establish the Office of Cane and Sugar with 
responsibilities for administering the production of sugarcane by the farmers, processing 
by the mills, and in addition, the general marketing of sugar.97 However, the Sugar Act 
B.E. 2511 (1968) did not benefit the sugarcane farmers, because the sugarcane industry 
was already monopolised by the sugarcane mills. 
The policy community, which had been established between sugarcane mills and 
the government, had existed since the 1960s. Ammar and Suthad argue, that 'From 1961 
to 1968, the government's major interest was to protect the sugar industry--which meant, 
essentially, sugar mills. Cane growers were supposed to reap benefits indirectly by selling 
to the mills. ,98 The sugarcane mills rather than the price in the world market controlled 
the domestic prices for sugarcane and this meant that the conflict over price between the 
sugarcane farmers and mills remained unresolved. This was because the Sugar Industry 
Act B.E. 2504 (1961) and the Sugar Act B.E. 2511 (1968), were drafted before the policy 
community between sugarcane farmers groups and the government was established. In 
order to resolve conflicts between the sugarcane farmers and mills, the government 
introduced the 70:30 revenue-sharing system in 1982 (see box 4-1, in Chapter 4), and 
promulgated the Sugarcane and Sugar Act B.E. 2527 (1984). The act was established, in 
order to legitimise the operation of all of the involved actors within the sugarcane 
96 Office of the Cane and Sugar Board (1999a), Cane and Sugar Industry in Thailand: 1998-99, Bangkok: 
Office of the Cane and Sugar Board, Ministry of Industry, pp.7-8 
97 Office of the Cane and Sugar Board (1999a), pp. 7-8 
98 Ammar Siamwalla and Suthad Setboonsamg (1989), p.87 
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industry. This brought about substantial restructuring and strict controls to the sugarcane 
industry of Thailand, and led to it becoming one of Thailand's most efficiently and well 
. d' d . 99 orgamse III ustnes. 
The development of the sugarcane industry in Thailand was achieved through 
highly involved government intervention, which is not a unique case within southeast 
Asia, because, with respect to two other major producers of sugarcane, namely Indonesia 
and the Philippines, government intervention is also highly involved.lOo Substantial 
government intervention has contributed to the successful development of the industry 
across Thailand, which is now in the top five of the worlds leading exporters of 
sugarcane. IOI Within the sugarcane industry, government intervention has not suppressed 
the role of sugarcane farmers groups, as has been experienced in other industries within 
the agricultural sector of Thailand. Rather, the 70:30 revenue sharing system and the 
Sugarcane and Sugar Act B.E. 2527 (1984), have positively impacted, with regard to the 
political participation and influence of sugarcane farmers, as it is illustrated in figure 5-5. 
Unlike other farmers in Thailand, sugar cane farmers are extremely well 
organized ... they have pressured governments to maintain the price of sugarcane well 
above the price it would receive from world markets. They have even forced 
organizational changes upon government ministers in order to accommodate their 
needs. 102 
In this respect, RamsayI03 uses the political influence of sugarcane farmers groups 
to challenge the dominant idea of 'bureaucratic polity', which was introduced by Riggs, 
in order to explain the Thai political environment of the 1960s. This is because the 
bureaucratic polity suggests the absence of the role for interest groups within the network 
of policy-making process, whereas sugarcane farmers groups have played a significant 
role in this regard. Ramsay concludes that the bureaucratic polity has failed to adequately 
explain this scenario, because sugarcane farmers groups have emerged as powerful 
insiders within the network of sugarcane policy-making process. He highlights that the 
99 Interview with Mr Rachai Chusilpkul 
100 Acosta, L. (1998) The Impact of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) on Selected Agricultural Products in 
ASEAN Countries, Frankfurt: Pete Lang, pAl 
101 Interview with Mr Vithet Yamprayoon 
101 
. Ramsay, A. (1987), p.248 
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emergence of sugarcane farmer groups has contributed to a more pluralistic Thai political 
arena. Sugarcane farmers have been able to share in the power, which has historically 
been concentrated amongst the elite bureaucrats and politicians. 
Rachai Chusilpkul104, the Secretary-General of the Thailand Sugarcane Planters 
Federation, was invited to participate in the drafting process of the Sugarcane and Sugar 
Act B.E. 2527, when nominated by one of the political parties, in order to represent 
sugarcane farmers in providing information, with regard to the sugarcane industry. There 
were other sugarcane farmers' representatives in the drafting process of the Act, because 
the government invited sugarcane farmers from various groups to participate. The 
expectation of the government for representatives of sugarcane farmers groups to take a 
consultative role, enables sugarcane farmer groups to establish their insider status within 
the network of the sugarcane policy-making process, because 'governmental policy 
makers need groups to facilitate the formulation of a workable and effective policy.,105 
Accordingly, the policy community between sugarcane farmers groups and the 
government is established. 
In this regard, the formation of the policy communities between government and 
sugarcane farmers groups in Thailand reflects what Smith has observed in relation to the 
formation of the policy community between the NFU and the British government. 'When 
the government increasingly began to intervene in agriculture, it was the NFU that it 
looked for advice and support. The relationship between the farmers and the MAF 
became increasingly institutionalized. ,106 Nevertheless, in Thailand, the patronage system 
appears to be an important element, which facilitates interest groups to be able to form an 
effective policy community, as was observed in the relationship between Rachai and one 
of the political parties. This effect has significantly improved both the political 
103 Ib'd 1 ., pp.248-267 
104 Interview with Mr Rachai Chusilpkul 
105 Maloney, W.A., Jordan, G. and McLaughlin, A.M. (1994), p.36 
106 Smith, M.l. (1992) 'The Agricultural Policy Community: Maintaining a Closed Relationship', in Marsh, 
D. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (eds) Policy Networks in British Government, New York: Oxford University Press, 
p.37 
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participation and influence of both the Thailand Sugarcane Planters Federation and the 
SCPA. 
During the drafting process of the Sugarcane and Sugar Act B.E. 2527, problems, 
with regard to the experiences of the sugarcane farmers were presented to the 
government, in order to appeal for a more favourable policy. The representatives of the 
sugarcane farmers' groups argued that the Act should provide elements ensuring that 
sugarcane farmers would not be exploited. Sugarcane farmers agree that the Act provided 
considerable improvements in the benefits available to sugarcane farmers, and the 
political participation of sugarcane farmers at the national level has been significantly 
enhanced, as is illustrated in figure 5-6. 
Figure 5-6 outlines the network of the sugarcane policy-making process, with five 
sugarcane policy communities. In each sugarcane policy community, there are a number 
of involved sugarcane farmers representatives, which enables sugarcane farmers to 
develop their insider status as an interest group within the network of the sugarcane 
policy-making process. In the 'Cane and Sugar Board', which is the highest ranked board 
within the network, there are 9 representatives of sugarcane farmers, 5 government 
officials and 4 representatives from the sugarcane mills. Sugarcane farmers have gained 
this privileged representation from the government, because of their successful appeal to 
the government, which argued that as they are not as well-educated as the representatives 
of the sugarcane mills, they need more representation, in order to help in the 
negotiations. 107 
107 Interview with Mr Rachai Chusilpkul 
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Figure 5-6 Structure of Sugarcane Industry Policy-making Process 
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However, the government bureaucracy presents challenges to the successful 
operation of network of the sugarcane policy-making process. As is represented in figure 
5-6, the Cane and Sugar Board is responsible to three ministries, namely the MOAC, the 
Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Industry. Often these three ministries disagree 
with the direction of the policy, which is recommended by the Cane and Sugar Board. 108 
In the wake of the economic crisis of 1997, the Cane and Sugar Board submitted 
proposals for a price increase in domestic sugar, which would in tum bring about an 
increase in the price of sugarcane. In response to this proposal, the Minister of 
Commerce, Supachai Panichapakdi of the Democraticrat Party disagreed with this 
proposal, arguing that the price of domestic sugar would not be increased, because this 
would make consumers unhappy. The Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Pongpol 
Adireksarn of the Chart Thai Party would neither agree nor disagree with this proposal, 
whereas the Minister of Industry, Somsak Thepsuthin of the Social Action Party agreed 
to the proposal to increase the price of domestic sugar. 109 
With reference to this issue, the power of elite politicians within the network of 
the sugarcane policy-making process remains substantial. Accordingly, sugarcane 
farmers groups find that personal connections are still an important element in their 
political strategy of enhancing their insider status, as is observed within the SCP A. 
Formal negotiations do not always bring about agreements between sugarcane farmers 
groups and sugarcane mills, particularly, with regard to the negotiations, in respect of the 
sugarcane prices. The SCP A argues that in many cases the personal connections, which 
they have with elite bureaucrats and politicians enables them to achieve their objectives 
more effectively. 11 0 
On occasIOn, actors outside the sugarcane policy community can use their 
personal connections, in order to successfully influence elite politicians, involved in the 
sugarcane policy community. This includes, for instance, the business groups who have 
108 Interview with Mr Vithet Yamprayoon 
109 Supara Janchitfah (1998) 'Sweet Business Turns Sour', Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 22 February 
1998,at www.bkkpost.samart.co.thlnewslBpachiveIBP19980222/220298_Perspective01.htmIRetrieved on 
22 july 2000 
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been playing a significant role within the Thai political arena. Sugarcane fanners have 
argued that the government has fixed the price of domestic sugar at a low level, in order 
to benefit the soft drink and condensed milk businesses rather than the ordinary 
consumers, because some elite politicians have strong connections with these business 
groupS.Ill Every year, the soft drink industry uses approximately 120,000 tonnes or 43 
per cent of the total consumption of sugarcane used in industrial production. II2 If the 
price of sugar was higher, this would generate an increase in income for sugarcane 
farmers. I13 This implies the power of elite bureaucrats and politicians over the sugarcane 
policy community as a result of the patronage system. Accordingly, the idea of 
bureaucratic polity is not totally invalid. 
Ramsayl14acknowledges the existence of political patronage within the sugarcane 
industry in Thailand. His study highlights that many MPs in the House of Representatives 
are sugarcane planters. Moreover, several large-scale sugarcane fanners and millers are 
significant financial sources for political parties. In the general elections of January 2001, 
Pracha Phothipipit or kamnan Sia, who had been the president of the SCPA since 1999, 
was initially elected as a Democrat Party MP. However, he was accused of winning 
through vote-buying, with the Election Commission 'yellow-carding' him, with regard to 
his future conduct, and the election for constituency five in the province of Kanchanaburi 
was re-balloted. However, there were further elections that year, as subsequent and 
similar claims continued to re-emerge against kamnan Sia. 115 Accordingly, it can be 
argued that the political influence of interest groups within the sugarcane industry was 
enhanced by the existence of bureaucratic polity and the patronage system. The 
bureaucratic polity thesis is still partially relevant to Thai politics, although it has failed 
to explain the existence of interest groups within the sugarcane industry. 
110 Interview with Mr Naradhip Anantasuk 
III Interview with Mr Rachai Chusilpkul 
112 Prayong Nettayarak (1992) Anakot utsahakam oiy lae numtan Thai (The Future a/Thai Sugarcane and 
Sugar Industry), Bangkok: Thailand Research Development Institute [TDRI], p.23 
113 Interview with Mr Rachai Chusilpkul 
114 Ramsay, A. (1987), p.257-256 
115 Bangkok Post, (Internet Edition), 8 June 2001, at 
WWW.bangkokpost.netielection2001/june2001/08060 1 c.html Retrieved on 20 June 2003 
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According to the experiences of sugarcane farmers' groups, the patronage system 
remains highly relevant, with respect to interest groups operating effectively within the 
Thai political arena. Sugarcane farmers groups have acknowledged the Thai political 
culture of both the patronage system and money politics. They are aware of what they 
need to do, in order to achieve their objectives. Thus, their demands are not out of reach 
for them. 
5.3.3 Interactions between the Policy-makers and Potato Farmers 
At national level, potato production is less important to the Thai economy, than 
both rice and sugarcane. Potato farmers are relatively low in numbers, and are based in 
only a few provinces in the northern region of Thailand. As a result, their political role is 
not widely recognised within the Thai political arena, even though many are represented 
by the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, a well-organised farmers group. 
Nevertheless, this farmers group was not politically formed, like for example, the SCP A. 
The formation of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd was intended 
to obtain a greater supply of potato seedlings from the government. However, this is not 
to suggest that this was aimed at improving their negotiating power against the 
government in terms of the control over the importing of potato seedlings. Rather, this 
farmers group was established because government regulation requires that the import of 
potato seedlings must be conducted through a legally registered organisation. As a result, 
the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd had to register as a co-operative, in 
accordance with government regulation. 116 Although, it has become one of the most 
successful farmers groups in Thailand, the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd 
is not as politically influential as the SCP A. Indeed, the characteristics of the Chiang Mai 
Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd is more similar to that of the NRGMR because they 
both aim to improve their self-reliant status. 
116 Thongchai Thonguthaisri (1993) Sahakorn phup/ug munfarang Chiang Maijumkad (Chiang Mai Potat? 
Growers Co-operative Ltd), paper presented at the 1th National Vegetable Conference, 31 March - 3 Apnl 
1993, Prince of Songkhla University, the province of Songkhla, Thailand [in Thai], p.4 
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The interaction between potato farmers and policy-makers is more intense at the 
local level than at the national level. Because potato production does not have economic 
importance at the national level, the government is less attentive to their problems. 
Although the local government agencies offices have contributed to the success of the 
Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, these agencies have only played a 
promotional role, and they never interfere in the management system of the co-
. 117 
operatIve. 
That there has been no government intervention, with regard to the management 
system of the group, has actually contributed to the success of the Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd. This is because since the first farmers' co-operative was 
established in 1916118, the government has tended to playa significant role in the 
management systems of farmers' co-operatives. Ammarl19 argues that if government 
intervention had been absent from the beginning of the introduction of co-operatives in 
Thailand, Thai farmers might already have had the chance to enjoy the benefits, which 
can be achieved in farmers co-operatives, such as those experienced within the Nokyo in 
Japan. 
Although, the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd has emerged as 'the 
main organisation and all influential potato farmers are members' 120, it cannot effectively 
protect the interests of its members in the potato market. The structure of the potato 
market itself, has played a more significant role in protecting the interests of potato 
farmers though the 'farming contract system' between factories and potato farmers, and 
government intervention schemes are rarely evident. As a result, potato factories 
dominate the potato market. 
117 Interview with Miss Nongnush Puranapun 
118 O'Reilly, F.D. and McDonald, P.I. (1983) Thailand's Agriculture, Budapest: Akdemiai Kiad6, p39 
119 Interview with Professor Ammar Siamwalla 
120 b~berg, L. (1999) 'Potato Farmers' ?rg.anisation in Thailand: A discus~on on th~ prerequisites of the 
formation and survival of farmer-orgamsatIons', paper presented to the 7 InternatIOnal Conference on 
Thai Studies (4-8 July 1999), University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
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However, government intervention is clearly evident within the potato seedling 
market. In 1981, the government began to control the import of potato seedlings, in order 
to manage the excess supply of potatoes within the domestic market. Instead of benefiting 
farmers, this policy adversely affected their production. During the 1980s, potato fanners 
needed high quality potato seedlings from abroad, due to the sharp growth in the potato 
market. This immediately increased the demand for potato seedlings, however, with their 
supply being strictly controlled by the government, this dramatically increased the price 
of potato seedlings.121 Through the increased cost of production, fanners were worse off 
as a result. 
Although the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, with other potato 
farmers representatives are able to place their demands for potato seedlings to the 
government, and in addition, that some potato fanners representatives are involved within 
the potato seedling policy-making process l22, this relationship with the government can at 
most be described as a form of policy network. This is because this relationship is loosely 
formed, without a stable and closed connection, which would allow potato fanners to act 
in a more assertive way. Any demands, which are considered, are in fact accorded with 
because of the existing requirements of government legislation. 
According to figure 5-7, potato farmers are only able to act indirectly through 
farmers' co-operatives, in order to have their requirement for potato seedlings represented 
to either the government or potato chips companies. Furthermore, within the network of 
the potato seedling policy-making process, with regard to importation, farmers are not in 
the position to communicate directly with the policy-makers I23, and therefore, policy-
makers do not respond effectively to their demands for potato seedlings. Figure 5-7 
illustrates that the policy-makers in central government have absolute power to set the 
quota for imported potato seedlings l24, because the policy community between potato 
121 I . . h P I J . ntervIew WIt Mr ramua aI-ngem 
122 Interview with Mr In-om Pothacharoen 
123 Department of Agricultural Extension (2001), Potato Seedlings Importing Process,. Department of 
Agricultural Extension, the district of Sansai Office, the province of Chiang Mai, [UnpublIshed Document 
in Thai] 
124 Interview with Miss Nongnuch Puranapun 
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farmers and the government does not exist, in order to protect the interests of potato 
farmers . brnberg has argued that the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd is one 
of the most effectively organised farmers' groups, to a level, which is rarely evidenced in 
Thai politics. In terms of the implication of the network of the potato seedling policy-
making process, with regard to importation, it is clear that executive power and authority 
are concentrated within the central government and business groups. 
Figure 5-7 Structure of Potato Seedling Importation Policy-making Process 
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The Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co., with other potato chip companies, has achieved 
insider status within the network of the potato seedling policy-making process, with 
regard to importation. On 16 June 1998, the Subcommittee for Onion and Garlic, which 
is responsible for the importation of potato seedlings approved a further request, which 
was made by the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co., in order to import an additional 1,200 tonnes 
of potato seedlings. Previously, the company had requested an additional 3,048 tonnes, 
which was already an extension to the 1998 import quota of 5,750.50 tonnes. The Chiang 
Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd was approved a total of only 137.5 tonnes of 
potato seedlings for importation, whereas a total of 5,613 tonnes were shared between the 
Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. and six other potato chip companies. 125 As a consequence of the 
allocation of the quota, the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd relied on the 
Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. for extra potato seedlings. 
The dramatic expansion of the domestic market for potato chips in the late 1990s, 
led to the establishment of a policy community between the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. and 
the government, in the network of the potato seedling policy-making process, with regard 
to importation. Over this period, the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. has been attempting to 
monopolise the potato chip market of Thailand. In 1999, the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. 
bought out Mun Mun, a 20-year-old Thai brand, and spent 100 million baht on an 
advertising campaign. Consequently, the market share of the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. 
dramatically increased from 8 per cent in 1992, to over 50 per cent by 1999.126 
The role of the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. in potato production was enhanced, when 
the MOAC announced a project to increase the production of potatoes through the 
reduction of onion and garlic areas under cultivation, which aimed to reduce onion and 
garlic cultivation by 6,000 rai per year for the three years, between 1998-2000. The 
government agreed to subsidise farmers with 1,500 baht per rai in the first year after 
125 Phusadee Arunmas (1998) 'Additional Potato Import Approved: Area for Onion, Garlic Cultivation 
Reduced', Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 17 June 1998, at 
www.scoop.bangkokpost.co.thlI998/juneI998IbpI99806171170698_ ... Retrieved on 9 November 2001 
126 The Nation (Internet Edition), 20 March 1999, at 
www.nationmultimedia.com/page.arcview.php3?c1id=6&id=3770&usrses ... Retrieved on 9 November 
2001 
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joining the project. 127 The Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. along with other potato chip 
companies co-operated with the project, by providing a market for potato farmers through 
its farming contract system. In 1998, the government expected 4,369 farmers covering 
5,381 rai of land under cultivation, to join the project. 128 
The members of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd have argued 
that they are satisfied with the price of 8 baht per kilogram, which they receive from the 
Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co, through farming contract system, even though they would still 
hope for a higher price. However, through the farming contract system the farmer's sign a 
contract, which fixes the price regardless of the demand or supply in the market, during 
the harvest. Consequently, potato farmers cannot expect a higher price in years when 
demand exceeds supply. 129 
With reference to the price conflicts between the sugarcane farmers and sugarcane 
mills, which led to the formation of the SCPA, in contrast, there is no collective action by 
potato farmers groups, which can be observed against the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. The 
best explanation for this is that the price, which is offered by the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. 
is reasonable and in accordance with the market price. This is in clear distinction to the 
case of the sugarcane farmers, because until the introduction of the 70:30 revenue-sharing 
system, the price could be determined by sugarcane mills, regardless of the market price. 
Problems, with regard to fluctuating potato prices, are not significant enough, in 
order to mobilise the collective action of farmers against the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. 
However, in general terms, the farming contract system with the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. 
is favourable, because potato farmers have argued that 'The company has guaranteed the 
prices of products and given us support to find credit from the banks.' 130 In this respect, it 
127 Department of Agriculture (1999) 'Krongkan lodphuentee ~lug ho~ houyai lae kratium ~ueplug 
munfarang todtan pee 2542 (The Reduction of Onion and Ga:hc Cultivated Areas f~r IncreasI~g. the 
Production of Potatoes Project)" paper for Farmers Training ProJect, Department of AgrIculture, MInIstry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives [in Thai], p.7 
128 Phusadee Arunmas (1998) 
129 I . . h M W h' L . nterview WIt r anc at at 
130 Suphaphan Plengmaneepun (1998) 'Potatoes Thrive on Boom in Chips Sales' Bangkok Post (Internet 
Edition), 16 November 1998, at 
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is worth noting the argument of Ammar131 , with regard to the general conflict over the 
prices of agricultural products. He maintains that even when the prices of agricultural 
products are higher than would be the case when the price is artificiaIIy suppressed, and 
the price is in accordance with the market price, farmers remain unsatisfied and continue 
to demand higher prices. 
The monopoly power of the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. within the domestic market, 
is not the only contributing factor, with regard to the political weakness of potato farmers. 
Indeed, it can be argued that this weakness as a consequence of government policy 
failures in providing technical assistance to farmers. It has been argued that the 
government has introduced new crops to farmers, without first providing adequate 
technical assistance to farmers. Accordingly, potato farmers have tended to rely on the 
technical assistance provided by the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co., and chaIIenging the 
company would be very risky for them. 
There are no phu mi itthiphon or jao pho involved with the Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd protecting the interests of potato farmers, in contrast to 
observations, with regard to the SCP A. In this respect, the absence of both a patronage 
network and a role for phu mi itthiphon or jao pho, can be perceived to be a contributing 
factor, with regard to the difficulties experienced in forming a policy community between 
potato farmers and the government. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The Thai government's emphasis on its policy of industrialisation, whilst the 
majority of the population are stiII employed within the agricultural sector, has led to an 
imbalance in the development of the Thai economy. This has increased the income 
disparity between people in rural and urban areas. However, this has not only affected 
fanners in terms of economic status, as in addition, this has also adversely affected the 
http://scoop.bangkokpost.co.thlbkkpostl1998/november 1998/bp 19981116/161 ... Retrieved on 9 November 
2001 
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level of political participation for farmers, preventing them from participating within the 
network of the policy-making process at the national level, in order to protect their 
interests. Low household incomes mean that farmers have a restricted access to 
education, whilst the government considers educational qualifications to be an important 
factor in justifying the involvement of actors within the network of the policy-making 
process. 
The absence of farmers within the network of the policy-making process suggests 
that government and business groups can maintain their policy community, which is 
closed to outside actors, in order to protect their reciprocal interests. With reference to 
this, the existence of both a corrupt Thai political culture and patronage system has 
played a significant role, with regard to enhancing the policy community between 
government and businessmen. Consequently, the government intervention within the 
agricultural sector tends to impact negatively rather than positively, with regard to its 
development, as has been observed for instance, in rice subsidy policies. 
In the Thai political context, the patronage system is a main factor in both the 
formation and operation of the policy community, whilst corruption permeates its very 
existence. This factor, with regard to the Thai case, means that the formation of the policy 
community differs from the original concept, which was developed in the United 
Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, the agricultural policy community was established 
with an interdependence of resources between the NFU and the government. The NFU 
co-operated with the government in providing specific agricultural information, in order 
to help to achieve favourable policy outcomes for British farmers. Smith asserts that 'The 
government in Britain created the agricultural policy community when it wanted an 
interventionist agricultural policy. In so doing, it made farmers a powerful group.' 132 
In the Thai political context, the most important resource needed, in order to 
either establish interest groups or to gain access to the policy community, is economic 
131 Interview with Professor Ammar Siamwalla 
132 Smith, MJ. (1992), p.49 
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status. Therefore, an agricultural policy community can be established, when a particular 
group of elite bureaucrats or politicians and their business clients can achieve reciprocal 
benefits, with regard to specific policy outcomes, and this can explain the limited 
formation of influential farmers groups in Thailand. In this respect, any help given to 
farmers is usually a by-product of the actions of the policy community, as evidenced for 
example, by the increase in the import of potato seedlings in 1998, which was requested 
by the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co. 
With regard to the political participation of rice, sugarcane and potato farmers 
groups, a policy community between farmers groups and government can only observed, 
with reference to sugarcane farmers, who are involved with phu mi itthiphon and jao pho 
and their connections with elite bureaucrats and politicians. Nevertheless, the existence of 
the policy community between sugarcane farmers groups and the government has greatly 
contributed to the political influence of sugarcane farmers groups in Thailand, and their 
privileged status. This process has allowed sugarcane farmers to effectively utilise insider 
strategies, with respect to the government, and this has helped sugarcane farmers groups 
to avoid the costs incurred in protesting. The evidence has shown that the insider 
strategies, which the sugarcane farmers have adopted, are both through formal and 
informal connections with the government. 
In terms of the cases of rice and potato farmers groups, the research has not 
uncovered, with reference to either group, a policy community relationship with the 
government. However, this is not only because they are politically inactive, as the 
absence of phu mi itthiphon and jao pho and their personal connections with elite 
bureaucrats and politicians, is also regarded as an important factor. Indeed, both the 
NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, as revealed in the case 
studies, have shown a greater tendency to self-reliance, rather than of attaching their 
fortunes to the assistance, which is inconsistently availed by the government. A higher 
degree of autonomy from government assistance reduces their reliance on the role, which 
is filled by phu mi itthiphon and jao pho, and is needed, in order to either establish or 
access a policy community. 
Chapter 6 Global Impacts on Thai Agriculture 
Introduction 
As Thailand is a member of the WTO and must therefore abide by its rules and 
obligations, evidently, the Thai government cannot disregard the influence of the WTO in 
relation to the policy-making process at the national level. In particular, the impact of the 
WTO on agricultural production is apparent to Thai exporters. With reference to this, the 
question is raised as to whether Thai farmers acknowledge the influence of the WTO, 
because as has now been established, there are few politically active and influential farmers 
groups at the national level, within the Thai political arena. Accordingly, this chapter will 
examine how the global impact has influenced Thai farmers and their political 
participation. The discussion will consider the impact on the trade in Thai agricultural 
products, which has resulted from domestic protectionist policies pursued by developed 
countries, and in addition, the role of Thailand within the WTO, in defending its interests 
through these multilateral trade negotiations. Furthermore, consideration will be given to 
examine how rice, sugarcane and potato farmers groups in Thailand have previously 
responded, and indeed, continue to respond to the influence of the WTO. 
However, the research has been unable to establish sufficient evidence to support an 
argument, which would suggest that the NRGMR, SCP A, or Chiang Mai Potato Growers 
Co-operative Ltd respond politically to the involvement of the WTO. Accordingly, the 
main question, with respect to the global impact on Thai farmers, is why rice, sugarcane 
and potato farmers groups are not better organised, in order to respond to the impact of the 
WTO. Accordingly, the thesis will examine the relative weaknesses in the organisational 
structures of the NRGMR, SCP A, and Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, in 
order to explain why these three farmers groups, and Thai farmers groups more generally, 
do not respond more proactively to global pressures. A comparative analysis will attempt to 
contrast the fortunes of these three farmers groups with those of both the NFU in the UK 
and the Nokyo in Japan. This is intended to reveal the distinctions, which exist between the 
various scenarios faced by farmers groups in these different countries, in relation to their 
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differing levels of political participation, helping to inform an investigation into the relative 
failure of Thai farmers groups in this regard. 
6.1 Historical Background of Thailand within the WTO 
The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT took place 
between 1973-1979, and was the first to involve Thailand, initially as an observer, before 
becoming a temporary member of the GATT in 1978, later becoming a permanent member 
in 1982. Post 1982, Thailand had a low profile within the GATT, however, its role 
increased significantly during the Uruguay Round, specifically, with regard to agricultural 
production negotiations. The profile of Thailand within the GATT was to increase because 
of the importance of agriculture to the Thai economy, and the more assertive strategies 
adopted at this time by the Thai government, which understood the significance of the 
Uruguay Round. I 
The Uruguay Round, which lasted for 8 years, between September 1986 and April 
1994, was the first time in which the agricultural sector was a main issue to be considered.2 
It was intended that developing countries would benefit from negotiations, which would 
increase market access in relation to both developed and developing countries, primarily 
through the reduction of export subsidies. Accordingly, 'the negotiations have resulted in 
four main portions of the Agreement; the Agreement on Agriculture itself; the concessions 
and commitments Members are to undertake on market access, domestic support and 
export subsidies; the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; and the 
Ministerial Decision concerning Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing 
countries. ,3 
I World Trade Organisation, at www.wto.orglenglishlthewto_e/gattmem_e.htm Retrived on 7 August 2004, 
~d Interview with Dr Ampon Kittiampon 
. Winham, G.R. (1998) 'Explanations of Developing Country Behaviour in the GATT Uruguay Round 
Negotiation', in Werner, J. (ed) World Competition: Law and Economics' Review, Vol. 21 No.3, March 
1998, Kluwer Law International, p.lll 
3 World Trade Organisation (2003) A Summary o/the Final Act o/the Uruguay Round, at 
WWW.wto.orgienglishidocs_e/legal_e/ursum_ehtm Retrieved on 6 April 2003 
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During the Uruguay Round, Thailand became a member of the Cairns Group, 
because the Thai government recognised the advantage of collective power in world trade 
negotiations. The Cairns Group is a coalition, which consists of agricultural product 
exporters from both developed and developing countries, namely Argentina, Australia, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay. In 
1992, these countries represented approximately 10 per cent of total world trade and more 
than 25 per cent of world agricultural trade. 'In the GATT context, this sort of market 
weight buys a certain amount of influence. That influence was used first to influence the 
shape of the agenda for the Uruguay Round, then to advance negotiating proposals, and 
finally to ensure that a big agricultural package acceptable to the Group could not be 
pushed off the negotiating table ... ,.4 The Cairns Group had experienced considerable 
damage resulting from the trade conflicts between the dominant powers, namely, the 
United States, the EU, and Japan, which led the dominant powers towards adopting highly 
protectionist policies. 
At the WTO multilateral trade negotiations, in relation to agricultural issues, rice 
has always been the primary concern for Thailand. The Thai government was disappointed 
with the outcome of the Uruguay Round; expecting that agricultural sector liberalisation 
would allow Thailand to export more rice to both Japan and South Korea. However, 
agricultural trade exemptions during many rounds of the GATT, allowed developed 
countries to utilise trade barriers, in order to block the establishment of formal trading 
relationships with developing countries. This was because the Agreement on Agriculture 
'also addresses many other issues of vital economic and political importance to many 
Members.,5 In this respect, the liberalisation of the domestic rice markets of Japan and 
South Korea after the Uruguay Round, would not significantly accelerate the rate of growth 
of the world rice trade. This is because both of these countries still insist on protecting their 
4 Wolfe, R. (1997) A Strategy for Thailand's Trade Diplomacy, Bangkok: Thailand Development Research 
Institute [TDRI], p.16 
5 World Trade Organisation (2003) 
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rice markets under the 'rice clause' of the GATT, which allows for a delay to the 
implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture to open up rice markets.6 
The trade issue between Thailand and the United States is in contrast to the issue 
between Thailand and Japan and South Korea, as whilst the former is one of competitive 
rivalry, the latter is one of market access. The United States has been losing its share to 
Thailand within the world rice market, since Thailand became the world's largest rice 
exporter in 1981.7 Between 1994-2002, the United States exported on average, 45.50 per 
cent of its rice production annually. 8 More than 70 per cent of the total rice production is 
long grain rice, whilst the remainder is medium and short grain rice. The production of long 
grain rice is concentrated in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Texas, 
whereas the production of medium and short grain rice is concentrated in California and 
occupies more than 95 per cent of the state's rice producing areas.9 Specifically, most of 
rice produced in California is J aponica rice, which is identical to Japanese rice, and 
consequently, Japan is the largest export market for Californian rice. 10 
In 1985, the United States passed the 'Rice Title of the Food Security Act of 1985', 
in order to subsidise rice farmers in attempting to regain the world market share, which had 
been lost to Thailand. I1 'The language of the Act (particularly Section 1165) advocated that 
the United States should reclaim specifically from Thailand, its share of the world rice 
market. .. U.S. rice exporters can compete in world markets only by increasing government 
6 Wolfe, R. (1998), p.125, and p.195 
7 Childs, N and Burdett (2000) 'The U.S. Rice Export Market', in Economic Research Service, USDA (ed) 
Rice Situation and OutlooklRCS-2000/November2000, Washington, D.C.: United States Department of 
Agriculture [USDA], p.48 
8 Economic Research Service, USDA (1999) International Agricultural Baseline Projections to 20071AER-
767, Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture [USDA], p.56 
9 Childs, N. (2001) 'World Rice Glut Keeps Lid on U.S. Prices', in Economic Research Service, USDA (ed) 
Agricultural OutlookINovember 2001, Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture [USDA], 
p.7 
10 Dyck, J., Childs, N., Ackerman, K., Skully, D., Hanson, S., Maginnis, H. and Kotschwar, L. (2000) 'Rice 
Tariffication in Japan: What Does It Mean for Trade?', in Economic Research Service, USDA (ed) 
~gricultural OutlookiApril1999, Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agric~lture ~USDA]? p.15 
Muler, K. (1995) The Political Economy of Agricultural Trade of the ASEAN Economies, Wttterschhck 
(Germany): Wehle, pp.l20-121 
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subsidies.,12 These subsidies, since instituted, have been maintained to the present time. 
Thailand has been hoping for an improvement to its competitiveness and interests within 
the world rice market, through the removal of both the domestic support and export 
subsidies within the United States, through the world trade negotiations within the WTO. 
6.2 Thai Agricultural Policy in Response to the WTO 
The establishment of the WTO was an important outcome of the conclusions to the 
Uruguay Round, where the WTO replaced the GATT. The WTO was established, in order 
to act as a forum for negotiating new trade deals, and in addition, to implement the new 
GATT agreements. Developing countries were heavily involved in the construction of the 
WTO, through their considerable interest in key areas such as agriculture, tropical products, 
and textiles and clothing, and pursued self-interest far more openly than in the previous 
rounds of the GATT. 13 The first ministerial meeting of the WTO was in December 1996, 
and most of the agenda covered issues left outstanding from the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture, relating mainly to market access, domestic support, and export 
subsidies. 14 
Thailand is co-ordinating its own trading regulations with most of the past GATT 
commitments, so as to advance its own integration into the world free trade system. 
Thailand has participated in many rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including those 
organised by regional institutions, notably, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), in addition to negotiations, which are 
organised by the GATT/WTO. Thailand now anticipates the multilateral trade negotiation 
agreements being fully implemented. 
12 Surakiart Sathirathai and Ammar Siamwalla (1987) 'GATT Law, Agricultural Trade, and Developing 
Countries: Lessons From Two Case Studies', The World Bank Economic Review, VoLl, No.4 (1987):595-
618, p.607 
13 Hoekman, B. and Kostecki, M. (1996) The Political Economy of World Trading System: From GAIT to 
WTO, Oxford University Press, pp.240-241 . 
14 Economic Research Service, USDA (1996) Agricultural Outlook/December 1996, Washmgton, D.C.: 
United States Department of Agriculture [USDA],p.18 
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Although in theory, each member country must fully implement the rulings of the 
WTD, in practice they are widely flouted. This is because member countries often find that 
certain rules are against both their national interest and against the political interest of the 
incumbent government. Consequently, countries tend to prioritise their national interests 
over their GATT/WTO commitments. With reference to the Thai agricultural policy-
making process, the impact of the WTO is especially significant, because Thailand has 
modified many of its agricultural trade policies, in order to meet its commitments with the 
WTD.15 As characterised by Wolfe: 
... the state remains important. Thai trade is influenced by the practices of 
multilateral enterprises, big international law firms, and consumer in distant market. Thai 
policy is shaped by interaction with international organisations and constrained by the 
views of global investors ... Thailand will not choose a policy of autarchy in economics or 
isolate in politics, yet it will wish to retain some policy autonomy in both domains. 16 
With regard to world agricultural trade liberalisation through the WTD, whilst 
Thailand does believe that it is a net beneficiary, with regard to certain products Thailand 
can be disadvantaged in relation to poorer countries such as Vietnam. The main factors 
include the improvement to domestic market access, the competitiveness of certain 
agricultural products produced by other countries, and the higher labour costs of Thailand 
when compared to certain other countries. 
Agricultural products from Thailand can be less competitive within the world 
market, when compared for instance to Vietnam, which has already become a main 
competitor in the medium and low quality rice market, and it is additionally moving its 
emphasis to the high quality rice market. Indeed by 1994, Vietnam had taken over from 
Thailand as the major importer to South Africa of medium quality rice, which is most 
popular there. 17 According to figure 6-1, Vietnamese rice exports steadily increased, from 
2,308,000 tonnes in 1994 to 3,500,000 tonnes in 1997. The volume of rice exports from 
Vietnam is projected to increase to 3,986,000 tonnes by 2007, which will maintain 
15 Interview with Dr Ampon Kittiampon 
16 Wolfe, R. (1997), pp.6-7 
17 Barnes, W. (1994) 'Thailand Wants Quality, Not Quantity, From Rice Crop - The Favoured Strategy for 
Contending With Fiercer Competition in the Export Market', Financial Times, 19 May 1994 
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Vietnam's position as the world's second largest rice exporter, with a market share of 16 
18 per cent. 
Figure 6-1 Projection of Rice Exports from the World's Three Major Exporters: Thailand, 
Vietnam, and the United States, Between 1994-2007 
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In order to limit the disadvantages resulting from commitments to the WTO, 
Thailand has modified its agricultural trade policy, chiefly through the mechanism of the 
MOAC, which has introduced the policy of production adjustment. At its inception, the 
government provided the elements needed in production, including quality seeds and low 
interest rate loans to participating farmers in the program, This program primarily aims to 
improve both the productivity and quality of agricultural products, which will improve the 
competitiveness of Thai agricultural products within the world market. 19 
18 Economic Research Service, USDA (1999) International Agricultural Baseline Projections to 2007/AER-
767, Washington, D.C. : United States Department of Agriculture [USDA], p.55 
19 Interview with Dr Ampon Kittiampon 
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As Thailand lacks the economic influence to challenge developed countries, the 
Thai government generally concedes to its WTO commitments. Thailand therefore assumes 
a relatively passive role, with regard to WTO negotiations, in comparison with the more 
active role taken by developed countries such as the United States, EU countries, and 
Japan. Wolfe20 suggests that Thailand should use its WTO commitments as the basis for its 
principal trade agreements with its trading partners. However, Wolfe's suggestion fails to 
consider that Thai agricultural interests are not guaranteed through the WTO, largely 
because many developed countries are able to continue to maintain their domestic support 
and export subsidies, in order to protect their agricultural sectors. It is not possible for 
Thailand to play an assertive role in influencing developed countries to fully comply with 
their WTO commitments. 
As was evidenced, with regard to the liberalisation of the Japanese rice market, 
Thailand is not as influential as the United States in influencing the Japanese government. 
In 1998, when the Japanese government announced that it would impose an over quota 
tariff of ¥ 350 per kilogram of imported rice above the minimum access quota, which for 
U.S. rice equated to a tariff of 350 per cent. In response to this, the United States declared 
that it would invoke the Super 301 provision of the Omnibus Trade Act, which imposes 
trade barriers on products exported from Japan to the United States.21 The Japanese 
government reconsidered, and on 1 April 1999, imposed an over quota tariff of ¥ 341 per 
kilogram. 22 
The balance of power between the United States and Japan has benefited the U.S. 
rice industry. Between 1995-2001, as illustrated in figure 6-2, the United States achieved 
the highest share of imported rice within the Japanese rice market, through the minimum 
access quota. Although Thailand is the second largest exporter to this market, this share is 
20 Wolfe, R. (1997), p.7 .. 
21 Morishita, K. (1998) 'Rice Tariffs Obscure Agriculture Reform', The Nikkei Weekly (Internet EditIon), 14 
December 1998, at wysiwygI193/http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/ .. .ion=TNW &NS-docs-matched=2&NS-doc-
number=2 Retrieved on 14 December 1998 
22 Paggi, M.S. and Yamazaki, F. (2001), p.15 
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disproportionately low, when compared to Thailand's status as the world's leading rice 
exporter. 
Figure 6-2 Market Shares within the Japanese Rice Market Through the Minimum 
Market Access Quota System 
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The Thai government is aware of its political and economic weakness, which, with 
regard to WTO negotiations, has been exposed on occasion. At the beginning of the 
Uruguay Round, in their bilateral negotiations Japan demanded that Thailand withdrew 
from rice negotiations, a demand to which Thai trade representatives conceded.23 Thailand 
joined the Cairns Group, anticipating improved negotiating power, with respect to this 
alliance, and in addition, through its membership of ASEAN. Subsequently, Thailand 
23 Interview with Dr Ampon Kittiampon 
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submitted its proposals and technical papers, with respect to WTO agricultural trade 
negotiations, though these two groupS.24 
Thailand's main concerns within the WTO are the same concerns raised during the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT, which were market access, domestic support and export 
subsidies.25 The multilateral trade negotiations within the WTO, conducted through the 
Cairns Group greatly benefit Thailand, especially since the Cairns Group's increased 
negotiating power, which resulted after the entry of several Latin American countries. 
According to Ampon26, the Cairns Group is very concerned, with regard to world trade 
based on an 'equal playing field', because Cairns Group members are less able to afford 
agricultural sector budgets allocated towards spending on domestic support, in contrast to 
the United States, the EU and Japan. 
The Bureau of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, within the Ministry of Commerce27 
states that at the negotiations within the WTO, Thailand emphasises the areas with which 
the country has the greatest comparative advantage, for instance, within the area of 
agriculture, textiles, and within the service sector. In addition, the bureau states that 
Thailand should hold back, with regard to negotiations at the WTO, which emphasise such 
issues as both labour and human rights, because international organisations already take 
care of these issues. Indeed, its refusal to negotiate, with regard to these issues can be 
perceived to be a result of the low standards of both labour and human rights in Thailand. 
The government perceives that if the economic and political welfare of labour in Thailand 
improved in accordance with the country's commitment to human rights, then the cost of 
labour in Thailand would increase as a consequence. Consequently, Thailand would lose its 
comparative advantage, notably in relation to labour intensive industries and agriculture. 
24 World Trade Organisation, at www.wto.org/englishitratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd03_groups_e.htm 
Retrieved on 6 April 2003 
25 Bureau of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (2001a) Kwamtoglong wadouy kankaset paitai ongkarnkalog 
(Agreement on Agriculture of the WTO), Bangkok: Department of Business Economics, Ministry of 
Commerce [Leaflet in Thai] 
26 Interview with Dr Ampon Kittiampon 
27 Bureau of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (200Ib) Thailand and the Preparation for the New ~ound ~f 
WTO Trade Negotiations, Bangkok: Department of Business Economics, Ministry of Commerce [m ThaI], 
p.22 
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Supachai28 suggests that in relation to specific agricultural products, Thailand 
would have a comparative advantage, and should therefore, focus on these areas, reducing 
the level of production where there is no comparative advantage. Supachai asserts that as 
an agricultural developmental strategy, this would enable Thailand to gain from world 
agricultural market liberalisation. However, the agricultural diversification programmes, 
which were introduced by the MOAC, were unsuccessful due to the combined factors of 
the deficiency of research in relation to production, the insufficiency of technical assistance 
provided to farmers, and in addition, endemic corruption. 
On 1 September 2002, Supachai Panitchpakdi, a Thai national, became the director-
general of the WTO.29 The position of director-general would not allow Supachai to benefit 
Thailand within the WTO. It was observed during the contest for director-general between 
Supachai and Mike Moore, a former New Zealand Prime Minister, the dominance of 
developed countries, particularly the United States, within the WTO. 
Officially, Washington says it prefers Mr Moore but would not block Mr Supachai 
if he emerged as strong favourite. Other countries suspect the US of harbouring deeper 
objections to the Thai candidate than it has admitted and accuse it of scheming to 
sabotage his campaign .... They claim that it brought pressure behind the scenes to delay 
a decision on the new WTO chieflast month when, by Mr Mchumo's count, Mr Supachai 
was narrowly ahead. Since then, Mr Moore has edged into the lead, thanks to intensive 
lobbying by the US and - more surprisingly - by France.3o 
Eventually, it was decided that Supachai and Moore would share the job of general-
director for half of a term each. That Moore began first implies the failure of developing 
counties to challenge the United States within the WTO, because it could be suggested that 
for strategic reasons it was preferable for the United States to have a more co-operative 
director-general at the time that Moore began. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the interests 
of developing countries within the WTO, including Thailand, will be significantly 
improved during the Supachai period of office. 
28 Supachai Panitchpakdi (2001) Botbat Thai nai wetee sethakijlok (The Role of Thailand in the World 
Economy), Bangkok: Ministry of Commerce, pp.236-237 . ' 
29 World Trade Organisation, at www.wto.orglenglishlthewto_e/dg_e/dg_e.htm Retneved on 1 Apnl2003 
30 Jonquieres, G. and Williams, F. (1999) 'Trading Blows', Financial Times, 7 May 1999, p.20 
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Box 6-1 Bangkok Post Interview with Ampon Kittiampon 
"Now we know that small farmers did not gain from the negotiations . We never strengthened the farm sector. 
We just helped them by giving, but never let them make any decisions by themselves." 
"We always introduced them to new things that we did not fully understand. We led them into the Green 
Revolution. We led them into the WTO. But when they run into debt problems and come to us asking for help 
we don't know how to deal with their problems." , 
"Anyway, before returning to the negotiating table all representatives [of Thailand] have to really understand the 
sector. Most of all we have to acknowledge the past mistakes we have committed ... " 
Source: Penapa Hongthong (2000), p.49 
Whilst Supachai is very positive towards the impact of world agricultural trade 
liberalisation, with regard to both Thai agriculture and the farmers , Pasuk31 argues that 
these benefits are concentrated amongst the large-scale farmers and agribusiness . With 
reference to this position, the conflict between Supachai, when Minister of Commerce 
between November 1997 - February 2001, and Ampon Kittiampon, a Thai trade 
representative at the Uruguay Round, was apparent. Ampon32 states that Supachai was 
unhappy with his critique in relation to the impact of the WTO on Thai agriculture, as seen 
in box 6-1. Supachai sent a copy of the interview, which Ampon gave to the "Bangkok 
Post" to the then Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, with Ampon demanding an 
explanation for this action. Indeed, although Ampon did not disagree with the free trade 
ideology held by Supachai, he was criticising the competitiveness of Thai agriculture 
within the world market, and how the policy of agricultural development has both failed to 
strengthen the agricultural sector, and improve the standard of living of farmers. This 
chapter illustrates the conflict, with regard to agricultural trade liberalisation between the 
Ministry of Commerce and the MOAC, the two main actors in terms of the development of 
the Thai agricultural sector. This can be considered to be a major contributing factor in 
relation to the weakness of Thailand within the multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO. 
31 Interview with Professor Pasuk Phongpaichit 
32 Interview with Dr Ampon Kittiampon 
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6.3 Impact of the WTO on Selected Thai Agricultural Products 
In accordance with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Thailand must reduce its 
domestic support by 13 per cent within 10 years, from 21,816.41 million baht in 1995 to 
19,028.48 baht by 2004. Furthermore, Thailand is committed to reducing tariffs against 740 
agricultural products by 24 per cent within the same period. Initially, the average tariff for a 
product was 49 per cent, which Thailand must reduce to between 27-40 per cent. 33 
Table 6-1 Importation of23 Agricultural Products Through the Quota Tariff System 1995-1998 
Products 
Rice 
Sugar 
Potatoes" 
Milk and Dairy product 
Skimmed milk 
Oniona 
Onion seedlings 
Coconut 
Dried coconut 
Coconut oil 
Coffee beans 
Instant coffee 
Tea 
Pepper 
Garlic 
Com for animal feed" 
Soybeans 
Soybean meal 
Soybean oil 
Palm oil ••• 
Tobacco 
Raw.iIk 
Dried longan 
In Quota 
Tariff 
(percent) 
1995 
30.0 
65 .0 
T1 .0 
20.0 
20.0 
T1 .0 
30.0 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
30.0 
40.0 
30.0 
T1. 0 
T1.0 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
60.0 
30.0 
30.0 
Over 
Quota 
Tariff 
(per cent) 
1995 
57.4 
103 .0 
137 .6 
45 .0 
237 .6 
156.4 
239.6 
59.4 
39.6 
57.4 
99.0 
54.4 
99.0 
56.4 
62.4 
&1.2 
88. 1 
146.5 
160.4 
157 .4 
79.2 
253 .9 
58.4 
Over 
Quota 
Tariff 
(per cent) 
2004 
52.0 
94 .0 
125.0 
4\.0 
216 .0 
142.0 
218.0 
54.0 
36.0 
52 .0 
90.0 
49.0 
90.0 
5\.0 
57.0 
73.0 
&1.0 
133 .0 
146.0 
143.0 
72.0 
226.0 
53.0 
1995 
Agreed 1m ported 
237,863.00 
13, 105.00 
288.00 
2,286.00 
45,000.00 
348.00 
3.00 
2,312 .00 
694.00 
382 .00 
5.0 
128.00 
596.0 
43 .00 
62.00 
52,096.00 
10,402.00 
219,5&1.00 
2,173.00 
4,629.00 
6,129.00 
460.00 
5.00 
83 .00 
2.00 
1,166.00 
0.0 
53,495 .00 
0.0 
3.30 
62.00 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
88.00 
0.D2 
0.00 
383,209.00 
278,934 .00 
648 ,035 .00 
2,002 .00 
15,000.00 
6,481.00 
0.0 
0.0 
1996 1997 
Agreed 1m ported Agreed 1m ported 
239,184.56 154 .00 240,506.11 177.44 
13, 177.78 9.00 13,250.56 4.00 
289.56 3,193 .00 291.11 4,69023 
2,298.67 0.0 2,3 11.33 0.0 
46, II \.00 67,638.00 47,222.22 55,83800 
349.89 347.00 351.78 344.14 
3.02 7.00 3.03 6.40 
2324 .78 82 .00 2,337.56 73.48 
745 .44 0.0 796.89 0.0 
384 .11 0.0 386.22 0.0 
53 0.0 5.06 3.96 
128.67 46.00 129 .33 64.54 
599.22 178.00 602.44 89.87 
43.22 0.02 43.44 0.04 
62.33 0.0 62 .67 00 
52,385.33 299,756.00 52,674.67 194 ,116.00 
10,459.78 422,625 .00 10,5 17.56 869,397.00 
220,799.89 799 ,99000 222,01 9.78 1.054.925 .00 
2185 .00 583 .00 2,197 .00 00 
4,654.67 24 ,77000 4,6&1.33 17,412.45 
6,163.00 8,27300 6,197.00 8,3 7965 
462 .56 0.0 465 .11 0.0 
5.33 0.0 5.67 0.0 
II Imported lower than committed quota II Imported more than committed quota 
* Potatoes in fact relates to potato seedlings. 
** Importation of com for animal feed is subject to an additional charge of 380 baht per tonne 
1998 
Agreed Imported 
24 1,8T1.67 147.7 1 
13,323.33 0 0 
292 .67 4,786.95 
2,324.00 00 
48,333 .00 44,214.01 
353 .67 353.49 
3.05 6.44 
2350.33 51. 257 
848.33 0.0 
388.33 0.0 
5.08 1.56 
130.00 2954 
605.67 11 2 .64 
43 .67 21.64 
63 .00 0.0 
52,964.00 265 ,78866 
10,575.33 744 ,04878 
223,239.67 1.070.827 16 
2,209.00 00 
4,7 06.00 6,2 11 .91 
6,231.00 7.66082 
467 .67 00 
6.00 00 
Unit : Tonnes 
*** Palm oil including crude palm oil 
Source: Edited and Translated from Pitak Udomwichaiwatana (2000), p. appendix 1, and Department of 
Business Economics (2000), pp.18-19 
33 Bureau of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (2000) Pholkratob chag kan pird seree tangkanka paitai WTO 
tor sinka kaset Thai (The impact of Free Trade Under WTO on Thai Agricultural Products), Bangkok: 
Department of Business Economics, Ministry of Commerce [in Thai], pp.1-3 
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However, a very significant aspect to the commitment was the tariffication of 23 
agricultural products illustrated in table 6-1, where Thailand must end its non-tariff 
protectionism schemes on these products and introduce tariffs, as outlined in Article 4 
Market Access of the Agreement on Agriculture. This commitment is a concern for the 
Thai government, since many products under this tariffication scheme are politically 
sensitive, particularly rice and sugarcane. According to table 6-1, less than half of the 
products on the tariffication list imported into Thailand, complied with the WTO agreement 
for minimum access, because the government could not politically afford the adverse 
consequences, incurred in meeting this target. It is arguable that the Thai government, like 
other governments, has given priority to their domestic popularity, in order to secure their 
political power. 
The discussion of the impact of the WTO, with regard to the Thai agricultural sector 
will focus primarily on rice, sugarcane, and potato production, because these three products 
are at the centre of this thesis. It has been argued that rice and sugarcane are economically 
important to the Thai economy in terms of exports, whereas potato is only important in 
terms of a localised market for it. Therefore, the impact of the WTO, with respect to potato 
production is weaker than the impact, in terms of rice and sugarcane production. 
In 1994, Thailand agreed to comply with a minimum access for rice of 237,863 
tonnes, and in addition, agreed to increase the volume of imports every year until reaching 
249,757 tonnes by 2000, subject to a 30 per cent in-quota tariff.34 However, as illustrated in 
table 6-1, between 1994-1998 the imports of rice into Thailand never met their targets, in 
part, because there was never any excess of demand over supply, in terms of domestic 
consumption. 
34 Chan Ling Yap (1996) 'Implications of the Uruguay Round on the World Rice Economy', Food Policy, 
Vol. 21, No.4/5, pp.377-391, 1996, pp. 382-384 
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Figure 6-3 National Shares of the World Rice Market 
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Thailand produces approximately 21 million tonnes of paddy rice a year, which 
equates to 13 .7 million tonnes of milled rice. Of this, between 5-6 million tonnes is 
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exported annually.35 As seen in figure 6-3, in 2001, Thailand's market share within the 
world rice market was 30 per cent, with Vietnam at 18 per cent and the United States at 12 
per cent. This has been possible because long grain, Indica rice dominates the world rice 
market, and this is the main variety of rice, which is produced in Thailand, and this can be 
seen in figure 6-4. 
Mingsarn36 argues that under the commitment, with regard to the opening up of the 
domestic rice market, Thailand will only need to import some varieties of rice, which are 
not produced widely in Thailand, such as Basmati rice from Pakistan and Koshihikari rice 
from Japan. With respect to this, Thai consumers of these two varieties of rice will have 
cut-price rice as a result of the Uruguay Round. In Thailand, imported rice is rarely cheaper 
than domestically supplied rice, which is in sharp contrast to the Japanese rice market, 
where imported rice is normally far cheaper than domestic rice. Consequently, therefore, 
the importation of rice would not lead the Thai government to be overly concerned, with 
regard to this competition. 
With regard to the liberalisation of the world rice market, the two major concerns of 
the Thai government are the level of domestic support and the export subsidies, both given 
to rice farmers by Thailand's major rivals, especially the United States. The bilateral trade 
negotiations between the United States and the EU concluded in November 1992, almost 
two years before the conclusion to the Uruguay Round. This settlement allowed the United 
States to maintain its domestic support, with regard to grain production, and accordingly, 
the United States did not have to reduce its domestic support for its rice farmers. 37 For 
instance, in the market year 2000/2001, rice farmers in the United States received almost 
US$ 1.5 billion of government domestic support, a figure, which is more than 40 per cent 
larger than the total market value of rice production within the United States. Moreover, 
rice farmers within the United States receive additional benefits, which include 'revenue 
35 Chan Ling Yap (1997) 'Price Instability in the International Rice Market: Its Impact on Production and 
~arm Prices', Development Policy Review, Vol. 15 (1997): 251-276, p.258 . . . 
Mingsarn Khaosa-ard (1994) Anakot khao Thai nairaya 10 pee khangna (The Future a/That Rlce In the 
Next 10 Years) Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute [TDRI] [in Thai], p.64 
37 ' Ibid., p.63 
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insurance as well as from trade promotion programs, food aid, and export credit 
,38 guarantees. 
In addition to these factors, the Thai government is also aware of the opportunity, 
which has been created through the partial1iberalisation of the Japanese and South Korean 
rice markets. Chan Ling Yab39 argues that the opportunity to engage within the Japanese 
rice market, has led to an increase in rice production in exporting countries, such as 
Thailand and Vietnam, in order to supply the additional demand for imported rice, which 
was generated by Japan's commitment to the Uruguay Round. The Japanese government 
was concerned that this increase in the volume of imports would lead to the decline of 
domestic rice production, however, Japan could maintain its massive domestic support for 
rice, because whilst agricultural domestic support must be reduced overall, this 
commitment is non-product-specific. 
Previous to the commitment finally agreed at the conclusion to the Uruguay Round, 
the Japanese government had been reluctant to reduce its support for rice production. In 
1993, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa led the non-LDP coalition government, which 
had on many occasions debated the case in favour of rice market liberalisation. The 
coalition parties of the government reluctantly supported the Prime Minister, because rice 
farmers are influential within their support and that of the Social Democratic Party, which 
formed the basis of the coalition, and evidently, the GATT agreement was potentially 
politically damaging. 40 
'As expected, strong opposition came from agricultural interests and LDP 
politicians, who took advantage of being in the opposition to blame the Hosokawa 
government for damaging Japan's agriculture. ,41 Nevertheless, the LDP would themselves 
have liberalised the Japanese rice market, as a result of external influences, including that 
38 Childs, N. (2001) 'World Rice Glut Keeps Lid on U.S. Prices', in Economic Research Sex:vice, USDA (ed) 
Agricultural OutlookINovember 2001, Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agnculture [USDA], 
p..9 
9 Chan Ling Yap (1996), pp. 377-379 
40 Financial Times, 14 December 1993, pA 
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from the GATT and the United States, had they been in power. Iwai asserts that LDP 
politicians believed that with the non-LDP coalition government taking this step, this 
would politically benefit the LDP, because 'the LDP could avoid responsibility for 
problems arising from the decision, problems that their party had been incapable of 
I · h'l' ,42 reso vmg w 1 e III power. 
The Hosokawa government of 1993-1994 was the first non-LDP government in 38 
years.43 The decline of the LDP, which has always relied heavily on the support of rice 
farmers, and in addition, the external pressures, with regard to the liberalisation of the 
Japanese rice market, have both significantly affected the interests of rice farmers and the 
negotiating power of the Nokyo. In this respect, it can be argued that the stability of the 
agricultural policy community between the LDP and the Zenchu or central committee of 
the Nokyo at the national level was damaged by the entry of the new actors. 
Iwai argues that 'Under the LDP, decisions are often made by the party rather than 
by a neutral government deliberative council. Zenchu could often achieve farmers' 
objective by using the strength and size of their vote as a political weapon. ,44 'ZenchCi had 
limited access to the non-LDP Hosokawa cabinet, since its past lobbying had been focused 
exclusively on the LDP. ,45 However, this does not mean that the power of the Nokyo was 
significantly reduced. Indeed, Shinoda confirms that the ability of the Nokyo to influence 
rurally based MPs was still substantial, and reveals that Social Democratic Party MPs, the 
largest group within the eight party coalition of the Hosokawa government, threatened to 
leave if the rice market was liberalised.46 This can be argued to be one of the contributing 
factors, with respect to the erosion of the popularity of the Hosokawa government, before 
the Prime Minister's resignation in April 1994. 
41 Shinoda, T. (1998) 'Japan's Decision Making Under the Coalition Government', Asian Survey, Vol. 
XXXVIII, No.7, July 1998: 703-723, p.706 
42 Iwai, T. (1997) 'Japan's Agricultural Politics at a Turning Point', in Jain, P. and Inoguchi, T. (eds) 
Japanses Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy?, Hong Kong: Macmillan, p.189 
:~ McLean, I. (1996) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.548 
Iwai, T. (1997), p.187 
45 Ib'd 1 ., p.189 
46 Shinoda, T. (1998), p.706 
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The Japanese government's commitment to rice liberalisation at the Uruguay 
Round encouraged the Thai government to look towards expanding into this export market. 
To comply with the minimum access commitment, Japan would open its domestic market 
to imports of 4 per cent of 1995 base period consumption, a target, which would increase 
by 0.8 per cent annually, until reaching 8 per cent by 2000. As base period consumption in 
1995 was 9,475,000 tonnes, Japan would import 379,000 tonnes of rice until reaching 
758,000 tonnes in 2000.47 This commitment enabled Japan to delay the tariffication of 
imported rice.48 In 1995, 56,630 tonnes of Thai rice was exported to Japan, reaching 
145,509 tonnes by 1999, an increase of 257 per cent.49 However, even this figure remains 
low when compared to the export volume of Thai rice into Japan in 1993, which exceeded 
660,000 tonnes, and produced a near doubling in Thailand's domestic rice price. However, 
this high export volume of Thai rice into Japan, was purely a direct result of Japan's poor 
harvest, and did not relate to any free trade ideology emerging from Japan at that time. 50 
Overall, the liberalisation of the Japanese and South Korean rice markets did not 
lead to a significant increase in Thai rice importation, largely because different varieties of 
rice are consumed in both Japan and South Korea. These consumers favour Japonica, a 
short grain rice, whilst the production of Japonica rice in Thailand is both limited and 
relatively expensive. With reference to both the restricted market access and the domestic 
consumer preferences, Thailand still cannot fully access the Japanese rice market. 
According to the trade report of 2000, by Thailand's Department of Business Economics51 , 
focusing on trade between Thailand and Japan, rice was not in the top-ten products 
exported from Thailand to Japan. Nevertheless, Thailand is attempting to produce more 
47 Paggi, M.S. and Yamazaki, F. (2001) 'The WTO and International Trade Prospects: Rice', paper presented 
at Executive Seminar on Agricultural Issues, 10 December 2001, University of California, p14 
48 Shinmura, T (1996) 'Rice Market Opens Slightly Despite Opposition From Farm Lobby', Japan Economic 
Almanac 1996 
49 Bureau of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (2000), pp.15-16 
50 Barnes, W. (1994) 'Thailand Wants Quality, Not Quantity, From Rice Crop - The Favoured Strategy for 
Contending With Fiercer Competition in the Export Market', Financial Times, 19 May 1994, p.34 
5 I Department of Business Economics (2000) Sarup kanka rawang prathet khong yeepun lae 
tanakankaengkan khong Thai pee 2543 (The Summary of International Trade and Competitiveness !3etwe~n 
Japan and Thailand 2000) Bangkok: Department of Business Economics, Ministry of Commerce [m Thai], 
pp.4-6 
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Japonica rice, in order to meet the demand of Japanese consumers.52 In addition, 'Thai 
farmers planting the more expensive Japonica varieties still have production costs 50% 
lower than those Japanese farmers. ,53 
With regard to the preferences of Japanese rice consumers, the United States is 
better placed than Thailand in the competition for market share within the Japanese rice 
market, because California rice is in every way identical to Japanese rice. This important 
factor has contributed to the United States gaining a figure approaching 50 per cent of 
market share within the Japanese rice market, between 1995-2001, as is illustrated in figure 
6-4. The importation of California rice is the main concern of the Nokyo, because if it were 
imported into Japan freely, its price would be cheaper than domestically produced rice. 
With reference to the Regular Minimum Access Import Scheme of January-November 
1998, the USDA calculated that the tariff of ¥ 351.17 per kilogram would raise the U.S. 
wholesale import price of rice into Japan to ¥ 429 per-kilogram, a 449 per cent increase, 
whilst Uonuma Koshihikari, the Japanese premium rice, sold domestically at the whole-
sale price of ¥ 519 per kilogram. 54 
'To protect the last citadel-a metaphor for self-identity under threat as the phrase 
is used to oppose California rice importation, the pure, "chemical-free" domestic rice, rice 
without contamination from foreign influence, and the pure white rice embodied in the self, 
both individually and collectively, must be summoned for the self-rejuvenation. Or, the self 
purges itself by removing and placing it on the internal and external other. ,55 Although, this 
campaign by the Nokyo helped Japanese rice farmers to gain domestic support, the 
liberalisation of the Japanese rice market suggested that domestic pressure such as this 
could not ultimately resist the overwhelming impetus of external pressures. 
52 Unchalee Ulaikul (1994) 'Nayobai Khong Kratroung Kaset Lea Sahakom Tee Keaw Kub Khao (Rice 
Related Policies of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives)" Rai Ngan Kan Prachum Wichakan Khao 
Lea Palitphun Khao Hang Charti (The Report from the First National Conference on Rice and Rice 
Products), 29-30 June, 1994, Bangkok: National Research Institute [in Thai], pp. 24-28 
53 Busaba Sivasomboon, Chiratas Nivatpumin and Jirajaree Chaimusik (1996) 'World's Top Exporter Faces 
New Challenges', Bangkok Post, 18 November 1996 
54 Dyck J. Childs N. Ackerman K., Skully, D., Hanson, S., Maginnis, H. and Kotschwar, L. (2000), p.14 
55 " " , . P . Ohnuki-Tiemey, E. (1993) Rice as Self Japanese Identities Through Time, New Jersey: nnceton 
University Press, p.136 
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In addition to rice, sugar is another product, which interests developing countries in 
Asia, who have since the Uruguay Round tariff reductions expected to access the markets 
of developed countries. Most clearly, as the two leading exporters of sugar in Asia, 
Thailand and the Philippines, would expect to gain. 56Within the provisions of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture, market access opportunities are increased and export 
subsidies are reduced, and this would directly impact on the world sugar market. 
Governments in developed and developing countries have widely used tariffs, in order to 
intervene in the world sugar market, and tariff reductions, with regard to sugar importation 
were agreed by 89 member countries at the Uruguay Round. Nevertheless, the average 
rates of tariff remain very high, particularly within the EU market. 'On average, the 
developing and developed countries would reduce tariff rate on raw sugar imports by 22 
percent and 16 percent, respectively, by 2004. ,57 With reference to market access, a total of 
20 countries made commitments at the Uruguay Round, including the countries of the 
EU.58 
Thailand itself is a country, which employs protectionist policies against the 
importation of sugar, and in addition provides domestic support to sugarcane production. 
Consequently, both domestic consumers and exporters pay higher prices than the free 
market price would be. During the Uruguay Round, Thailand agreed to replace its non-
tariff barriers by a tariff quota. According to table 6-1, as part of its commitment, in 1995 
Thailand agreed to import 13,105 tonnes of sugar, but the 65 per cent tariff charged on 'in 
quota tariff imports within this agreed level, meant that imports were not competitive in 
comparison to domestically produced sugarcane. Consequently, only 2 tonnes of sugarcane 
were imported into Thailand in 1995. Whilst Thailand agreed to import 13,323.33 tonnes of 
sugar in 1998, none was ever imported. Although sugarcane is one of the most highly 
subsidised agricultural products in Thailand, nevertheless the Thai government has notified 
56 Interview with Mr Bancha Nakasakdisevi 
57 WWW.fao.org/waicentlfaoinfo/economic/uroundiumetiur-net.htm Retrieved on 6 July 1998 
58 WWW.fao.org/waicentlfaoinfo/economic/uroundiumet/ur-net.htm Retrieved on 6 July 1998 
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the GATT that sugarcane subsidisation of 5.63 billion baht will be reduced by 13.3 per cent 
. 10 59 In years. 
It was anticipated that sugarcane farmers in Thailand would directly benefit from 
the Uruguay Round, because of the reSUlting increase in world-wide sugarcane production 
projected to be 12 per cent by the year 2000, and between 14-16 per cent by 2005. This 
would combine with steadily increasing sugar prices, as it was estimated that in 2000 
sugarcane prices should increase by 2-5 per cent and by 4-8 per cent in 2005.60 Indeed, the 
agreements of the Uruguay Round allowed Thailand to experience an impressive increase 
in its sugar exports to the EU market, which in 1999 had increased by 74 per cent, or 
21,197 tonnes.61 
After the end of the GATT, sugarcane farmers would gain from the WTO, which is 
targeting the removal of the special and differential treatment, notably from those, which 
the United States provides to countries, which have reciprocal benefits with the United 
States, economically and militarily.62 The United States employed a country-specific quota 
policy for sugar importation between 1934-1974, which benefited U.S. dependencies, 
namely Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Philippines, and in addition Cuba. 
This policy was reintroduced in 1982, and the shares for export countries in sugar 
importation to the United States have been reassigned to respect diplomatic consideration. 
In October 1990, the United States replaced the country-specific quota with a 'tariff-rate 
quota' or 'tariff quota', in order to comply with GATT rules, which resulted from a formal 
complaint made by Australia in May 1989.63 
59 United Nations (1995) Benefits and Challenges Facing Asia-Pacific Agricultural Trading countries in the 
Post-Uruguay Round Period: Prepared under the ESCAPIUNDP Regional Trade Programme (RASI921035), 
New York: United Nations, p.161 
60 Jeerawat Na Thalang (1997) 'Synchronised Strategy Needed to Benefit From WTO', The Nati?n (Internet 
Edition), 4 July 1997, at http://203.146.51.4/nationnewsI1997/199704119970407/3 869 .html RetrIeved on 22 
November 1998 
61 Bureau of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (2000), pp.15-16 
62 Interview with Mrs Araya Arunanondchai and Mr Bancha Nakasakdisevi, .. . 
63 Skully, D.W. (1998) 'Auctioning Tariff Quotas for U.S. Su~ar Imports, m E~onomIc Research SerVIce, 
USDA (ed) Sugar and SweetenerlSSS-223lMay 1998, Washmgton D.C.: UnIted States Department of 
Agriculture [USDA], pp.17-18 
251 
Previously, Thailand had substantially gained from the country-specific quota 
policy of the United States, which is recognised within the sugarcane industry in Thailand 
as the 'U.S. Quota'. This is because of Thailand's strong military relationship with the 
United States between 1950-1976, when the United States utilised areas of Thailand for use 
as military bases. The U.S. Quota benefited the exporters of sugarcane to the United States 
because the price available was higher than the world market price.64 Between 1992-1994, 
the price of raw sugarcane in the world market averaged 15 cents per lb., whereas the 
average price available through the U.S. quota was 21.5 cents per Ib. 65 However, the 
interest of Thailand within the U.S. quota has declined steadily. In 1999, the United States 
granted Thailand with only 15,166 tonnes of in-quota tariffs for U.S. sugar importation, 
whereas the Philippines received 146,243 tonnes. The Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Executive Office of the President, announced that 'These allocations are 
based on the countries' historical trade to the United States. ,66 
Thailand has the capacity to export far in excess of its allocated quota, but would 
experience the disincentive of the high level over-quota tariff. In compliance with the 
Agreement on Agriculture of the Uruguay Round, in 1996 the United States set the over-
quota tariff for raw sugar at 17.17 cents per lb., which was reduced gradually to 15.36 cents 
per lb. by 2000.67 If the WTO could successfully remove the special and differential 
treatment, with regard to U.S. sugar importation, Thailand would experience a higher 
degree of market access to the United States. 
Potatoes and potato products are, like many of the agricultural products of Thailand, 
exported mainly to markets within the local southeast Asian region. However, exports of 
potato products normally only contribute approximately 6.6 billion baht per year, which is 
64 Interview with Mrs Araya Arunanondchai, and Mr Bancha N akasakdisevi 
65 Business Research Centre (2001) Sakayapap kankaengkhan khong utsahakam numtan (Capacity in the 
Competition in Sugarcane Industry), Bangkok: Faculty of Commerce and Accountancy, Thammasat 
University [in Thai], p.399 . 
66 Office of the United States Trade Representative (1998) 'USTR Announces AllocatIOn of the Raw Cane 
Sugar, Refined Sugar and Sugar Containing Products Tariff-Rate Quotas for 199~-999', Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the PreSIdent (press release on 16 
September 1998) 
67 Skully, D.W. (1998), p.18 
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a small percentage of the Thai economy when compared to the contributions of both rice 
and sugarcane. The MOAC has attempted to accelerate annual exports of potato products 
and hoped that exports would reach 10 billion baht by 2001.68 Concerning market access, 
Thai potato products have not normally encountered problems. 
Although potato farmers in Thailand are heavily reliant on the importation of potato 
seedlings, the Thai government applies limited quotas and high tariffs, with respect to these 
imports, and this has been a serious issue between farmers and government since the early 
1980s.69 Indeed, the Thai government controls the importation of potato seedlings, both in 
order to stabilise the production of potatoes, and in addition, because of the high cost of 
importation. Potato seedlings should be stored at 14 degree Celsius until they are planted, 
which is expensive for importers and this cost is reflected in their price. In order to solve 
this problem, the government encourages farmers to produce their own potato seedlings, 
however, the farmers have found that imported potato seedlings are of a higher quality than 
those, which are domestically produced.70 
According to table 6-1, in 1995, the in quota tariff for potatoes was 27 per cent, 
with the over quota tariff at 137.6 per cent. With regard to WTO rules, Thailand is 
committed to reducing its over quota tariff to 125 per cent by 2004. In addition, between 
1995-1998, Thailand was able to import far in excess of that agreed under the WTO rules. 
As can be calculated from the figures of table 6-1, in 1995, Thailand already imported 878 
tonnes, or 305 per cent above that agreed under the WTO rules. By 1998, this figure had 
further increased to 4494.28 tonnes, or 1536 per cent. This occurred because of the 
significant expansion of the potato chip industry in Thailand, which began in the mid-
1990s, and led to a large increase in the demand for potato seedlings. Therefore, with 
regard to the reductions of both import quotas and import tariffs, potato farmers benefited 
68 Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 7 February 1998, at 
www.bkkpost.samart.co.thlnewslBpachiveIBPI99802027/070298_Business08.htmIRetrieved on 14 June 
2000 
69 Suphaphan Plengmaneepun (1998) 'Potatoes Thrive on Boom in Chips Sales' Bangkok Post (Internet 
Edition), 16 November 1998, at 
http://scoop.bangkokpost.co.thlbkkpostlI998/november 1998/bp 199811161161 ... Retrieved on 9 November 
2001 
70 Interview with Mr Pramual Jai-ngern 
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from the lower cost of potato seedlings, which resulted from the WTO rules. This was 
possible, because potato seedlings was one product, which the Thai government agreed 
should have its trade barriers lowered, subject to the WTO rules improving market access. 
Although Thailand benefited from agricultural trade liberalisation after the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the Thai government continues to promote the country's 
interests through the WTO, as many protectionist policies are still applied by the developed 
countries. For example, with regard to market access commitments, Annex 5 or 'Japan's 
rice clause', allows Japan to continue to protect its domestic rice market by delaying the 
impact of its commitment.71 Through the WTO therefore, appears to be the most effective 
method for Thailand and other developing countries to achieve real agricultural trade 
liberalisation, within the world trade system. 
Progress in terms of phasing out protectionist practices takes time, because 
developed countries are reluctant to co-operate, in terms of world trade generally, but also 
notably within agriculture, which adversely affects developing countries such as Thailand 
disproportionately. Although the latest GATT rules were applied by the WTO, developed 
countries would rather liberalise their agricultural markets gradually and retain their 
substantial level of domestic support, as has been evidenced with the United States. In May 
2002, Congress approved the largest farm subsidy package in the history of the United 
States, where 'federal spending on farm programmes will increase by $82.8bn over the next 
10 years, on top of some $100bn that Congress was already set to give to farmers ... Under 
what are known as "counter-cyclical payments" growers of wheat, com, cotton, rice and 
soyabeans will now be guaranteed a certain price regardless of what the market does. If 
prices fall further, subsidies will rise accordingly .... The overwhelming support for the 
farm bill from both parties was testimony to the strength of local political concerns in an 
election year in which control of Congress is at stake' 72 
71 Wolfe, R. (1998), p.124 and pp.l93-195 
72 Alden, E. and McGregor, D. (2002) 'A Crash Crop', Financial Times, 10 May 2002, p.18 
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6.4 The Ineffective Political Participation of Rice, Sugarcane, and Potato Farmers 
Groups in Relation to the WTO 
The research has highlighted that negotiations, which take place between the WTO 
and Thailand are specifically, the interactions between the WTO, and the Thai government 
represented by bureaucratic trade representatives. Accordingly, there is no direct 
involvement at the decision-making stage of negotiations by Thai farmers, in relation to the 
obligations of Thailand within the WTO. As previously illustrated in Chapter 5, the policy 
communities with regard to rice, sugarcane, and potato production are closed to elite 
bureaucrats and politicians, and their clients, with rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers 
groups remaining as outsiders. Accordingly, the response of the NRGMR, SCP A, and 
Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd in terms of the impact of the WTO is weaker 
than that observed in the cases of both the Nokyo and the NFU. With reference to this 
outcome, the main factors, which have adversely impacted on the political participation of 
the rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers groups can accordingly be categorised as either 
internal or external factors. 
6.4.1 The Internal Factors 
Interviews with members of the NRGMR, SCP A, and the Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd revealed that the farmers within these groups have little 
knowledge about the WTO and how it impacts on Thai agriculture generally and on their 
interests specifically. The contribution of internal factors in relation to the ineffective 
political participation of the three farmers groups in terms of the impact of the WTO can be 
classified into two main categories, namely the ineffective organisational structures of 
farmers groups and problems, which derive from the farmers themselves. 
Neither the NRGMR, SCP A, nor the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd 
are sufficiently established as farmer groups at the national level, in order to be equipped to 
properly comprehend the challenge and involvement of the WTO in relation to Thai 
agriculture. This is in direct contrast to the examples of the NFU and the Nokyo. 'The NFU 
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is the largest farming organisation in the UK, representing around three quarters of the full 
time commercial farmers of England and Wales. Through over 300 branch offices, seven 
regional offices, one office in Wales and its London headquarters, the NFU is able to keep 
in close contact with its members and serve their needs locally and nationally. Through its 
Brussels office the NFU has a voice at the heart of Europe. [Emphasis added]'73 With 
regard to the WTO, the interests of farmers in the United Kingdom are pursued by the EU. 
Conversely, the NRGMR, SCP A, and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, do 
not have a department, which is dedicated to the challenge of world markets for agricultural 
production. Instead, the three groups are primarily concerned with domestic price issues, 
and give little consideration to either the impact of world markets or to the WTO. 
As highlighted in Chapter 4, the educational levels reached by members of the 
NRGMR, SCP A, and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd is modest by Thai 
standards. Indeed, the problem of education is not the only factor, which contributes 
towards the low level of political participation of the three farmers groups within the 
domestic political arena. Furthermore, this is a significant contributing factor in relation to 
the response of the three farmers groups towards the impact of the WTO on their 
livelihoods. As a specific example, Thai people with a low level of education are very 
unlikely to be able to speak English, and the understanding of which, would help to inform 
their appreciation of much the impact of the WTO, which operates its website, 
www.wto.org primarily in English. Furthermore, access to the internet is prohibitively 
expensive for the three farmers groups, and remains so more generally across rural 
Thailand. 
Access to information, which relates to the WTO, does not prove problematic for 
the NFU and the Nokyo because they are well established farmers interest groups that are 
well financed and politically influential. With regard to the NFU, there is clearly no 
language barrier in relation to the WTO and access to the internet is freely accessible to 
farmers in the United Kingdom. With regard to the Nokyo, the effectiveness of its 
73 National Farmers' Union, at www.nfu.org.uklintradoc-
cgi/idc _ cgijsapi.dll?IdcService=GET _DOC _ P AGE&Action=GetTemplatePage&Page=NFU _ABOUT _ NFU 
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organisational structure significantly reduces the language problem, because the Nokyo is 
one of the main actors within the network of policy-making process in relation to 
agriculture, especially with regard to rice. As illustrated in section 6.3, Japanese rice 
farmers are well informed about the potential negative impacts of WTO commitments on 
their livelihoods, and the Nokyo was politically powerful enough to pressurise the Japanese 
governments' stance in relation to the liberalisation of the Japanese rice market. 
However, notwithstanding the fact that Thai farmers are unable to autonomously 
obtain much important and relevant information, this should not be considered as a 
problem, which stems from the farmers themselves. Rather, as the WTO is an international 
institution, which was established, in order to liberalise the world trading system, it is 
implied that world trade should be free and fair for all of its members. Accordingly, 
farmers in non-English speaking countries should have as equal an opportunity to obtain 
information in relation to the world agricultural market as farmers of English-speaking 
countries experience. Scholte's study in relation to the accountability of global governance, 
which includes the WTO, emphasises the importance of both accessible and understandable 
information from international institutions. 'It is one thing to release information into the 
public domain; and it is another to make information understandable to all affected people.' 
Therefore, international institutions should 'make themselves truly visible to laypersons .... 
documents should be translated into the relevant languages and that hard copies need to be 
made available for people who lack internet access.' 74 However, at present, WTO 
publications, both on its official website and hard copies are only available in three main 
languages, namely English, French, and Spanish.75 
The problem of access to WTO information, which can be easily accessed and 
understood by Thai farmers remains as a form of trade barrier imposed on groups such as 
the NRGMR, SCP A, and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, whilst the 
WTO itself is intended to remove trade barriers. If information in relation to agricultural 
PAGE Retrieved on 4 September 2004 
74 Scholte, J.A. (2004) 'Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance', Government and 
Opposition, Volume 39 Number 2 Spring 2004, Oxford: Blackwell, 211-233, pp.218-219 
75 World Trade Organisation (2004) at www.wto.orglindex.htm 
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trade issues and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture was provided free of charge by the 
WTO in translated hard copies to groups such as the NRGMR, SCP A, and the Chiang Mai 
Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, this would remove the otherwise prohibitive cost and 
difficulty of accessing such information. This would be intended to increase the political 
participation of Thai farmers, whose response to the global impact would be accelerated 
accordingly. 
However, in relation to the NRGMR, SCP A, and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers 
Co-operative Ltd, the educational levels and political awareness of farmers, which contrive 
to make farmers victims of the patronage system of Thailand, help to prevent these farmers 
groups from using their potential voting strength as a political weapon. Accordingly, in 
terms of the global impact, the question arises as to whether better access to information 
can significantly contribute towards an improving level of political participation for the 
three farmers groups. With reference to political observation in Thailand, farmers may not 
be able to maximise the benefits of accessing information in relation to the WTO, which 
has been translated. This can be perceived to be a result of their low education level, as 
evidenced in relation to domestic political issues, where information is already provided in 
Thai and is accessible for most Thai people. In addition, the better educated middle class of 
Bangkok are more sensitive to issues that would affect their livelihoods than are the rural 
population. 'Political analysts saying voting behaviour in rural areas-home to about 80% 
of voters-is still more influence by patronage than by policies. Thaksin has travelled to all 
76 provinces in Thailand in recent months, and along the way has approved plans for 35 
billion baht ($840 million) in new public-works projects for rural areas. ,76 
However, as previously established by the research, which was developed as an 
argument in Chapter 4, the NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd 
are classified as 'potential pressure participants'. Accordingly, they might be able to utilise 
WTO related information more effectively than Thai farmers in general, if such 
information were in fact, available to them. Of the three farmers groups, the SCP A, as an 
'interest group', is best positioned in terms of an ability to positively utilise such 
76 Crispin, S. W. (2004) 'Blow to Thaksin' Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 September 2004, p.2l 
258 
information for the benefit of its members, which is largely due to both their financial 
status and their organisational structure. The SCP A commissions the TRDI, an independent 
research institution, to analyse the sugarcane industry of Thailand,77 which counters the 
problem of the low level of education of its members, and promotes the ability of the group 
to utilise WTO related information. The NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-
operative Ltd also have close links with promotional groups, which include local 
schoolteachers, bureaucrats, and certain NGOs that are able to provide them certain 
assistance. 
6.4.2 The External Factors 
The consideration of the impact of external factors in relation to the level of 
political participation of the NRGMR, SCP A and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-
operative Ltd, will primarily focus on the roles of both the Thai government and of political 
activists and NGOs within Thailand. The NRGMR, as a potential pressure participant, is 
unable to perform such an effective political role as that, which is observed in the example 
of the Nokyo. As has been established in Chapter 4 and in Section 6.3, the Nokyo has long 
been an influential insider within the network of the policy-making process, and especially 
in relation to rice. With reference to this, the exchange of information between the Japanese 
government and the Nokyo within the rice policy community of Japan can be argued to be 
one of the main sources of information for the Nokyo in relation to the WTO. In addition to 
this, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of Japan, provides most of the 
information, which is relevant to farmers in relation to the WTO, in both Japanese and 
English on its official website www.maff.go.jp.This is a resource, which greatly benefits 
the Nokyo and its members. Consequently, the political strategies of the Nokyo respond 
very effectively to the potential threat of global pressures in relation to the decision-making 
process of the Japanese government. Moreover, in considering the high level of political 
influence of the Nokyo, which is detailed in Chapter 2, the effectiveness of its 
77 Interview with Mr Bancha Nakasakdisevi, manager at the office of the Thailand Sugarcane Planters 
Federation, Payatai Plaza Building, Bangkok, 11 May 2001 
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organisational structure should be emphasised, with academic consensus holding that the 
Nokyo is one of the most influential interest groups in Japan. 
Whilst the status of the SCP A as an influential interest group within Thailand can 
be related to its close links to government through the patronage system, this does not 
however, provide the group with full access to WTO related information, which is 
otherwise withheld from groups within civil society by the government. However, the 
nature of sugar policy in the United Kingdom can be a closed consultation between the 
government and the NFU, with for example, the review of the EU Sugar Sector. The NFU 
is well informed regarding the impact from the focus, which took place at the WTO Sugar 
Panel at the Doha Round, with the intention to improve access to the EU market for 
developing countries exports. Such information is published on the NFU website, and is 
fully available to its members. 78 
According to Mr Bancha N akasakdisevi, 'the government is not very supportive in 
tenns of releasing information about the WTO. We receive this information from the 
newspapers and the television news more than from the government, and so sugarcane 
fanners groups are unlikely to be aware of the impact of the WTO on the domestic 
sugarcane industry. ,79 With reference to the research, as previously outlined in Chapter 4, 
the political strategy of the SCP A corresponds highly with the particular state of the 
domestic political arena. Whilst farmers are aware that the price of sugarcane is affected by 
world prices, they are not normally aware that the commitment of the Thai government to 
the WTO has contributed towards limiting domestic support, and in addition, towards 
higher importation of sugarcane, as illustrated in table 6.1. Support to this argument was in 
evidence during the conducting of the research, as the protests of the SCP A and other 
sugarcane farmers groups were only related to price issues, and issues in relation to the 
WTO did not feature. 
78 National Farmers' Union (2004) 'DEFRA Consultation: Review of the EU Sugar Sector', at 
www.nfu.org.uklstellentdev/groups/pub lic/ documents/policypositions/reviewoftheeusuga _ ia415 045b2-1.hcsp 
Retrieved on 4 August 2004 
79 Interview with Mr Bancha Nakasakdisevi 
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The research has found that most information, which is distributed in relation to the 
WTO, is available to fanners with connections to political activists and NGOs. These 
groups include the Assembly of the Poor, the Sahaphan Kasettakorn Park Neu (Sor Kor 
Nor) or the Northern Farmers Association, and Inter Mountain Peoples Education and 
Culture in Thailand Association. It became apparent throughout the conduct of the research 
that political activists and NGOs are frequently opposed to the ideologies of free trade and 
globalisation. Consequently, most of the information, which is available to farmers, is less 
positive than if information available to farmers was provided by the WTO, who promotes 
the ideologies of free trade and globalisation. This effect was in evidence through the 
protest against the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at 
the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre, in Bangkok, in February 2000. Then in May 
2000, 38 groups of political activists and NGOs, including the Assembly of the Poor and 
the Isan Assembly of Small-Scale Farmers, mobilised and supported the protest at the ADB 
Annual Conference in the province of Chiang Mai. 80 
Whilst Thai political activists are not necessarily absolutely against free trade, they 
do commonly believe that free trade within the WTO context is only free for the few 
developed countries. Prayong81 argues that the agricultural trade liberalisation through the 
WTO, only benefits agribusiness, whilst small-scale farmers are excluded from these 
benefits. This position concurs with Ampon's analysis, which argues that the 40 per cent 
increase in rice exports, which resulted from the Uruguay Round did not benefit to small-
scale farmers, as the majority of the benefits were directed to the small group of rice 
exporters.82 In this regard, Ammar83 takes the third way position, arguing that although 
agricultural trade liberalisation would benefit Thailand as a whole, largely benefiting the 
large-scale fanners and agribusiness, with the increase in export volumes, small-scale 
farmers would also benefit. 
80 Anonymous handout, provided at the protest against the ADB in the province of Chiang Mai in May 2000 
~in Thai] 
I Interview with Mr Prayong Doklamyai 
82 Bangkok Post, 2 September, 2000 
83 Interview with Professor Ammar Siamwalla 
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Adul,84 the president of the Northern Farmers Association, argues that 'Thai rice 
will not gain from the liberalisation of the world rice market and Thailand will only lose its 
competitiveness within the world rice market. The importation of rice into Thailand will 
damage the interests of rice farmers. Also, Thailand will not gain from the liberalisation of 
the Japanese rice market.' Furthermore, Adul demands that the government withdraw the 
23 agricultural products on the WTO tariffication list, as detailed in table 6-1. However, in 
accordance with the evidence of figure 6-1, it is projected by the USDA that Thailand will 
continue to be the world's leading exporter of rice until 2007, and beyond. With reference 
to this projection, Thailand will not easily lose its competitiveness in relation to its major 
competitors, notably Vietnam and the United States, within the world market. The research 
of the TDRI, which was conducted by Mingsarn85, maintains that for as long as Thailand 
remains the world's leading exporter of rice, Thai rice will by definition be cheaper than 
imported rice, because otherwise Thailand would not be able to maintain its export 
capacity. As illustrated in figure 6-2, since the liberalisation of the Japanese rice market, 
between 1995 and 2001, Thailand had been the second largest exporter of rice through the 
minimum access quota, with an average share of 130,650 tonnes per year, or 23 per cent. 
When the interviews with the members of the SCPA were conducted in May 2001, 
they were unaware that NGOs such as the Thai Cane and Sugar Corp. Ltd were to 
participate at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, in Doha, Qatar 9 - 13 November 
2001.86 Moreover, they were unaware about the existence of any NGOs, which explains 
their complete reliance on the SCP A for assistance, as detailed in Chapter 4. Significantly, 
at the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in 2003, there were 10 Thai NGOs in 
attendance; with 4 of these NGOs involved specifically with matters relating to the 
sugarcane industry, namely the Sugar Industry Trade Association, the Thai Cane and 
Sugar Corp. Ltd, the Thai Sugar Manufacturing Association (TSMA), and the Thai Sugar 
Millers Corporation Ltd.87 Of these NGOs, none have direct connections with Thai 
84 Interview with Mr Adul Y ogkamju 
85 Mingsam Khaosa-ard (1994), p. iii . 
86 World Trade Organisation, at www.wto.org!englishlforums_e/ngo_e/doha_attend_e.doc RetrIeved on 3 
September 2004 
87 World Trade Organisation, at www.wto.orglenglishlforums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm Retrieved on 3 September 
2004 
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sugarcane farmers groups such as the SCP A. Accordingly, it can be argued that such NGOs 
represent the interests of agribusiness rather than the interests of sugarcane farmers. 
The Northern Farmers Association, the Assembly of the Poor, and in addition, other 
NGOs strongly support the campaign to withdraw the 23 agricultural products from the 
WTO tariffication list, by mobilising a farmers movement against both the government and 
the WTO.88 On 29 March 2001, a total of 200 farmers, NGO representatives, and students 
protested by dumping potatoes, garlic and onions in front of the lobby of the hotel where a 
WTO seminar was being held, in the province of Chiang Mai. Thailand had been the host 
for four days of meetings between 29 March - 1 April 2001, regarding the Agreement on 
Agriculture, which was attended by the senior officials responsible for agriculture, 
commerce and foreign affairs, of 19 WTO members from the east, south-east, and south of 
Asia. The protesters were arguing that the WTO had induced a fall in the prices of potatoes, 
garlic, soybeans and onions.89 
The nature of this protest against the WTO in relation to potato prices raises the 
question as to whether these protesters truly represented potato farmers. The research 
conducted interviews between 4-5 April 2001 with potato farmers in the district of Sansai, 
in the province of Chiang Mai, and no connection was found between the Chiang Mai 
Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd and the protesters. Moreover, they were unaware that this 
protest had actually taken place, just one week previously, and the Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd members themselves, have never protested in such a manner. 
Furthermore, the research established that the Northern Farmers Association, 
which was a main actor within the protest, was uninformed about the existence of the 
Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, despite the fact that they are the most 
prominent potato farmers group in Thailand.90 Similarly, the Chiang Mai Potato Growers 
Co-operative Ltd was uninformed about the existence of the Northern Farmers Association. 
Significantly, interviews and field research revealed that the Chiang Mai Potato Growers 
88 Interview with Mr Nitirat Sapsomboon and Mr Prayong Doklamyai 
89 Nantiya Tangwisutuit (2001) 'Protest at Chiang Mai WTO Forum', Bangkok Post, 30 March 2001, p.A6 
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Co-operative Ltd believed that if the import restrictions on potato seedlings were removed, 
then they would benefit from lower prices. Therefore, they believe that the removal of 
potato seedlings from the tariffication list would not benefit potato farmers, a position, 
which is diametrically opposed to the position of the Northern Farmers Association. It is 
clear that the protest lacked any overall mandate to represent either the Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd or potato farmers generally in Thailand. 
It can be argued here that the promotional role of political activists and NGOs, 
acting from an uninformed position without properly realised arguments or detailed and 
correct information, can adversely affect the interests of farmers. Frequently, the political 
role played by political activists and NGO members within the Thai political arena is 
utilised, in order to advantage the personal interests of individual political activists and 
NGO members, without regard to whether or not the interests of farmers would be 
furthered. The research has indicated that frequently, political activists and NGO members 
have been encountered placing personal interests above the public interest. With reference 
to this, it can be argued that the political influence of farmers has instead been suppressed 
by certain groups of political activists and NGOs, when it would normally be anticipated 
that these groups would instead be acting in such a way that would actually be helping 
farmers. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The integration of Thailand into the world economy has meant that it has become 
necessary for global institutions, notably the WTO, to assist in managing the negative 
affects of the consequent interdependence, with regard to economic and social development 
within Thailand. This has focused the concern of the research in relation to the impact of 
the WTO, with respect to farmers, because this institution has significantly influenced the 
policy-making process within Thailand. However, the NRGMR, SCP A, Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd, and farmers in general, remain largely uninformed about the 
90 Interview with Mr Adul Yogkamju 
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impact of the WTO, and this continues because of the continued existence of internal and 
external factors, which affect the function of these groups. 
The internal factors emerge from the ineffectiveness of the organisational structures 
of the NRGMR, SCP A, and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, which both 
combines derives from the farmers themselves, and finds its root cause in the low levels of 
education and political awareness of the farmers, which manifests within the farmers 
groups. These internal factors mean that such farmers groups are unable to access the 
required information in relation to the WTO, which would increase their potential to 
become involved actors. Of the three farmers groups, the SCP A, through its status as an 
influential farmers interest group, exhibits those factors, which imply the greatest potential 
with regard to utilising WTO related information. In terms of the NRGMR and the Chiang 
Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, through their statuses as potential pressure 
participants, they show greater potential to utilise WTO related information than less well 
organised farmers groups within Thailand. 
With reference to external factors, there is little evidence of collaboration between 
farmers groups and the Thai government in relation to the WTO, and there are no farmers 
groups as involved actors at this level of the policymaking process, which is in clear 
contrast to the examples of the NFU and the Nokyo. This situation within Thailand shows 
that there is a political opportunity for political activists and NGOs to play a significant 
role, in terms of mobilising a counterbalance to the influence of global organisations such 
as the WTO. In relation to Thailand, the most explicit examples have included the protests 
against the WTO in the province of Chiang Mai, in 2001, and in both cases, the 
participating farmers groups received information, with respect to the WTO, from political 
activists and NGOs. These farmers groups received a negative interpretation, in relation to 
the impact of the WTO, because these Thai political activists and NGOs are strongly 
against the ideology of globalisation. In general terms, the limited access to information, 
which farmers receive, with regard to the WTO, means that it is difficult for them to 
respond to the impact of globalisation, in a more effective manner. 
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As Thailand is a leading exporter, with reference to a number of agricultural 
products, in order to play an active role within the WTO, the Thai government has needed 
to act through both the Cairns Group and the ASEAN, because politically within the WTO, 
Thailand is generally not influential. The government's position, with respect to the WTO 
is formulated in terms of its own specific interests, and the Bureau of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations of the Department of Business Economics, within the Ministry of Commerce 
is the main actor in this regard. 
The influence of rice, sugarcane, and potato farmers groups on the government's 
position in relation to the multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO was not in evidence at 
the time of the research. Thai farmers groups are less equipped to resist the negative 
impacts of the WTO, than farmers groups in Japan and the West. Japanese rice farmers 
groups are well informed, with regard to the impact of rice market liberalisation, in relation 
to their interests. 
With regard to the case study of sugarcane farmers, the lack of political 
participation of farmers in general is not an adequate explanation for the lack of influence, 
which farmers have in relation to the government's relationship with the WTO. As has 
been established, sugarcane farmers groups have emerged to be influential within the Thai 
political arena, as they have established a stable policy community between themselves and 
the government. However, most representatives of the sugarcane farmers in this policy 
community are not small-scale sugarcane farmers, and nor are they sugarcane farmers at 
all. These representatives are normally phu mi itthiphon or jao pho, or those who have 
close connections with them, reducing the effectiveness of the policy community, and this 
is because they give priority to their personal interests above the interests of the sugarcane 
farmers. 
Through investigating the problems, which relate to the political participation of the 
NRGMR, SCP A, and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, their various 
connections and interrelations have been considered. Particularly revealing were the 
references made to the responses of the three Thai farmers groups to international 
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institutions, especially with regard to the WTO, and the comparison reveals that their 
experiences are in stark contrast to those of the NFU of the UK and the Nokyo of Japan. It 
has been established within this chapter, as evidenced through the experiences of the three 
Thai farmers groups that although the global impact on their lives can be significant, their 
responses have usually been inadequate, and moreover, differ greatly when compared to 
the responses of both the NFU and the Nokyo. The failure of their organisational structures 
to conceptualise the potential impact of institutions such as the WTO, has meant that their 
members remain generally unaware of the global impact. In order for farmers to meet the 
challenge of the global impact, the three farmers groups need to look to the examples of the 
NFU and the Nokyo, notably in terms of their organisational structures. 
It would be anticipated that through the successful application of certain aspects 
of the organisational structures of the NFU and the Nokyo, that the three farmers groups 
would take the opportunity to formulate political strategies, in order to protect their 
interests more effectively. With reference to this, it can be anticipated that through 
increasing political participation in relation to the global impact within the NRGMR, 
SCP A, Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, and Thai farmers more generally, 
that Thai farmers groups can begin to reach the status of professional interest groups. 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This study into the political participation of rice, sugarcane, and potato 
farmers groups in Thailand has revealed strong evidence to support the importance of 
selective incentives in solving the problem of mobilisation. This contribution towards 
the understanding of the group formation of Thai farmers, informs the suggestion that 
there is now the political opportunity for farmers groups to emerge as potential 
pressure participants within the Thai political arena. Upon successfully developing 
into an influential interest group, Thai farmers groups would then become more 
involved within the network of the policy-making process in relation to agricultural 
Issues. 
Accordingly, the new conceptual lens of policy network/community is 
introduced, in order to inform the study examining the exchange of information 
between Thai farmers and the government, through providing a useful analytical 
framework. This theoretical contribution to the study of the political participation of 
Thai farmers groups therefore, facilitates evaluations in relation to the level of 
political participation of Thai farmers. 
Through the utilisation of this framework, the thesis has established that Thai 
farmers are excluded from the network of the policy making process, because the 
policy community in Thailand remains closed to farmers, which is a consequence of 
the restrictions imposed by the patronage system. With reference to this, the policy 
network/community framework has been modified, in order to accommodate specific 
considerations in relation to the Thai political culture, and notably, of the patronage 
system, where the consideration at the micro level is all-important. This modification 
makes the framework more applicable to Thailand, whilst avoiding an over-stretching 
of the original concept, because a consideration of the informal relationships, which 
exist between actors, has already been included. 
The thesis has established that Thai farmers groups cannot normally intervene 
within the network of the policy-making process, in order to influence the 
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government's position, in relation to their specific interests. A qualification to this 
assertion has emerged through the research, with reference to the case studies of rice , 
sugarcane, and potato farmers groups. Rice and potato farmers groups represent the 
general case of political weakness of Thai farmers, but sugarcane farmers groups 
represent the exceptional case of an influential farmers group within the Thai political 
arena. In light of Western policy concepts, the rice and potato farmers groups are 
defined as 'potential pressure participants', and sugarcane farmers groups as 'interest 
groups'. 
The research regarding the political participation of Thai farmers groups, with 
reference to the case studies has examined the impacts of both domestic and global 
factors. It has been established that overall, the domestic impact is greater than the 
global impact, and consequently farmers are more informed and involved, with regard 
to the nature of domestic politics than the influence of global institutions. 
Accordingly, it is the domestic impacts on Thai farmers, which have acted as the main 
catalysts, in relation to the political participation of Thai farmers groups. 
With reference to the case studies, the different expenences of the rice, 
sugarcane and potato farmers groups in relation to government involvement exposes 
the disparate levels of government intervention experienced by the various farmers 
groups. This can largely be explained through the existence of the patronage system. 
With reference to the example of the case study of the SCP A, it has been established 
that sugarcane farmers have received more favourable treatment from the government 
than either rice or potato farmers groups. This outcome can be directly linked to the 
high level of involvement of the patronage system, with regard to the interactions 
between the government and sugarcane farmers groups. 
Nevertheless, in relation to potato farmers the research has revealed the 
significant degree of interaction, which exists between the Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd and the Frito-Lay (Thailand) Co., a Multinational 
Corporation (MNC). Accordingly, an area for further research is the globalisation of 
the potato farming industry, and furthermore, the role, which MNCs play in relation to 
the political participation of Thai potato farmers. 
The Thaksin government has introduced many policies, in order to promote 
the welfare of farmers and the rural population. These have included for example, the 
promotion of 'the war on dark influences' campaign in late May 2003, which is 
attempting to purge the Thai political arena of phu mi itthiphon and jao pho. A 
question for future research would be to consider if such policies improve the political 
participation of Thai farmers. 
It has been argued that the domestic impacts rather than the global impacts 
have more significantly influenced the political participation of Thai farmers. 
Specifically in relation to the existence of the patronage system and corruption within 
the Thai political arena, these have been major contributing factors in the formation of 
policy communities in the Thai political context. Moreover, these factors have 
reinforced a reality that farmers remain as potential policy participants outside of the 
network of the policy-making process. 
Significantly, the thesis has established that phu mi itthiphon and jao pho have 
acted as catalysts in the formation of numerous policy communities within the Thai 
political arena, as was highlighted in the case study of the SCP A. If these actors were 
absent, then the existing policy communities would become fragmented. In such a 
scenario, would the absence of these actors affect the potential for farmers to develop 
new policy communities? Although certain farmers groups would evolve their status 
from that of potential policy participants to that of influential interest groups, the 
nature of the Thai political arena would tend to continue to favour certain farmers 
groups in relation to the formation of policy communities. The nature of the Thai 
political culture does not easily accommodate a pluralistic approach to the formation 
of policy communities, and within the Thai political arena, the formation of policy 
communities tends to develop in line with the patronage network. The main 
explanation for this scenario is the existence of the patronage system within the Thai 
political arena. 
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7.1 Thai Farmers Groups Formations 
At their establishment, farmers groups formed because of the interdependence 
of localised labour forces, although there was a low level of tendency regarding the 
formation of influential interest groups. This pattern became established because of 
the hierarchical structure of Thai society, where the aspirations of farmers and 
accordingly of farmers groups, were restricted to a limited number of objectives. 
Therefore, because Thai farmers have perceived that the government is in a position 
of superiority over them, this perspective has inhibited them from challenging state 
power. Accordingly, the government has been in a position to exploit farmers and this 
has contributed towards the imbalance between the agricultural and industrial sectors, 
with regard to government policies, which seek to promote economic development. 
The continuing failure of the Thai government, with regard to the development 
of the agricultural sector, has acted as a catalyst in mobilising the group formation of 
farmers, as has been observed through the formation of the NRGMR and the Chiang 
Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd. Both of these farmers groups have perceived 
the merits of collective action, in order to both establish and further their self-reliant 
status. In this regard, to aspire towards this self-reliant status without attempting to 
seek political influence, is a collective incentive in relation to group formation. The 
effect is for these groups to achieve 'outsider status' and to qualify as 'potential policy 
participants', because the achievement of self-reliance has enabled them to become 
successfully established as farmers groups. In the future, this success may accord 
them the opportunity to participate more actively within the Thai political arena, as in 
Olsonian theory their political influence is a by-product of their non-political 
activities. 1 Further research into this area could consider case studies on rice and 
potato farmers groups, and as to whether their non-political activities acted as 
catalysts, in terms of their future political influence. 
In the case studies of the NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-
operative Ltd, the research has established that collective benefits alone cannot 
successfully mobilise farmers to both join and remain within farmers groups. In order 
to achieve this objective, selective incentives are required, in addition to collective 
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incentives. As detailed in Chapter 4, in terms of these two case studies, the 
determining selective incentives were the provision of low cost fertilisers and credit 
, 
which were needed because the government had failed to provide such support. 
Regarding sugarcane farmers groups, the research was conducted through the 
case study of the SCP A, which attested to the notion that political influence is a 
collective benefit for most sugarcane farmers groups. This is because these farmers 
groups assert the furthering of their negotiating powers. With this clear objective, they 
are the most politically active of farmers groups within the Thai political arena, and 
have emerged as successful interest groups in terms of the Western concept. However, 
this collective benefit alone cannot provide the complete explanation for the success 
of the SCP A, because in addition, this farmers group has offered a series of selective 
incentives to both its members and potential members, in order for them to remain 
within or to join the group. 
Selective incentives became more significant after the introduction of the 
70:30 revenue-sharing system in 1982, and in addition, with the introduction of the 
Sugarcane and Sugar Act B.E. 2527 (1984), in order for the government to more 
closely regulate the sugarcane industry. This government intervention significantly 
reduced conflicts in relation to sugarcane prices, between the sugarcane farmers and 
the sugarcane mills. Consequently, the importance of collective incentive, with regard 
to improving the negotiating powers of sugarcane farmers, became less effective at 
mobilising the membership of the SCP A. As detailed in Chapter 4, a series of 
selective incentives emerged, because of the government's failure to provide such 
support to the development of the agricultural sector, which was a similar experience 
to those of the NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd. 
Olsonian theory emphasises the importance of selective incentives over 
collective benefits, and corresponds with the case studies of rice, sugarcane and potato 
farmers groups. In this respect, the post-Olsonian arguments of Western academics, 
1 Olson, M. (1974, Fourth Edition) The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, p.137 
such as those of Marsh2 are challenged, which consider collective incentives to be 
more important than selective incentives, with regard to group formation and 
sustainability. Olsonian theory accommodates the universal economic truth that the 
rational individual will always choose selective incentives over collective incentives , 
as detailed in Chapter 2. However, the arguments of Marsh, which were also 
established in the context of the Western culture, only consider empirical evidence 
from the Western culture, and therefore, do not so easily accommodate a different 
political culture, such as that found in the Thai case. 
As established in Chapter 2, Olson's group theory argues that individuals are 
rational individuals who respond to the benefits of selective incentives, which are 
offered, in order to avoid the problems of the 'free-rider' experienced with collective 
incentives. With reference to the case studies, it was evidenced that although the 
problem of the 'free-rider' cannot be disregarded, the primary motivation for groups 
to provide selective incentives, in addition to collective incentives, is the knowledge 
that benefits such as access to finance, fertilisers, health care and other forms of 
selective incentives can effectively mobilise individuals to join the group. In 
considering the progress of group formation in Thailand, the benefit in utilising 
selective incentives such as these is clear, where there is often inadequate government 
provision for such services, which are not normally available to the general 
population. This is especially relevant when considering the poor, rural farmers and 
their families, as was highlighted in Chapter 4. 
In terms of the NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative 
Ltd, these farmers groups illustrate the example of farmers group formation, which 
whilst effective with respect to their primary objective of achieving self-reliance, have 
limited their status to that of potential pressure participant. They are politically 
inactive and uninformed, with regard to the possibility of advancing their status to that 
of influential interest group. Furthermore, as the research established in Chapter 4, the 
relatively unassertive political strategy, which has been more lately employed by the 
NRGMR, was informed by the failure of the strategy of political assertiveness 
previously employed by the core members of the NRGMR, before the NRGMR's 
2 Marsh, D. (1976) 'On Joining Interest Groups: An Empirical Consideration of the Work of Mancur 
actual inception. Utilising the insider-outsider typology, the NRGMR is an outsider 
group by necessity, whilst aspiring to achieve insider group status. However, because 
these farmers are not politically sophisticated and lack personal connections with 
government, they are unable to achieve this. 
There are a number of factors in Thailand that limit the extent to which groups 
are likely to develop politically assertive actions. These factors, when related to the 
case studies of the NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, 
help to further explain why both groups have chosen to adopt relatively unassertive 
political strategies. The importance of political culture and traditions within Thailand 
must be considered in relation to the shaping of political actions. As outlined in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the main factors, which need consideration in this regard, 
are the notions of reciprocal relationships, social hierarchy and in addition, the 
concept of bunkhun, and Thai people's adherence to Buddhism. 
These factors may indicate that farmers would resist the opportunity to act 
assertively in relation to the various elements, which impact upon them. Nevertheless, 
there has been observed within the Thai political arena, an increase in assertive 
actions, as farmers have learnt to escape both the social and cultural conditioning, 
which have always existed within Thai society. This transition can be explained 
through the emergence of a number of important factors. Significantly, the expansion 
of the Western democratic model into Thailand has produced a paradigm shift in 
terms of how informed the population has now become. This is especially relevant 
when considering the notion of human rights, a concept, which had traditionally been 
under-emphasised within Thai society. Furthermore, the opportunity, which this now 
offers many Thai farmers and the population in general has been reinforced through 
the extensive improvements to the transport system, improving the link between the 
rural and urban populations, both in terms of the physical link, and in addition, the 
cultural link which now exists, with a network of information from the urban centres 
informing the rural regions. 
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Importantly, the physical link, in terms of the improvement to the transport 
system, has enabled a once isolated rural population to access the centre of 
government in Bangkok, in order to protest, a phenomenon, which had very little real 
possibility before these improvements were made. The cultural link in its element 
includes the influence of an informed urban middle class, involving groups, which are 
attempting to expand the Western democratic model throughout Thailand. As 
evidenced in Chapter 3, actors within the urban middle class, including academics and 
political activists within NGOs have shown this commitment to the rural population, 
with reference to the example of their support both in terms of finance and 
information, which has been provided to the Assembly of the Poor. 
However, when considering the example of the SCP A and the political 
assertiveness observed in relation to its political strategies, these positive 
contributions are less relevant. Phu mi itthiphon and jao pho are by definition, 
involved in the patronage system, where personal advantage is the primary objective 
through assertive actions. The research has established that the actions of the SCP A 
are largely driven by the involvement of phu mi itthiphon and jao pho, who through 
the patronage system have appropriated the SCP A, in order to satisfy their personal 
motivations. 
7.2 Nature of Bureaucratic Polity and the Involvement of Businessmen 
As a consequence of the linkages of the sakdina system, the highly 
hierarchical characteristic of Thai society, and in addition, the concentration of 
political power, elite bureaucrats and politicians have been able to both reinforce and 
misappropriate their political positions. Following Rigg, the highly concentrated 
political power amongst elite bureaucrats and politicians was described as the 
'bureaucratic polity', until the late 1970s. Bureaucratic polity has been a major 
contributing factor, with reference to both the high levels of corruption and the 
patronage system within the Thai political arena, because most extra-bureaucratic 
groups were excluded. 
In order to exploit the operation of government projects and policies to work 
In their favour, businessmen have established reciprocal relationships with elite 
bureaucrats and politicians through the establishment of policy communities. 
Accordingly, both corruption and the patronage system are the main contributing 
factors when considering the formation of the multiple policy communities, which 
exist between elite bureaucrats, politicians, and businessmen. 
With the increasing involvement of businessmen within the Thai political 
arena, from the late 1970s onwards, academics within Thai studies have argued that 
the bureaucratic polity has declined, and that the Thai political arena has become 
more pluralistic. This is because many businessmen, through becoming politicians, 
have been able to directly participate within the Thai political arena. In relation to the 
accession of businessmen to becoming more directly involved within the Thai 
political arena as MPs and cabinet ministers, the argument in terms of the decline of 
the bureaucratic polity appears to be convincing. However, when such businessmen 
abuse their political positions, it remains the state power, which is being 
misappropriated. Although theoretically, their primary identity as businessmen has 
changed to be that of politicians, in truth their real identities have not changed, as 
their business interests remain their primary concern. Whilst this has clearly 
strengthened the policy community between the government and businessmen, this 
has nevertheless confirmed the outsider status of farmers, in relation to the network of 
the policy-making process. Furthermore, the nature of the bureaucratic polity within 
Thailand has revealed that policy communities are established through the direct 
connections between the macro level of the government and the micro level of 
powerful individuals and interests groups, through the patronage system. 
Accordingly, studies in relation to the Thai political arena, which consider the 
policy network/community framework, should not only limit their considerations to 
the meso level. Furthermore, although it has been observed within the Western society 
that the patronage system is not a crucial element within political arenas, the main 
concern of the policy network/community framework is the consideration of closed 
and stable relationships between actors. Therefore, a greater degree of attention 
should be placed in relation to the direct connections, which exist between the macro 
level and the micro level, in order to develop the framework so as to be more 
applicable to the dynamic nature of political science. 
7.3 Domestic Impacts on the Political Participation of Thai Farmers 
The destruction of the FFT by the government can be perceived to have been 
an indirect consequence of the absence of connections between the FFT and the 
military government and elite bureaucrats of the late 1970s. During the same period, 
the SCP A, which was not destroyed, was mobilising assertive outsider strategies in 
terms of its political participation. As outlined in Chapter 4, the strong relationship, 
which existed between the government and the SCP A had been established at the 
inception of the SCP A, and for this reason, the political participation of this interest 
group was not disrupted by the government, unlike the case of the FFT. Notably, in 
1978 the SCPA protested four times, including for instance May 1978, when 5,000 
members protested in the province of Kanchanaburi, in order to influence the 
government to intervene in relation to the price of sugarcane. 3 
Praphat4 notes that academics have perceived the high level of geographical 
concentration in terms of sugarcane production, and the high level of government 
intervention within the sugarcane industry to be the main contributing factors in 
explaining the political influence of sugarcane farmers groups. However, if both 
geographical concentration and government intervention were the main contributing 
factors, then this would have enabled both the NRGMR and the Chiang Mai Potato 
Growers Co-operative Ltd like the SCP A, to emerge as influential farmers' interest 
groups within the Thai political arena. Accordingly, the research has established that 
the political motivations of the SCP A, allied to the patronage system and the roles of 
phu mi itthiphon andjao pho are actually the most important contributing factors, in 
relation to the success of the SCPA as an influential farmers' interest group. These are 
the main contributing factors, which have enabled the SCP A to establish a closed and 
stable policy community with the government. 
Subsequent to the launch of the Thaksin government campaign, 'the war on 
dark influences', on 4 July 2003 police searched properties owned by Pracha 
Pothipipit or kamnan Sia, the president of the SCP A, who had been classified by the 
3 Praphat Pintobtaeng (1998), p.25 
4 Ibid. 
government as jao pho. 5 With the involvement of phu mi itthiphon and jao pho within 
sugarcane farmers groups such as the SCP A, sugarcane farmers have been able to 
both establish and maintain closed and stable policy communities with the 
government. However, the question arises as to whether sugarcane farmers would be 
able to maintain their political influence with the removal of phu mi itthiphon and jao 
pho from the Thai political arena. This government campaign has the potential to 
result in the decline of the political influence of the SCP A, which has been enhanced 
through the involvement of phu mi itthiphon and jao pho. If the operation of the 
patronage system and vote-buying is challenged, then the policy community between 
the sugarcane farmers groups and the government will also be adversely affected. The 
nature of the policy community, which exists in Thailand, will be changed forever 
with the successful implementation of the Thaksin government's policy, as this policy 
community was established through the contribution of personal connections within 
the patronage system. 
The suggestion might be that in consideration of the nature of the Thai 
political arena, this transition would not be realised for many years. Amongst both 
academics and Thai people, there is much suspicion about the actual intention of this 
policy and as to whether this is a cynical attempt by Thaksin and the TR T party to 
dominate the Thai political arena. The first attack in line with this policy was on 
kamnan Sia and other members of the Democrat Party, although clear connections 
between the TRT party and phu mi itthiphon and jao pho are also visible. 
Furthermore, Thaksin has stated his intention to work towards the creation of a Thai 
political arena with a limited number of larger political parties, inspired by the 
systems, which operate within the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Some decline in the operation of the patronage system and vote-buying might 
lead to the promotion of both the political participation and political awareness of 
Thai farmers, which would strengthen their political influence within the Thai 
political arena. Therefore, the future development of interest groups and policy 
communities in the Thai political context would tend to adopt more of the patterns, 
which exist in relation to the contemporary Western political framework. 
5 Bangkok Post (Internet Edition), 5 July 2003, at www.bangkokpost.netlNets/05JuI2003_news09.html 
Rice and potato farmers groups have established themselves without the 
benefits of the patronage system, through utilising the success of their self-reliance. 
However, will they be capable of evolving their status as potential pressure 
participants to that of influential interest groups? If such groups as the NRGMR and 
the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd can evolve their statuses through 
this process, then they will be setting an example for the evolution of this process 
within Thailand. Accordingly, the understanding of the process of group formation 
and of the relationships of these groups with the government will be the primary point 
of reference, which can be objectively compared to and linked with the Western 
political framework established by Jordan and Halpin, classifying groups into either 
'potential pressure participant' or 'interest group'. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, with regard to the Western political context of 
establishing policy communities in specific policy areas, governments and involved 
actors establish their interactions through reciprocal relationships, which are based on 
the requirement for data needed by both parties. As has been illustrated through the 
case studies, the patronage system plays a significant role in relation to this matter. 
Accordingly, the removal of the personal interactions, which operate within the 
patronage system, would create the potential for the development of more formal 
procedures between government and involved actors within specific policy areas. The 
expected consequence of such a paradigm shift would be to change the nature of the 
policy community towards the direction of the Western policy community framework. 
However, a successful transition would require the established interest groups to 
successfully occupy the void, which would be left by the departure of the patronage 
system from the landscape of the Thai political arena. Moreover, such a change would 
require that the established interest groups did not develop the same problems that 
were for instance, previously experienced within the SCP A, in order to achieve this 
successful transition. 
There is an implication that Thailand should move towards the Western policy 
community framework. However, is this the right path when considering the nature of 
group formation and political participation in relation to Thai farmers? As observed 
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within the Western society, a democratic political arena operating without the 
existence of a patronage system has offered a greater opportunity for individuals to 
participate within the political arena more actively. When considering the 
opportunities, which could potentially be offered to Thai farmers under a reformed 
Thai political arena, this would indicate an improvement to their political 
opportunities and status. Accordingly, the improved status achieved by various actors 
within the Thai political arena would provide a catalyst to the democratisation of 
Thailand. 
7.4 Political Participation of Thai Farmers and the Resistance Movement in 
Relation to Globalisation 
The relationships between the Thai government and the WTO, the ADB, and 
other international institutions including the World Bank and the IMF, are not 
normally acknowledged by Thai farmers. This is primarily because Thai farmers do 
not normally engage in direct relationships with these international institutions. 
Furthermore, the involvement of these institutions normally manifests through the 
bureaucratic processes of the Thai government. As a result, the channels of access to 
information, in relation to the impacts of the WTO on their livelihoods, are very 
limited. As Thai farmers do not directly interact with the WTO, and in addition, as 
farmers remain outside the network of the policy-making process, this compounds the 
problems inherent when responding to the impacts of such institutions. In relation to 
other countries, this contrasts with the experiences of farmers groups in Japan and the 
United Kingdom, as outlined in Chapter 2. 
In the research, the low levels of education achieved by Thai farmers emerged 
as a main obstacle, with regard to their political participation. Other obstacles 
included a lack of access to information, and finance. There were two main 
consequences in relation to the obstacle of educational opportunity. Significantly, the 
ability of farmers to mobilise their political participation has been reduced, largely 
because it has been generally beyond the ability of farmers to be able to organise 
effective actions. Jordan and Maloney emphasise the importance of education as 
'probably the most important individual resource of those who tend to participate in 
political activities. ,6 Furthennore, the government's perception of an undereducated 
rural population has contributed towards a culture where the government tends not to 
seriously consider the merits of the arguments, which are made by fanners groups 
attempting to become more involved within the network of the policy-making 
process. It was established in Chapter 4 and again in Chapter 5 that educational 
attainment is a main criterion, which the government considers, in order to select 
extra-bureaucratic groups to participate within the network of the policy-making 
process. This consideration continues to prevent fanners from receiving important 
information about the WTO. 
With regard to the infonnation, which is obtained by farmers and farmers 
groups about the impacts of the WTO, and other international institutions, it is 
political activists, NOOs, local schoolteachers and the media that provide most of the 
information in this respect. Accordingly, political activists and NOOs have assumed 
the position of intennediary, in tenns of providing a link between farmers and farmers 
groups, and these international institutions. 
As outlined in Chapter 6, the infonnation fanners have received from Thai 
political activists and Thai NOOs concerning international institutions, has frequently 
overemphasised their negative impacts, in order to mobilise the resistance of farmers 
and the rural population, in relation to the threat of globalisation. Political activists 
and NOOs have seized the opportunity to fill the void, which has been left by 
government failure to sufficiently consider the position of the rural population and 
their frustrations. These groups have acknowledged the frustrations of these people 
and have attempted to utilise this problem, in order to further their own agenda, which 
is one of anti globalisation. They are usually opposed to the ideology of globalisation, 
as evidenced by their mobilisation of the fanners' protests against both the WTO and 
the ADB, in 2002. The success of political activists and NOOs as promotional groups, 
is partially a result of the hierarchical structure within Thai society, in that the rural 
popUlation tends to respect the more highly educated. 
6 Jordan, G. and Maloney, W.A. (1997) The Protest Business? Mobilizing campaign Groups, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, p.lll 
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The reliance on information, which is provided by political activists and 
NOOs, with reference to impact of these international institutions, has not always 
benefited farmers. This is detailed in Chapter 6, and was evidenced by the demands of 
political activists and the NGOs that the government should withdraw 23 agricultural 
products on the WTO tariffication list. As it was illustrated, Thailand does not benefit 
in relation to every product through this WTO commitment. However, the arguments, 
which were made by the political activists and NGOs has revealed that their 
promotional role of political action is frequently uninformed. This was made clear 
through their argument, which predicted a decline in competitiveness of domestically 
produced rice with the opening up of the Thai rice market to imported rice. This was 
further evidenced, in the opinion of political activists and NGOs that Thai rice exports 
would be unable to access the Japanese rice market through the process of 
liberalisation, which is taking place through the GATT/WTO commitments. 
The decline in competitiveness of Thai agricultural production was primarily 
caused by two main factors. Significantly, the policy of industrialisation was 
restricting the availability of resources in relation to the agricultural sector, and 
consequently productivity was falling behind Thailand's competitors, in terms of 
agricultural production. A further effect of the policy of industrialisation was to 
increase the cost of labour within the agricultural sector, largely through the transfer 
of labour from the agricultural sector and into the industrial sector. 
Although the Thai government has introduced agricultural developmental 
programmes, In order to restore Thailand's competitiveness through increasing 
productivity, as illustrated in Chapter 5, most programmes were relatively 
unsuccessful. This was primarily because of inadequate research into improving 
productivity, and in addition, because of the ever-present adverse effects of both the 
patronage system and corruption. 
The combination of the existing political weakness of farmers, and in addition, 
the failure of the Thai government to implement policies, which can improve their 
economic position, has meant that some farmers have come to rely on the 
involvement of MNCs, in order to support them in their agricultural production. This 
was evidenced in relation to potato production. However, their political weakness 
continues to mean that it is not possible for them to challenge their treatment by the 
MNCs, which because of their clear dependency on the MNCs is often unfavourable. 
Accordingly, it is not only international institutions such as the WTO, which has 
adversely impacted on the political participation of Thai farmers. 
As Thailand is now integrating into the world economic system and is now 
relying on expanding world markets, it cannot withdraw its involvement, in respect of 
international institutions such as the WTO. If Thailand withdrew its membership of 
the WTO as has been argued by certain political activists and NGOs, then the political 
pressure exerted by its trading partners would soon force the Thai government to 
reconsider its course of action. Accordingly, the position held by such political 
activists and anti-globalisation NGOs is unrealistic. Neither the withdrawal of 
agricultural products, nor the withdrawal of Thailand from the WTO would benefit 
Thai farmers. 
In order to promote the interests of Thai farmers, and in addition, to protect 
them from the negative impacts of the WTO, the political participation of Thai 
farmers groups needs to be improved at the local and national levels. Their lack of 
political participation continues to be a significant obstacle to accessing important 
information, which would inform their decision making, in relation to factors, which 
affect their livelihoods. In order to promote the welfare of farmers, the government 
should provide more opportunities for farmers to access information in relation to the 
WTO. To achieve this target, the educational level of farmers needs to be improved, 
because this will help farmers to better understand this information. After the Thaksin 
government took office in 2001, the process of reforming the Thai educational system 
was further promoted. If successful, these reforms would contribute towards 
improving the political awareness of Thai farmers, which would help them to access 
more information in relation to the WTO. Further research into this area could 
consider how these educational reforms are improving the political participation of 
Thai people and Thai farmers specifically. 
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6. Mr Vithet Yamprayoon, factory manager of Rajburi Sugar Co., Ltd, prOVInce of 
Ratchaburi, 10 May 2001 
7. Mr Sumeth Leelasuwannaket, a quota man, province ofNakhon Pathom, 8 May 2001 
8. Mr Sa-ngiam Pookpusa, a quota man, province ofRatchaburi, 7 May 2001 
9. Mr Lek, a quota man, province of Ratchaburi, 8 May 2001 
10. Mrs Yupin Meetrong, a quota man, province ofRatchaburi, 7 May 2001 
Potato Farmers 
1. Mr Wanchai Lai, member of the committee of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-
operative Ltd, district of Sansai, province of Chiang Mai, 4 April 2001 
2. Mr Pramual Jai-ngem, member of the committee of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-
operative Ltd, district of Sansai, province of Chiang Mai, 4 April 200 I 
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3. Mr In-om Pothacharoen, member of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, 
district of Sansai, province of Chiang Mai, 4 April 2001 
4. Mr Vicham Kumtheu, Chairman of the Klum kasetakorn tumna Maefag (Rice Farmers' 
Group in the sub-district of Mae fag), and member of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-
operative Ltd, district of Sansai, province of Chiang Mai, 5 April 2001 
5. Mr Sawasdi Boonterm, member of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, 
district of Sansai, province of Chiang Mai, 5 April 2001 
6. Mr Prabhand Boontorm, member of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, 
district of Sansai, province of Chiang Mai, 5 April 2001 
7. Mr Plean Chuansuk, member of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, 
district of Sansai, province of Chiang Mai, 5 April 2001 
8. Mr Sunan Momlert, member of the Chiang Mai Potato Growers Co-operative Ltd, district 
of Sansai, province of Chiang Mai, 5 April 2001 
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Interview Questions 
1. How long have you engaged in agriculture? 
2. Have you received any government assistance in your production? 
3. Where did you get your farming knowledge from? 
4. Do you think if education is important in improving your production? 
5. When you have a problem with your production, who is the first person that you think of? 
6. How informed do you feel about the agricultural policies of the government? 
7. What do you think about the political participation of Thai farmers in general? 
8. Have you ever participated in political protests in order to appeal for government 
assistance? 
9. Were you happy with the result(s) of the protest(s) that you participated in? 
10. Why did you participate in the protest(s)? 
11. Did you have any other alternatives to solving your problems instead of protesting? 
12. Do you think that being a member of a farmers group can enhance your bargaining 
power? 
13. Overall, what are the benefits of being a member of a farmers group? 
14. Are you aware of the problem of vote-buying in your area? 
15. Are you aware of the nature of the patronage system in Thai politics? 
16. What are the main obstacles for farmers groups in establishing political access to achieve 
favourable policies from the government? 
17. Do you know about the WTO? 
18. Do you understand about the impact of the WTO on the agricultural policy-making 
process of Thailand? 
19. Do you know about any NOOs or local activists? 
20. Have you ever received any help from NOOs or local activists? 
21. Do you think that it is necessary to either establish and/or maintain connections with 
NOOs or local activists? 
22. Do you think that Thai farmers groups are able to improve their political influence? 
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